

A HISTORY OF GREECE.

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Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

THE
PART
OF
THE
TIME OF
VOL. II.



H. De laune, del.

*Then turning into tears, as he places the
ace, garland on his dead son.*

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TABLE,
ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL,
TO THE THIRD VOLUME OF
THE HISTORY OF GREECE.
Athens

CHAPTER XVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATHENIAN MARITIME ASCENDANCY TO THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.

B. C.		Page
	Beginning of Cimon's public Life	2
476.	Conquest of Eion	3
476.	Of Scyros	4
466.	Revolt of Naxos	5
466.	Battles of the Eurymedon	6
464.	Earthquake at Sparta	7
464.	Beginning of the third Messenian War	8
	Education of Pericles	10
	His first public Appearance	11
	His political Views	13
	Cimon's Munificence	15
	Popular Measures of Pericles	16
	Ephialtes	17
	Impeachment of Cimon	18
	Attempt to depress the Areopagus	19
461.	The Athenians at Ithome	20
	Alliance between Athens and Argos	21
	The Eurymedon of Eschylus	22
	Change in the Jurisdiction of the Areopagus	24
460.	Athenian Expedition to Egypt	25
457.	Great Efforts of the Athenians	26
457.	Myronides	27

vi ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

	Page
467. Spartan Expedition to Doris	28
457. Battle of Tanagra	29
456. Battle of Ctenophyta	30
455. Expedition of Tolmides	31
455. End of the third Messenian War	32
455. Disasters of the Athenians in Egypt	33
453? Cimon's Recall	35
Assassination of Ephialtes	36
449. Death of Cimon; his Peace	37
Project of a Congress at Athens	38
448. Spartan Expedition to Delphi	39
447. Battle of Coronea	41
445. Invasion of Attica	42
445. Thirty Years' Truce	45

CHAP. XVIII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE TO THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND CORINTH, WITH A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF PERICLES.

	Policy of Pericles described	46
	Increase of Tribute	47
	Authority of Athens over her Allies	48
	Origin of the Samian War	49
	Revolt of Samos	50
	Application of the Samians at Sparta	51
440.	Siege of Samos	52
	Reduction of Samos	54
	Position of Athens toward her Allies	55
	Athenian Colonies	56
	In Eubœa, Naxos, Andros, Thrace	57
437.	Amphipolis	58
443.	Therai	59
	Scrutiny at Athens	61
	Public Buildings at Athens	63
	Athenian Artists	64
	Expenditure for public Amusements	66
	For the Tribunals and the Assembly	67
	Magnificence of the Age of Pericles	69
	Literature of the Age	71
	The Drama	72
	Æschylus	76
	Sophocles	77
	Influence of Tragedy	78
	Comedy	79

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. vii

B. C.		Page
	Freedom of the Attic Stage	- 81
	Influence of Comedy	- 83
	Attacks on Pericles	- 84
	Pnidias	- 86
	Aspasia	- 89
	Anaxagoras	- 90

CHAP. XIX.

CAUSES AND OCCASIONS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

	Affairs of Epidamnus	- 93
435.	War between Corinth and Corcyra	- 95
	Envoys of Corinth and Corcyra at Athens	- 96
	The Athenians send Succours to Corcyra	- 98
432.	Sea-fight between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans	- 99
432.	Revolt of Potidea	- 102
	Battle of Potidea	- 103
	Congress at Sparta	- 105
	Advice of Archidamus	- 107
	Sthenelaidas	- 108
	Decision of Sparta	- 109
	Second Congress of Sparta	- 110
	Embassies from Sparta to Athens	- 111
	Pericles animates the Athenians to War	- 112
431	Attempt of the Thebans on Plataea	- 114
	Repulse of the Thebans	- 116
	The Peloponnesians march upon Attica	- 117
	Strength of the Spartan Confederacy	- 119
	Resources of Athens	- 121
	Preparations of the Athenians	- 122
	Prophecies and Forebodings	- 123

CHAP. XX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR.

431.	The Peloponnesians enter Attica	- 125
	Firmness of Pericles	- 126
	Exploit of Brasidas	- 127
	The Athenians sail round Peloponnesus	- 128
	Revenge of the Athenians on Egina and Megara	- 129
	Provident Measures of Pericles	- 130
	Funeral Ceremonies	- 131
	Funeral Oration of Pericles	- 132

viii ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B. C.		Page
430.	Second Invasion of Attica	- 133
	Plague at Athens	- 135
	Its Causes, Symptoms	- 136
	And moral Effects	- 138
	Expedition of Pericles against Peloponnesus	- 139
	Murmurs against Pericles	- 140
	His Defence of his Policy	- 141
	Surrender of Potidæa	- 142
429.	Invasion of Platæa	- 143
	Negotiations between the Platæans and Archidamus	- 144
	Siege of Platæa	- 145
	Blockade of Platæa	- 147
	Affairs of Acarnania	- 147
	The Ambracians invade Acarnania	- 150
	Are repulsed before Stratus	- 151
	Victory of Phormio in the Corinthian Gulf	- 152
	Preparations for another Sea-fight	- 155
	Second Victory of Phormio	- 157
	Attempt to surprise Piræus	- 158
	Operations of the Athenians in Chalcidice	- 159
	The Odrysian Monarchy	- 160
	Alliance of Sitalces with Athens	- 161
	Spartan Embassy to Persia	- 162
	Expedition of Sitalces	- 164
	Condition of Macedonia	- 165
	Retreat of Sitalces	- 166
	Death of Pericles	- 167

CHAP. XXI.

FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

428.	Third Invasion of Attica	- 169
	Affairs of Mitylene	- 170
	Preparations for Revolt	- 171
	Siege of Mitylene	- 173
	Mitylene admitted into the Spartan Alliance	- 174
	Efforts of the Athenians	- 176
	Attempt of the Platæans	- 179
427.	Fourth Invasion of Attica	- 180
	Surrender of Mitylene	- 182
	Operations of Alcidas	- 183
	Treacherous Conduct of Paches at Notium	- 184
	Debate at Athens on the Treatment of the Mitylenæans	- 185
	Character of Cloon	- 186
	Debate on the Decree against the Mitylenæans	- 189
	The Decree is repealed	- 191
	Fate of Paches	- 192

R. C.		Page
	Surrender of Platæa	- 193
	Punishment of the Platæans	- 195
	State of Parties at Corcyra	- 197
	Troubles at Corcyra	- 199
	Massacre at Corcyra	- 201
	Spirit of the Greek Factions	- 203

CHAP. XXII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH YEAR OF THE PELOPON-
NESIAN WAR TO THE GENERAL PACIFICATION OF SICILY.

	Cessation and Consequences of the Plague at Athens	- 205
426.	Expedition of Nicias against Melos	- 206
	Spartan Colony at Heraclea	- 207
	Expedition of Demosthenes against Ætolia	- 208
	Its disastrous Issue	- 210
	The Ætolians attack Naupactus	- 211
	The Ambracians invade Amphilochia	- 212
	Battle of Olpæ	- 213
	Slaughter of the Ambracians at Idomene	- 215
	Moderation and Prudence of the Acarnanians	- 216
	Purification of Delos	- 217
	The Athenians form Designs on Sicily	- 218
	Reign of Gelo at Syracuse	- 219
478.	Hiero and Polyzelus succeed him	- 220
	Reign of Hiero	- 221
467.	He is succeeded by Thrasybulus	- 223
466.	End of Gelo's Dynasty	- 224
	War between the Syracusans and the Mercenaries	- 225
452.	Troubles at Syracuse	- 227
	Enterprises of Ducetius	- 229
	Ancendancy of Syracuse established	- 231
428.	Embassy of Gorgias	- 232
	The Athenians send Succours to the Leontines	- 233
425.	Fifth Invasion of Attica	- 235
	Expedition of Eurymedon and Sophocles	- 236
	Fortification of Pylus	- 237
	Brasidas at Pylus	- 239
	The Spartans shut up in Sphacteria	- 240
	They make Proposals for Peace	- 241
	The Proposals are rejected and they deprived of their Navy	- 243
	Perplexing Position of the Athenians at Pylus	- 244
	Cleon undertakes to reduce Sphacteria	- 245
	Preparations of Demosthenes	- 247
	Attack on the Spartans	- 249
	Their Surrender	- 250
	Expedition of Nicias to the Isthmus	- 252

X ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B. C.		Page
	Butchery at Coreyra - - - - -	255
	Accession of Darius Nothus - - - - -	256
	Athenian Embassy to Persia - - - - -	257
424.	Expedition of Nicias to Cythera - - - - -	258
	Distress of Sparta - - - - -	259
	Capture of Thyrea - - - - -	260
	Operations of the Athenians in Sicily - - - - -	261
	Arguments of Hermocrates for Peace - - - - -	262
	General Pacification of Sicily - - - - -	263

CHAP. XXIII.

FROM THE GENERAL PACIFICATION OF SICILY TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS.

	Brasidas prepares for an Expedition to Thrace - - - - -	266
	The Athenians make an attempt upon Megara - - - - -	267
	Surrender of Nisæa - - - - -	269
	Revolution at Megara - - - - -	271
	March of Brasidas through Thessaly - - - - -	272
	His quarrel with Perdicas - - - - -	273
	He persuades the Acanthians to revolt - - - - -	276
	Project for a Revolution in Bœotia - - - - -	277
	Occupation of Delium - - - - -	278
	Battle of Delium - - - - -	281
	Dispute about the Slain - - - - -	282
	Siege of Delium - - - - -	283
	Demosthenes at Siccyon - - - - -	284
	Brasidas marches against Amphipolis - - - - -	285
	Surrender of Amphipolis - - - - -	287
	Exile of Thucydides - - - - -	288
	Conquests of Brasidas - - - - -	289
	Surprise of Torone - - - - -	290
	Capture of Leeythus - - - - -	291
423.	Year's Truce between Sparta and Athens - - - - -	292
	Revolt of Scione - - - - -	293
	Revolt of Mende - - - - -	295
	Expedition against Lyncestis - - - - -	296
	Retreat of Brasidas - - - - -	297
	Nicias recovers Mende - - - - -	298
	Treats with Perdicas - - - - -	299
422.	Expedition of Cleon - - - - -	300
	He recovers Torone - - - - -	301
	Marches toward Amphipolis - - - - -	302
	Battle of Amphipolis - - - - -	303
	Death of Brasidas and Cleon - - - - -	304
	Negotiations for Peace - - - - -	305
	Pleistoanax and Nicias - - - - -	306

ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. xi

B. C.		Page
421.	Treaty of Peace	307
	• Alliance between Sparta and Athens	309
	Release of the Prisoners taken in Sphacteria	310

CHAP. XXIV.

FROM THE PEACE OF Nicias TO THE CONQUEST OF MELOS.

	Obstacles to the Execution of the Treaties	311
	Internal Condition of Argos	312
	Corinth discontented with the Treaty	313
	State of Mantinea	314
	Elis seeks the Alliance of Argos	315
	Policy of Boeotia and Megara	316
	Intrigues of the Corinthians	317
	Surrender and cruel Punishment of Scione	318
	Restoration of the Delians	319
	Change of Administration at Sparta	320
	Intrigues of the new Ephors	321
420.	Negotiations between Sparta and Boeotia	322
	Between Argos and Sparta	323
	Alcibiades	324
	His Character and Education	325
	Intercourse with the Sophists	326
	With Socrates	327
	His Indiscretion	329
	His Profusion	330
	His early Popularity	331
	His Petulance	332
	His Appearance in public Life	333
	His Rivals	334
	His Animosity toward Sparta	335
	Spartan Embassy at Athens	336
	Tricked by Alcibiades	337
	Treaty between Athens and Argos	338
	Proceedings of Elis against Sparta	339
419.	Boeotian Interference at Heraclea	340
	Operations of Alcibiades in Peloponnesus	341
	The Argives invade Epidaurus	342
418.	The Spartans invade Argolis	344
	Truce between Sparta and Argos	345
	Attack on Orchomenus	346
	Agis before Mantinea	348
	Battle of Mantinea	349
	Blockade of Epidaurus	351
	Peace between Sparta and Argos	352
	Alliance between Sparta and Argos	353
417.	Revolution at Argos	354

xii ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B. C.		Page
	Counter-resolution at Argos	- 355
416.	Expedition to Melos	- 357
	Conference at Melos	- 358
	Surrender of Melos	- 360
	Bloody Execution	- 361
	Inertness of the Spartans	- 362

CHAP. XXV.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS IN SICILY.

	Events at Leontium	- 364
422.	Embassy of Ptoemach	- 365
415.	Embassy from Segesta to Athens	- 366
	Alcibiades threatened with Ostracism	- 367
	Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus appointed to command in Sicily	- 368
	Debate on the Expedition	- 371
	Warnings of Nicias	- 374
	Omens and Prophecies	- 376
	Mutilation of the Hermes Rusts	- 377
	Charges against Alcibiades	- 378
	Departure of the Armament	- 380
	Its Strength	- 382
	Its Reception at Rhegium	- 383
	Proposition of Hermocrates	- 384
	Consultation of the Athenian Generals	- 387
	The Athenians admitted into Catana	- 389
	Alarm at Athens	- 391
	Information of Dioclidea	- 392
	Andocides	- 395
	Recall of Alcibiades	- 397
	His Escape	- 398
	Operations of Nicias and Lamachus	- 399
	Landing at Syracuse	- 400
	Victory of the Athenians	- 401
	The Athenians winter at Naxos	- 402
	Preparations for Defence at Syracuse	- 403
	Debate at Camarina	- 404
	Alcibiades at Sparta	- 407
	Appointment of Gylippus	- 408
414.	The Athenians occupy Epipolæ	- 409
	Operations before Syracuse	- 411
	Death of Lamachus	- 412
	Despondency prevails at Syracuse	- 413

CHAP. XXVI.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION FROM THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS
TO ITS CLOSE.

B. C.		Page
	Arrival of Gylippus in Sicily	- 415
	He enters Syracuse	- 416
	Occupation of Plemyrum	- 417
	The Syracusans complete their Counterwork	- 418
	Despatch of Nicias	- 419
	The Athenians decree a new Armament	- 421
413.	Occupation of Decelea	- 423
	Departure of Demosthenes	- 424
	The Thracians at Mycaleus	- 425
	Surprise of Plemyrum	- 426
	Battle in the Corinthian Gulf	- 429
	Demosthenes at Rhegium	- 430
	Naval Operations at Syracuse	- 431
	Stratagem of Aristo	- 432
	Arrival of the second Armament	- 433
	Night Attack on Epipolæ	- 434
	Council of War	- 436
	Eclipse of the Moon	- 439
	Superstition of Nicias	- 440
	Defeat of the Athenians	- 441
	Preparations for a last Effort	- 442
	Exhortations of Nicias	- 443
	Victory of the Syracusans	- 447
	Stratagem of Hermocrates	- 448
	Retreat of the Athenians	- 449
	Repulsed in the Valley of the Anapus	- 450
	They change the Line of their March	- 452
	Surrender of Demosthenes	- 453
	Surrender of Nicias	- 454
	Execution of Demosthenes and Nicias	- 455
	Fate of the Prisoners	- 456

APPENDIX.

- I. Note to page 24. on a pretended Power of the Areopagus - 469
- II. On some of the Charges brought against Pericles - 461
- III. On the Author of the Oration against Alcibiades attributed to Andocides - 463
- IV. A Comparison of the Accounts given by Thucydides and Andocides of certain Points connected with the Prosecution of Alcibiades - 466



HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XVII

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATHENIAN MARITIME ASCENDANCY TO THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.

THOUGH the issue of the Persian invasion had not broken nor even dangerously shaken the power of Persia, it had relieved the European Greeks, and the islanders of the Ægean, from all apprehension of another attack on their freedom from the same quarter. Most of the states now united with Athens would have been satisfied with this security, and had no wish to act on the offensive against the vanquished enemy. But Athens saw a vast field open to her ambition in the East; the situation of the Asiatic Greeks afforded a fair pretext for the continuance of hostilities, and many of her leading statesmen were desirous of giving this direction to the restless spirit of their countrymen.

Foremost among these was Cimon, son of Miltiades. In his youth he gave little promise of the abilities or of the character which he afterwards displayed, and seemed to have inherited the limited capacity of his grandfather, who had incurred a nickname expressive of extreme simplicity¹, rather than his father's genius. His propensity to pleasure was thought to be so strong as to divert his attention from business, and drew on him the satire of the comic poets; and in his early youth he is

¹ Ὁ Κελεύρορ.
Κ

said to have neglected the ordinary accomplishments of an Athenian gentleman. If however this was the case, he would seem, from an anecdote reported by Plutarch on the authority of a contemporary, to have supplied this deficiency at a later period.¹ But he was not gifted with the promptness and volubility which commonly distinguished his countrymen, and never shone as an orator. It was probably his consciousness of this defect that determined him to devote himself to a career which kept him mostly away from Athens, and to abandon the popular assembly to his rivals. At his father's death he seems to have succeeded to a very scanty fortune²; and he would perhaps have found it difficult to raise the penalty of 50 talents due to the treasury, if Callias, one of the wealthiest men of Athens, struck by the charms of his sister Elpinice, a woman more remarkable for her beauty and talents than for the propriety of her conduct, had not undertaken to discharge the penalty as the price of her hand. Cimon however had attracted notice, and gained reputation, by the spirit which he displayed on the occasion of leaving the city on the approach of the barbarians, when he was the foremost to hang up a bridg in the Acropolis, as a sign that he placed all his hopes in the fleet; and by the valour with which he fought at Salamis; and many friendly voices encouraged him to tread in his father's footsteps. Aristides, in particular, saw in him a capacity and disposition, that fitted him for a coadjutor to himself, and an antagonist to Themistocles, and exerted his influence in his favour; and the readiness with which the allied Greeks, when disgusted by the arrogance of Pausanias, united themselves with Athens, was owed in a great measure to Cimon's mild temper, and to his frank and gentle manners. Yet we should be inclined to question the genuineness of his generosity and good

¹ Plut. Cim. 9.

² According to Diodorus (Mai ii. p. 39.) it was Themistocles who was the author of Cimon's fortune, by recommending him as a son-in-law to a rich Athenian, who had consulted him on the choice of a husband for his daughter, and whom he advised to look out not for wealth which wanted a man, but for a man who wanted wealth.

nature, if we believed what was related by an author cited by Plutarch : that after the flight of Themistocles, Cimon procured a capital sentence against Epicrates, for having aided the wife and children of the exile in escaping from Athens, and joining him in the dominions of Admetus.

The popularity of Themistocles was already declining, while Cimon, by a series of successful enterprises, was rapidly rising in public favour and esteem. The first of these triumphs, achieved in the third year after the battle of Plataea (B. C. 476), was the conquest of Eion on the Strymon, which was held by a Persian garrison, among whom were some men of high rank, and even related to the king. They were on friendly terms with the neighbouring Thracians, and, probably with their aid, gave great annoyance to the adjacent Greek towns. Cimon, after defeating and shutting them up, pressed the place so closely, that Boges, the Persian governor, unable to hold out, and disdaining to surrender, set fire to the town, and perished in the flames, which consumed his friends, family, and treasures. This victory was on many accounts peculiarly agreeable to the Athenians, who by it were relieved from a troublesome enemy, and gained a very important position, which not only provided immediately for the wants of many, but was the first step to the establishment of one of their most valuable colonies. They conferred the freedom of their city on Meno the Pharsalian¹, who on this occasion gave them twelve talents, and himself came to their aid with 300 of his Penests mounted at his own charge. The reward they bestowed on the conqueror was considered at the time as an extraordinary mark of favour, and was celebrated in after-ages, when much slighter services were far more richly recompensed, as a proof of the cheapness of the ancient heroism. It consisted in three stone busts of Hermes, each inscribed with two or three distichs in honour of the exploit, but containing neither the name of the general, nor any

¹ Demosth. Aristocr. p. 687.

allusion to his particular merit. In the course of the same year Cimon effected another conquest, which had a value in the eyes of the people independent of the substantial advantage it afforded them. The inhabitants of the isle of Scyros, a mixt race of Pelasgians and Dolopians, had become infamous for piracy, and had incurred the ban of the Amphictyons, by a breach of hospitality in plundering some Thessalian merchants. Cimon seized this specious pretext for exterminating the people, and dividing their land among Attic colonists. He was afterwards fortunate or skilful enough to discover the relics of Theseus, who, according to an ancient tradition, had been buried in Scyros.¹ An oracle was procured, which directed the Athenians to recover the hero's remains, and to treat them with due honour. Perhaps Cimon and his party may have thought it seasonable, on political grounds, to reanimate the popular veneration for the founder of the ancient order of things. The bones were dug up, and carried with great pomp to Athens, where a temple, which became a perpetual asylum for the oppressed, was erected in honour of the hero, who had so often exerted his prowess in protecting innocence, and redressing wrong.

The next enterprises to which the Athenian arms were directed, were important as the first steps toward the establishment of a new system in the relation between Athens and her allies. The town of Carystus in Eubœa, from what causes we are not informed, provoked the hostility of the Athenians, and, though not supported by any other states in the island, made a long resistance before it was reduced to submission. Its revolt was perhaps considered as of too little importance to deserve more strenuous efforts for its suppression. But that of the rich and powerful island of Naxos, which followed, was of greater moment. It was an

¹ According to Paus. i. 17. 6. the professed object of the first expedition was to avenge the murder of Theseus, though Lycomedes had been instigated by jealousy of the honours which his subjects paid to the hero. But the bones were not brought to Athens till six or seven years after the conquest of the island, in the archonship of Aphepsion, or Apsepsion, a.c. 468. See Mr. Clinton, F. H. ii. p. 34.

indication that the Athenian alliance began to be felt irksome, and that Athens would only be able to preserve the advantages which she derived from her station in the confederacy, by taking a new ground, and exacting by force what was no longer cheerfully given. Naxos was conquered after a hard siege, and, instead of an ally, became a subject of Athens: the first member of the confederacy which experienced from its protectors the worst evil which it had to fear from the Persians. But its example did not induce those who were exposed to the same danger either to unite in defence of their liberty, or to abstain from provoking a like attack. One after another they unseasonably refused compliance with the requisitions of the leading state, and were punished with the loss of their independence. Many were imprudent enough to seek ease from their burdens by sacrificing their strength. They offered to commute their personal services in the endless expeditions to which they were summoned, for stated payments of money. Cimon perceived the advantage which Athens would reap from this arrangement, and accepted it whenever it was proposed. Its effect was, that the states which adopted it, exempt from the necessity of keeping up a naval force of their own, were ever after exposed, without any means of defence, to the growing demands of Athenian rapacity, and when the wants of their sovereign were multiplied, found themselves in addition subjected to the very services from which they had so dearly purchased a temporary relief.

In the year of the conquest of Naxos (B. C. 466) the same in which Themistocles took refuge in Asia, Cimon obtained his most memorable triumph over the Persians. A great sea and land force had been collected at the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia: the fleet, according to Ephorus, who is most moderate in his numbers, amounted to 350, and the Persian commanders expected to be joined by 80 Phœnician galleys from Cyprus. Cimon having strengthened his

fleet by successive reinforcements, as he slowly moved along the south coast of Asia Minor, till it amounted to 250 galleys, provoked the enemy to an engagement before the arrival of the Phœnicians, and having defeated them and sunk or taken 200 ships, sailed up the river to their camp, and landing his men flushed with victory, completely routed the Persian army, and carried away the rich booty which they left in their tents. According to the author whom Plutarch follows, he still found time for another victory the same day, and having sailed to meet the Phœnician squadron, which had not heard of the defeat of their allies, fell in with it and destroyed the whole.

Cimon's next enterprise was one in which he had a personal and hereditary interest. The Persians still kept possession of the Thracian Chersonesus, and were supported by some of the Thracian tribes of the main land. Cimon sailed with a small force, and dislodged them, not only from the territory of the republic, but from perhaps the most valuable part of his own patrimony. It appears to have been soon after the power of the Athenians had been thus strengthened in this quarter — in the year following the battles of the Eurymedon — that they were again engaged in a contest with one of their allies, who was able and disposed to make a vigorous resistance. The Thasians were compelled to defend their gold mines on the continent from the cupidity of Athens, which perhaps claimed them as a conquest won from the Persians. The islanders were first defeated at sea by Cimon, and then closely besieged. While the siege was in progress, the Athenians suffered a disastrous defeat in one of their most important possessions. They had sent a colony of ten thousand settlers, partly citizens and partly allies, to establish themselves in a site on the Strymon, then called, from the various lines of communication which branched from it, the Nine Ways¹, and occupied by the Edonian Thracians. These the colonists

¹ See Vol. II. p. 253.

dislodged; but in an expedition which they made into the interior against the Edonian town of Drabescus they were attacked by the united forces of the Thracians, who viewed their settlement as a hostile invasion, and were cut off to a man.

The Thasians, alarmed at the turn which the war had taken, began to look out for foreign assistance. The jealousy of Sparta toward Athens had been betrayed, as we have seen, immediately after their joint victory over the common enemy; and the events of the subsequent period were not fitted to allay it. The Thasians therefore sent an embassy to engage the Spartans to make a diversion in their favour by invading Attica. Their envoys were favourably received, and dismissed with a secret promise that their wishes should be fulfilled; and the Spartans were preparing to keep their word, but had not yet taken any step which could disclose their intention to the Athenians, when a calamity befel them by which they were forced to renounce this design, and to struggle hard for their own preservation. The whole of Laconia was shaken by an earthquake, which opened great chasms in the ground, and rolled down huge masses from the highest peaks of Taygetus: Sparta itself became a heap of ruins, in which not more than five houses are said to have been left standing.¹ More than twenty thousand persons were believed to have been destroyed by the shock², and the flower of the Spartan youth was overwhelmed by the fall of the building in which they were exercising themselves at the time. It was chiefly the presence of mind displayed on this occasion by king Archidamus, that preserved the state from a still more terrible disaster. Many of the Helots assembled, and hastened to the city, to take advantage of the defenceless condition in which they hoped to surprise their masters. But Archidamus foreseeing the danger, as soon as the first consternation had subsided, while the survivors were busied among the ruins, ordered an

¹ Plut Cim. 16.² Diod. xi. 63.

alarm to be sounded, as of an enemy's approach, and gathered all his people round him in arms. The Helots, finding an armed band ready to receive them, retreated and dispersed. But though this danger was thus averted, the safety of Sparta was not yet secured. The Messenians seized the opportunity of rising against their hated lords, and fortified themselves in the ancient stronghold of their liberty, Ithome. Their insurrection was the more formidable, as they were joined not only by many of the Helots, but by the free inhabitants of some of the Laconian towns. The Spartans, though reduced to extreme weakness, were still masters of the open country, and laid siege to Ithome, but made very slow advances toward the reduction of the place. In the meanwhile the Thasians, left to themselves, were compelled to capitulate in the third year of the war, and after dismantling their fortifications, surrendering their ships, ceding their continental territory and mines, paying a sum of money immediately, and stipulating to pay a certain tribute in future, were permitted to remain subjects of Athens.

As the siege of Ithome lingered, the Spartans called on their allies for aid; and among the rest they did not blush to implore it from the Athenians. This application gave rise to a very warm debate in the Athenian assembly, and was treated by the leaders of the opposite parties as an occasion of trying their strength. The feelings with which it was received can scarcely be clearly understood, without taking a view of these parties and of their relative position: and a short digression on this subject will be necessary to place many events of the following history in their proper light.

Cimon was beyond dispute the ablest and most successful general of his day: and his victories had shed a lustre on the arms of Athens, which almost dimmed the glories of Marathon and Salamis. But while he was gaining renown abroad, he had rivals at home, who were endeavouring to supplant him in the affections of the people, and to establish a system of domestic and

foreign policy directly counter to his views, and were preparing contests for him in which his military talents would be of little avail. While Themistocles and Aristides were occupying the political stage, an extraordinary genius had been ripening in obscurity, and was only waiting for a favourable juncture to issue from the shade into the broad day of public life. Xanthippus, the conqueror of Mycale, had married Agariste, a descendant of the famous Cleisthenes, and had left two sons, Ariphron and Pericles. Of Ariphron little is known beside his name: but Pericles, to an observing eye, gave early indications of a mind formed for great things, and a will earnestly bent on them. In his youth he had not rested satisfied with the ordinary Greek education, but had applied himself, with an ardour which was not even abated by the lapse of years, nor stifled by his public avocations, to intellectual pursuits, which were then new at Athens, and confined to a very narrow circle of inquisitive spirits. His birth and fortune afforded him the means of familiar intercourse with all the men most eminent in every kind of knowledge and art, who were already beginning to resort to Athens as a common seat of learning. Thus, though Pythoclides taught him to touch the cithara, he sought the elements of a higher kind of music in the lessons of Damon, who was believed to have contributed mainly to train him for his political career: himself no ordinary person; for he was held up by the comic poets to public jealousy, as a secret favourer of tyranny, and was driven from Athens by the process of ostracism. But Pericles also entered with avidity into the abstrusest philosophical speculations, and even took pleasure in the arid subtleties of the Eleatic school, or at least in the ingenuity and the dialectic art with which they were unfolded to him by Zeno. But his principal guide in such researches, and the man who appears to have exercised the most powerful and durable influence on his mind and character, was the philosopher Anaxagoras, with whom he was long united in intimate friendship. Not only his public

and private deportment, and his habits of thought, but the tone and style of his eloquence were believed to have been formed by his intercourse with Anaxagoras. It was commonly supposed that this effect was produced by the philosopher's physical speculations, which, elevating his disciple above the ignorant superstition of the vulgar, had imparted to him the serene condescension and dignified language of a superior being. But we should be loth to believe that it was the possession of such physical secrets as Anaxagoras was able to communicate, that inspired Pericles with his lofty conceptions, or that he was intoxicated with the little taste of science which had weaned him from a few popular prejudices. We should rather ascribe so deep an impression to the distinguishing tenet of the Anaxagorean system, by which the philosopher himself was supposed to have acquired the title of *Mind* from his contemporaries. The doctrine of an ordering intelligence, distinct from the material universe, and ruling it with absolute sway, was striking from its novelty, and peculiarly congenial to the character of Pericles. Such was the supremacy which Athens exercised over the multitude of her dependent states, and such the ascendancy which he felt himself destined to obtain over the multitude at Athens.

It was undoubtedly not for the mere amusement of his leisure that Pericles had enriched his mind with so many rare acquirements. All of them were probably considered by him as instruments for the use of the statesman : and even those which seemed most remote from all practical purposes, may have contributed to the cultivation of that natural eloquence, to which he owed so much of his influence. He left no specimens of his oratory behind him, and we can only estimate it, like many other fruits of Greek genius, by the effect it produced. The few minute fragments preserved by Plutarch, which were recorded by earlier authors because they had sunk deep in the mind of his hearers, seem to indicate that he loved to concentrate his thoughts

in a bold and vivid image: as when he called Ægina the eyesore of Piræus, and said that he descried war lowering from Peloponnesus. But though signally gifted and accomplished for political action, it was not without much hesitation and apprehension that he entered on a field, where he saw ample room indeed for the display of his powers, but also many enemies and great dangers. The very superiority of which he could not but be conscious, suggested a motive for alarm, as it might easily excite suspicion in the people of views adverse to their freedom: and these fears were heightened by some circumstances, trifling in themselves, but capable of awakening or confirming a popular prejudice. His personal appearance was graceful and majestic, notwithstanding a remarkable disproportion in the length of his head, which became a subject of inexhaustible pleasantry for the comic poets of his day¹: but the old men who remembered Pisistratus, were struck by the resemblance which they discovered between the tyrant and the young heir of the Alcæonids, and not only in their features², but in the sweetness of voice, and the volubility of utterance, with which both expressed themselves. Still, after the ostracism of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides, while Cimon was engaged in continual expeditions, Pericles began to present himself more and more to the public eye, and was soon the acknowledged chief of a powerful party, which openly aimed at counteracting Cimon's influence, and introducing opposite maxims into the public counsels.

To some of the ancients indeed it appeared that the course of policy adopted by Pericles was entirely determined by the spirit of emulation, which induced him to take a different ground from that which he found

¹ Plut. Per. 3. 14.

² The contemporaries of Pisistratus seem to have discovered a striking likeness between his head and that of a statue of the god Dionysus, which was therefore supposed by some to have been sacrilegiously designed by the artist as a portrait of the mortal, and was looked upon as a specimen of the tyrant's arrogance. (Athen. xii. p. 533.) Hence, probably not without a malicious allusion to the scandal about Aspasia, Hermippus, in one of his comedies, entitled Pericles King of the Satyrs. Plut. Per. 33.

already occupied by Cimon? and that, as Cimon was at the head of the aristocratical party which had been represented by Aristides, he therefore placed himself in the front of that which had been led by Themistocles. The difference between these parties, after the revolution by which the ancestor of Pericles had undermined the power of the old aristocracy, was for some time very faintly marked, and we have seen that Aristides himself was the author of a very democratical measure, which threw the first offices of the state open to all classes of the citizens. The aristocracy had no hope of recovering what it had lost; but, as the commonalty grew more enterprising, it became also more intent on keeping all that it had retained, and on stopping all further innovation at home. Abroad too, though it was no longer a question, whether Athens should continue to be a great maritime power, or should reduce her navy to the footing of the old *naucraries*, and though Cimon himself had actively pursued the policy of Themistocles, there was room for great difference of opinion as to the course which was to be followed in her foreign relations. The aristocratical party wished, for their own sake at least as much as for that of peace and justice, to preserve the balance of power as steady as possible in Greece, and directed the Athenian arms against the Persian empire with the greater energy, in the hope of diverting them from intestine warfare. The democratical party had other interests, and concurred only with that part of these views which tended toward enriching and aggrandizing the state.

It is difficult wholly to clear Pericles from the charge of having been swayed by personal motives in the choice of his political system, as it would be to establish it. But even if it were certain that his decision was not the result of conviction, it might as fairly be attributed to a hereditary prepossession in favour of the principles for which his ancestors had contended, and which had probably been transmitted in his family, as to his competition with Cimon, or to his fear of incurring the

suspicion that he aimed at a tyranny, or unconstitutional power ; a suspicion to which he was much more exposed in the station which he actually filled. But if his personal character might seem better adapted to an aristocratical than to a democratical party, it must also render us unwilling to believe, that he devoted himself to the cause of the commonalty merely that he might make it the instrument of his own ambition. There seems to be much better ground for supposing that he deliberately preferred the system which he adopted, as the most consistent, if not alone reconcilable, with the prosperity and safety of Athens : though his own agency in directing and controuling it might be a prominent object in all his views.* But he might well think that the people had gone too far to remain stationary, even if there was any reason why it should not seize the good which lay within its reach. Its greatness had risen with the growth of the commonalty, and, it might appear to him, could only be maintained and extended by the same means : at home by a decided ascendancy of the popular interest over that of the old aristocracy, and every other class in the state ; abroad by an equally decided supremacy over the rest of Greece.

The contest between the parties seems for some time to have been carried on, without much violence or animosity, and rather with a noble emulation in the service of the public, than with assaults on one another. Cimon had enriched his country with the spoil and ransom of the Persians ; and he had also greatly increased his private fortune.¹ His disposition was naturally inclined to liberality, and he made a munificent use of his wealth. Several great works were wanting for the security of the city, and little had yet been done for its embellishment. The southern wall of the citadel was built with the treasure which Cimon brought home from Asia, and the plans of Themistocles were

¹ Plut. (Cim. 10.) attributes his wealth entirely to this source ; but it may have been in great part derived from the recovery of the Chersonesus, as Wachsmuth observes, l. 2. p. 57.

brought nearer, to their accomplishment, by preparations which were now made for joining the city to its harbours, by walls carried down on the one side to Phalerus, on the other to Piræus. The laying of the foundations of these walls was itself an arduous and expensive work, on account of the marshy ground which they crossed; and Cimon himself executed the most difficult part with magnificent solidity at his own charge. He also set the example of adorning the public places of the city with trees, and by introducing a supply of water converted the Academy, a spot about two miles north of the city, from an arid waste, into a delightful grove, containing open lawns and courses for the exercises of the young, shady walks for the thoughtful, a scene of wholesome recreation for all.

This kind of expenditure was wise and noble: but it was coupled with another, mischievous in its tendency, and seemingly degrading both to the benefited and to the benefactor. Cimon, it is said, not only like Pisistratus invited all who would to partake of the fruits of his fields and orchards, but threw down the fences, that none might scruple to enter. He not only gave the usual entertainments expected from the rich, to the members of his deme, but kept a table constantly open to them. When he went out into the streets he was commonly attended by a number of persons in good apparel, who when they met with any older citizen scantily clothed, would insist on exchanging their warm mantles for his threadbare covering. It was the office of the same agents respectfully to approach any of the poorer citizens of good character, whom they might see standing in the market-place, and silently to put some small pieces of money into their hands. There were some, Plutarch innocently observes, who decried this liberality as flattery of the mob, and the trick of a demagogue¹: but such slander is, he thinks, amply

¹ Cim. 10. In his Life of Pericles, 9. he seems himself to adopt the same view. With regard to the removal of the fences, Plutarch's statement is not confirmed by Theopompus (*Athæ.* xii. p. 533.), and may therefore be suspected of exaggeration.

refuted by the fact, that Cimon was the leader of the aristocratical and Laconian party, and one of the few Athenians whose incorruptible integrity raised them above all suspicion of venality, or of ever acting from selfish motives. And he adds a story of the magnanimity with which Cimon had rejected a present offered to him by a foreigner who needed his protection. It might perhaps be alleged with more colour of truth, that the ordinary relation subsisting at this period between the rich and the poor at Athens, rendered such good offices so common, that they could not fairly be attributed even to ambition, much less to any meaner motive. It is true that the state of things had undergone a great change at Athens in favour of the poorer class, since Solon had been obliged to interpose, to protect them from the rigour of creditors, who first impoverished, and then enslaved them. Since this time the aristocracy had found it expedient to court the commonalty which it could no longer oppress, and to part with a portion of its wealth for the sake of retaining its power. There were of course then, as at all times, benevolent individuals, who only consulted the dictates of a generous nature: but the contrast between the practice which prevailed before and after the age of Solon, seems clearly to mark the spurious origin of the ordinary beneficence. Yet Isocrates, when he extols the bounty of the good old times, which prevented the pressure of poverty from being ever felt, speaks of land granted at low rents, sums of money advanced at low interest¹, and asserts that none of the citizens were then in such indigence, as to depend on casual relief.² Cimon's munificence therefore must have been remarkable, not only in its degree, but in its kind: and was not the less that of a demagogue, because he sought popularity, not merely for his own sake, but for that of his order and his party.

Such was the light in which it was viewed by Pericles; and some of the measures which most strongly

¹ Areop. c. 12.

² Ibid. c. 38.

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marked his administration were adopted to counteract its effects. He was not able to rival Cimon's profusion, and he even husbanded his private fortune with rigid economy, that he might keep his property in the management of public affairs free both from temptation and suspicion. His friend Demotides is said first to have suggested the thought of throwing Cimon's liberality into the shade, and rendering it superfluous, by proposing a similar application of the public revenue.¹ Pericles perhaps deemed it safer and more becoming, that the people should supply the poorer citizens with the means of enjoyment out of its own funds, than that they should depend on the bounty of opulent individuals. He might think that the generation which had raised their country to such a pitch of greatness, was entitled to reap the fruits of the sacrifice which their fathers had made, in resigning the produce of the mines of Laurium to the use of the state. Very early therefore he signalised his appearance in the assembly by becoming the author of a series of measures, all tending to provide for the subsistence and gratification of the poorer class at the public expense. We do not stop to describe these measures, because they will find a more appropriate place in a general view of the administration of Pericles. But we must here observe, that, while he was courting the favour of the multitude by these arts, he was no less studious to command its respect. From his first entrance into public life, he devoted himself with unremitting application to business: he was never to be seen out of doors, but on the way between his house and the seat of council: and, as if by way of contrast to Cimon's convivial tastes, declined all invitations to the entertainments of his acquaintance — once only during the whole period he broke through this rule, to honour the wedding of his relative Eurypolemus with his presence — and confined himself to the society of a very select circle of intimate friends. He bestowed the most assiduous attention on

¹ Plut. Per. 9., on the authority of Aristotle.

the preparation of his speeches, and so little disguised it, that he used to say he never mounted the *bema*, without praying that no inappropriate word might drop from his lips. The impression thus produced was heightened by the calm majesty of his air and carriage, and by the philosophical composure which he maintained under all provocations.¹ And he was so careful to avoid the effect which familiarity might have on the people, that he was sparing even in his attendance at the assembly, and, reserving his own appearance for great occasions, carried many of his measures through the agency of his friends and partizans. Among them the person whose name is most frequently associated with that of Pericles was Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, a person not much less conspicuous for his rigid integrity than Aristides himself, and who seems to have entered into the views of Pericles with disinterested earnestness, and fearlessly to have borne the brunt of the conflict with the opposite party.

Immediately after the conquest of Thasos an occasion occurred for the two parties to measure their strength. It would appear that Cimon had received instructions, before he brought home his victorious armament, to attempt some further conquest on the mainland between the newly conquered district and Macedonia. Plutarch says, that he was expected to have invaded Macedonia, and to have added a large tract of it to the dominions of Athens. Yet it does not clearly appear how the conquest of Thasos afforded an opportunity of effecting this with greater ease: nor is any motive suggested for such an attack on the territories of Alexander. We might hence be inclined to suspect, that the expedition which Cimon had neglected to undertake, though called for by the people's wishes, if not by their express orders, was to have been directed, not against Macedonia,

¹ Plutarch tells a story — characteristic if not true — of a rude fellow, who after railing at Pericles all day, as he was transacting business in public, followed him after dusk with abusive language to his door, when Pericles ordered one of his servants to take a light, and conduct the man home.

but against the Thracian tribes on its frontier, who had so lately cut off their colonists on the Strymon : a blow which the Athenians were naturally impatient to avenge, but which the king of Macedonia might well be supposed to have witnessed without regret, even if he did not instigate those who inflicted it. However this may be, Cimon's forbearance disappointed and irritated the people, and his adversaries inflamed the popular indignation by ascribing his conduct to the influence of Macedonian gold. This part of the charge at least was undoubtedly groundless ; and Pericles, though appointed by the people one of Cimon's accusers, when he was brought to trial for treason, seems to have entered into the prosecution with reluctance. The danger however was great, and Elpinice came to the house of Pericles to plead with him for her brother. Pericles, playfully, though it would seem not quite so delicately as our manners would require, reminded her that she was past the age at which female intercession is most powerful ; but in effect he granted her request ; for he kept back the thunder of his eloquence and only rose once, for form's sake, to second the accusation. Plutarch says, that Cimon was acquitted : and there seems to be no reason for doubting the fact, except a suspicion, that this was the trial to which Demosthenes alludes, when he says that Cimon narrowly escaped with his life, and was condemned to a penalty of fifty talents : a singular repetition of his father's destiny.¹

This however was only a prelude to a more momentous struggle, which involved the principles of the parties, and excited much stronger feelings of mutual resentment. It appears to have been about this time that Pericles resolved on attacking the aristocracy in its

¹ Aristog. p. 688. In this case he does not mention the charge, but, as Wachsmuth observes, the motive of the prosecution. On the other hand the language of Demosthenes, *ὅτι τὴν πάτριον μετικίνησε πολιτείαν*, would suit very well what Plutarch says of Cimon's attempt to revive the old aristocracy, Cim. 15. ; but then we hear of no formal prosecution before the ostracism. Bekker's reading, *Πατρίαν* for *πάτριον*, would put an end to this question, and would seem to show that the orator had confounded Cimon's history with his father's.

ancient and revered stronghold, the Areopagus. We have seen that this body, at once a council and a court of justice, was composed, according to Solon's regulation, of the ex-archons. Its character was little altered after the archonship was filled by lot, so long as it was open to none but citizens of the wealthiest class. But, by the innovation introduced by Aristides, the poorest Athenian might gain admission to the Areopagus. Still the change which this measure produced in its composition was probably for a long time scarcely perceptible, and attended with no effect on its maxims and proceedings. When Pericles made his attack on it, it was perhaps as much as ever an aristocratical assembly. The greater part of the members had come in under the old system, and most of those who followed them probably belonged to the same class; for though in the eye of the law the archonship had become open to all, it is not likely that many of a lower station would immediately present themselves to take their chance. But even if any such were successful, they could exert but little influence on the general character of the council, which would act much more powerfully on them. The poor man who took his seat among a number of persons of superior rank, fortune, and education, would generally be eager to adopt the tone, and conform to the wishes of his colleagues: and hence the prevailing spirit might continue for many generations unaltered. This may be the main point which Isocrates had in view, when he observed, that the worst men, as soon as they entered the Areopagus, seemed to change their nature.¹ Pericles therefore had reason to consider it as a formidable obstacle to his plans.² He did not however attempt, or perhaps desire, to abolish an institution so hallowed by tradition; but he aimed at narrowing the range of its functions, so as to leave it little more than an august name. Ephialtes was his principal coadjutor in this

¹ Areop. 15.

² On this subject see some excellent remarks in Droysen's German translation of *Æschylus*, i. p. 176.

undertaking, and by the prominent part which he took in it exposed himself to the implacable enmity of the opposite party, which appears to have set all its engines in motion to ward off the blow.

It is not certain whether this struggle had begun, or was only impending, at the time of the embassy which came from Sparta to request the aid of the Athenians against Ithome. But the two parties were no less at variance on this subject than on the other. The aristocratical party considered Sparta as its natural ally, and did not wish to see Athens without a rival in Greece. Cimon was personally attached to Sparta¹, possessed the confidence of the Spartans, and took every opportunity of expressing the warmest admiration for their character and institutions; and, to mark his respect for them, gave one of his sons the name of Lacedæmonius. He himself was in some degree indebted to their patronage for his political elevation, and had requited their favour by joining with them in the persecution of Themistocles. When therefore Ephialtes dissuaded the people from granting the request of the Spartans, and exclaimed against the folly of raising a fallen antagonist, Cimon urged them *not to permit Greece to be lamed, and Athens to lose her yoke-fellow*.² This advice prevailed, and Cimon was sent with a large force to assist the Spartans at the siege of Ithome.

The Spartans had hoped that the Athenians, who were eminently skilful in this kind of warfare, would have enabled them speedily to reduce the place. But when they found that a long time passed without any impression having been made on it, they began to suspect that the fault lay in the will, rather than in the ability of their auxiliaries, and conceived apprehensions, suggested perhaps by the consciousness of their own bad faith, that the Athenians might be induced to betray them to the besieged. Their distrust soon became

¹ φιλολάκων. Plut. Cim. 16.

² μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χαλῆν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἱπποδύνα περιιδεῖν γεγενημένην — the language of Cimon reported by his contemporary the poet Ion of Chios. Plut. Cim. 16.

so strong that, while they retained all their other allies, they dismissed the Athenian troops, without assigning any other reason, than that they had no further need of their services. The Athenians, who clearly perceived the real motive, were probably more exasperated by this want of confidence, than they would have been by a perfidious attack. The first effect produced by the affront at Athens, was a resolution to break off all connection with Sparta, and, to make the rupture more glaring, they entered into an alliance with Sparta's old rival, Argos. Argos had been induced by her jealousy of Sparta to keep aloof from the Persian war, and had probably been much offended at seeing Mycenæ, over which she claimed a disputed supremacy, take an honourable part in that glorious struggle. After that event Mycenæ seems to have shown a disposition to put forth new pretensions, grounded on the title of her ancient kings. She asserted a right to the presidency of the Nemean games, which had been long enjoyed by Argos, and to the superintendence of a temple of Heré, which was common to the two cities, and lay between them, though nearer to Mycenæ. It had no doubt been the prospect of support from Sparta, that encouraged Mycenæ in this rivalry with her more powerful neighbour. But when the earthquake and the Messenian insurrection had disabled Sparta from all efforts on behalf of others, the Argives seized the opportunity of making war on Mycenæ. They were assisted by Tegea and Cleonæ, defeated the Mycenians in battle, shut them up within their walls, and in spite of a gallant resistance took the city, razed it to the ground, and annexed the territory to their own. It was apparently very soon after this important conquest, to which we shall hereafter return, that they received proposals of alliance from Athens, which they gladly embraced; and the Thesalians — by what means does not appear — were included in the treaty.¹

¹ Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hell.*, on the authority of Diodorus, places the fall of Mycenæ in the archonship of Theagenides, Ol. 78. 1. a. c. 468, four

This turn of events was extremely agreeable to the democratical party at Athens, not only in itself, on account of the assistance which they might hope to receive from Argos, but because it immediately afforded them a great advantage in their conflict with their domestic adversaries, and in particular furnished them with new arms against Cimon. He instantly became obnoxious, both as the avowed friend of Sparta, and as the author and leader of the expedition, which had drawn so rude an insult on his countrymen. The attack on the authority of the Areopagus was now prosecuted with greater vigour, and Cimon had little influence left to exert in its behalf. Yet his party seems not by any means to have remained passive, but to have put forth all its strength in a last effort to save its citadel: and it was supported by an auxiliary who had some very powerful engines to wield in its defence. This was the poet Æschylus, who was attached to it by his character, and his early associations. Himself a Eupatrid, perhaps connected with the priestly families of Eleusis, his deme, if not his birth-place, he gloried in the laurels which he had won at Marathon, above all the honours earned by his sword and by his pen, though he had also fought at Salamis, and had founded a new era of dramatic poetry.¹ He was an admirer of Aristides, whose character he had painted in one of his tragedies, under the name of an ancient hero, with a truth which was immediately recognized by the audience. The contest with Persia, which was the subject of one of his great works, probably appeared to him the legitimate object for the energies of Greece. Beside this general disposition to side with Cimon's party, against Pericles, the whole train of his poetical and religious feelings, nourished by a deep study of the mythical and religious tra-

years before the earthquake at Sparta. But Diodorus seems to be much better entitled to attention in his view of the connection of the events, which is that taken in the text, than in his date. Independent of his authority, it is scarcely conceivable that Sparta would have permitted the destruction of Mycenæ, if she had been in a condition to protect her ally.

¹ Paus. i. 14. 4.

ditions of Greek antiquity, engaged him, in the cause of the Areopagus, to oppose what he probably considered as a sacrilegious encroachment on a venerable and hallowed institution. As such he endeavoured to represent it to the people, with all the power of his solemn poetry, and all the arts of theatrical illusion. In his tragedy, entitled the *Eumenides*, which was acted probably in the year of the rupture with Sparta, and just after the conclusion of the treaty with Argos, he exhibits the mythical origin of the court and council of Areopagus, in the form which best suited his purpose, tracing it to the cause first pleaded there between the Argive matricide Orestes, who pledges his country to eternal alliance with Athens, and the *dread Goddesses*, who sought vengeance for the blood which he had shed. The poet brings these terrible beings on the stage, as well as the tutelary goddess of the city, who herself institutes the tribunal, *to last throughout all ages*, and exhorts her people to preserve it as the glory and safeguard of the city: and the spectators are led to consider the continuance of the blessings which the pacified avengers promise to the land, as depending on the permanence of the institution which had succeeded to their functions.

Nevertheless, though the composition to which this drama belongs seems to have surpassed all his former productions, the author failed in his political object; and Ephialtes carried a decree, or a law, by which the Areopagus was shorn of its authority, and only retained a few branches of its jurisdiction. Thus much is certain; but it is extremely difficult to determine the precise nature of the innovation, and whether it affected the power of the tribunal, which took cognizance of causes of murder, or that of the council, which claimed a large and indefinite superintendence over the education and conduct of the citizens, and the decision of various causes pertaining to religion and morals, and even the right of interfering with the decrees of the people, in cases where, according to its own view, the public safety might seem to require it. One of the strongest

arguments for the opinion that the law of Ephialtes took causes of murder out of the jurisdiction of the Areopagus, and transferred them to the popular courts, is afforded by the poem of Æschylus, which turns entirely on the foundation of the *court*. Yet it must be owned that the praises of Athene rather apply to the *council*, and it is especially difficult to conceive what object Pericles and his party could have had in touching that part of the criminal jurisdiction, which was at once the most venerable, the most rarely exercised, and the least liable to abuse. For it does not appear that hitherto the spirit of party had become so furious at Athens, as to resort to assassination; though not long after we shall meet with a remarkable instance of such an excess. On the other hand it may be objected, that the power of the council had long ceased to be formidable, and could not give occasion to so earnest and passionate a contest. Yet its dormant claims might be revived at a more seasonable juncture, and there were some branches of the jurisdiction pertaining to its censorial authority, which might at all times offer a convenient handle to the aristocratical party for an attack on Pericles and his friends. There was none, as the event proved, which they had more cause to fear than a charge of impiety, which now came under the cognizance of the Areopagus but at a later period in the life of Pericles seems to be no longer subject to it. We are therefore still inclined to think, though some of the highest modern authorities are on the opposite side, that it was the council, with its incidental jurisdiction, rather than the tribunal for the prosecution of murder, which Ephialtes struck at: and this opinion seems to accord best with the manner in which Plutarch connects the attempts of Cimon to restore the authority of the Areopagus, with those which he made to revive the old aristocratical constitution.¹

This triumph of Pericles and his party over the

¹ Cim. 15. For the literature of the controversy which has been warmly agitated in Germany on this question, the reader may consult note 4. p. 118. of Mueller's edition of the *Eumœnides*.

Areopagus seems to have been immediately followed by the ostracism of Cimon, which took place about two years after the return of the Athenians from Messenia : and it is therefore not improbable that his exile may have been not so much an effect of popular resentment, as a measure of precaution, which may have appeared necessary even to the moderate men of both parties, for the establishment of public tranquillity.

The rupture between Athens and Sparta led to new movements, by which Athens gained a great immediate advantage, but lost one of her old and most useful allies. Corinth and Megara had been for some time past at war : a dispute about their frontier was probably the pretext rather than the cause of the quarrel. The party uppermost at Megara could now rely on the friendship of Athens ; it renounced the alliance with Sparta, and admitted an Athenian garrison into the city, and into the port of Pegæ on the Corinthian gulf. To secure the communication between Megara and the sea, and its dependence on its new ally, the Athenians connected the city with its harbour at Nisæa by a work similar to that which had lately been begun between Athens and Piræus, and themselves garrisoned the walls which they built for the Megarians.

While a part of their force was thus employed, another was carrying on the war with Persia in a new quarter. Inarus, king of some of the Libyan tribes on the western border of Egypt, had excited an insurrection there against the Persians, and his authority was acknowledged throughout the greater part of the country. Artaxerxes sent his brother Achæmenes with a great army to quell this rebellion. An Athenian armament of 200 galleys was lying at the time off Cyprus, and Inarus sent to obtain its assistance. The Athenian commanders, whether following their own discretion, or after orders received from home, quitted Cyprus, and having joined with the insurgents enabled them to defeat Achæmenes, who fell in the battle by the hand of Inarus. They then sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where a body of Persians, and

some Egyptians, who still adhered to their cause, were in possession of one quarter of the city, called White Castle.¹ The rest was subject to Inarus, and there the Athenians stationed themselves, and besieged the Persians.

They were still engaged in this enterprise, which from the magnitude of the force employed in it might once have seemed sufficient to engross their attention, in the year B. C. 457, one of the most eventful in their annals. The occupation of Megara had roused the most vehement resentment at Corinth, and was followed by a war in which the Corinthians were joined by Ægina and the maritime towns of Argolis. The Athenians did not wait to be attacked. They landed a body of troops near Halie in the Argolic Acté, but were driven back to their ships with loss by the united forces of Corinth and Epidaurus. This check however was soon revenged by a victory which they gained over the Peloponnesian fleet, off the island of Cecryphalea in the Saronic gulf; and shortly afterward, under the command of Leocrates, their arms were crowned with a still more brilliant success. He defeated the allies in a great sea-fight near Ægina, and took seventy of their galleys, and then landing his troops on the island, laid siege to the city. The Corinthians thought to effect a diversion in favour of the Æginetans by seizing the passes of Geranea, and invading the Megarian territory, while they sent a small force over to Ægina. They could not believe it possible that the Athenians, while they were carrying on a war in Egypt and the adjacent coasts of Phœnicia, and in Cyprus, could protect Megara without drawing their troops away from Ægina. But the spirit of Athens was even greater than her strength, and rose against dangers and difficulties²; and she had a man within

¹ *Ἀσπὸν τοῦ λευκοῦ*. Thuc. i. 104. Ctesias c. 32. Diodor. (xi. 74) calls Achæmenes the uncle of Artaxerxes.

² The Athenians were conscious of the greatness of their own efforts. In an inscription still preserved in the Louvre, the Erechthean tribe records with emphatic simplicity, that its slain fell in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phœnicia, at Halie, in Ægina, in Megara, *in the same year*. See Dr Arnold on Thuc. i. 104.

her walls perhaps not inferior to Cimon or Miltiades. Myronides collected all the citizens, young and old, who had been left at home for the defence of the city, and marched out with them to meet the Corinthians. The action which followed was not decisive; but the Athenians remained on the field, and erected a trophy, while the Corinthians returned home. But, being there reproached for yielding to so unequal a force, twelve days after they again sallied forth, and marched to the scene of action, to set up a rival trophy, or, more properly, to challenge the Athenians to another battle. The Athenians, who, perhaps expecting a fresh attack, had remained at Megara, immediately issued from the town, cut to pieces a party of the enemy who were erecting the trophy, and then, coming up to the main body, completely defeated them. In their flight a part of the Corinthians missed their road, and turned into a large pit or quarry, from which they could find no egress. The Athenians having stationed their heavy-armed in the passage by which they entered, surrounded the place with their light troops, who with their missiles slew every man within. Thucydides does not mention the number that fell, but says that the loss was great enough to be deeply felt at Corinth.

Some time before the Corinthians made this ineffectual attempt to relieve Ægina, the king of Persia, who saw himself in danger of losing his last hold on Egypt, had endeavoured to procure a similar diversion in his own favour, which might draw away the Athenians from Memphis. The time had now come when the gold of Persia was to be found more formidable to Greece than her arms. Artaxerxes sent a Persian, named Megabazus, to Sparta, with a sum of money, to be employed in bribing the principal Spartans to use their influence, so as to engage their countrymen in an expedition against Attica. Megabazus did not find the leading Spartans unwilling to receive his money; but they seem to have been unable to render him the service for which it was offered. Ithome still held out: and

Sparta had probably not yet sufficiently either recovered her strength, or restored internal tranquillity, to venture on the proposed invasion. Some rumour of this negotiation may have reached Athens, and have quickened the energy with which Pericles now urged the completion of the long walls, for which preparations had been made, as we have seen, some years before. But among his opponents there was a faction who viewed the progress of this great work in a different light from Cimon, and saw in it, not the means of securing the independence of Athens, but a bulwark of the hated commonalty. They too would gladly have seen an invading army in Attica, which might assist them in destroying the work and its authors. And in the same year which witnessed the last-mentioned victory of Myronides, an opportunity presented itself — if it was not procured by their intrigues — which encouraged them to hope for such a triumph. The Phocians had invaded Doris, and had taken one of its little towns. The piety of the Spartans was roused; they assembled an army of 10,000 allied troops, and 1500 of their own, marched into Doris, and compelled the Phocians to restore their conquest. But an obstacle seemed now to be placed in the way of their return. The Athenians, who had a squadron at Pegæ, could prevent them from crossing the Corinthian gulf; and, though they had been permitted to traverse the Isthmus without hindrance, they heard that the passes were now vigilantly guarded by the enemy. These were the ostensible reasons which induced Nicomedes, who commanded in the stead of the young king Pleistoanax, to turn aside on his march through Bœotia, as if to deliberate on the safest course, and to encamp at Tanagra, near the borders of Attica. But he had received secret advice from the oligarchical faction at Athens, which led him to hope for their co-operation in striking a great blow. These intrigues were not so carefully concealed as to avoid all suspicion: but the apprehensions they excited only animated the sounder part of the Athenians to seek

the enemy, instead of waiting for an attack in which force might be seconded by treachery. They mustered their whole strength, which, with 1000 Argives and some other allied troops, chiefly from Ionia, amounted to 14,000 infantry; and a body of cavalry came to their aid from Thessaly. With this army they marched to Tanagra. While the two armies were here in presence of each other, and an engagement was daily expected, Cimon, who was in the neighbourhood, came to the Athenian camp, and requested leave to take his post among the men of his tribe. The Athenian generals either felt or affected a suspicion of his intentions; which, though groundless, was not perhaps unreasonable. All was not secure, as we have just seen, at Athens; and there were friends and partizans of Cimon in the army, who formed a body of 100 men. Instead of breaking up this band, and distributing it over the army, the generals, according to Plutarch, referred Cimon's request to the council of Five Hundred, which ordered them to reject it.¹ Elsewhere Plutarch ascribes the refusal to the friends of Pericles, who was himself present, and probably in command.² Thus repulsed, Cimon is said to have left his armour with his friends, exhorting them by their deeds to refute the calumnies of those who charged them with preferring Sparta to their country. A hard-fought battle took place, in which Pericles signalized himself by extraordinary feats of valour, as if in emulation of Cimon's friends, who had placed his panoply in their ranks, and fought round it with inflexible spirit, till they fell, every one at his post; the most painful loss which the Athenians suffered on this disastrous day. The treachery of the Thessalians, who went over to the enemy in the midst of the action, contributed to decide it in favour of the Peloponnesians; though the slaughter was great on both sides, and the author followed by Diodorus³ represented the victory as doubtful, and that the battle was followed by a truce for four months. But Thucy-

¹ Cim. 17.² Per. 10.³ XI. 80.

dides is clear as to the issue of the engagement, and seems to know^c nothing of the truce. The Peloponnesians, as he relates, ravaged the Megarian territory, and finding the passes of Geranea now open, returned home over the isthmus.

If Plutarch's information was accurate, the Athenians were not only worsted at Tanagra, but were so disheartened by their defeat, and so apprehensive of an early invasion from Peloponnesus, that they recalled Cimon from his exile for the purpose of concluding the war through his mediation. But this account seems totally inconsistent with the facts recorded by Thucydides, and Cimon's return, if in any degree connected with the battle of Tanagra, appears to have been separated from it by a much longer interval. Only about three months after that event, early in the year B. C. 456, the Athenians were again in the field, to retrieve the credit which they had lost in Bœotia, where they had partizans whose political influence depended on the success of their arms. Under the command of Myronides they met the Bœotians, who were assembled in greatly superior numbers in a tract called from its vineyards Cœnophytæ, and gained a brilliant and long-celebrated victory, which gave them undisputed possession both of Bœotia and of Phocis, or at least made their interest there decidedly predominant. Diodorus¹ says that Myronides made himself master of all the Bœotian towns, except Thebes. But even there, as may be gathered from an allusion of Aristotle²,

¹ XI. 83. By a blunder not uncommon with him, he makes two battles out of one; but observes, with great simplicity, that for the first of these battles, — though it was one of the most memorable the Athenians ever fought — no historian had assigned a place.

² *Ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύταις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη*, Pol. v. 2. Wachsmuth (l. 2. p. 105, n. 10.) suspects an error, and that Aristotle meant to allude to the battle of Tanagra, when the oligarchy may be supposed to have recovered its ascendancy at Thebes. But it seems quite as probable, that not *διεφθάρη*, but *κακῶς πολιτευομένων* is to be joined immediately with the preceding words; and that the meaning is, that after the victory of Athens at Cœnophytæ the democratical party at Thebes lost all moderation, and running into excesses like those committed at Megara, Syracuse, and Rhodes, which are mentioned immediately after, provoked a reaction, which finally overthrew it.

his victory established the ascendancy of a democratical party, which, if not absolutely dependent on Athens, could not be friendly to Sparta. To secure these advantages he razed the walls of Tanagra, and forced the Locrians of Opus to put 100 of their citizens — probably one member of each of the ruling families — as hostages into his hands. It was about the same time that the Athenians completed their long walls, which, as they gave their city the strength of an island, turned their views more unreservedly than ever toward the sea; and not long after in the same year the Æginetans capitulated, on nearly the same terms which had been granted to the Thasians: demolition of their walls, surrender of their ships, and payment of tribute.

In the following year, 455, the Spartans were reminded that they were also liable to be attacked at home. An Athenian armament, of fifty galleys, and, if we may trust Diodorus, with 4000 heavy-armed troops on board¹, sailed round Peloponnesus under Tolmides, burnt the Spartan arsenal at Gythium, took a town named Chalcis belonging to the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians, who attempted to oppose the landing of the troops.² But the most important advantage gained in the expedition was the capture of Naupactus, which belonged to the Ozolian Locrians, and now fell into the hands of the Athenians at a very seasonable juncture. The third Messerian war had just come to a close. The brave defenders of Ithome

¹ According to Diodorus, xi. 84. 1000 men had been voted to Tolmides for this expedition, to be selected by himself. But he took advantage of the power thus committed to him to induce many to give in their names as volunteers, pretending that he should otherwise force them to serve. When in this manner he had obtained 3000 names, he exercised his power by choosing 1000 more. We feel great doubt about the truth of the story in this form, and are inclined to suspect that, if it was well founded, it belongs to the later expedition in which Tolmides lost his life. Even if he had the means of playing such a trick, it is not probable that after having undertaken, as Diodorus relates, to accomplish the objects of his expedition with 1000 men, he should have desired to take out four times that number; nor does it appear that so large a force was needed for his purpose, as we find that 1000 men sufficed Pericles for similar, if not more extensive operations. Compare Plut. Per. 19.

² According to Diodorus, he also made himself master of all the towns in Cephallenia. Diodorus seems to suppose that one of these was named Zacynthus.

had obtained honourable terms, granted, as the Spartans professed, in compliance with an oracle which enjoined their clemency. The besieged were permitted to quit Peloponnesus with their families, on condition of being detained in slavery if they ever returned. Tolmides now settled the homeless wanderers in Naupactus, a position full of hope for the exiles, as it was that from which the Dorians had crossed over to the conquest of their native land, and most useful to the Athenians, for their operations in the Corinthian gulf.

But these successes were counterbalanced by a reverse which befel the arms of Athens this same year in another quarter. After the defeat of Achæmenes, Artaxerxes, disappointed in his hopes of assistance from Sparta, had resolved on a still more vigorous effort, and raised a greater army, which he placed under the command of an abler general, Megabyzus son of Zopyrus. Megabyzus defeated the insurgents and their allies, and forced the Greeks to evacuate Memphis, and to take refuge in an island of the Nile, named Prosopitis, which contained a town called Byblus, where he besieged them for eighteen months. At length he resorted to the contrivance of turning the stream which separated the island from his own side of the river, into new channels, and conducted the work so vigorously, that the Greek galleys were all left aground, and were fired by the Athenians themselves, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands. The Persians then marched into the island over the dry bed of the river: the Egyptians in dismay abandoned their allies, who were overpowered by numbers, and almost all destroyed. A few reached the opposite bank, and made their way to Oxyene. Inarus himself was betrayed into the hands of the Persians, and put to death; according to Ctesias, he surrendered himself to Megabyzus on condition that his life should be spared, but having been carried a prisoner to Persia, was sacrificed by Artaxerxes to the vengeance of his mother for the death of Achæmenes, and the indignation of Megabyzus at this breach of

faith involved the empire in a civil war. Egypt however was again reduced under the Persian yoke, except a part of the Delta, where another pretender, named Amyrtæus, who assumed the title of king, protected by the marshes and by the spirit of the people, the most warlike, Thucydides observes, of the Egyptians, maintained himself for several years against the power of the Persian monarchy. But the misfortune of the Athenians did not end with the destruction of the great fleet and army which had been first employed in the war. They had sent a squadron of fifty galleys to the relief of their countrymen, which, arriving before the news of the recent disaster had reached them, entered the Mendesian branch of the Nile. They were here surprized by a combined attack of the Persian land force and a Phœnician fleet, and but few escaped to bear the mournful tidings to Athens.

Yet even after this calamity we find the Athenians, not suing for peace, but bent on extending their power, and annoying their enemies. Early in the next year (454) an opportunity offered itself of enlarging the range of their influence in the north of Greece. A Thessalian named Orestes, whose father Echekratidas is called by Thucydides king of the Thessalians, and had probably held the office of *Tagus*, had been driven from his country, and applied to the Athenians for aid to effect his restoration. Succours were granted to him, and the forces of Bœotia and Phocis, now at the disposal of Athens, were called out to support her ally. But the superiority of the Thessalians in cavalry checked all their operations in the field; they failed in an attempt upon Pharsalus, and were at length forced to retire without having accomplished any of their ends. It was perhaps to sooth the public disappointment that Pericles shortly afterwards embarked at Pegæ with a thousand men, and, coasting the south side of the

¹ There seems to be no ground for supposing that this expedition was conducted by Myronides, who is evidently mentioned by Diodorus, only because, with his usual carelessness, he makes the invasion of Thessaly immediately follow the battle of Cœnophyta.

Corinthian gulf, made a descent on the territory of Sicyon, and routed the Sicyonian forces sent to oppose his landing. He then took on board some Achaean troops, and, sailing over to the coast of Acarnania, laid siege to the town of Œniadæ, which had long incurred the enmity of the Athenians, chiefly it would seem because, being situate in a tract of uncommonly rich land formed by the depôts of the Achelous, it had early excited their cupidity.¹ This attempt however proved unsuccessful; and the general result of the campaign seems not to have been on the whole advantageous or encouraging.

In this state of things Cimon's friends might not find it difficult to awaken a feeling of regret in the people for their old favourite, by contrasting his glorious and profitable victories with the recent failures and losses, and, as a natural consequence, to turn their thoughts and wishes toward peace with Sparta. It seems to have been not long after the events which have been just related, that Cimon was recalled from his exile; and the decree for that purpose was moved by Pericles himself;—a fact which seems to intimate that some change had taken place in the relations or the temper of parties at Athens. We have already assigned a reason for rejecting Plutarch's statement as to the motive and the time of Cimon's recall; and indeed he himself, with all the other writers who mention the fact, describes that event as having been immediately followed by a suspension of hostilities, which, according to Thucydides, were interrupted for three years before a formal truce was concluded between the belligerents. Hence it seems clear that Cimon's return, which, as is known from a fragment of Theopompus², took place before five years of his exile had quite expired, must be dated in the third or fourth year after the battle of Tanagra. According to an account not improbable in itself, but rendered suspicious by the confusion and inaccuracy of

¹ Paus. iv. 25. 1.

² Published by Marx, Ephori Fragments, p. 224.

the context in which it appears, he had retired to his patrimony in the Chersonesus.¹ The motives which led Pericles to promote his recall must always remain doubtful. It is possible that he made a virtue of necessity, and sought to conciliate his rival by complying with a public feeling which he knew it would be vain to resist. But it is also possible that he may have been really desirous of forming an union with Cimon on terms honourable and advantageous to each. There were some ancient authors, of that class who are in every secret, who related that Cimon's recall was the result of a compact concluded through the mediation of Elpinice, according to which Pericles was to be left undisputed master of the political field, while he himself prosecuted the war with Persia. This was probably no more than an inference drawn from the ensuing events. If we might indulge in a similar conjecture, we should be inclined to connect the conduct of Pericles with those factious machinations, which, as we have seen, threatened the safety of Athens, and involved Cimon himself in an unjust suspicion at the battle of Tanagra. We may at least collect from the facts mentioned by Thucydides, that the aristocratical, or oligarchical, party at Athens was, as usually happens, divided within itself, and included a narrower circle of political fanatics, implacable in their enmity, restless in their ambition, and ready at any moment to sacrifice the independence of their country to their interests or revenge. Cimon by his conduct before the battle of Tanagra had testified his abhorrence of this furious faction, which probably began to regard him as an apostate, and seems not to have been deterred from pursuing its course. For there can be little doubt that it is in the spirit of this reckless faction we must seek for the explanation of an event, the details of which are lost in impenetrable obscurity, but which appears to have hap-

¹ Andocides de Pace, 3. It is impossible to know that an author who so confounds names, times, and events, may not, in speaking of the Chersonesus, have been thinking, not of Cimon, but of Miltiades, whom in the present text he actually names.

pened in the course of the year preceding Cimon's recall. The virtuous Ephialtes was despatched by the hand of an assassin in the night. That he fell a victim to the resentment of his political adversaries, seems to have been universally admitted. The murderer was never brought to justice, and appears even to have escaped detection¹; but a suspicion so strong that Aristotle did not scruple to adopt it as sufficiently grounded², attributed the deed to a man named Aristodicus, a native of Tanagra, a place where the enemies of Ephialtes might be likely enough to find heated partizans, who would gladly lend their services for the destruction of a democratical leader.³ The loss of Ephialtes, and still more the indication it afforded of the spirit which still prevailed in a portion of the opposite party, may not improbably have disposed Pericles to strengthen himself by a coalition with Cimon, and to promise his concurrence in Cimon's foreign policy, which happened at this juncture to fall in with the wishes of the people.

However this may have been, the three years next following Cimon's return, as we have fixed its date, passed, happily for his contemporaries, without affording any matter for the historian; and this pause was followed by a five years' truce, in the course of which Cimon embarked in his last expedition, and died near the scene of his ancient glory. The pretender Amyrtæus had solicited succour from the Athenians, which pride as well as ambition prompted them readily to grant; for there was now not only honour and spoil to be gained, but a stain to be wiped away from their arms. Cimon was appointed to the command of a fleet of 200 galleys, with which he sailed to Cyprus, and sent a squadron of sixty to the assistance of Amyrtæus, while he himself with the rest laid siege to Citium. Here he was carried off by illness, or the consequences of a wound; and the armament was soon

¹ Antipho de Cæd. Herod. 68.

² Plut. Per. 10.

³ The reader will remember the treatment which Tanagra suffered after the battle of Cænophyta.

after compelled by the want of provisions to raise the siege.

But Cimon's spirit still animated his countrymen, who, when they had sailed away with his remains, fell in with a great fleet of Phœnician and Cilician galleys near the Cyprian Salamis, and, having completely defeated them, followed up their naval victory with another which they gained on shore, either over the troops which had landed from the enemy's ships, or over a land force by which they were supported. After this they were joined by the squadron which had been sent to Egypt, and which returned, it would appear, without having achieved any material object, and all sailed home. (B. c. 449.)

In after-times Cimon's military renown was enhanced by the report of a peace, which his victories had compelled the Persian king to conclude on terms most humiliating to the monarchy. Within less than a century after his death it was, if not commonly believed, confidently asserted, that by this treaty, negotiated, as it was supposed, by Callias, son of Hipponicus, the Persians had agreed to abandon at least the military occupation of Asia Minor, to the distance of three days' journey on foot, or one on horseback, from the coast, or, according to another account, the whole peninsula west of the Halys, and to abstain from passing the mouth of the Bosphorus and the Chelidonian islands, on the coast of Lycia, or the town of Phaselis, into the Western Sea. The mere silence of Thucydides on so important a transaction would be enough to render the whole account extremely suspicious; and the vague and contradictory statements of the later authors with respect both to the conditions and the date of the treaty — for while one describes it as the result of Cimon's victories near the Eurymedon, another refers it to those of his last campaign — conspire to strengthen our distrust. But it is also abundantly evident that a state of things such as would be implied in the supposed treaty never really existed; that the Persian court was totally

unconscious of having ever resigned its claims to dominion over the Asiatic Greeks, and to the tribute which it once received from them; and that no alliance was ever made to such a concession in any of the negotiations which took place between Persia and either of the leading states of Greece, from the death of Cimon to Alexander's invasion. The fable, founded no doubt on really glorious recollections of the awe with which Persia had been inspired by the Athenian navy, seems to have sprung up, or to have acquired a distinct shape, in the rhetorical school of Isocrates, and to have been transmitted through the orators to the historians; and Craterus, a compiler of Athenian state documents, did not scruple to insert a piece in his collection, which he pretended was a copy of the treaty concluded by Callias.¹

Cimon's death probably saved him from the mortification of seeing his pacific labours defeated by causes which he could not have controuled. We are however inclined to suspect that it was at this juncture that Pericles conceived a project, which is indeed only mentioned by Plutarch, but seems to have been attested by a genuine document found by his author in the Athenian archives, and which might be considered as a step toward the prosecution of Cimon's policy. Plutarch relates that Pericles carried a decree through the assembly, by virtue of which envoys were sent to various parts of Greece, and even to the islands and the Asiatic colonies, to invite every Greek state to send deputies to a general congress to be held at Athens. The professed objects of this assembly were partly religious—to take measures with respect to the temples which had been burnt in the Persian war, and the vows made on that occasion and still due to the gods—partly political;

¹ This famous peace of Cimon or Callias is the subject of a separate essay in Dahlman's *Forschungen*, which places the whole matter in the clearest light. The reader who cannot consult this work may compare the descriptions of Isocrates, Paneg. 136. 138. Arcop. 91. Panath. 64. Demosthenes, D. F. L. 311., Lysurgus in Leocrat. 74., the narratives of Plutarch, Cim. 13. 19., and Diodorus, xii. 4., and the observation of Theopompus in Hæpocratio, Ἀθηναίων γερμανισμός, which proves that Craterus either fabricated or adopted a forgery.

to provide for the security of commerce, and remove all obstacles which obstructed the free passage of Greek vessels. The real end which Pericles had in view is very doubtful. It may have been to dazzle the Athenians with a spectacle in which their city would appear as the common capital of Greece; it may have been the more solid advantage of strengthening the Athenian confederacy, by the accession of some continental states which were still wavering between Athens and her rival; it is also possible that the proposed congress was a mere pretext to cover the secret instructions of the envoys. In any case the period during which the Athenian influence was predominant in Bœotia and Phocis, seems the best suited to such a scheme. Plutarch says it fell to the ground through the counter-machinations of Sparta.

It seems to have been in the year following that of Cimon's death that a new occasion of indirect hostility arose between the two states. The people of Delphi, though they had been commonly considered as a branch of the Phocian nation, and were nominally subject to the Amphictyonic council, appear in fact to have been from the earliest times in the exclusive possession of the temple which was the boast of their city, that is, to have exercised the superintendence of the oracle, and the guardianship of the sacred treasures, by ministers of their choice. The Phocians, relying perhaps on the protection of Athens, had wrested this important charge from the Delphians. There is reason to believe that the ruling families at Delphi were of Dorian blood. From this or other causes they had always been on friendly terms with Sparta, and she now stepped forward to assert the claims of this valuable ally. An army marched to Delphi, and restored possession of the temple to the Delphians. They were at the same time induced by the authority of Sparta to renounce their union with the Phocian league, and to declare themselves a perfectly independent state; and a line of demarcation, perhaps including some addition of territory,

was drawn between them and Phocis.¹ To requite these benefits the Delphians granted to Sparta the right of precedency in consulting the oracle: an honour which the Spartans caused to be recorded at Delphi by an inscription on the bronze image of a wolf. But shortly after they had withdrawn their forces, Pericles appeared at Delphi with an Athenian army, and reinstated the Phocians in the custody of the temple. The honour which had been bestowed on the Spartans was now transferred to Athens, and was commemorated on another part of the same image which celebrated the triumph of Sparta.

This was only a prelude to more important movements which took place in the following year (447). Bands of Bœotian exiles, who had been driven out of their respective cities by the ascendancy which the battle of Œenophyta had every where given to the Athenian or democratical party, found means of making themselves masters of Chæronea, Orchomenus, and some other towns. This event, which threatened the interests of Athens throughout the north of Greece, seemed to call for prompt interference to avert the danger; and Tolmides, trusting to his gallantry and good fortune, perhaps underrating the enemy's strength, proposed instantly to march, with as many Athenians as might be willing to join him, to suppress the insurrection. Pericles, in whose military character caution was a prominent feature, was averse to this hasty and ill-prepared expedition. But the impetuous spirit of Tolmides was seconded by the assembly, and his reputation drew a thousand volunteers², including the flower of the Athenian youth, to share his enterprise. With this force, and some allied troops, whose numbers are not mentioned, he entered Bœotia, and first attacked Chæronea. He succeeded in reducing it,

¹ Strabo, ix. p. 423. Anemorea was on this border.

² Plut. Per. 18. Thucydides, i. 113, mentions the number, but does not describe them as volunteers. If Tolmides ever used the artifice related by Diodorus, and mentioned in a preceding note, we suspect that it may have been on this occasion; not however that he played it off on his fellow citizens, but on the allies, who might be less zealous in the cause.

and was retiring with his little army, which he had weakened by leaving a garrison in the captured town, when, in the neighbourhood of Coronea, he was surprised by the appearance of a hostile army, composed of the Bœotian exiles assembled in Orchomenus, of Locrians, exiles from Eubœa, and other partizans of the same cause. The Athenians were completely defeated; many of them were taken prisoners, and Tolmides himself was among the slain. The immediate consequence of this defeat was a counter-revolution, which overthrew the Athenian influence throughout Bœotia. To recover the Athenian prisoners, who were probably for the most part young men of good families, the Athenians stipulated to withdraw all their troops from Bœotia; and their departure was every where followed by the return of the exiles, and the predominance of the party hostile to Athens.

But the full effects of this disaster did not become visible until the five years' truce had expired (445). Athens had then to sustain a quick succession of hostile attacks, which were probably preconcerted in reliance on the co-operation of Sparta. The first blow was the revolt of Eubœa; and when Pericles had crossed over to reduce it to subjection, he received tidings of a revolution at Megara, where the adverse party, supported by auxiliaries from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus, had risen upon the Athenian garrison, and put the greater part to the sword: the rest took refuge in Nisæa. He at the same time learnt that a Peloponnesian army was on its march toward Attica. This intelligence induced him to transport his forces back from Eubœa with the utmost speed for the defence of Athens, and the Peloponnesians soon after entered the country, and began to ravage the fertile plains on the western frontier. They were commanded by the young king Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias; but to supply the defect of his years the ephors had placed a counsellor of maturer age, named Cleandridas, at his side. Pericles, it is said, found Cleandridas accessible to bribes, and

prevailed on him to withdraw the invading army. Both he, and the young king, on their return to Sparta, were charged with having sold the interests of their country. Cleandridas shrank from the accusation by a voluntary exile, and was condemned to death in his absence. Pleistoanax, according to Plutarch, was sentenced to so heavy a penalty, that, being unable to discharge it, he quitted the country. But Thucydides would rather lead us to suppose that he fled, like Cleandridas, to avoid a severer punishment; for he chose the sanctuary of Jupiter, on Mount Lycæum in Arcadia, as the place of his retreat, and for greater security fixed his abode in a part of the sacred buildings.¹ Pericles however no sooner saw himself rid of this enemy, than he returned with an armament of 50 galleys and 5000 heavy-armed, to quell the revolt of Eubœa. He speedily overpowered all resistance, and seized this occasion of at once securing the Athenian dominion in the island, and providing for a part of the poorer citizens at the expence of their refractory allies. According to Plutarch, the Chalcidian landowners were all again deprived of their estates; and the whole population of Histiaæ was expelled from its native seats, to make room for an Attic colony, and at the same time to expiate the inhumanity with which they had put to death the crew of an Athenian galley captured in the war.²

But though the most pressing danger was thus for the present averted, the alarm which had been excited at Athens by these simultaneous attacks from so many quarters was still so strong as to dispose the people to peace. On the other hand the Spartans, having lost the most favourable opportunity for action through the treachery or weakness of their commanders, were not eager for a fresh expedition. But they took advantage of the present state of public feeling at Athens, to exact

¹ V. 16.

² Plut. Per. 23. We shall hereafter notice some reasons for doubting whether the measure was so extensive as Plutarch's language describes it.

conditions which under other circumstances would probably have been rejected with scorn. What they required amounted indeed to little more than a complete deliverance of Peloponnesus from Athenian influence. The Athenians were in possession of Trœzen, which, notwithstanding its Dorian colony, had always continued to regard them as kinsmen, and they had a hold on Achaia which enabled them, as we have seen, to levy troops there, though its precise nature is not described. But as long as they continued to occupy Pegæ, there could be no security for the allies of Sparta on the western side of Peloponnesus, and as little was their possession of Nisæa consistent with the safety of the party now prevailing at Megara. The restitution therefore, or evacuation of Trœzen, Achaia, Pegæ, and Nisæa, was demanded by Sparta, and conceded by Athens; and on these terms a truce was concluded between the two states, and the confederacies over which they presided, for thirty years (B. C. 445). Thucydides mentions no other conditions of the treaty; but it seems probable that the Athenians lost ground in some other points after the battle of Coronea. The revolution in Bœotia seems to have been followed by the overthrow of their influence in Phocis, which, when it is next mentioned, is numbered among the allies of Sparta; and it was most probably at the same time that the temple at Delphi was restored to the custody of the Delphians; for, though the fact is not recorded, there can be little doubt that, a few years after, the oracle and the treasury were in their keeping.¹

Pericles, if we may judge from the maxims which Thucydides attributes to him on a subsequent occasion, may not have considered the concessions of this treaty so important as they would appear to those who did not share his views, as to the real foundation of the greatness of Athens, and the policy which her true interest

¹ This is evident from the zeal with which the oracle espouses the Spartan cause just before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Thuc. I. 118.

prescribed. The points abandoned, whether they were regarded as posts of attack or defence, would in his eyes seem of little moment, so long as Athens remained absolute mistress of the sea, and held firm possession of her maritime empire. Yet it is not certain that the treaty was his work, and that it may not have been imputed to the opposite party, and have contributed to render it obnoxious. After Cimon's death, this party found a new leader in Thucydides, son of Melesias, a kinsman of Cimon's, and a person, who, though inferior to him in military talents, was better versed in the art of managing a popular assembly. He devoted himself entirely to political business, and according to Plutarch organized a more regular opposition than had hitherto been formed against the administration of Pericles. But his activity only served to hasten his own downfall, and to consummate his adversary's triumph. Pericles far surpassed him in eloquence and address; and he himself is said to have acknowledged this superiority by a lively image, in a conversation with the Spartan king Archidamus. The Spartan asked him, whether he or Pericles was the better wrestler. "When I throw Pericles," he answered, "he always persuades the bystanders that he has not been down." But this was probably the slightest of the advantages which Pericles possessed over him and his party. The contest was not one of rhetoric or wit; and what enabled Pericles to overpower all opposition, was not so much his intellectual predominance, as the accordance of his policy with the spirit and situation of his countrymen. The measures which Thucydides opposed were precisely those which were in their own nature popular and irresistible. The ground which he took must have appeared to his contemporaries at the best as an unseasonable affectation of an over-refined morality; even if they could see in it anything more than a party manoeuvre, thinly covered by a shew of severe justice and wise economy. When therefore the contest was brought to an issue, which rendered it necessary for one of the

rivals to go into a temporary exile, the ostracism fell, as it could not fail to do, on Thucydides (B. C. 444). The anecdote above related seems to imply that he retired to Sparta; it appears, indeed, that he was not long after restored to his country, perhaps because he had ceased to be formidable; but his faction was entirely broken up, and the sway of Pericles in the Athenian councils became more absolute than ever, and lasted with scarcely any interruption to the end of his life.

CHAP. XVIII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE TO THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND CORINTH, WITH A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF PERICLES.

THE 'Thirty Years' Truce, though concluded upon terms seemingly disadvantageous to Athens, afforded an interval of repose highly favourable to her prosperity, only interrupted by one successful effort. It was during this period that Pericles was enabled to carry out his views into action, with the amplest means that the state could furnish, at his command, and with scarcely a breath of opposition to divert him from his purpose. The history of Athens during the continuance of the 'Thirty Years' Truce may be properly comprised in a general survey of his administration.

Pericles, to describe his policy in a few words, had two objects mainly in view throughout his public life: to extend and strengthen the Athenian empire, and to raise the confidence and self-esteem of the Athenians themselves to a level with the lofty position which they occupied. Almost all his measures may clearly be referred to one or the other of these ends. There are only a few as to which it may seem doubtful whether they can be traced to any higher aim than that of establishing his own power, and whether they must not be regarded as a sacrifice by which, at the expence of his principles, he purchased that popularity which was the indispensable condition of success in all his undertakings.

The condition of the greater part of the states which composed the Athenian confederacy had, as we have

seen, undergone a great change in the time of Cimon, and through his management. A very important innovation, which visibly altered the relation before subsisting between Athens and her allies, appears to have been effected even in the life-time of Aristides. We learn from Plutarch, that a proposal was then made, nominally at least by the Samians, to transfer the treasury of the confederacy from Delos to Athens. Aristides is said to have admitted the expediency of the change for the interest of Athens, but to have condemned it as unjust. Perhaps he was aware, that the Samians, who made this application, did not really express the wishes of their countrymen, who can scarcely have had any motive for desiring what they proposed, and that they were only employed by the party at Athens who wished to carry the measure, to take away the appearance of open violence. It is not quite certain, though most probable, that the objections of Aristides were overruled on this occasion; but at least the change was not long deferred. Those introduced by Cimon stript the weaker states one after another of their means of defence; and when Pericles came to the head of affairs, there probably remained but a few steps more to be taken to convert the confederacy into an empire, over which Athens ruled as a despotic sovereign. It seems to have been he who raised the annual contributions of the allies from 460 talents, the amount at which they had been fixed by Aristides, to 600², and who first accustomed the Athenians to exert a direct and engrossing authority over the states which had been deprived of their political independence, and to interfere with the concerns of their domestic administration. Beside her financial exactions, there were two ways in which

¹ This appears from Plut. Arist. 25, to have been the fact. But whether the turn given to the conduct of Aristides by Theophrastus, who represented him as recommending the measure in spite of its iniquity, is a sufficient ground for saying with Wachsmuth, i. 2. p. 75, that he approved of it, may be doubted. He may either have said that it was unjust, but expedient, or that it was expedient, but unjust.

² Still it does not appear what part of the additional 140 talents arose from the commutation of service for money, and whether those who had contributed to the 460, were now at all more heavily burdened than before.

Athens encroached on the rights of her subjects : one affecting their forms of government; the other the dispensation of justice. The establishment of a democratical constitution was not an invariable effect of their subjection, but it was a consequence which must in most cases have flowed from it, even without any interference on the part of the ruling state; and where an aristocratical party was permitted to prevail, it probably furnished a pretext for stricter inspection and heavier burdens. This however was but a slight grievance, in comparison with the regulation by which all trials of capital offences, and all cases involving property exceeding a certain low amount, were transferred from the cognizance of the local courts to Athenian tribunals. The advantage which the Athenians derived, as well from the fees of justice, as from the influx of strangers at the yearly sessions held for the foreign suitors, was undoubtedly great; but the loss and inconvenience inflicted by the same means on their subjects was still greater. Justice was rendered needlessly expensive, slow, and uncertain. Not only were the most important causes delayed to the season proper for a voyage, but it might happen through the unavoidable accumulation of business, even where no dishonest artifices were employed, that after a long stay in a foreign city, the parties were forced to return home, leaving their suits till pending.

The authority which Athens assumed over her allies, and her interference in their domestic concerns, proved the occasion of a war, which threatened to put an end to the thirty years' truce in the sixth or seventh year from its commencement, but by its issue consolidated the Athenian empire, and raised the reputation of Pericles, by what he and his contemporaries considered as the most brilliant of his military triumphs. A quarrel had arisen between Samos and Miletus, Thucydides says, about Priene. But the more especial object of contention seems to have been the town of Anæa, on the main land opposite Samos, a place of some note

in the early history of the Ionian settlers.¹ A war ensued, in which the Milesians were vanquished, and now sought protection from Athens, and endeavoured to excite her jealousy against their successful rivals. In this application they were seconded by a party in Samos itself, which hoped with Athenian assistance to overthrow the oligarchical government which had been hitherto permitted to subsist in the island. They found a favourable hearing. Pericles indeed was charged with sacrificing the Samians to private feelings, which will be hereafter explained. But it was probably a political motive, more than any personal bias, that induced him to seize the opportunity thus offered of reducing Samos to a closer dependence on the ruling state. The Samians were ordered to desist from hostilities, and to submit the matter in dispute to an Athenian tribunal; and as they did not immediately comply, Pericles was sent with a squadron of forty galleys to enforce obedience, and to regulate the state of Samos as the interest of Athens might seem to require. On his arrival he established a democratical constitution, and to secure it against the powerful party which was adverse to this change, he took a hundred hostages — fifty men and fifty boys — whom he lodged in Lemnos, having it is said rejected the offer of a large sum of money, with which the oligarchs would have been willing to purchase his protection. Diodorus found an account, which is not improbable, that he exacted a contribution of 80 talents. He then sailed home, leaving a small Athenian garrison in Samos.²

In the meanwhile a body of Samians — the more resolute perhaps, or the more obnoxious of the defeated party — had quitted the island on the approach of the

¹ See Vol. II. p. 87. Hence in the Life of Sophocles the war is called *τὸ πρὸς Ἀσάσιον πολέμου*. See Brunck, *Sophocles*, i. p. xv. Seidler's Dissertation on the Antigone in Hermann's edition, p. lxxiv. Boeckh on the Antigone in the Berlin Transactions, 1824.

² That this garrison was left in Samos, not in Lemnos (where the whole population being friendly it was not needed), is moreover so clear from the context, that it might have been thought impossible to mistake the meaning of Thucydides.

Athenians, and had opened a correspondence with Pisuthnes the satrap of Sardis, who is even said to have furnished them with gold, when hopes were entertained of bribing Pericles. When the Athenian squadron had retired, they concerted a plan with their Persian ally for regaining possession of their country, and seem to have shown great energy and dexterity in carrying it into execution. First of all, having raised seven hundred mercenaries, and given notice to their friends at home, they crossed over to Samos in the night, overpowered and secured the Athenian garrison, and the greater part of their political adversaries, and abolished the newly established form of government. Next, and probably before news of this revolution had reached Lemnos, they secretly conveyed away the hostages who had been deposited there¹, and being thus freed from all restraint, openly renounced the Athenian alliance or authority, and bent their thoughts on the means of maintaining their independence. They placed their Athenian prisoners in the hands of the satrap; the condition perhaps on which they obtained a promise that they should be supported by a Phœnician fleet; they also found means of engaging Byzantium to join in the revolt, and prepared immediately to renew hostilities against Miletus, in the hope perhaps of striking a decisive blow before succour should arrive from Athens. Yet these aids, even if none should fail them, could not inspire a reasonable confidence, so long as Athens was able to direct her whole strength against them; and the general inaction of the other subject states seemed to prove the hopelessness of their undertaking. Their only fair prospect of success and safety depended on the disposition which they might find among the enemies of Athens in Greece, to take up

¹ ἐπαλψαντες. Thuc. i. 115. The use of this term seems clearly to prove that those who conveyed away the hostages did not at the same time make themselves masters of an Athenian force that had been left to guard them, even if it was possible to reconcile this supposition with the expression ὅσαν παρὰ σφίσιν. Plutarch (Per. 25.) makes Pisuthnes himself carry off the hostages; if so, the prisoners delivered to him must have been taken at Samos.

their cause. The allies of Sparta, probably at their request, held a congress, in which the question seems to have been earnestly discussed. According to the slight and rhetorical allusion made by Thucydides to the proceedings of this assembly, it was Corinth that determined her confederates to abandon the Samians to the vengeance of their incensed sovereign. The ground on which the historian represents the Corinthians to have acted on this occasion, is too consonant to their general policy, and too important, to be looked upon as a rhetorical invention. It is indeed alledged by a Corinthian orator before an Athenian assembly, as a claim upon Athenian gratitude; but it cannot have been feigned; and it implies that the authority which Athens exercised over her allies was generally acknowledged to be legitimate. The Corinthians, it is said, voted against the Samians, when many of the other Peloponnesian states were inclined to send them succours, and at the same time laid down the general principle, that every state had a right to punish its offending allies.¹ Whether in fact the Corinthians apprehended that the lending assistance to the revolted Samians might prove a precedent attended with dangerous consequences to the system which they themselves observed toward their colonies, or they only put the principle forward as a pretext to cover the unwillingness which they may have felt on other accounts to break the truce so early, is a question of little importance. But under all the circumstances of the case to treat the Samians as rebels, in an assembly where every one present avowedly wished well to their cause, was certainly a large admission in favour of the highest pretensions that Athens had ever maintained as to the extent of her supremacy.

These deliberations, if begun, were probably not at an end before Pericles, accompanied by nine colleagues, had crossed the sea with a fleet of sixty sail, to suppress the insurrection. They had learnt that a fleet was expected to come to the assistance of the Samians from

¹ Thuc. i. 40.

Phœnicia, and some galleys were sent to look out for it, while another small squadron was despatched to bring up the reinforcements to be furnished by Chios and Lesbos. Though his numbers were reduced by these detachments to forty-four galleys, Pericles did not shrink from engaging with a Samian fleet of seventy, including twenty transports, as it was returning from Miletus, and gained a victory. Shortly after he received an addition to his forces, of forty ships from Athens, and five-and-twenty from Chios and Lesbos, which enabled him to land a body of troops sufficient to drive the enemy into the town, and to invest it with a triple line of intrenchments. Yet it appears that even after the siege was formed another sea-fight took place, in which the Samians, who were commanded by the philosopher Melissus¹, were victorious. The advantage however must have been very slight, or soon followed by a reverse; for we find that, while the hopes of the Samians rested on the Phœnician fleet, and they despatched five galleys to hasten its movements, Pericles thought himself strong enough to take sixty ships, and sail along the coast of Caria, to meet the expected enemy. The Phœnicians did not come up; but during his absence the besieged drew out their remaining galleys, and surprised the naval encampment of the Athenians, sank their guardships, and defeated the rest, which were brought out in disorder to repel the sudden attack. This success made them masters of the sea, and enabled them to introduce supplies into the town. They retained the ascendant fourteen days; it was perhaps nearly so long before the Athenians were able to convey the news to Pericles. On his return, the state of things was reversed, and the Samians once

¹ See Vol. II. p. 137. It is on the authority of Aristotle that Plutarch, *Per. 26*, relates this fact, of which Thucydides does not give the slightest hint, and, but for the extreme brevity of his narrative, he might seem to contradict it. Brandis (*Handbuch der Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie*, i. p. 397.) suggests a doubt, whether this Melissus was the philosopher.

more closely besieged. But the effort they had made seems to have excited some alarm at Athens, and to have induced the Athenians to put forth more of their strength. A squadron of forty galleys; under three eminent commanders, Hagnon, Phormio, and Thucydides¹, was followed by one of twenty sail under Telepolemus and Anticles, and this by thirty others from Chios and Lesbos. Yet even this overpowering force did not deter the Samians, though the succours expected from Phœnicia did not arrive, from venturing on another sea-fight, which was soon decided, so as to leave them no means of doing more than remain on the defensive. They however held out nine months, and seem at last to have been reduced to capitulate by famine; though Pericles is said to have employed some new kinds of artillery², and to have harassed the besieged by a continual succession of attacks, which may also have served to divert the impatience of his own troops, among whom, if we may believe the statement of a later author, plenty and security seem to have bred an unusual degree of luxury and dissoluteness.³ The terms which the Samians obtained may be considered as mild; especially if, as Plutarch relates, the two parties had been so far exasperated as mutually to brand their prisoners.⁴ They were compelled to

¹ It is a very doubtful point who this Thucydides was. That he was the historian himself seems highly improbable, not only because he would most likely have given some hint of his presence, but because we might then have expected a somewhat fuller account of the siege. On the other hand the son of Melesias had been ostracised less than ten years before. Yet it seems easier to suppose that the term of his exile had been abridged, than that the officer mentioned on this occasion was a person otherwise unknown.

² Invented, according to Ephorus (Plut. Per. 27.), by a lame engineer of Clazomenæ, named Artemo, who from his being carried about in a litter was distinguished by the epithet *Ἰσχιόγερος*. But Heracleides disputed the fact on the ground that a person of the same name and epithet was mentioned by Anacreon (compare Athenæus, xii. 46.), and was also celebrated for mechanical contrivances. The coincidence would indeed be singular, but might be credible, if the two persons belonged to the same family.

³ See the account of the statue of Aphrodite at Samos, quoted from Alexis, a Samian writer, by Athenæus, xiii. p. 572.

⁴ Plutarch represents the Athenians as the aggressors. They branded their prisoners with the figure of a kind of merchant ship, used at Samos, and called a *Samæna*. The Samians branded the Athenians with the figure of an owl. The irritation of the Samians found vent afterwards in the writings of their countryman Duris, who charged the Athenians and Pericles with atrocious inhumanity toward their prisoners.

dismantle their fortifications, to deliver up their ships, and to pay the cost of the siege by instalments.¹ The submission of Byzantium, which does not seem to have taken an active part in the war, followed close upon the reduction of Samos.

Pericles on his return to Athens was greeted with extraordinary honours. The whole merit of the success was ascribed to him, and he is said exultingly to have compared the issue of his nine months siege with the conquest which had cost Agamemnon ten years. The contest had at one time assumed a threatening aspect: and Thucydides himself seems to intimate that the result might have been very different, if the Samians had been better supported.² In the funeral obsequies with which the citizens who had fallen before Samos were honoured, according to an usage which had been introduced at Athens in the Persian war³, Pericles was chosen to deliver the customary oration. At its close the women who attended the ceremony, expressed their sense either of his eloquence or of his military services, by a shower of headbands and chaplets. Elpinice alone, it is said, was heard reproachingly to contrast the triumph which he had dearly won over a Greek city, with those which her brother had achieved over the barbarians. Pericles retorted by a line of Archilochus, which, unless it was a mere personal sarcasm, signified that Cimon's policy was now antiquated.⁴

The event of the Samian war gave the sanction of success to the claim which Athens advanced of absolute authority over her allies. It established the fact that the name *alliance*, so far as it signified a relation

¹ Thuc. i. 117. Diodorus, xii. 28, mentions 200 talents, as the sum at which Pericles estimated the expenses of the siege. But this is manifestly much too little, and one might almost suspect that the words, *καὶ χιλίων*, had dropt either out of his text, or out of his head. Compare Isocr. *ἀντιδ.* p. 446. Bekker.

² VIII. 76.

³ Diodorus, xi. 33. The Scholiast on Thucydides, ii. 35, attributes the institution to Solon — probably because he did not know of any other legislator whom his author could be alluding to.

⁴ *οὐκ ἔν μύροισι γράυς ἰούσι ἡλείφει.*

of equality, or any degree of subordination short of entire subjection to the will of the ruling state, was a mere mockery. The question of right could not indeed be so determined. But the aid which Chios and Lesbos — the only members of the confederacy which retained either a show of independence, or the means of asserting it — had lent toward the suppression of the Samian revolt, and still more the acquiescence of Sparta and her allies, interpreted by the language in which a part of them expressly recognized the title of Athens to the sovereignty which she claimed, might seem to attest the justice of her cause. Nor would it have been difficult to find arguments — had they been wanted — to satisfy the scruples of the Athenians. Though the league over which they presided had been originally formed with the free consent of all parties, it might be speciously contended, that none of its members had a right to endanger the safety of the rest by withdrawing from it. Athens had been compelled to repress several attempts which had been made with this object, by force; and the resentment, and jealousy which she had thus excited, constrained her to take up a new position, to treat all her allies as her subjects, and to acknowledge no obligations toward them, except the duty of protecting them, which was included in that of maintaining and strengthening her maritime empire. One important conclusion which resulted from this view of her situation, was that she owed her confederates no account of the treasure which she drew from them; that it might be legitimately applied to purposes foreign to those for which it had been at first contributed, and that even if a part of it was laid out in a manner which could benefit none but the Athenian people, these might be considered as the savings of its prudence, or as the earnings of its valour, for which it was not responsible, and which it might use, or enjoy, as seemed fit to itself. Such perhaps was the nature of the arguments by which Pericles silenced the opposition of Thucydides and his party, when they urged that the transfer of the com

mon treasure from Delos to Athens, could not affect its character, or discharge the Athenians from the engagement by which they were bound to employ it for public ends. The sophistry was not too gross to have blinded the most enlightened both of nations and of individuals, if it fell in with their inclinations.

The condition of an Athenian citizen acquired a new dignity and value, when he was considered as one of the people which ruled a great empire with such absolute sway. But as it was one object which Pericles had constantly in view, to elevate the Athenians to a full consciousness of their lofty station, as members of the sovereign state, and to lead them to look upon their city not merely as the capital of Attica, but as the metropolis of their extensive dominions, it was also one of his chief cares to prevent the contrast which might sometimes arise between the public character and the private circumstances of his fellow-citizens, from becoming too glaring, or too general. One great class of measures which formed a prominent feature in his system, served the double purpose of providing many individuals with the means of subsistence, and of securing and strengthening the state. "With this view numerous colonies were planted during his administration in positions where they might best guard and promote the interests of Athens. And the footing on which a great part of these colonists stood, while it preserved the closest connection between them and the mother country, rendered the relief thus afforded to their indigence so much the more acceptable. They were treated as Athenian citizens who had obtained grants of land in a foreign country, where they might fix their residence or not, as they thought fit, but without in either case renouncing their Athenian franchise.¹ There can be no doubt that the greater number of the colonists shifted their abode, and very seldom returned to exercise their ancient franchise. But still it must have been but

¹ Κληροῦχοι, thus distinguished from ἀπαινοί, colonists parted from the mother country.

rarely, and under peculiar circumstances, that they altogether dropped the character and feelings of Athenians.

Thus the north of Eubœa was protected by a colony of 2000 Athenians, who were planted in the new town of Oreus, which rose into the place of the depopulated Histiaæa. If we might believe Plutarch, Pericles also expelled the landowners of Chalcis, who seem to have returned to their ancient seats after they had been evacuated by the Athenians in the Persian war, and were perhaps permitted to retain possession of them, subject to tribute.¹ If Pericles ejected them when he conquered Eubœa, it must have been to make room for Athenian settlers. But the relation which we find afterward subsisting between Chalcis and Athens, does not allow us to consider the former as an Athenian colony²; and we therefore cannot believe that the measure spoken of by Plutarch extended beyond the confiscation of some estates. The submission of Naxos was secured by a colony of 500 Athenians, who were probably provided for at the expence of the more obnoxious of the islanders. Andros afforded a new home and subsistence for half as many Athenian settlers. A thousand were tempted by the offer of land in the territory of the Bisaltian Thracians.³ As many more found room in the Thracian Chersonesus, and thus served to guard that important conquest, and to protect the Athenian commerce in that quarter. Among these settlements there are some which deserve more particular notice, either on account of their connection with subsequent events in this history, or as indications of the large views, and aspiring thoughts, which now directed the Athenian counsels. The failure and loss which the Athenians had experienced in their attempt to establish themselves on the Strymon, at the Nine Ways, did not

¹ Theopompus in Strabo, x. p. 445. τὸν Ἰεῖδον — δῆμον ὄντα πρῶτον τῶν Ἰστιαίων.

² Wachsmuth, i. 1. Appendix 13.

³ The exact place is not mentioned. Their land lay to the south of the Strymon. This colony was probably connected with the foundation of Amphipolis; perhaps the Ἀγρινία of Steph. B.

deter them from renewing the enterprise. In the twenty-ninth^e year after the disaster at Drabescus, B. C. 437, Hagnon son of Nicias, having collected a sufficient force at Eion, of which the Athenians still retained possession, succeeded in finally dislodging the Edonians from the site of his intended colony, and founded a new city, to which, from its situation — on a spur of mount Pangæon, commanding an extensive view both toward the coast and into the interior, between two reaches of the Strymon which he connected together by a long wall carried across the hill at the back of the town¹ — he gave the name of Amphipolis. Hagnon enjoyed the honours of a founder as long as Athens retained any hold on the affection or respect of the colony. But the number of the Athenian settlers, as was to be expected from the perilous nature of the adventure, seems to have been originally small, and never to have formed a considerable part of the population.

In the course of an expedition which Pericles conducted in person into the Euxine, at the head of a large and gallant armament, for the purpose of displaying the power of Athens, and strengthening her influence among the cities and nations on those coasts, an opportunity presented itself of gaining possession of Sinope. The city was distracted by a civil war between the partisans and the adversaries of the tyrant Timesilaus; and as Miletus was no longer able to interfere in the affairs of her colony, the friends of liberty applied to Pericles for assistance. Being unable to remain long enough to bring the contest to a close, he left thirteen galleys under the command of Lamachus, a brave officer, whose name will be made familiar to us by a long and active career. The tyrant and his adherents were expelled, and the successful party invited a body of 600 Athenians to share the freedom of the city, and the confiscated estates of the exiles. It may have been at the same period that Amisus admitted so great a

¹ See Dr. Arnold in the Appendix to Thucydides, vol. ii., on the neighbourhood of Amphipolis.

number of Athenians among her citizens, that in the time of Mithridates the whole population was considered as an Attic race.¹—The fall of Sybaris made an opening for an Athenian colony in the west, which, though not very important in itself, is interesting for the circumstances under which it rose, for the celebrated names which were connected with it, and for the ambitious hopes which it suggested or cherished. The Sybarites who survived the destruction of their city, had taken refuge in their colony of Laos, and in Scidrus, which had probably also belonged to them, and seem to have made no attempt to recover their ancient seats. But the children and grandchildren of these exiles appear to have engaged a body of adventurers from Thessaly², to join them in effecting a settlement on the vacant site of Sybaris, which was thus restored fifty-eight years after its fall.³ The new colony very soon roused the jealousy of Croton, or was found to encroach upon her interests, and at the end of five or six years the settlers were forced to quit their new home. They did not however remain passive under this violence, but sent envoys to Sparta and Athens, to solicit aid for the renewal of their attempt. Sparta saw no benefit that she could derive from the undertaking, and declined to take a part in it. But at Athens the proposals of the envoys were seconded by Pericles, and warmly embraced by the people. Ten commissioners were sent out, among whom was a celebrated diviner named Lampon, a man of eminent skill in the interpretation of oracles, and the regulation of sacred rites. An oracle was procured exactly suited to the purpose of the leaders of the expedition, and under its guidance a new town was built, with geometrical regularity⁴, at a short distance

¹ Appian, Mithrid. 8, calls it *πολιν Ἀττικῶν γένους*, and, *ibid.* 83, says that Lucullus heard *ὅτι Ἀθηναίων αὐτοὺς θαλασσοκρατοῦντων συνακίσσαι*.

² Diodor. xii. 10 but xi. 90 he only speaks of a leader named Thessalius. Wesseling prefers the first of these statements, but assigns no reason for his *minus commodè*, with which he rejects the latter.

³ B. C. 452. See Wesseling on Diodor. tom. i. p. 484. 53.

⁴ There were four main streets—the Heraclea, the Aphrodisias, the Olympias, and the Dionysias—crossed at right angles by three called

from the site of the old city, and called Thurium, or Thuri, from a fountain which rose there. Two very celebrated persons, Herodotus the historian, and the orator Lysias, were among the settlers. They were both foreigners; for the Athenians had invited adventurers from all parts of Greece, and particularly from Peloponnesus, to share the risks and the advantages of the expedition. The miscellaneous character of the population led to quarrels which for a while gave a violent shock to the peace of the colony. The descendants of the ancient Sybarites put forward ridiculous pretensions of superiority over the new comers. They claimed the exclusive enjoyment of the most important offices of the state; in the division of the territory they insisted on being allowed to choose the parcels of land which lay nearest the city; and in public sacrifices they would have their kinswomen take precedence of the other women. Such were not the terms on which the new citizens had accepted their invitation; they were indignant at the insolence of this aristocracy, which, though entirely dependent on their help, treated them as an inferior race; their resentment at length broke out into a furious attack, by which the whole of this last remnant of the ill-fated people is said to have been exterminated; examples of a tragical destiny, which after restoring them unexpectedly to their own soil, made them fall there the victims of their arrogance. After this event the remaining Thuriens recruited their forces by a fresh band of adventurers from Greece, who were invited to join them upon terms of perfect civil and political equality. In imitation perhaps of the Athenian institutions they distributed themselves into ten tribes, which were named after the different nations of which the colony was composed. Four of these tribes, which took their names from Athens, Ionia, Eubœa, and the islands, may perhaps

Herœa, Thuria, and Thurina. Singular that none took a name connected with Athens; especially if, as Mueller conjectures (*Dor. iv. i. 1.*), Hippodamus was the architect. Is there any mistake as to the last two?

be considered as a measure of the utmost influence which Athens could exert there. Of the rest three represented Peloponnesus¹, three the north of Greece.² They maintained peace with Croton, the more easily no doubt for the destruction of the Sybarites; enriched themselves by the industrious cultivation of their fertile and equably divided territory; and provided for domestic order and tranquillity by borrowing the institutions of Charondas. We learn from Strabo³ that some Athenians took a part in the settlement of the new Parthenope (Neapolis), a colony of Cuma and the adjacent islands. Niebuhr⁴ conjectures that it was founded at about the same time with Thurii. And it seems probable that though Pericles may have promoted these enterprises without any other object than that of prosecuting the policy which has been already described, there were ardent spirits at Athens who viewed these western settlements as steps toward the accomplishment of a vast scheme, which, according to Plutarch⁵, was already floating as a day-dream in the minds of some political speculators, and which embraced Sicily, Etruria, and Carthage itself, as possible additions to the Athenian empire.*

The anxiety of Pericles to raise the value of the Athenian franchise, was still more distinctly proved by a law which he caused to be enacted at an early period in his administration, confining the rights of citizenship to persons whose parents were both Athenians. This law was not called into extensive operation before the year B. C. 444, nearly at the same time with the foundation of Thurii. But this year the Libyan prince, Psammetichus, who was master of a large part of Lower Egypt, having sent a present of corn to be distributed among the Athenian people, a rigid scrutiny was instituted to try the titles of those who claimed a share of the largess. The result was that nearly 5000 persons were declared to

¹ The Arcas, Achæis, and Elea.

² The Boeotia, Amphictyons, and Doris.

³ L. p. 154, but see his remark in note 79.

⁴ Per. 20.

⁵ V. p. 246.

be aliens, and, it is said, suffered the penalty appointed by a rigorous law for those who usurped the privileges of a citizen, being sold as slaves. The number of the citizens who passed through this ordeal amounted to very little more than 14,000. But even after this reduction, and while the colonies were drawing off a part of the residue, Pericles was obliged to make it one of his leading objects to provide for the subsistence of those who were left, and the extraordinary expenditure which he directed was destined mainly, though not exclusively, to this purpose. Thus a squadron of sixty galleys was sent out every year, and was kept at sea eight months, partly indeed to keep the crews in training, but not without a distinct view to the advantage which a large body of citizens derived from the pay, which probably supported them during the remainder of the year. But still more ample employment was furnished to the poorer class by the great works which were undertaken at the proposal of Pericles, and carried on under his eye, for the defence and the embellishment of the city, and which have rendered his accession to power an epoch no less important in the history of the arts, than in that of Attica itself.

The great plan of Themistocles, which Cimon had prosecuted by the erection of the Long Walls, was completed under the administration of Pericles, by the construction of a third wall, within the two first built, which ran parallel and near to that which joined the city to Piræus, and served the purpose of keeping the communication open, even if either of the outer walls happened to be surprised by an enemy.¹ The ravages of the Persians, and the gratitude due to the gods who had delivered the city, imposed a religious obligation of replacing the defaced or demolished temples, at Athens, Eleusis, and in other parts of Attica,

¹ This view of the subject, which is that of Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. ii. 13.) and Mueller (Ersch and Grueber's Encyclopædia, art. *Attika*), seems decidedly preferable to the opinion of col. Leake, and Kruse (Hellas, ii. p. 132.), who hold that the *diá mērou téichos*, mentioned by Plato (Gorgias, p. 455.), was a transverse wall which joined the two long walls together.

and of adding new ones, all on a scale of magnificence corresponding to the increased power and opulence of the state. The whole summit of the Rock was covered with sacred buildings and monuments, among which the greater temple of the tutelary goddess, the Parthenon, rose supreme in majesty and beauty. An ornamental fortification called the Propylæa, which covered the western side — the only one not quite precipitous — of the citadel, formed an approach worthy of the marvellous scene to which it gave access. Edifices of a different kind were required, as well for the theatrical and musical entertainments of the people, as for the reception of multitudes assembled on graver occasions. A theatre adapted to this purpose, as well as to the new form of the drama, had been begun before the time of Pericles. He added one designed for the performance of music, thence called the *Odeum*, with a pointed roof, shaped it is said in imitation of the tent of Xerxes, and constructed out of the masts of Persian ships. In the planning and adorning of these buildings some of the greatest architects and sculptors Greece ever produced — the unrivalled Phidias with his two scholars, Alcamenes and Agoracritus, Ictius, and Callicrates¹, Mnesicles², Callimachus³, Corœbus⁴, Metagenes, Xenocles⁵, and others — found ample exercise for their genius and talents. But according to Greek usages and taste architecture and sculpture were intimately allied with a long train of subordinate arts, which gave employment to the skill and ingenuity of a multitude of inferior workmen. Thus not only was the colossal image of the goddess, which was the principal object of worship in the Parthenon, formed of ivory and gold, but the same precious metal was profusely employed in the decoration of the sculptures which adorned the exterior of the temple,

¹ Architects of the Parthenon.

² Architect of the Propylæa.

³ Inventor according to Vitruvius of the Corinthian order; he also executed a golden lamp, and a brazen palm-tree for the temple of Athene Polias.

⁴ He began the temple at Eleusis which was continued by Metagenes.

⁵ He added the roof with a circular aperture (*skuteron*) to the *Arctonagora*.

and which were also relieved by the most brilliant colours. The groups which filled its pediments, while they roused the strongest feelings of Attic religion and patriotism by the subjects which they represented, and satisfied the severest taste by the harmony of the design, also dazzled the eye as gorgeous pictures¹, lighted up by the sky of Attica, and rendered the more striking by the simple purity of the marble frames in which they were set, and of the colonnades which supported them. Hence, as Plutarch observes, so long as these vast undertakings, which required so many arts to be combined for their execution, were in progress, it was scarcely possible that a hand which needed work could be left idle in Athens. As a variety of costly materials, gold, and brass, and marble, and ivory, and ebony, and cedar, were frequently demanded for different parts of the same work, so many classes of artists or craftsmen, whose labours were more or less mechanical — a distinction to which the Greeks seem to have attached less importance than we do² — were needed to concur in working them up. And while carpenters, and masons, and smiths, and turners, and dyers, and carvers, and gilders, were thus employed at home, a great number of trades were set in active-exercise to procure their materials, and to transport them by land and sea. Every art could marshal a host of dependents whom it maintained. It must however be observed, that though in every branch of industry which required a high degree of intelligence, the Attic workman might commonly be sure of being preferred at least to all foreigners who were not Greeks, in those which depended upon mere

¹ See Brøndsted, *Reisen*, ii p 161.

² In the passage to which we here allude, Per. 12, Plutarch — as is observed by Thiersch, *Epoch*, p 102 — classes a number of arts together, without making any distinction between those which we regard as liberal professions, and others which we treat as mechanical. Thiersch shows from Lucian (*Somn.* § 1.) that the epithet βαρυσσος was applied no less to Phidias, or Polycletus, than to a common mason. But they seem to have been brought down to this level only in contrast with the higher dignity of political or military functions, according to the sentiment which Plutarch expresses, Per 2.; as Æschylus thought little of his poetry in comparison with the honour of having fought at Marathon.

manual labour he was constantly brought into a disadvantageous competition with the slaves, and could not fail to be supplanted, or reduced to the most indigent condition, unless he had the means of becoming owner of some whom he could employ in the same manner. This was an evil against which even the lavish expenditure of Pericles, judiciously, as it was applied, could only afford a temporary or partial relief. For a time however the large sums which were distributed through so many channels diffused general prosperity. The rapidity with which the new buildings were completed was no less marvellous than the perfection of art which they exhibited. The Propylæa, the most expensive of all¹, and the most laborious, as well on account of the difficulties of the ground, as the massiveness of the structure, were finished in five years. During the whole period of this extraordinary activity there must have been a comparative scarcity of labour at Athens.

We shall shortly return to this subject for the purpose of presenting it under another point of view. For the present it leads us to consider some other modes of expending the public money, which exhibit the administration of Pericles in a much less favourable light, because they appear to serve no higher end than a temporary gratification of individuals, by which they were as little benefited as the state itself. It was, as we have seen, in his competition with Cimon for public favour, and to counteract the disadvantage under which he was placed by the slenderness of his private fortune, that Pericles was induced to adopt these measures. But this motive cannot be admitted as an excuse for his conduct, if he courted popularity to the manifest detriment of the common weal. And this is a charge from which it is scarcely possible wholly to acquit him. But on the other hand he seems to have been often too harshly judged, and to have borne the blame of a later state of things, which, though it arose out of his system,

¹ See col. Leake, *On the cost of the works of Pericles. Topography of Athens*, p. 416.

was not a necessary result of it, and was one which he could not easily have foreseen.

Pericles did not introduce that strong passion for public amusements, which in the end consumed so large a part both of the fortunes of individuals and of the revenues of the state at Athens. But he appears to have increased the number of spectacles by new festivals, sacrifices, processions, musical and gymnastic exhibitions; he probably heightened their attractions by new refinements of art; and he made them accessible to all the citizens without distinction, instead of being reserved for the more affluent. In the period when a wooden theatre still sufficed for the Attic drama, the public safety had appeared to require that a small sum should be paid for admission, which was originally gratuitous; and this continued to be exacted after the stone theatre had been built. Pericles removed this imposition from the poorer class by a law, which enabled them to receive the amount from the treasury, and thus restored to them an enjoyment of which some had been deprived without sufficient reason, or which they were compelled to purchase by an inconvenient sacrifice. This was in itself a harmless and reasonable indulgence, and may have appeared the most economical expedient for attaining the object proposed. But it would have been better to have revived the free admissions; for the precedent thus set was extremely liable to abuse, and in fact opened the way for a profuse distribution of money, under the pretext of enabling the poorer citizens to enjoy various festivals, and led to the establishment of a fund called the *Theoricon*, which drained the vitals of the commonwealth, and absorbed resources urgently demanded for the public service, to be squandered away in frivolous entertainments. What part of this evil may justly be imputed to Pericles, could only be ascertained, if we knew how many steps he himself advanced beyond the first application of the theoric allowance. But his views had scarcely any thing in common with those of the demagogues who succeeded him; and the re-

creations which he procured for the people operated rather as a spur to industry than a temptation to idleness. Another innovation of a similar nature which is ascribed to him seems also to have been attended with a train of pernicious consequences which he could not have anticipated. He introduced the practise of paying the jurors for their attendance on the courts of justice¹; a provision, which — putting out of the question the causes which filled the tribunals with suitors — was no more than equitable. The remuneration which he assigned for the loss of time on these occasions was extremely moderate², and could not have encouraged the taste for litigation which was gradually unfolded to a mischievous excess in the Athenian character; but the sum was afterwards tripled, and became one of the heaviest items in the Attic civil list. This however was not perhaps the worst effect of the measure; for it seems probable that it suggested another — which has sometimes been erroneously attributed to Pericles himself — the payment of attendance in the popular assembly³; a regulation which became more and more pernicious, as the burden which it laid upon the state was more sensibly felt.

We can understand how Plato⁴, even though he was only looking at the remote consequences of these measures, which had become visible in his own day, might introduce Socrates saying: "I hear that Pericles made the Athenians a lazy, cowardly, talkative, and money-loving people, by accustoming them to receive wages." But we find no sufficient ground for the remark of a modern author, that Pericles despised the multitude whom he pampered.⁵ This might indeed have been

¹ Μισθὸς δικαστικός.

² An obolus, the sixth of a drachma, equivalent to about fourteen pence of our currency, according to the calculation of col. Leake, Topogr. of Ath. p. 416.

³ Μισθὸς ἐκκλησιαστικός.

⁴ Gorgias, p. 515.

⁵ Boeckh, Staatsh., ii 13. The high authority which Boeckh has so well earned by his learning and candour, entitles even a passing, and perhaps hasty remark of his, to more attention than is due to all the attempts, which for the last forty years have been systematically made in our own literature — the periodical as well as the more permanent — for political

the case with Pisistratus or Cimon. But as Pericles had nothing to give, and could only persuade the people to dispose of treasure, which — whether by right or by wrong — had in fact become its own, so it is certain that in the manner of expenditure his private taste coincided with that of the public. The interest which the Athenians in general took in the master-pieces of art which even in their ruins still attract the admiration of the civilized world, is evinced by two well known stories, which show that Pericles followed as well as guided the popular inclination. When the question was agitated in the assembly, whether marble or ivory should be employed in the statue of the goddess, and Phidias, the sculptor, recommended marble as the cheaper material, the assembly on that very ground unanimously decided for ivory. On another occasion when Thucydides, the rival of Pericles, complained of the enormous expence to which he had subjected the state by the monuments erected at his suggestion, he is said to have offered to defray the cost, if he might be allowed to inscribe them with his name. The offer, it is true, if it had been accepted, could not have been made good. But it was probably only meant to signify the firm reliance which Pericles placed on the liberality of his countrymen; and it seems to have answered his purpose, by reminding them of the lustre which these splendid works reflected on their own renown.¹ He was desired to proceed as he had begun, and to draw without sparing from the public treasury. Whether the age of Pericles is not degraded, when it is compared with other celebrated periods in the history of mankind, which resemble it in the successful cultivation of the arts, and whether in this respect it does not stand on an

and other purposes, to vilify the Athenians. But it is not very easy to reconcile Boeckh's remark with the admission which he makes in the next sentence.

¹ It is construed in a very different manner by Drumann, *Geschichte des Verfalls der griechischen Staaten*, p. 238., as a low, impudent trick, an interpretation for which we can find no better ground than the violent aversion which this writer takes every opportunity of expressing to the character and conduct of Pericles.

eminence which has never yet been approached, is a question on which opinions may differ. But at least it is distinguished by one very important feature. The magnificence which adorned it was not like that of a Lorenzo, or a Leo; it was not supplied from the coffers either of a wealthy citizen or a prince, to gratify the taste of a small circle of cultivated minds: nor was it like the magnificence of the Cæsars, who expended a part of their immense revenues for the diversion of their slaves; still more strongly was it contrasted with that of the selfish and narrow-minded despot, whose whole life expressed his maxim: I am the state¹; it was not the magnificence of Pericles, but that of the Athenian people. That Pericles despised this people, even while he was providing for the least intellectual of its entertainments, we are as little able to believe, as, when we contemplate the remains of the works executed to gratify its taste, it is in our power, whatever we may think of its failings or vices, to despise it.

These works served two main ends, which were important enough to have justified the application of the treasure expended on them, had it but come by fair means into the hands of the Athenians.* And even the fugitive amusements which were shared by the whole people under the superintendence of Pericles, contributed at least toward one of these ends. All of them tended continually to refine that matchless purity of taste by which the Athenians were long distinguished, and which must have been an important element in their political prosperity, through the influence which it could not fail to exert on their manufactures and commerce. But the public buildings answered a still higher end, by exalting and endearing the state in the eyes of its citizens. Their exceeding magnificence, the more striking from its contrast to the extreme simplicity of all private dwellings², expressed the majesty

¹ *L'état, c'est moi.* The reader who wishes to feel rightly on this subject should compare Plutarch's Pericles, 12, 13, with Saint Simon's remarks on the magnificence of Louis XIV. *Mémoires*, tom. xiii. p. 84—90.

* Demosthenes, *Aristocr.* p. 689. Compare Meid. p. 565. foll.

of the commonwealth, before which the greatness of the most eminent individual shrank into nothing. They were at the same time monuments of the past, and pledges of the future. The Parthenon and the Propylæa might be considered as trophies of Marathon and Salamis. They displayed the fruits of the patience and fortitude with which Athens had resisted the barbarians. They indicated the new station to which she had risen, and the abundance of the means she possessed for maintaining it. It is probable that the complacency with which the Athenians contemplated them from this point of view, was seldom embittered by the reflection, that this magnificence was in great part founded upon wrong and robbery. It is true that in the account which all nations have to render at the bar of history, there is probably not one which can appear with clean hands to impeach the Athenians on this head. We must not however on this account shut our eyes upon the real nature of their conduct. And it may be useful to remember, that not only their greatness was unstable in proportion as it rested on violence and fraud; but—as one of the most splendid monuments of the Medicean age was the occasion of an irreparable calamity to the power which raised it—so the great works with which the Athenians now adorned their city, both contributed to alienate and provoke the allies at whose expence they were executed, and to elate the people with that extravagant pride and confidence in its own strength and fortune, which hurried it on to its ruin.

Before the Persian war Athens had contributed less than many other cities, her inferiors in magnitude and in political importance, to the intellectual progress of Greece. She had produced no artists to be compared with those of Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, Ægina, Laconia, and of many cities both in the eastern and western colonies. She could boast of no poets so celebrated as those of the Ionian and Æolian schools. But her peaceful glories quickly followed and outshone that of her vic-

tories, conquests, and political ascendancy. In the period between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars, both literature and the fine arts began to tend toward Athens, as their most favoured seat. For here, above all other parts of Greece, genius and talents were encouraged by an ample field of exertion, by public sympathy and applause, as well as by the prospect of other rewards, which however were much more sparingly bestowed. Accordingly it was at Athens that architecture and sculpture reached the highest degree of perfection which either ever attained in the ancient world, and that Greek poetry was enriched with a new kind of composition, the drama, which united the leading features of every species before cultivated in a new whole, and exhibited all the grace and vigour of the Greek imagination, together with the full compass and the highest refinement of the form of the language peculiar to Attica. The social and intellectual condition of the two or three centuries preceding the Persian war had been highly favourable to the cultivation of lyrical poetry; the drama itself, as we have already noticed¹, grew out of one of its forms; and for the greater part of a century the lyrical element continued to predominate in it. Simonides of Ceos, whose powerful and flexible genius is just sufficiently attested by a few fragmentary remains, to justify a deep regret for the loss of his multifarious works, lived long enough to celebrate the triumphs of the Persian war in his old age. His younger contemporaries, Bacchylides and Pindar, were the latest of the lyrical poets whom the judgment of all ages, so long as their works were preserved, set apart from the rest, as of a superior order. The Theban poet Pindar, if he was not the greatest of them all, has been the most fortunate; for his merits are beyond dispute, and comparison. Even of his countrywoman Corinna, who both guided his youthful genius by her precepts, and quickened it by emulation, having five times carried away the prize from him in a

¹ Vol. II. p. 126.

poetical contest¹, not a specimen is left, either to vindicate the taste of her age, or to show how far she was inferior to her scholar. He no doubt experienced the animating influence of that joyful and stirring time which followed the defeat of the barbarian invader, though, as a Theban patriot, he could not heartily enjoy a triumph by which Thebes as well as Persia was humbled. But, like Simonides, he loved to bask in the sunshine of a court, and his grateful muse was cherished by the munificence of the sovereigns of Syracuse and Cyrene, and of the noble and wealthy families of Thessaly and Locris, Corinth, Ægina, and Rhodes, and others whose names he has rescued from oblivion. Yet Athens also shared his praises, though all his prejudices were adverse to her rising greatness; and she requited him with extraordinary favours.² He died at an advanced age, when the Attic drama had just attained its full maturity.³ All that we hear of lyrical poetry after him, indicates that it soon began to degenerate; that the decay of strength was betrayed by extravagance, and the poverty of invention by an artificial, conventional diction.

The drama was the branch of literature which peculiarly signalized the age of Pericles; and it belongs to the political, no less than to the literary history of these times, and deserves to be considered in both points of view. The steps by which it was brought through a series of innovations to the form which it presents in its earliest extant remains, are still a subject of controversy among antiquarians; and even the poetical character of the authors by whom these changes were effected, and of their works, is involved in great uncertainty. We have reason to believe that it was no want of merit, or of absolute worth, which caused them to be neglected and forgotten, but only the superior

¹ Ælian, V. H. xlii. 25. Paus. ix. 22, 23.

² If we may believe Isocrates, *Ævrið.* p. 461., Bekker, with the title of proxenus, and 10,000 drachmas. Perhaps Aristophanes may be alluding to this, Acharn. 612., Bek.

³ B. C. 438. The Antigone of Sophocles was represented B. C. 440.

attraction of the form which the drama finally assumed. Of Phrynichus in particular, the immediate predecessor of Æschylus, we are led to conceive a very favourable opinion, both by the manner in which he is mentioned by the ancients who were acquainted with his poems and by the effect which he is recorded to have produced upon his audience.¹ It seems clear that Æschylus, who found him in undisputed possession of the public favour², regarded him as a worthy rival, and was in part stimulated by emulation to unfold the capacities of their common art by a variety of new inventions.³ These however were so important, as to entitle their author to be considered as the father of Attic tragedy. This title he would have deserved, if he had only introduced the dialogue, which distinguished his drama from that of the preceding poets, who had told the story of each piece in a series of monologues. So long as this was the case, the lyrical part must have created the chief interest; and the difference between the Attic tragedy, and the choral songs which were exhibited in a similar manner in the Dorian cities, was perhaps not so striking as their agreement. The innovation made by Æschylus altered the whole character of the poem; raised the purely dramatic portion from a subordinate to the principal rank, and expanded it into a richly varied, and well-organised composition. With him, it would seem, and as a natural consequence of this great change, arose the usage which to us appears so singular, of exhibiting what was sometimes called a *trilogy*, which comprised three distinct tragedies, at the same time.⁴

It is a question still agitated by learned men, but one as to which we can scarcely expect to find any

¹ See Vol. II. p. 222.

² Aristophanes Ran. 908., λαβὼν παρὰ Φρυνίχῃ τρεφίντας.

³ Aristoph. Ran. 1295., ἵνα μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν Φρυνίχῃ λιμῶσι Μουσῶν ἰεὲς ἀφθίην δρίσαν.

⁴ So much at least seems clear, notwithstanding the widely different interpretations given to the statement of the Scholiast of Aristoph. Ran. 1122., about Aristarchus and Apollonius, by Welcker, *Æschyliache Trilogie*, p. 504., and by Gruppe, *Ariadne* (the quaint title of an interesting book on the history of Greek tragedy), p. 41.

decisive evidence, whether, as in one instance furnished by his remaining works, he always, at least after an early period in his dramatic career, constructed the three tragedies of each trilogy into one great whole, which might be compared to some of Shakspeare's historical plays. The supposition is at least perfectly conformable to his genius, fills up a chasm which would otherwise be mysterious in the history of the drama, and, as far as it can, is confirmed by the remains of the poet's numerous lost works. Æschylus paid no less attention to the exhibition of tragedy as a spectacle, for the purpose of heightening the effect of his poetry by scenic illusion. It was for him that Agatharchus painted the first scene which had ever been made to agree with the rules of linear perspective, and thus led to a scientific investigation of its principles.¹ It need not however be supposed that the imagination of an Athenian audience was less capable of apprehending the poet's description, and of filling up his outlines with colours of its own, than that of Shakspeare's contemporaries. But the more fastidious taste of the Athenians seems to have required that, while the higher faculties were gratified, the eye and the ear should perceive nothing which tended to disturb this impression. They were perhaps the less easily satisfied in this respect, the more familiar they became with the masterpieces of sculpture, and the difficulty was the greater as the scene was exposed to the broad light of day. Thus the decorations of tragedy became a very heavy charge, which fell almost entirely upon wealthy individuals; but the charm of the entertainment increased in proportion, and was the more generally felt. Æschylus—who himself, according to a long-established custom, bore a part in the representation of his own plays—not only superintended the evolutions of his chorusses with the

¹ Vitruvius, *Præf.* lib. vii. This seems to contradict Aristotle, who, *Poet.* c. 10. attributes the introduction of scene painting to Sophocles. Hence it has been supposed that Agatharchus may have been employed for one of the latest representations of Æschylus. But it is possible that his was a first essay which was carried to perfection in the time of Sophocles.

most anxious attention, but is recorded to have invented several minute additions to the theatrical wardrobe; and at Athens this was not thought unworthy of honourable mention in the life of a man who is known to us as one of the most sublime and original of poets.

Though out of seventy tragedies, which he is said to have written, seven have been preserved, it is properly only from one specimen that we can form a judgment on the full compass of his genius and his art; for it is evident that the same poem must appear in a very different light, according as it is considered as a part of a great whole, or as complete in itself. In the tripartite drama founded on the crimes and sufferings of the royal house of Mycenæ, each of the three tragedies is independent of the rest, and yet, to be rightly estimated, must be viewed in its connection with them. If we might venture to look upon this, not as an experiment which, though eminently successful, was never repeated, but as an example of his usual method, we should be led to conclude that his skill in the management of his subjects was not much inferior to the grandeur of his conceptions. The sublimity of his characters and his diction is universally acknowledged: the boldness and novelty of his creations astonished his contemporaries; and even if, as is the case with many of them, they had been known to us only through description, they would have been sufficient to support his reputation. His prominent figures are all colossal; the Homeric heroes themselves appear more majestic and terrible in his scene; he is not satisfied with bringing the most revered persons of the popular mythology into action, and exhibiting them in new situations: the gods of Olympus are not great and awful enough for him; he loves to revive the mysterious traditions which represented them as a race of upstarts and usurpers, and from the depths of the remotest antiquity to evoke the gigantic, shadowy, melancholy forms of an earlier dynasty, which they overthrew and oppressed, but were unable to humble and subdue. The thoughts and words which he assigns

to them are worthy of such personages; the men of Marathon and Salamis could endure them; but they were too ponderous for the feebler criticism of the next generation, which complained that his language was not human.¹ But a reader only familiar with the modern drama, especially that of the romantic school, will be more apt to feel wearied by the extreme simplicity and languid movement of several of his plays, and perhaps may sometimes be startled by abrupt transitions, and unexpected turns in the dialogue. It is possible that this impression is in part a consequence of the loss we have suffered, which may have prevented us from reading most of his remaining works in their original connection and order, as acts of a more complicated drama. Yet, admitting this to be the case, we must still believe that he was more capable of sketching a vast outline, than of filling up all its parts with a steady and delicate hand. He seems to content himself with bringing forward a few groups, of superhuman dimensions, by a profusion of bold and vivid touches, and to leave the rest to the spectator's imagination. Hence too perhaps, rather than from the want of a mastery over all the resources of his language, arose the harshness and obscurity which frequently interrupt the enjoyment of his most magnificent passages.

In the general harmony of his compositions, in the equable diffusion of grace and vigour throughout every part, in the unlimited command over all the power and all the charm of expression which the Greek language supplied, his younger rival Sophocles, though in some respects a genius of a lower order, undoubtedly surpassed him; and it was chiefly by these advantages that he supplanted him in the public estimation, and became the favourite poet of the age of Pericles, as his works most vividly reflect its intellectual character. The contest in which Sophocles with his first exhibition gained the victory over the elder poet, — who is said to have been so wounded by his defeat that he withdrew

¹ Aristoph. Ran. 1056.

to Sicily, perhaps to the court of Hiero — was signalised by Cimon's appearance in the theatre, on his return from the expedition in which he brought the relics of Theseus to Athens; and the interest excited by the competition between the old master of the scene and his young antagonist was so strong, that the victorious general and his colleagues, who had come to pay their official devotions to the god of the festival, were induced by the presiding magistrate to stay, and award the prize. This story is the counterpart of another, equally repugnant to our habits and feelings, but no less accordant with those of the Athenians: that Sophocles was rewarded for one of his successful tragedies with the rank of general, and in that capacity accompanied Pericles in the Samian war. He died full of years and of glory; but not before he had himself experienced the mutability of the public taste in the growing preference given to Euripides, who died a year sooner, but in the character of his poetry belongs entirely to the latest period of the life of Sophocles.

The Attic tragedy was not merely a spectacle for the multitude, or a study for the lovers of literature and art, but was capable of being applied to moral, or religious, and political purposes. The general impression which Æschylus appears to aim at, if we may properly attribute any such objects to him, is rather of a religious than a moral nature. His persons are for the most part raised too far above the sphere of real life to awaken much moral sympathy. He sometimes represents man as the helpless sport of an inscrutable destiny; sometimes as the victim of a struggle between beings of a superior race; and such views may inspire an undefined sense of religious awe, but cannot convey any practical lesson. Yet even his darkest scenes are not without some gleams of light, which seem to fall from a higher and clearer region, and disclose partial intimations of a providential order of compensation and retribution, in which truth and justice will finally triumph. In the poetry of Sophocles this tendency is still more

conspicuous; there dim forebodings brighten into a more cheerful hope, or suggest instructive warnings — the more efficacious as his persons are not too far removed from the common level of humanity — to rebuke the excesses of passion, the wantonness of power, the presumption of security, in which men forget their mortal condition, and trample upon laws human or divine. We have already mentioned an instance in which Æschylus employed the drama as a political engine — to support the sinking authority of the Areopagus. There were perhaps few cases in which a tragic poet so distinctly disclosed a political object; still fewer in which he aimed at affecting the course of events. Æschylus seems to have been the last who ventured to bring the men of his own time upon the stage. In the play which celebrated the battle of Salamis, he had followed the example of Phrynichus, who was not deterred by the reception he met with, when he exhibited the fall of Miletus, from treating another contemporary subject more grateful to the feelings of his audience. But Æschylus seems not to have been content with the simple theme of his extant drama; there is ground for suspecting, that he connected it on the one hand with the earliest struggles between Europe and Asia, on the other with the recent victory gained by the Sicilian Greeks over the Carthaginians at Himera, and represented both events as the fulfilment of ancient prophecies, and as pledges of the lasting triumph which fate had decreed to Greece over all the power of the barbarians. With these few exceptions the scene of Greek tragedy was always laid in the heroic age, and its subjects were almost wholly confined to the circle traced by the epic poets. Yet allusions to living persons and passing occurrences were by no means rare, and were easily introduced. No extraordinary dexterity was needed to adapt the ancient legends to the new relations between Athens and other Greek states, and to cherish the feelings which happened to prevail in the public mind by a historical parallel. But in all these

cases the object seems to have been rather to display the poet's ingenuity, than to produce any practical effect on his audience, or to influence the management of public affairs.

If the limitations which custom prescribed to this branch of the drama transported the spectator to the remote past, and to a state of things widely different from that in which he lived, and allowed only a few indirect and obscure allusions to the present, comedy was entirely free from such restrictions. Its field lay within the walks of daily life; its main business was with the immediate present; and there was no class of persons or things which could engage public attention that might not be brought within the range of its representations. The Athenians possessed another kind of ludicrous drama called the *satyrical*, which was totally distinct from their comedy in its form and its object. It had been introduced in compliance with ancient usage for the sake of those who, in the improved state of the drama, were still unwilling to lose the chorus of *satyrs*, which once formed a main part of the Dionysiac entertainments; and it exhibited the highest persons of tragedy thus attended, and under circumstances which were humorously contrasted with the solemnity of their character. But this kind of burlesque could scarcely be said to have any other end than that of unbending the spectator, after his mind had been kept on the stretch by scenes of heroic action or suffering, with the sportive sallies of a mere animal nature. One of these exhibitions commonly followed each tragic performance, and it was always furnished by the tragic poet himself. It is remarkable that Æschylus was accounted no less a master of the light than of the serious drama¹: an effect perhaps of the very grandeur and severity of his tragic style. But there does not appear to have been any instance in which a tragic poet tried his powers in comedy.

Comedy was not in the same sense as tragedy an

1 Paus. ii. 13. 6.

Attic invention. It was an application of the dramatic form first introduced by Thespis, and afterwards employed to regulate the rude jests and natural outbreaks of simple mirth and of personal ridicule, which in Attica as elsewhere were freely indulged during the festive season, which in this respect bore some resemblance to a modern carnival. But this application seems to have been first made at Megara, — probably during the period of democratical licence which followed the downfall of Theagenes, — and to have been thence imported by its author, Susarion, into Attica, where however it appears to have been neglected, and to have yielded no fruits of much value for nearly a century. Nor was it at Athens, but at Syracuse, chiefly through the philosophical poet Epicharmus, who flourished at the court of Hiero, that comedy first assumed a regular form. But Epicharmus probably did not suffer his comic vein to transport him beyond the bounds of the Dorian gravity, or to expose him to the loss of his patron's favour. The subjects of his pieces appear to have been mostly drawn from the ancient mythology ; so that they approached nearer to the character of the satirical drama than to that of the Attic comedy, which cannot therefore have been much indebted to them. It owed its importance and popularity not more to the genius of the poets, than to the unbounded freedom which they enjoyed. They were under the safeguard of the god whose festival they cheered ; and the privileges of the mask were much larger than those of the cap and bells among our ancestors. No objects or persons, not even the gods, and among them the god of the festival himself, were exempt from their most unsparing ridicule. They did not confine themselves to hints and allusions, nor even to the most direct mention of living persons. There was no Athenian, whatever might be his rank and station, if he was only of sufficient importance, who might not see himself brought upon the stage, with the most ludicrous exaggeration of his personal appearance, and exposed for some hours to

the laughter of thirty thousand spectators. While however the persons were frequently taken from real life, the poets exercised their humour, and preserved the purely poetical character of the entertainment, by devising situations and incidents, in which nature and probability were designedly sacrificed, by the most extravagant fictions, to the leading objects of the piece; and on the other hand not only was the presence of the spectators often recognised in the dialogue, but a direct address to them became a prominent and almost an essential member of every comedy. With such instruments at their absolute disposal, the comic poets assailed every kind of vice and folly which was sufficiently notorious to render their ridicule intelligible. And they never suffered their attacks to miss the mark through any ambiguity in their descriptions. The simplicity, or, as we should call it, the coarseness of the Attic manners, even in their best period, seems to have permitted the grossest things to be publicly spoken of in the grossest language; and whatever restraints may have been imposed upon this privilege by a sense of decency on other occasions, were entirely removed in the theatre by the sacred licence of the festive season. It is unfortunate with regard to our estimate of the tone of Athenian society, that we have no decisive evidence on the question whether women were present at the dramatic exhibitions.¹ It seems however the more probable opinion, that they were excluded either by law or custom from the comic, though not from the tragic, spectacles; and their absence may have contributed to encourage the freedom, with which the comic poets made their works reflect the licentiousness of their age in its most revolting features, a freedom to which antiquity affords no parallel, unless in the Roman satirists; who however can as little give an adequate conception of the homeliness or indecency of the Attic comedy, as they can of the sublimity—for such is the impression which it produces—of its wit, humour, and fancy.

¹ See F. Schlegel, *Werk* iv. p. 140.

As we have no entire composition remaining of more than one comic poet, Aristophanes, who belongs to a later period, we cannot ascertain the exact relation in which he stood to his predecessors. But their subjects undoubtedly bore a general resemblance to his; and if their practice was similar, the failings and excesses of private life formed but very subordinate objects of their ridicule. The character and conduct of public men, and the administration of the public affairs, were, we know, always exposed to their unreserved animadversion, and therefore were probably their principal theme; and this must have led them very early to point their satire against the people itself, in its collective capacity of sovereign, if not, as was afterwards done, to personify it on the stage.

Such a censorship, as it has been appropriately termed, one so unlimited in its range and in its processes, may at first sight appear the most formidable engine ever wielded in a state by private hands; and it excites our curiosity to inquire whether it produced effects worthy of its seemingly irresistible force. It is not without surprise that we find it to have been, though not absolutely powerless, yet on the whole feeble and insignificant in its operation, and this notwithstanding the consummate ability of the minds by which it was directed. We have no reason to believe that it ever turned the course of public affairs, or determined the bias of the public mind, or even that it considerably affected the credit and fortunes of an obnoxious individual. The surprise however which this discovery may at first excite, will abate when we reflect on the circumstances and the temper in which the comic poets found their audience. It was not a time or place, nor were men in the humour, for any serious thought. They cared little at whose expence the laugh was raised, whether it was at their neighbour's or their own, nor even if it was at that of the state or the gods. When the holidays were over they returned to their ordinary pursuits in their habitual mood, and the gay lessons

which they had just received, were soon effaced from their memories by the business of the day. The boldness and impunity of the poets seem in fact to have been the consequence of their felt and acknowledged harmlessness. Nothing shows more clearly how little importance was attached to their ridicule, than that they were permitted to level it not only against all that was most exalted in the state, but against all that was most sacred in religion. What they had most to fear from was perhaps the resentment of powerful individuals who were the objects of their attacks. But against this they were sheltered by the ægis of the laws, by the favour of the public, and by their own means of retaliation. And though it is impossible that private feelings should not sometimes have been deeply stung by the poignancy of their wit, we must not measure the irritation which it produced by our modern sensibility. The Greeks, and the ancients in general, were much more callous to the impression of words; and could patiently endure language which would now be deemed an intolerable insult. There is only one fact which may seem to indicate that the importance of comedy was, if not greater than we here represent it, at least sometimes differently estimated. It is related that while the power of Pericles was at its height (B. C. 440), a law was passed to restrain the exhibition of comedy. But we know neither the occasion which gave rise to it, nor the precise nature and extent of its enactments. All that is certain is, that it remained in force no more than two or three years, and that it was entirely repealed; and no attempt of the same kind seems to have been made as long as Athens preserved her political independence.

If Pericles himself had been the author of this obscure measure, it is probable that we should have heard something more about it. But though no man at Athens had so much to apprehend from the hostility of the comic poets, or was the object of more frequent attacks from them, his dignity and his prudence would equally have prevented him from taking any notice of them.

He must rather have been glad to see the envy and jealousy, which he was conscious of exciting, find vent in so harmless a way. His character and station would necessarily have rendered him a constant mark for all the comic poets of his day, though they had borne him no illwill, and had only aimed at amusing the people at his expence. But among them he seems to have had some personal enemies, who probably belonged to the party of his political opponents, and no doubt very seriously wished and endeavoured to injure him in the public estimation. Eupolis, and Cratinus, Plato, and Teleclides, perhaps contented themselves with bringing their dramatic engines to play upon him; but Hermippus assailed him with real malignity, both in and out of the theatre, and on his tenderest side. We find that he was repeatedly brought upon the stage, as was Myronides¹, and probably most of his eminent contemporaries. His person however was not one which easily lent itself to ridicule; the slight peculiarity in the conformation of his head afforded matter for some harmless pleasantry; but altogether he was too dignified and too elevated a personage to be placed in a ludicrous point of view. He had much more reason to dread the effect of exaggerated descriptions of his power and place in the commonwealth. So it appears that no title was more frequently bestowed upon him than that of the Father of the gods, whose sovereignty he represented by his absolute sway over the Athenian state. He was still more distinctly called by Cratinus, *the greatest of tyrants, the eldest born of Time and Faction*.² His friends were sometimes described by the odious name of Pisistratids; he was called upon to swear that he would not assume the tyranny, and Teleclides endeavoured to alarm the jealousy of the people, by reminding it that all the power which Athens exercised over Greece

¹ Plut. Per. 24.

² Στάσις καὶ περισυγωγὴς Χρῆνος, ἀλλήλοισι μίγνεται, μίγιστον τίπτεται τύραννον, ἐν δὲ κεφαλῇ γέγραπται θεοὶ καλίσουσιν. Plut. Per. 3.

was lodged in his hands.¹ The longer however he enjoyed the public confidence, the less he was liable to be hurt by these general insinuations. But his private life presented some vulnerable points, through which his adversaries were able to strike more dangerous blows, which, though they did not permanently affect his influence or his reputation, must for a time have put his equanimity to a hard trial, and threatened to destroy his domestic happiness.

The public works which were undertaken through the advice of Pericles were executed under his inspection; the choice of the artists employed and of the plans adopted, was probably entrusted in a great measure to his judgment; and the large sums expended on them passed through his hands. This was an office which it was scarcely possible to exercise at Athens without either exciting suspicion or giving a handle for calumny. We find that Cratinus in one of his comedies threw out some hints as to the tardiness with which Pericles carried on the third of the Long Walls which he had persuaded the people to begin. "He had been long professing to go on with it, but in fact did not stir a step."² Whether the motives to which this delay was imputed were such as to call his integrity into question, does not appear; but in time his enemies ventured openly to attack him on this ground. Yet the first blow was not aimed directly at himself, but was intended to wound him through the side of a friend. Phidias, whose genius was the ruling principle which animated and controlled every design for the ornament of the city, had been brought, as well by conformity of taste as by the nature of his engagements, into an intimate relation with Pericles. To ruin Phidias was one of the readiest means both of hurting the feelings and of shaking the credit of Pericles. If Phidias could be convicted of a

¹ Πόλιόν τε φέρουσ, αὐτάς τε πόλιν, τὰς μὲν διῶν, τὰς δ' ἀναλύειν, Λάιναι τίχουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀποδομῶν, τὰ δὲ γ' αὐτὰ πάλιν καταβάλλειν, Σπινδάς, δύναμιν, κράτος, εἰρήνην, πλοῦτόν τ', εὐδαιμονίαν τε. Plut. Per. 16.

² Plut. Per. 13. Πάλαι γὰρ αὐτὸ Λόγους προέγει Περικλῆς, ἱερῶσι δ' οὐδὲ μινύει.

fraud on the public, it would seem an unavoidable inference that Pericles had shared the profit. The ivory statue of the goddess in the Parthenon, which was enriched with massy ornaments of pure gold, appeared to offer a groundwork for a charge which could not easily be refuted. To give it the greater weight, a man named Meno, who had been employed by Phidias in some of the details of the work, was induced to seat himself in the agora with the ensigns of a suppliant, and to implore pardon of the people as the condition of revealing an offence in which he had been an accomplice with Phidias. He accused Phidias of having embezzled a part of the gold which he had received from the treasury. But this charge immediately fell to the ground through a contrivance which Pericles had adopted for a different end. The golden ornaments had been fixed on the statue in such a manner, that they could be taken off without doing it any injury, and thus afforded the means of ascertaining their exact weight. Pericles challenged the accusers of Phidias to use this opportunity of verifying their charge; but they shrank from the application of this decisive test.

Though however they were thus baffled in this part of their attempt, they were not abashed or deterred; for they had discovered another ground, which gave them a surer hold on the public mind. Some keen eye had observed two figures among those with which Phidias had represented the battle between Theseus and the Amazons on the shield of the goddess, in which it detected the portraits of the artist himself, as a bald old man, and that of Pericles in all the comeliness of his graceful person. To the religious feelings of the Athenians this mode of perpetuating the memory of individuals, by connecting their portraits with an object of public worship, appeared to violate the sanctity of the place; and it was probably also viewed as an arrogant intrusion, no less offensive to the majesty of the commonwealth. It seems as if Meno's evidence was required even to support this charge. Phidias was committed to

prison, and died there. The informer, who was a foreigner, was rewarded with certain immunities; and — as one who in the service of the state had provoked a powerful enemy — was placed by a formal decree under the protection of the Ten Generals.

This success emboldened the enemies of Pericles to proceed. They had not indeed established any of their accusations; but they had sounded the disposition of the people, and found that it might be inspired with distrust and jealousy of its powerful minister, or that it was not unwilling to see him humbled. They seem now to have concerted a plan for attacking him, both directly and indirectly, in several quarters at once; and they began with a person in whose safety he felt as much concern as his own, and who could not be ruined without involving him in the like calamity. This was the celebrated Aspasia, who had long attracted almost as much of the public attention at Athens as Pericles himself. She was a native of Miletus, which was early and long renowned as a school for the cultivation of female graces. She had come, it would seem, as an adventurer to Athens, and by the combined charms of her person, manners, and conversation, won the affections and the esteem of Pericles. Her station had freed her from the restraints which custom laid on the education of the Athenian matron; and she had enriched her mind with accomplishments which were rare even among the men. Her acquaintance with Pericles seems to have begun while he was still united to a lady of high birth, before the wife of the wealthy Hipponicus. We can hardly doubt that it was Aspasia who first disturbed this union, though it is said to have been dissolved by mutual consent. But after parting from his wife, who had borne him two sons, Pericles attached himself to Aspasia by the most intimate relation which the laws permitted him to contract with a foreign woman; and she acquired an ascendancy over him, which soon became notorious, and furnished the comic poets with an inexhaustible fund of ridicule, and his

enemies with a ground for serious charges. On the stage she was the Here of the Athenian Zeus, the Omphale, or the Dejanira of an enslaved, or a faithless Hercules. The Samian war was ascribed to her interposition on behalf of her birth-place; and rumours were set afloat which represented her as ministering to the vices of Pericles by the most odious and degrading of offices. There was perhaps as little foundation for this report, as for a similar one in which Phidias was implicated¹; though among all the imputations brought against Pericles this is that which it is the most difficult clearly to refute. But we are inclined to believe that it may have arisen from the peculiar nature of Aspasia's private circles, which, with a bold neglect of established usage, were composed not only of the most intelligent and accomplished men to be found at Athens, but also of matrons, who it is said were brought by their husbands, to listen to her conversation; which must have been highly instructive as well as brilliant, since Plato did not hesitate to describe her as the preceptress of Sociates, and to assert that she both formed the rhetoric of Pericles, and composed one of his most admired harangues. The innovation which drew women of free birth, and good condition, into her company for such a purpose, must, even where the truth was understood, have surprised and offended many; and it was liable to the grossest misconstruction. And if her female friends were sometimes seen watching the progress of the works of Phidias, it was easy, through his intimacy with Pericles, to connect this fact with a calumny of the same kind.

There was another rumour still more dangerous, which grew out of the character of the persons who were admitted to the society of Pericles and Aspasia. Athens had become a place of resort for learned and ingenious men of all pursuits. None were more welcome at the house of Pericles than such as were distinguished by philosophical studies, and especially by

¹ Plut. Per. 13.

the profession of new speculative tenets. He himself was never weary of discussing such subjects; and Aspasia was undoubtedly able to bear her part in this, as well as in any other kind of conversation. The mere presence of Anaxagoras, Zeno, Protagoras, and other celebrated men, who were known to hold doctrines very remote from the religious conceptions of the vulgar, was sufficient to make a circle in which they were familiar pass for a school of impiety. Such were the materials out of which the comic poet Hermippus, laying aside the mask, framed a criminal prosecution against Aspasia. His indictment included two heads: an offence against religion, and that of corrupting Athenian women to gratify the passions of Pericles.

This cause seems to have been still pending, when one Diopithes procured a decree, by which persons who denied the being of the gods, or taught doctrines concerning the celestial bodies which were inconsistent with religion, were made liable to a certain criminal process.¹ This stroke was aimed immediately at Anaxagoras—whose physical speculations had become famous, and were thought to rob the greatest of the heavenly beings of their inherent deity—but indirectly at his disciple and patron Pericles. When the discussion of this decree, and the prosecution commenced against Aspasia, had disposed the people to listen to other less probable charges, the main attack was opened, and the accusation which in the affair of Phidias had been silenced by the force of truth, was revived in another form. A decree was passed on the motion of one Dracontides, directing Pericles to give in his accounts to the Prytanes, to be submitted to a trial, which was to be conducted with extraordinary solemnity; for it was to be held in the citadel, and the jurors were to take the balls with which each signified his verdict,

¹ The *ισαγγελία*, a criminal information, designed to reach offences, which were not noticed or not distinctly described by the law. But as this would, without any decree, have been applicable to the cases mentioned in the text, it would seem that the decree of Diopithes must either have charged certain magistrates to inquire into such offences, or have offered a reward to an informer.

from the top of an altar. But this part of the decree was afterwards modified by an amendment moved by Agnon, which ordered the cause to be tried in the ordinary way, but by a body of 1500 jurors. The uncertainty of the party which managed these proceedings, and their distrust as to the evidence which they should be able to procure, seem to be strongly marked by a clause in this decree, which provided that the offence imputed to Pericles might be described either as embezzlement, or by a more general name, as coming under the head of public wrong.¹

Yet all these machinations failed at least of reaching their main object. The issue of those which were directed against Anaxagoras cannot be exactly ascertained through the discrepancy of the accounts given of it. According to some authors he was tried, and condemned either to a fine and banishment or to death; but in the latter case made his escape from prison. According to others he was defended by Pericles, and acquitted.² Plutarch says that Pericles, fearing the event of a trial, induced him to withdraw from Athens³; and it seems to have been admitted on all hands, that he ended his long life, in quiet and honour at Lampascus. The danger which threatened Aspasia was also averted; but it seems that Pericles, who pleaded her cause, found need for his most strenuous exertions, and that in her behalf he descended to tears and entreaties, which no similar emergency of his own could ever draw from him.⁴ It was indeed probably a trial more of his personal influence than of his eloquence; and his success, hardly as it was won, may have induced his adversaries to drop the proceedings instituted against himself, or at least to postpone them to a fitter season. After weathering this storm he seems to have recovered his former high and firm position, which to

¹ Εἴτε πλοῦτης καὶ δάσων, εἴτ' ἀδικίας. Plut. Per. 32.

² Diog. Laert. Anaxag.

³ Per. 32. But compare a somewhat different statement in his *Life of Nicias*, 23.

⁴ Athen. xii. p. 589.

the end of his life was never again endangered, except by one very transient gust of popular displeasure. He felt strong enough to resist the wishes, and to rebuke the impatience, of the people. Yet it was a persuasion so widely spread among the ancients, as to have lasted even to modern times, that his dread of the prosecution which hung over him, and his consciousness that his expenditure of the public money would not bear a scrutiny, were at least among the motives that induced him to kindle the war which put an end to the Thirty Years Truce. It was sometimes said that this expedient was suggested to him by his young kinsman Alcibiades, who being told that he was thinking how he should render his account, had him rather think how to avoid rendering it. But though this charge has been adopted by a modern writer of high authority¹, we are unable to discover any grounds for it more solid than the assertions of the enemies of Pericles, which they could never establish by legal proof, and which are contradicted by the great contemporary historian, Thucydides, in the most emphatic language with which it was possible to declare his unsullied integrity. Against such a judgment, an ironical allusion in one of Plato's dialogues², which implies, that Pericles had been convicted of peculation, might be safely neglected; even if it was less manifest that it arose out of a confusion of dates and circumstances. •

¹ Boeckh. St. d. Athen. ii. c. 8.

² Gorgias, p. 516. A. •

CHAP. XIX.

CAUSES AND OCCASIONS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

ATHENS had been permitted to complete the conquest of Samos without hindrance; but the addition which this success made to her power rendered it only the more evident, that peace could not last much longer between her and the Peloponnesian confederacy. Her ambition, the animosity which she had excited in several of the allies of Sparta, and the jealousy of Sparta herself, had reached such a height, that it was clear the Thirty Years Truce was much more likely to be violently abridged, than to lead to a lasting settlement. Nevertheless the two leading states, as if foreseeing the ruinous consequences of their conflict, shrank from striking the first blow, as well as from forfeiting the divine favour by a breach of the treaty. Sparta, as she had been a quiet spectatress of the fall of Samos, rejected an application which was made to her by the Mitylenæans, who, if they could have reckoned on her aid, would have renounced the Athenian alliance, and would probably have engaged the whole island to join in their revolt. According to Theophrastus a sum of ten talents distributed by Pericles every year among the leading Spartans, kept them in a pacific mood.¹ But the expectation which generally prevailed of an approaching renewal of hostilities, contributed to hasten the event. Without it the occurrences which immediately occasioned the disastrous war which we are about to relate, either would not have happened, or would have passed by without such an effect. By it they were converted into so many indications of a hostile spirit, which issued in an open and general rupture.

¹ *Mut. Per.* 23.

The storm began to gather in a quarter where perhaps none had looked for it. The city of Epidamnus had been founded on the eastern side of the Adriatic, on the site of the modern Durazzo, by colonists from Corcyra, who, in compliance with a custom already mentioned, had taken a Corinthian named Phalius, a Heracleid, for their leader, and had admitted several Corinthians, and other Dorians, to a share in the settlement. The colony became flourishing and populous: but with its growth it unfolded the germs of domestic factions, which at length brought it to the brink of ruin. It was planted in the territory of the Taulantians, an Illyrian tribe, who, regarding the Epidamnians as hostile intruders, gladly took advantage of their internal dissensions, to attack them with greater effect. A short time before the events now to be related, the democratical party had expelled the oligarchs. The exiles leagued themselves with the barbarians to infest the city by sea and land. Unable to make head against their combined forces, and reduced to extreme weakness, the party masters of the city applied to the parent state, Corcyra, for mediation and succour. The Corcyræans, though at this time themselves under democratical government, turned a deaf ear to the suppliants, who in their despair proceeded to consult the Delphic oracle, whether they should transfer their colonial allegiance to Corinth, and should implore her aid. With the sanction of the god they formally surrendered the colony to the Corinthians, and claimed their protection. The Corinthians, not displeased with an opportunity of at once strengthening themselves and indulging the hatred which they had long harboured against the Corcyræans—who had provoked the jealousy of the mother city, and withheld the usual tokens of filial respect—accepted the offer, and granted the petition of the distressed Epidamnians, though belonging to a party adverse to their own political institutions. They forthwith sent a force, consisting partly of Corinthians, partly of Ambracians and Leucadians, to garrison Epidamnus, and invited all who

might be willing to go and settle there. The troops went over land through fear of hindrance from the Corcyræans. But in the meanwhile the exiled Epidamnians had been pleading their cause at Corcyra, where the proceedings of their adversaries and of the Corinthians, as soon as they were known, excited the most vehement indignation. The Corcyræans without delay despatched a squadron of 25 galleys, which was soon backed by another, with orders for the revolted Epidamnians to receive the exiles, and to send away the Corinthian garrison and the new settlers. When obedience was refused they laid siege to the place, after inviting all who would, natives or foreigners, to quit it unmolested, and threatening all who should remain with hostile treatment.

The Corinthians, on hearing this intelligence, prepared an armament for the relief of their citizens and friends. They raised troops and money, by offering the freedom of Epidamnus to all who would either share the expedition in person, or remaining at home would advance a small sum on this security. They also procured the loan of money and ships from some of their allies, and from others both ships and men. They themselves equipped 30 galleys and 3000 heavy-armed troops. The Corcyræans, informed of these preparations, sent envoys to Corinth, who were accompanied by others from Sparta and Sicily, to propose that the Corinthians should either withdraw their people from Epidamnus, or, if they pretended to any right in the colony, should refer their claims to the decision of some neutral state, or of the Delphic oracle. The Corinthians would only consent on condition that the Corcyræans should in the mean time raise the siege, and withdraw their ships, and the Illyrians whom they employed on the land side. The Corcyræans were willing to do this, if the Corinthians would evacuate the place; or they would have stopped the siege until the question should have been peacefully decided: but the Corinthians would accept neither proposal, and, their armament, being now col-

lected, sent a herald to declare war against Corcyra, and set sail with a fleet of 75 ships, and 2000 heavy-armed, for the relief of Epidamnus. When they had reached the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, they were met by a herald, sent in a boat by the Corcyræans, to forbid them to advance further: a message which was of course disregarded. In the meanwhile the Corcyræans manned all their galleys which were fit for service, amounting to eighty sail; and put out to meet the enemy. The Corinthians were totally defeated with the loss of fifteen ships, and returned home leaving the Corcyræans masters of the sea. The victorious fleet sailed first to the Corinthian colony, Leucas, where the troops ravaged the land, and then to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, which was burnt, in revenge for the aid which Elis had furnished to the Corinthians. The allies of Corinth on the western coast were so infested by the Corcyræans, that the Corinthians were obliged in the course of the summer to send out another fleet to protect them, which continued to watch the enemy's movements, sometimes from Actium, and sometimes from Chimerium in Thesprotia. But though the Corcyræans took a station at the opposite headland of Leucimne, no offer of battle was made on either side, and on the approach of winter both returned home. On the day on which the Corcyræans gained their naval victory, Epidamnus surrendered to the besiegers, on condition that the settlers should be sold as slaves, and the Corinthians kept in prison during the pleasure of the conquerors. The Corcyræans appear to have been a sharp-sighted and calculating people. We have seen how carefully they watched over their own safety, and how little concern they showed for the interests of the other Greeks, in the Persian war. Since then it had been their maxim to enter into no alliances with other states, and especially to keep aloof from the two great confederacies over which Sparta and Athens presided, thinking perhaps that, as their position and naval power made them independent of their neighbours, they had nothing to

gain from the one, and might suffer some harm from the other. But their contest with Corinth, though thus far fortune had favoured them, compelled them to alter their policy. The Corinthians, burning to revenge their humiliating defeat, spent two years in new preparations for prosecuting the war. The Corcyreans were alarmed at the prospect of having to withstand them alone, and came to the resolution of resorting for assistance to Athens. Their envoys there met those of the Corinthians, who, apprised of their intention, hoped to frustrate it. On this, as on many other occasions in the course of his history, Thucydides has inserted in his narrative two elaborate orations, as if delivered by the rival ambassadors before the Athenian assembly. But he has previously warned his readers that the speeches thus introduced contain at the utmost no more than the substance of the arguments really used on both sides, and sometimes only those which he deemed appropriate to the occasion and the parties.¹ Though, viewed in either light, they are almost equally interesting, we shall only be able to afford room for very sparing notice of their contents.

The Corcyraean orator relies chiefly on the advantage which Athens will derive from an alliance with a state possessing so powerful a marine, and occupying so important a situation with respect to the western regions, toward which the views of the Athenians had for some time been directed. This advantage, he alleges, will be obtained, without any breach of faith or justice, by an honourable interposition on behalf of an injured and oppressed people. The terms of the treaty between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy permit either party to receive any state, not already in league with the other, into its alliance. "The time is near at hand when you will know the value of such an accession as we can bring to your naval power, and will bitterly regret its loss, if you suffer it to fall into the hands of the Corinthians, who are no less your enemies than

ours. War with Sparta is inevitable, and cannot be long kept off; the only question is whether, when it comes, Corcyra shall be against you, or on your side.

The Corinthian in answer endeavours to excite distrust and aversion toward the Corcyræans, by imputing their neutral policy to sordid motives, and charging them with unjust and undutiful conduct toward their parent state. He contends that the Athenians cannot receive the Corcyræans into their alliance, without violating the spirit of their treaty with Corinth, and cannot afford them succour without being drawn into acts of open hostility against their enemies. It would be impolitic in the Athenians, who depend so much on the fidelity of their subjects, to countenance the revolt of an unnatural colony; and it would be ungrateful toward the Corinthians, who, when the Samians solicited the protection of the Peloponnesians, maintained the same principle of neutrality, which they now urge on their own behalf, in favour of Athens. Nor ought the Athenians to forget the services which Corinth once rendered them in their war with Ægina. "The war which the Corcyræans describe as immediately impending, to hurry you into an act of unjust aggression, is still uncertain, and may be most probably averted by a seasonable display of friendly feelings, which may heal the offence we took at your conduct in the affair of Megara."

Two assemblies were held on the question. The Athenians did not wish to break their treaty; but, as they perceived war to be inevitable, they were equally unwilling to abandon the Corcyræan navy to the Corinthians, and most of all desired to see the two states which next to their own possessed the greatest maritime power, wasting their strength in a struggle from which they themselves stood aloof. With these views they concluded a treaty of defensive alliance with Corcyra, by which each party was bound to assist the other only in case an attack should be made on its territory, or on that of its allies; and in pursuance of the

same policy not long after ten ships were sent, under the command of Lacedæmonius son of Cimon, and two other officers, to the assistance of the Corcyræans, with orders not to act against the Corinthians, unless they should invade Corcyra. A foolish anecdote attributed the scantiness of this force to the jealousy of Pericles toward the son of Cimon.

The preparations which the Corinthians had been making from the time of their defeat, now enabled them, with the help of their allies, Elis, Megara, Leucas, Ambracia, and Anactorium, to send out a fleet of 150 galleys, which proceeded to the Thesprotian port Chimerium, where they encamped, and were joined by a considerable number of the Epirots, who were generally friendly to them. The Corcyræans, whose force amounted to 110 galleys, took their station, with the ten from Athens, at a little island — one of a group called Sybota or the swine pastures — while their troops, reinforced by 1000 heavy-armed Zacynthians, were encamped on their own coast at Leucimne. A few days after, the two fleets met in order of battle, the Corinthians, in the left of their own line, being opposed to the ten Attic ships, which were placed at the extremity of the Corcyrean right.

The engagement which ensued, — the greatest, Thucydides observes, that had taken place between Greeks to that day — was however more like a battle on shore, than a sea fight. For on both sides, according to the ancient practice, the decks were crowded with heavy-armed troops, and archers, and dartmen, and, after the first onset, the ships for the most part remained wedged together in a compact mass, on which the men fought as on firm ground, no room being left for the *dieplus*, the evolution which was the chief display of skill in the naval warfare of the Greeks, by which the enemy's line was suddenly pierced, and the oars of the adverse galley swept away. The Corcyræans on the left however soon put to flight and dispersed the enemy's right

wing, which was formed by the Megarian and other allies of the Corinthians, and pursuing them to the shore with twenty galleys, landed near the camp, where they plundered and fired the deserted tents. But the remainder of their fleet was overpowered by the superior numbers of the Corinthians. The Athenian commanders, fearful of transgressing their instructions, at first abstained from mixing in the fight, and contented themselves with threatening the enemy by their presence at the points where their allies were hard pressed. Gradually however, as victory declared itself on the side of the Corinthians, and the danger of the Corcyræans grew more imminent, the Athenians were drawn into the combat, and at length took as active a part against the Corinthians as the Corcyræans themselves. The first object of the Corinthians, when the main body of the Corcyræans had been put to flight, was to wreak their vengeance on the survivors who were clinging to the wrecks; and they were so eager in the slaughter, that they destroyed several of their own men, belonging to the vessels which had been sunk in the defeat of their right wing. Then, having chased the enemy to land, they returned to the coast of Epi-us, with all they could take up of their slain, and with their disabled galleys; and having deposited them there, in a desert harbour called, like the islands, Sybota, again put to sea, and made for Corcyra. * The Corcyræans, though they had lost seventy vessels, and had only destroyed thirty, were yet resolved, in defence of their territory, to meet the attack with their remaining force. It was late in the evening; but the pæan had already been raised for battle, when the Corinthians suddenly retreated, at the sight of another squadron which was advancing, unperceived by the Corcyræans, toward the scene of action. These proved to be twenty Attic ships, which had been sent by the Athenians through fear that the first force might be insufficient for the protection of their allies; and the Corinthians imagined that a greater armament might be behind.

The next day the Corcyræans, with the thirty Attic ships, sailed towards the port where the Corinthians lay, to offer battle. The Corinthians came out and drew up their fleet in fighting order; but, though still greatly superior in numbers, they did not wish to risk an engagement on a desert coast, where they had no means of repairing their vessels, and found it difficult to guard their prisoners. They were therefore bent on returning home, and only feared lest the Athenians should endeavour to obstruct their passage. To sound their intentions, they sent them a message. The bearers came alongside one of the Athenian vessels in a skiff, without the herald's staff, which would have been necessary to protect their persons from declared enemies. They complained of the aggression which the Athenians had committed in siding with the Corcyræans, and, if it was their design still further to violate the faith of treaties by impeding the passage of the Corinthians toward Corcyra or any other quarter, they offered themselves as the first victims of their undisguised hostility. The Corcyræans, who were within hearing, called out to take and kill them. But the Athenians replied to the messengers that they had been guilty of no aggression or breach of treaty, but had merely come to protect their allies the Corcyræans. Nor would they offer any impediment to the Corinthians, if they wished to sail in any other direction, but would do the utmost to prevent them from invading Corcyra. On receiving this security the Corinthians, after erecting a trophy, bent their course homeward. The Corcyræans likewise raised a trophy, on the pretext that the Corinthians had retreated before them on the evening of the battle, and that they had recovered their wrecks and slain — which had indeed been drifted to their station — without asking the enemy's leave. The Corinthians had taken upward of 1000 prisoners: of these 800 were slaves: but 250 were freemen, and most of them persons of the first rank in Corcyra. The slaves were sold: but the freemen were carefully

guarded, and treated with great attention, in the hope that, when they should be restored to their country they might be induced to form a Corinthian party, and effect a revolution which would perhaps prove more useful to the Corinthians than their late victory.

This first breach of treaty, as the Corinthians considered it, on the part of the Athenians, was almost immediately followed by events which led to a second. The Athenians, who could not doubt that the Corinthians would seize every opportunity of retaliating, were apprehensive that the influence which they possessed at Potidæa might afford them means of injuring the Athenian interests in that quarter. Potidæa, occupying an important site on the isthmus of Pallene, was a Corinthian colony, though subject and tributary to Athens. But it continued to receive magistrates who were sent to it yearly from Corinth. Its revolt would have endangered all that part of the Athenian empire which lay between Thrace and Macedonia. The Athenians had an additional ground of uneasiness on this subject, in the hostility of Perdiccas, king of Macedon, which they had provoked by entering into alliance with his brother Philip, and a chief named Derdas, who were leagued against him. Perdiccas had conceived hopes of engaging the Chalcidian towns to revolt against Athens, and had sent envoys to Peloponnesus, to instigate the Spartans to war, and to concert measures with the Corinthians for a revolution at Potidæa. To guard against this danger the Athenians, shortly after the return of their ships from Corcyra, ordered the Potidæans to throw down the walls of their town on the side of the peninsula of Pallene, to give hostages, and to send away their Corinthian magistrates, and receive no more in future. And as about the same time they were fitting out an expedition for the invasion of Macedonia, they instructed the officers who commanded it to enforce the execution of these orders, and also to keep a vigilant eye on the other subject towns in the same region. The Potidæans sent ambassadors to

Athens to obtain the revocation of their sovereign's command ; but they also applied to Sparta for a promise of assistance in case they should be forced to resist it. In this application they were seconded by the Corinthians, and obtained an assurance that, if the Athenians attacked Potidæa, a Peloponnesian army should march into Attica. Thus encouraged, when their suit was rejected at Athens, and they found that the Athenian armament prepared against Macedonia was no less directed against themselves, they openly asserted their independence, and their example was followed by a great number of the Chalcidian and Bottiæan towns. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians on the coast to abandon and demolish their towns, and to transfer their habitation to Olynthus, and there concentrate their strength. To those who consented to this sacrifice, he granted lands in his own dominions, to be enjoyed as long as the war with Athens should last. The Athenian commanders, Archestratus and ten colleagues, on their arrival at Potidæa, finding that they had come too late, and seeing their force — 30 ships and 1000 heavy-armed troops — too small to attempt the reduction of the insurgents, proceeded to the coast of Macedonia, and there carried on the war against Perdiccas, in conjunction with Philip, and the rebels who had invaded it from the upper provinces.

On receiving intelligence of these events, the Corinthians raised a force of 1600 heavy-armed, and 400 light troops, among whom several of their own citizens served as volunteers. They were placed under the command of Aristæus, who had connections with Potidæa which induced him to exert all his influence at Corinth in its behalf, and most of the volunteers had offered their services for his sake ; and such was his zeal in the cause, that he reached Potidæa in forty days after the insurrection broke out. The Athenians, when they heard of his arrival, sent 40 galleys and 2000 heavy-armed troops, all Athenian citizens, under Callias and four colleagues, to recover and punish the revolted

cities. They found Arcestratus on the coast of Macedonia, where he had just taken Therma, and was engaged in the siege of Pydna. They carried on the siege with him for a time, but finding that it would delay them too long, they concluded a treaty with Perdiccas, which suited the ends of both parties, but seems not to have been meant seriously by either. Perdiccas desired to get rid of the invaders at any rate; and the Athenians were impatient to proceed to the main object of their expedition. They therefore quitted Macedonia, and after an ineffectual attempt on Beroea, Callias sent the fleet forward, and taking with him the 3000 heavy-armed Athenians, and the troops furnished by the allies of the republic, with 600 Macedonian horse under Philip and Pausanias — probably the brother of Perdiccas and one of his partizans — marched over land to Potidæa. Judicious dispositions had been made for their reception by Aristæus, who had been appointed by the Potidæans and their Peloponnesian allies to the supreme command of the infantry; that of the cavalry was nominally assigned to the king of Macedonia, who had forgotten his treaty with the Athenians, as soon as they had turned their backs, and sent one of his generals with 200 horse to the assistance of their enemies. The plan of Aristæus was to place the Athenians between two fires; for this purpose he himself waited for them in the isthmus near Potidæa with the bulk of his forces, and ordered a body of Chalcidian troops with the Macedonian cavalry to remain at Olynthus, and on a signal being given — for the two towns were in sight of each other, and only between seven and eight miles apart — to hasten to the field, and fall upon the rear of the Athenians. But though the Athenians came as he expected, and gave him battle, the fortune of the day baffled his calculations. The wing of the army which he commanded in person, composed of Corinthians and other picked troops, was completely victorious over the division opposed to it, which he pursued to a great distance. But the rest of

his forces was no less completely routed by the Athenians, and driven into Potidæa. No assistance came from Olynthus. Callias had sent a small detachment of the allied troops with the Macedonian horse to check the movements of the enemy there, and though they came out on seeing the signal which was hoisted at Potidæa, the battle was so rapidly decided, that the signals were taken down before they engaged in action, and they then retired into the town. Aristæus returning from the pursuit found the Athenians masters of the field, and with great difficulty, and some loss — being forced to skirt the sea shore, and even to wade through the water — brought his men into Potidæa. The number of the slain was but small on both sides; the Potidæans lost about 300; the Athenians half as many of their own citizens, and their general Callias. But their success enabled them to commence the circumvallation of Potidæa, by carrying a wall across the isthmus on the side of Olynthus. They did not deem their force sufficient at once to defend this, and to execute a similar work on the other side. But not long after a fresh reinforcement arrived from Athens, of 1600 heavy-armed Athenians under the command of Phormio. He began by ravaging the Potidæan territory in the hope of provoking an action; but as the enemy kept within their walls, he set about completing the circumvallation, and the place was soon closely blockaded by sea and land. Aristæus, seeing no prospect of speedy succour, and little hope of deliverance but from the chances of a protracted siege, advised that all but 500 of the garrison should take advantage of the first fair wind, and make their escape by sea: and he offered himself to share the danger of those who should remain. But when this proposal was rejected, thinking he could do more service out of the place than in it, he contrived to elude the Athenian guardships, and passing over to Chalcidice there carried on the war with considerable success against the allies of Athens, and sent to Peloponnesus to obtain further aid. Phormio, after having invested

the city, made an inroad into Chalcidice with his 1600 men, ravaged the territory of the insurgents, and took some of their smaller towns. Such was the second affair in which Athens and Corinth, though the treaty between them was still subsisting in form, were brought into conflict with each other as open enemies.

The Corinthians, alarmed for the safety both of Potidæa itself and of their own citizens who were besieged there, were now very anxious to engage the Lacedæmonians in their quarrel. And as they knew that similar dispositions toward Athens prevailed very generally among their allies, they invited deputies from the other states of the confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded by several other members of the confederacy, who had also wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans for redress. The Æginetans, though they did not venture openly to send envoys on this occasion, had their secret agents at Sparta, who represented the subjection to which their island was reduced as inconsistent with the terms of the treaty between Athens and the Peloponnesian league.¹ The deputies of Megara were especially loud in their accusations; among all the grievances they alleged, there was none on which they dwelt so much, as the unjust hostility by which, in contravention of the treaty, they were excluded from all commerce, not only with Attica, but with all the ports subject to the dominion of Athens. The Corinthian deputy came forward last to enforce the impression made on the assembly by the preceding speakers. The speech put into his mouth by Thucy-

¹ Mueller, *Proleg.* p. 411, refers this complaint to the ancient compact made before or immediately after the battle of Platæa. Yet, according to the report of the oath in Diodorus xi. 29., the parties were only restrained from utterly destroying any of the contracting cities — οὐδεμίαν τῶν ἀγωνισσαμένων πόλιν ἀνάσταντον ποιῆσαι.

dides contains a delicate mixture of praise and censure, well adapted to rouse the pride and the jealousy of the Spartans against Athens. He reproaches the Spartans with the easy good faith, through which, unsuspecting as unconscious of evil intentions, they have suffered the Athenians to make a formidable progress in undermining the liberties of Greece. The transactions at Corcyra and Potidaea he treats as part of the preparation by which Athens has been arming herself for the approaching war. If after so many manifest declarations of hostility Sparta still remains passive, the ambition and insolence of her rival will break through all restraints. The most remarkable passage in the speech is an elaborate contrast which the orator draws between the Spartan and the Athenian character. "You seem never to have reflected," he says, "how wide a difference there is between you and the people with whom you have to contend. They are fruitful in new projects, and quick in devising and executing their plans: you are content to keep what you have, without aiming at more, and scarcely can be brought to act even by the spur of necessity. They are daring beyond their strength, enterprising against their judgment, sanguine in the midst of dangers: you let your undertakings fall short of your power, distrust the dictates of your soundest judgment, and if you fall into danger expect never to be extricated. They are as prompt, as you are dilatory, and as eager for foreign expeditions, as you are loth to stir from home. They, when they gain a victory, push forward as far as they can; when they are worsted, they fall back no further than they are driven. When they fail in an undertaking, they think they have lost something that belonged to them; whatever they may gain, they account little in comparison with what remains to be won. If they are disappointed in one object, they forthwith conceive some new hope to supply its place. With them between possession and desire there is no room for enjoyment; they make a pastime of business, and prefer laborious occupation to

indolent repose." In conclusion the speaker takes a still stronger tone, and intimates that, unless Sparta complies with his demand, and fulfils the promise by which Potidæa was encouraged to revolt, Corinth might be led, though reluctantly, to seek a new alliance: an allusion, sufficiently intelligible and not without weight, to the pretensions of Argos. . *

It happened that at this time Athenian envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in Sparta. They desired permission to attend and address the assembly, not, it is said, with a view to defend their city from the charges brought against it, but to caution the Spartans against rashly engaging in an unnecessary war, and to remind them of the power of Athens, and of the steps by which she had risen to it. The speaker however not only expatiates on the glorious origin of the Athenian empire, but at some length vindicates the conduct of the Athenians toward their allies. The course they had pursued was prescribed, he contends, not more by ambition than by necessity: necessity arising in part out of Sparta's unreasonable jealousy and estrangement. No other people in the same position would either have shown greater moderation, or have governed their subjects more mildly; least of all the Spartans themselves, whose supremacy was no sooner established, than it was felt to be intolerable. He bids them reflect on the uncertainty of war, and proposes that their differences should be decided by arbitration.

When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for instant war: and even those whose views were most pacific only ventured to recommend delay. Of this number was the elder king Archidamus, who endeavoured to temper the general ardour, by instructing his hearers to form more correct notions than they commonly entertained of the power and resources of Athens, and of the difficulty and dangers of the contest for which they were so eager. "It is one,"

he observes, "which cannot be carried on with any hope of success, without means of which we are at present destitute, and exertions of a kind wholly new to us. It will demand not only men, but ships and money. Without these we can make no impression on an empire such as that of Athens; yet our navy is still to be formed; we have no common treasure, and shall soon grow weary of extraordinary contributions. Let no one dream that by ravaging Attica, we shall be able to bring the war to a speedy termination; if we have no better expedient, we may more probably bequeath it to our children. The Athenians have other territories, beyond our reach, and supplies, which, while they are masters of the sea, we cannot intercept. Still it does not follow that we should tamely acquiesce in the injuries which they offer to our allies; there is a mean between a dishonourable peace and an immediate, unavailing, show of hostility. Let us wait at least two or three years before we draw the sword. In this interval let us demand satisfaction from the Athenians, and do our utmost to adjust our disputes by negotiation, which will be more likely to bring them to reasonable terms, while their territory, highly cultivated and still untouched, lies as a hostage at our mercy. At the same time let us turn our attention to other alliances, which may furnish us with what we are most in want of, ships and money; and let us not scruple to seek them even among the barbarians, if they should seem to hold out the fairer promise of advantage. Till this has been done, let us not sacrifice the safety and glory of Sparta, which rest on the union of moderation and strength, to the impatience of our allies."

But such counsels were too sober to suit the temper of the assembly, whose prevailing sentiments were expressed with homely brevity by Sthenelaidas, the presiding ephor. "He could not understand what the long speeches of the Athenians amounted to; they had said much in praise of themselves, but not a word to prove that they had not injured Sparta and her allies;

and the better their conduct had been in past times, the more they deserved to suffer for having now degenerated from their former virtues. The Spartans had never varied, and would neither see their allies wronged with impunity, nor let the redress be more tardy than the aggression. Others were strong in ships, and horses, and gold; Sparta in her allies: whom she ought not to desert; nor was it fit that she should be pleading and talking, while they were actually suffering, but that she should avenge them speedily, and with all her might. Let us not listen to those who recommend deliberation, which becomes those who are about to commit an injury rather than those who have received one, but vote, as befits the dignity of Sparta, for war."

He then put the question to the vote. It was proposed in the form of a resolution, that the Athenians had broken the treaty. The votes, according to Spartan usage, were given orally, and it cannot have been doubtful on which side the voices prevailed; but Sthenelaidas, wishing that the disposition of the assembly should be visibly displayed, professed that he could not distinguish the opinion of the majority, and directed them to divide. It was then seen that those who were for war greatly outnumbered the opposite party. The deputies of the allies were then informed of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if decided on, might be decreed by common consent. In the interval before the meeting of this congress the Corinthians were actively employed in soliciting the votes of the several states, in favour of the measure which they earnestly desired; and, with a view probably to sway the public mind, rather than to satisfy any doubts of their own, the Spartans sent to consult the Delphic oracle, whether it would be better for them to go to war. The answer which they received could not have been more agreeable to their wishes, if they had themselves dictated it. The god was made to

declare, that if they carried on the war with vigour they should conquer, and that he himself, invoked or uninvoked, would be their ally. When the congress met, the Corinthian deputies were again the most strenuous advocates of the course which the oracle recommended, and did not omit to urge its sanction, for the satisfaction of those who felt either scruples about the justice of the war, or doubts as to its issue. They also endeavoured to work upon the fears of those states which, lying remote from the sea, dreaded the cost of a war from which they had nothing to gain, by pointing out the connection of their interests with those of the maritime states, and the common danger which threatened all from the restless ambition of Athens. They animated the timid, by showing that the power of the enemy, formidable as it seemed, rested on an insecure foundation, and might easily be overthrown, if their own confederacy once put forth its full strength. A navy might be raised, capable of coping with that of Athens: and if their own means were insufficient to defray the expence, the treasures of Delphi and Olympia might be borrowed for such a purpose. With this supply they should be able to attract the foreign seamen, who formed the main strength of the Athenian marine, by the offer of larger pay; and the loss of a single sea-fight would probably be fatal to a power, which could only exist so long as it commanded the sea. But there were still other modes of attacking it; abroad, by exciting its subjects to revolt, and thus stopping the sources of its revenue; at home, by occupying a permanent post in its territory. Even however if there was less ground for confidence, and if there was more to be feared and sacrificed, all ought to be borne and risked, sooner than suffer a single city, one too of Ionian race, to swallow up the liberties of the rest, one after another, and establish itself tyrant of Greece.

The congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the necessary preparations were immediately

begun and vigorously prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double purpose, of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace, and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not perhaps so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the Alcæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the gods, to banish all who remained among them of that blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand, they must have parted with Pericles, who by the mother's side was connected with the Alcæonids. This indeed was not expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a pretext to his enemies at Athens, for treating him as the author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned the sanctuary of Tægarus, by dragging from it some Helots who had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of Pausanias. A fresh embassy then required the Athenians to desist from the siege of Potidæa, and to restore Ægina to independence, but above all to repeal the decree against Megara. The greatest stress was laid on this last point, probably because it was known to be that on which it was least likely that any concession would be made, and because this also furnished an occasion for malicious insinuations, and popular clamour against Pericles. He was accused in the scandalous stories of the times of having procured the decree to gratify a private grudge which Aspasia bore to the Megarians. But the enmity of the Athenians toward Megara needed not to be artificially inflamed, and, according to Plutarch, the decree, which was proposed by one Charinus, was occasioned by a murder which the Megarians were charged with committing on an Athenian herald, who had been sent to complain of their encroachments on the consecrated waste, which divided their territory from Attica. Thu-

Thucydides mentions this last ground of complaint, but without alluding to the alleged murder, and also one relating to some runaway slaves of the Athenians, whom the Megarians had harboured. Finally three new envoys, Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, came from Sparta with an ultimate proposal, but one of a nature which proved that nothing was farther from the thoughts of the Spartans than the peace which they affected to desire. It was no less than a demand that Athens should restore the Greeks to independence — in other words that she should abdicate her empire, and descend to a station, in which she would be perpetually at the mercy of her rival. The Athenians now held an assembly for the purpose of giving a final answer to the demands of Sparta, and Pericles demonstrated the justice and expediency of refusing every concession which had been required.

Some of the preceding speakers had treated the decree against Megara as a matter of slight moment, which ought not to be allowed to stand in the way of peace. But Pericles observed, that the last terms offered by the Spartans proved the insidious nature of their former proposals, and that the one relating to Megara had been held out merely to try the spirit and firmness of the Athenians, and if they gave way on that point, would soon be followed by an attempt to exact some still more important concession. They had only to choose between unconditional submission and uncompromising resistance. For to yield to terms prescribed, not by the judgment of an impartial umpire, but by the will of an adversary, whether in great or little matters, amounted to an acknowledgment of subjection. He then contrasted the means and resources of the two confederacies, and showed the advantages which Athens, as sovereign of a great empire, possessed, in the unity of its counsels and the promptness of its measures, over a league composed of many members, which had each a voice in every deliberation, and were divided in their interests and feelings. But even if the Peloponnesians were more

closely united, the war with Athens would require exertions and sacrifices, wholly new to them, and which they would not long be able to support. Athens had nothing to fear from them either by land or sea. The utmost they could attempt in Attica would be to occupy a fortress, which would perhaps enable them to cause some damage and annoyance, but would not prevent the Athenians from visiting their coasts with a retaliation which would be much more severely felt, because they depended entirely on their territories, while Athens could draw supplies from numberless quarters. To imagine that they could put their navy on a footing which would enable it to rival that of Athens, was contrary to all experience and probability. The nautical skill of the Athenians, which had not yet attained its full maturity, had been the fruit of the continual practice of many years, which the Peloponnesians would not even find means of cultivating in the face of a superior enemy. Should they even replenish their empty coffers with the sacred treasures of Delphi and Olympia, they would scarcely entice many foreigners away from the service of Athens, which had a hold on them as mistress of their native cities; and, after all, her best seamen were drawn from her own citizens, and she would never be at a loss for hands to man her fleets. On the other hand, the Athenians must beware of throwing away their natural advantages, by meeting the Peloponnesians with inferior numbers in the field. Let them not be provoked by the ravages which their territory might suffer, to risk an engagement in which victory would bring them little gain, defeat — by encouraging their subjects to rebellion — might lead to irreparable mischief. Let them not, for the sake of saving their crops and buildings, which might be soon replaced, hazard lives which were infinitely more precious. Rather, if he could hope to prevail with them, would he advise them with their own hands to lay their land waste, and thus convince the enemy of their inflexible resolution. He saw every reason to hope for the best issue of the

struggle, provided only they would not grasp at new acquisitions while they were defending the old, and did not expose themselves to unnecessary dangers. The answer he advised them to give to the Spartans, was that they would repeal the prohibition against the commerce of Megara, as soon as Sparta should abolish that part of her institutions by which foreigners were excluded from intercourse with her citizens; and that they would restore their subjects to independence, if that was their condition at the conclusion of the last treaty, and if Sparta would grant a real and not merely nominal independence to her allies, to whom she now prescribed the form of their political constitution; that they were still willing to refer their differences to an impartial judgment, and would not begin the war, but would hold themselves in readiness to repel an attack.

The advice of Pericles was adopted; and with this answer the Spartan envoys returned home. Still war had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C. 431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an event took place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement of war, embittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of three hundred Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called Boëtarchs. They had been invited by a Platæan named Naucleides, and others of the same party, who hoped with the aid of the Thebans to rid themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace, and one of

them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the market-place. Their Platæan friends wished to lead them at once to the houses of their adversaries, and to glut their hatred by a massacre. But the Thebans were more anxious to secure the possession of the city, and feared to provoke resistance by an act of violence. Having therefore halted in the market-place, they made a proclamation inviting all who were willing that Platæa should become again, as it had been in former times, a member of the Boeotian body, to join them. The Platæans who were not in the plot imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered; and, as they were in general attached to the Athenians, or at least strongly averse to an alliance with Thebes, they resolved to make the attempt, while the darkness might favour them, and perplex the strangers. To avoid suspicion they met to concert their plan of operation by means of passages opened through the walls of their houses; and having, barricaded the streets with waggons, and made such other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before day-break they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses on the enemy, all at the same time raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. The gate by which they were admitted had in the mean while been closed, and no other was open. Some, pressed by

their pursuers, mounted the walls, and threw themselves down on the outside, but for the most part were killed by the fall. A few were fortunate enough to break open one of the gates in a lone quarter, with an axe which they obtained from a woman, and to effect their escape. The main body, which had kept together, entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered at discretion.

Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them. The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. The Platæans anticipated this design, and were alarmed, for many of their fellow-citizens were living out of the town in the security of peace, and there was much valuable property in the country. They therefore sent a herald to the Theban army to complain of their treacherous attack, and call upon them to abstain from further aggression, and to threaten that, if any was offered, the prisoners should answer for it with their lives. The Thebans afterwards alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The Platæans denied that they

had pledged themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain however that they retired, and that the Plataeans, as soon as they had transported their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all the prisoners — amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes.

On the first entrance of the Thebans into Plataea a messenger had been despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid all the Boeotians in Attica under arrest; and when another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Plataeans, they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the execution: and the Athenians, foreseeing that Plataea would stand in great need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed the women and children and all persons unfit for service in a siege.

After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided by arms. Plataea was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta too instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica. Two thirds of the whole force which each raised were ordered to march, and when the time came assembled in the Isthmus, where king Archidamus put himself at their head. An army more formidable, both in numbers and spirit, had never issued from the peninsula¹; and Archidamus thought it advisable, before

¹ Thucydides does not mention the numbers of the army. Androtion (Schol. Soph. (Ed. C. 167.) states them to have amounted to 100,000; Plutarch (Per. 33.) to 60,000.

they set out, to call the principal officers together, and to urge the necessity of proceeding with caution and maintaining exact discipline, as soon as they should have entered the enemy's territory; admonishing them not to be so far elated by their superior numbers, as to believe that the Athenians would certainly remain passive spectators of their inroads. And though all beside himself were impatient to move, he would not yet take the decisive step, without making one attempt more to avert its necessity. He still cherished a faint hope, that the resolution of the Athenians might be shaken by the prospect of the evils of war which were now so imminent, and he sent Melesippus to sound their disposition. But the envoy was not able to obtain an audience from the people, nor so much as to enter the walls. A decree had been made, at the instigation of Pericles, to receive no embassy from the Spartans while they should be under arms. Melesippus was informed that if his government wished to treat with Athens, it must first recall its forces. He himself was ordered to quit Attica that very day, and persons were appointed to conduct him to the frontier, to prevent him from holding communication with any one by the way. On parting with his conductors he exclaimed, "This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece."

Such a prediction might well occur to any one, who reflected on the nature of the two powers which were now coming into conflict, and on the great resources of both, which, though totally different in kind, were so evenly balanced, that no human eye could perceive in which scale victory hung; and the termination of the struggle could seem near only to one darkened by passion. The strength of Sparta, as was implied in the observation of Sthenelaidas, lay in the armies which she could collect from the states of her confederacy. The force which she could thus bring into the field is admitted by Pericles, in one of the speeches ascribed to him by Thucydides, to be capable of making head against any that could be raised by the united efforts of

the rest of Greece. Within the Isthmus her allies included all the states of Peloponnesus, except Achaia and Argos ; and the latter was bound to neutrality by a truce which still wanted several years of its term. Hence the great contest now beginning was not improperly called the Peloponnesian war. Beyond the Isthmus she was supported by Megara and Thebes, which drew the rest of Boeotia along with it ; and Attica would thus have been completely surrounded on the land side by hostile territories, if Platæa and Oropus had not been politically attached to it. The Locrians of Opus, the Dorians of the mother country, and the Phocians, (though these last were secretly more inclined to the Athenians, who had always taken their part in their quarrels with Delphi, the staunch friend of Sparta,) were also on her side. Thessaly, Acarnania, and the Amphilocheian Argos, were in alliance with her enemy ; but for this reason, and more especially from their hostility to the Messenians of Naupactus, the Ætolians were friendly to her ; and she could also reckon on the Corinthian colonies, Anactorium, Ambracia, and Leucas.

The power which Sparta exerted over her allies was much more narrowly limited than that which Athens had assumed over her subjects. The Spartan influence rested partly on the national affinity by which the head was united to the Dorian members of the confederacy, but still more on the conformity, which she established or maintained among all of them, to her own oligarchical institutions. This was the only point in which she encroached on the independence of any. Every state had a voice in the deliberations by which its interests might be affected ; and if Sparta determined the amount of the contributions required by extraordinary occasions, she was obliged carefully to adjust it to the ability of each community. So far was she from enriching herself at the expence of the confederacy, that at the beginning of the war there was, as we have seen, no common treasure belonging to it, and no regular tribute for common purposes. But, to compensate for these

defects, her power stood on a more durable basis of goodwill than that of Athens; and though in every state there was a party attached to the Athenian interest on political grounds, yet on the whole the Spartan cause was popular throughout Greece; and while Athens was forced to keep a jealous eye on all her subjects, and was in continual fear of losing them, Sparta, secure of the loyalty of her own allies, could calmly watch for opportunities of profiting by the disaffection of those of her rival. At home indeed her state was far from sound, and the Athenians were well aware of her vulnerable side; but abroad, and as chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy, she presented the majestic and winning aspect of the champion of liberty against Athenian tyranny and ambition: and hence she had important advantages to hope from states which were but remotely connected with her, and were quite beyond the reach of her arms. Many powerful cities in Italy and Sicily were thus induced to promise her their aid, and it was on this she founded her chief expectations of forming a navy, which might face that of Athens. Her allies in this quarter engaged to furnish her with money and ships, which, it was calculated, would amount to no less than five hundred, though for the present it was agreed that they should wear the mask of neutrality, and admit single Athenian vessels into their ports. But as she was conscious that she should be still deficient in the sinews of war, she already began to turn her eyes to the common enemy of Greece, who was able abundantly to supply this want, and would probably be willing to lavish his gold for the sake of ruining Athens, the object of his especial enmity and dread.

The extent of the Athenian empire cannot be so exactly computed. In the language of the comic stage, it is said to comprehend a thousand cities¹; and it is difficult to estimate what abatement ought to be made from this playful exaggeration. The subjects of Athens were in general more opulent than the allies of Sparta,

¹ Aristoph. Vesp. 707.

and their sovereign disposed of their revenues at her pleasure. The only states to which she granted more than a nominal independence were some islands in the western seas, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and Cephallenia; points of peculiar importance to her operations and prospects in that quarter, though even there she was more feared than loved. At the moment of the revolt of Potidæa her empire had reached its widest range, and her finances were in the most flourishing condition; and at the outbreak of the war her naval and military strength was at its greatest height. Pericles, as one of the ten regular generals, or ministers of war, before the Peloponnesian army had reached the frontier, held an assembly, in which he gave an exact account of the resources which the republic had at her disposal. Her finances, beside the revenue which she drew from a variety of sources, foreign and domestic, were nourished by the annual tribute of her allies, which now amounted to 600 talents. Six thousand, in money, still remained in the treasury, after the great expenditure incurred on account of the public buildings, and the siege of Potidæa, before which the sum had amounted to nearly ten thousand. But to this, Pericles observed, must be added the gold and silver which, in various forms of offerings, ornaments, and sacred utensils, enriched the temples or public places, which he calculated at 500 talents, without reckoning the precious materials employed in the statues of the gods and heroes. The statue of Athene in the Parthenon alone contained forty talents weight of pure gold, in the ægis, shield, and other appendages. If they should ever be reduced to the want of such a supply, there could be no doubt that their tutelary goddess would willingly part with her ornaments for their service, on condition that they were replaced at the earliest opportunity. They could muster a force of 13,000 heavy-armed, beside those who were employed in their various garrisons, and in the defence of the city itself, with the long walls and the fortifications of its harbours, who amounted to 16,000 more; made up, indeed, partly

of the resident aliens, and partly of citizens on either verge of the military age. The military force also included 1200 cavalry and 1600 bowmen, beside some who were mounted ; and they had 300 galleys in sailing condition.

After rousing the confidence of the Athenians by this enumeration, Pericles urged them without delay to transport their families, and all their movable property out of the enemy's reach, and, as long as the war should last, to look upon the capital as their home. To encourage a patriotic spirit by his example, and at the same time to secure himself from imputations to which he might be exposed, either by the Spartan cunning, or by an indiscreet display of private friendship, he publicly declared, that if Archidamus, who was personally attached to him by the ties of hospitality, should, either from this motive, or in compliance with orders which might be given in an opposite intention, exempt his lands from the ravages of war, they should from that time become the property of the state. To many of his hearers that which he required was a very painful sacrifice. Many had been born, and had passed all their lives in the country. They were attached to it, not merely by the profit or the pleasure of rural pursuits, but by domestic and religious associations. For though the incorporation of the Attic townships had for ages extinguished their political independence, it had not interrupted their religious traditions, or effaced the peculiar features of their local worship ; and hence the Attic countryman clung to his *deme* with a fondness which he could not feel for the great city. In the period of increasing prosperity which had followed the Persian invasion, the country had been cultivated and adorned more assiduously than ever. All was now to be left or carried away. Reluctantly they adopted the decree which Pericles proposed ; and, with heavy hearts, as if going into exile, they quitted their native and hereditary seats. If the rich man sighed to part from his elegant villa¹,

¹ Isocr. Arcop. c. 20.

the husbandman still more deeply felt the pang of being torn from his home, and of abandoning his beloved fields, the scenes of his infancy, the holy places where his forefathers had worshipped, to the ravages of a merciless invader. All however was removed: the flocks and cattle to Eubœa and other adjacent islands; all beside that was portable, and even the timber of the houses, into Athens, to which they themselves migrated with their families.

The city itself was not prepared for the sudden influx of so many new inhabitants. A few found shelter under the roofs of relatives or friends; but the greater part, on their arrival, found themselves houseless as well as homeless. Some took refuge in such temples as were usually open; others occupied the towers of the walls; others raised temporary hovels on any vacant ground which they could find in the city, and even resorted for this purpose to a site which had hitherto been guarded from all such uses by policy, aided by a religious sanction. It was the place under the western wall of the citadel, called, from the ancient builders of the wall, the Pelasgicon: a curse had been pronounced on any one who should tenant it; and men remembered some words of an oracle, which declared it *better untrodden*. The real motive for the prohibition was probably the security of the citadel; but all police seems to have been suspended by the urgency of the occasion. It was some time before the new comers bethought themselves of spreading over the vacant space between the long walls, or of descending to Piræus. But this foretaste of the evils of war did not damp the general ardour, especially that of the youthful spirits, which began at Athens, as elsewhere, to be impatient of repose. Numberless oracles and predictions were circulated, in which every one found something that accorded with the tone of his feelings. Even those who had no definite hopes, fears, or wishes, shared the excitement of men on the eve of a great crisis. The holy island of Delos had been recently shaken by an earthquake. It

was forgotten, or was never known out of Delos itself, that this had happened already, just before the first Persian invasion.¹ It was deemed a portent, which signified new and extraordinary events, and it was soon combined with other prodigies, which tended to encourage similar forebodings. Such was the state in which the Athenians awaited the advance of the Peloponnesian army.

¹ Voss (*Mythologische Forschungen*, p. 128) observes, "Henceforward, (that is, after the legend about the fluctuation of the island previous to the birth of Apollo and Artemis had become current,) it was believed that Delos could never be shaken even by an earthquake; and the common people thought it a prodigy, when this happened in Ol. 87., just before the Peloponnesian war, and even, as the Delians gave out (Herod. vi. 98.) already in Ol. 72., before the first Persian invasion. The god, it was pretended, had shaken Delos, to signify those evils which impended over Greece in the reigns of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, according to an oracle which ran, *Κινῆσω καὶ Δῆλον, ἀκίνητόν τις ἰούσας*, *Delos itself will I move, my holy immovable island*. So that it was not before the reign of Artaxerxes that the Delians invented the story of their ominous earthquake. 'It was the first and the last before my time,' wrote the credulous Herodotus, before the Peloponnesian war broke out; and he forgot to correct this assertion in the additions which he afterwards made to his history. Whereas Thucydides did not consider the legend of the priests worth his notice." So far Voss; whom we have quoted only that the reader might at least see one way of reconciling the two historians, or of explaining their contradiction of each other.

CHAP. XX.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR.

AFTER the return of Melesippus, Archidamus had no further pretext for lingering at the Isthmus, and he forthwith set forward on his march. But instead of striking at once into the heart of Attica, or advancing along the sea-coast into the plain of Eleusis, he turned aside to the north, and, crossing the territory of Megara, sat down before a little place called Œnoe, which had been fortified and garrisoned to secure one of the passes of Cithæron between Attica and Bœotia. The Spartans, and the Peloponnesians in general, had no skill in sieges, and did not value it. The fortress defied their attacks, though they exhausted all the resources of their military art. The army grew impatient of the delay, which frustrated its hopes of a rich booty, by giving the Attic husbandmen abundant leisure for placing all their movable property in safety. Archidamus seems to have thought, that his presence was more likely to work upon the fears of the Athenians, before it was felt, and while they might still hope to keep their territory undamaged. But finding at length that he was only losing his time, while he wearied and provoked his troops, he abandoned his attempt upon Œnoe, and, marching southward, entered the Thriasian plain, or the district of Eleusis, where the corn was just ripe, and now began in earnest to give the Athenians a sample of what they had to expect from a continuance of the war. He advanced slowly, to leave the deeper traces; and, after defeating a body of Athenian cavalry in the neighbourhood of Eleusis, seeing no other enemy before him, proceeded across the ridge of Corydallus, leaving mount

Ægaleos on the right, to Acharnæ, seven or eight miles north of Athens, where he encamped, and made a long and destructive stay. His hope now was to provoke the Athenians to meet him in the field, and so perhaps to finish the war at a blow. For Acharnæ was the most populous and wealthy of the Attic townships; it numbered three thousand citizens, who served in the heavy-armed infantry: their voices, it might fairly be expected, would be loudly raised to induce the rest to go out with them, to rescue their property from the enemy; or, if this should not be done, they might be so offended or disheartened, as to take but little interest in the common cause. Thus, if the rashness of the Athenians did not expose them to a fatal defeat, their prudence might give rise to civil discord.

Thucydides intimates that the tardiness with which Archidamus advanced, at first induced the Athenians to believe that Pericles was secretly tampering with him, and to hope that they should soon see themselves rid of the enemy, as cheaply as they had been fourteen years before of Pleistoanax. But when they beheld one of the richest districts of Attica, at so short a distance from the city, laid waste, there was a general disposition to march out and defend it; and the Acharnians were as urgent as the Spartan king expected. Few could bring themselves to admit the necessity of remaining passive; and Pericles was angrily reproached for adhering to the advice which all had adopted while the enemy was at a distance. He however continued immovable, and paid no heed to the clamour which was raised against him, nor to the taunts of the comic stage, nor to the prophecies which were circulated to second the wish of the multitude. He is said to have observed, that trees cut down might shoot up again; but that men were not easily replaced. He would neither lead an army into the field, nor call an assembly to deliberate on the subject. He only provided for the defence of the walls, and from time to time sent out squadrons of horse, to protect the neighbourhood of the city. A body of

cavalry had come from Thessaly, according to the terms of the old alliance subsisting between that country and Athens, each of the principal towns furnishing its contingent, commanded by its own officers; and with this aid the Athenians were able to face the Bœotians, who were the strength of the enemy's cavalry, and on one occasion would perhaps have put them to flight, if they had not been supported by the advance of the infantry. This slight affair gave the Peloponnesians a pretext for a trophy. But Archidamus, finding that he could not draw the Athenians into a general engagement, and that his provisions were nearly spent, broke up from Acharnæ, and marching through the country, with desolation in his train, on to Oropus, returned home by the way of Bœotia, and disbanded his forces.

He had not quitted Attica before an Athenian fleet of a hundred galleys, with a thousand men of arms and four hundred bowmen on board, set sail to retaliate upon Peloponnesus. They were joined by fifty Corcyrean ships, and by others from the same quarter, among which some were manned by Messenians from Naupactus. As they coasted the Argolic *acté*, they ravaged it with fire and sword. The Læconian territory was next similarly visited; but the only memorable occurrence in this part of the expedition arose out of an attempt to take the town of Methone on the western coast of Messenia.¹ It was defeated through the courage and activity of a Spartan named Brasidas, who on this occasion gave a specimen of the energy and ability which afterwards rendered him one of the most conspicuous persons in this period of Greek history. The place was slightly fortified, and without any regular garrison: the Athenians, informed perhaps of its weakness, made their approaches with careless confidence, and only with a part of their force, while the rest were scattered over the country. Brasidas, who was stationed with a small body of troops in the neighbourhood, hear-

¹ Or, as Thucydides would say (iv. 8.) ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ ποτὶ οὐρανὴν; and therefore he here (ii. 25.) calls it simply Μεθωνήν τῆς Λακωνικῆς.

ing of the danger, came to the relief of Methone, with no more than a hundred heavy-armed ; and taking the assailants in the rear, by surprise, he cut his way through them with the loss of a few men, and threw himself into the town. The unexpected succour infused such spirit into the besieged, that they were able to repel all the attacks of the enemy, who betook themselves again to their ships. This exploit — the first of any note in the war — made Brasidas known to his countrymen, and opened the way for his subsequent achievements.

On the coast of Elis, to which the Athenians next proceeded, they were more successful. They landed near the isthmus which connects the rocky peninsula called Icthyus with the main land, close to the town of Pheia, ravaged the country for two days, and defeated the first body of troops which was sent to protect it ; and when the fleet was forced to take shelter from a sudden gale in the port of Pheia, on the other side of the isthmus, the Messenians, who had been left on shore with a few comrades, in the hurry of the embarkation, made themselves masters of Pheia itself, while the fleet was doubling the cape. But as the Elcæus were now coming up with their whole force, they hastily re-embarked ; and the armament, as soon as the weather permitted, pursued its course northward. The capture of Sollium, an Acarnanian town belonging to the Corinthians, which was transferred to the dominion of its neighbour Palærus ; the reduction of the Acarnanian city of Astacus, and the expulsion of its tyrant Evarchus ; and the submission of the island of Cephallenia, which now acceded without resistance to the Athenian alliance, were the last fruits of this expedition.

While this great fleet was still at sea, a squadron of thirty galleys was despatched into the Eubœan channel, to protect the coasts of the island, which were infested by privateers issuing from the opposite ports of Locris, and to take vengeance for the evils which they had already inflicted. The latter object was accomplished

by a series of descents on the Locrian coast, in the course of which the invaders routed a body of Locrians, took Thronium, and carried away some hostages. The defence of Eubœa was permanently provided for, by the erection of a fort on the desert isle of Atalante, which commands a view of the Opuntian shores.

Early in the summer the Athenians, consulting policy no less than revenge, had expelled the whole free population of Ægina, who, though by themselves no longer formidable, occupied a position, which might threaten either Attica or Peloponnesus, and which it was therefore expedient to entrust only to Athenian citizens; but the satisfaction of a long hatred, and the desire of new possessions, were no less powerful motives. The greater part of the unhappy outcasts found a home in Laconia, where the government, grateful for their services in the last Messenian war, and hoping that they would be no less useful in guarding a debatable frontier, assigned the town and territory of Thyrea, the ancient scene and prize of contest between Sparta and Argos, for their habitation.

Towards autumn Pericles himself took the field with the whole disposable force of Athens, to wreak the popular resentment upon Megara, by ravages like those which Attica had suffered, in part through her hostility. While the invading army was in Megaris, it was joined by the troops just returned from the expedition round Peloponnesus. During the war the Athenians never again mustered so large a force as was thus assembled. The number of the heavy-armed citizens amounted to 10,000, though 3000 were employed at Potidæa. To these were added 3000 aliens, heavy-armed, and light infantry in proportion. But the strength thus displayed was only exerted in unresisted devastation; and when this was completed, the invaders returned home. A clause in the decree cited by Plutarch, to which we have already referred, made it a part of the oath taken by the generals on entering into office, that they would

invade the Megarian territory twice a year: and we learn from^c Thucydides that it was strictly observed.¹

The mind of Pericles appears — though his name is not mentioned — in a provident measure which was adopted immediately after the departure of the Peloponnesian army from Attica. Regulations were made, which were observed to the end of the war, for the defence of the coast and of the frontier; and at the same time a decree was passed, to set apart a thousand talents from the sum then in the treasury, and to reserve a hundred of the best galleys in the navy every year; both money and ships to be employed in case the city itself should ever be attacked by a naval armament — the last of all conceivable emergencies — but on no other occasion or pretext whatsoever. The appropriation was guarded by the severest penalties against the dangers of popular levity or evil counsel. If in any other case but the one described, a proposition should ever be made to divert the fund and the vessels to any other purpose, both the mover and the magistrate who should put it to the vote, were to be punished with death.

In the course of the winter, while hostilities were suspended by the season, the ancient usage of paying funeral honours to the citizens who had fallen for their country, afforded Pericles — who was again called upon to display the eloquence which had captivated the people on the like occasion at the close of the Samian war — an opportunity of animating the courage and the hopes of his countrymen, and indirectly of vindicating the policy of his own administration. The custom was that on the third day after the remains of the deceased had been exposed in a pavilion erected for the purpose, to receive the separate tributes of domestic affection, they were deposited in ten coffins of cypress wood — one for each of the tribes — and with a bier spread in honour of those whose corpses had not been found, were carried in procession, on as many cars, to the public sepulchre

in the Ceramicus, the fairest suburb of the city, where, since the Persian war all who had so fallen, except the heroes of Marathon, had been interred. The procession was attended by a long train of citizens and strangers, among whom the foremost place was occupied by the mourning relatives, especially the women, who took the chief part in the funeral wailings, and the sons of the slain, who were brought up at the public expence till they reached the military age, when they received each a full suit of armour, in which they were exhibited at the most frequented of the Dionysiac festivals in the theatre, were honoured by solemn proclamation with the front seat during the spectacle, and were dismissed to the business of life with their country's benediction.¹ Such was the assembly to which it was the duty of the appointed orator to address the language of consolation and encouragement. But as the public service was the occasion of the ceremony, so its chief end was the honour of the state. We may gather from the specimens which have been preserved of this kind of composition², that the merits of individuals were never noticed, and that the general panegyric bestowed on the deceased was so turned, as to exalt the glory of the country which had given birth to such brave men, and had stimulated their valour by numberless examples of ancient heroism. The praises of Athens were the main topic of every funeral harangue.

On this occasion the historian Thucydides, then in the prime of life, and already intent on collecting materials for his great work, was most probably among the bystanders. The speech was among the most celebrated compositions of Pericles; though Plato satirically ascribed it to Aspasia. That which Thucydides puts into his mouth may be pretty safely considered as representing the substance

¹ *Æschines Ctes.* p. 523. Bek.

² Among which the noble oration of Lysias — a worthy rival to that of Thucydides, and strangely undervalued by Dahlmann *Forsch.* p. 22. — almost as far surpasses Plato's in the *Menæxenus*, as this does the poor declamation attributed to Demosthenes as delivered over the slain of *Chæronæa*.

of the one really pronounced, with more than the historian's usual fidelity; and, among the topics it embraces, there are some which belong to history as much as any part of his narrative.

The mythical glories of the land — a copious theme with the later rhetoricians — seem to have been very slightly touched upon. What Athens then was, and had become through the exertions of the existing generation, and the counsels of the orator himself, furnished an equally ample, and far more interesting subject. He will not, even dwell on the martial achievements by which she had been raised to such a pitch of greatness. He thinks it more important to observe the institutions, the manners, the national character, which were the true foundation of her power. A constitution, which, while it placed all the citizens on an equal footing before the laws, abolished all privileges of birth and wealth, and admitted no distinctions but those of capacity and merit in the service of the state. Freedom in private life from all unnecessary restraints on the tastes and pursuits of individuals, which were not jealously watched — as at Sparta — but tempered by a generous respect for the magistrates and the laws. A succession of public spectacles, which, while they honoured the gods, enlivened the aspect of the city, and diffused a general cheerfulness; and a decent enjoyment of the luxuries which commerce drew from all parts of the world into the port of Athens. A liberal intercourse with foreigners, who were not debarred, as by Spartan laws or edicts, from seeing and learning all that might excite their curiosity, nor viewed with suspicion as spies of state secrets; which need not be so anxiously guarded, where there is a consciousness of strength, and where men rely more upon their courage than upon manœuvres and stratagems. A mode of education, which, though it cherished the martial spirit of the young — so that Athens, divided as her forces were, could defy the united efforts of the Peloponnesian confederates, and could successfully attack them on their own ground — did not

subject them to a course of incessant toil and hardship, which was not required either for discipline or valour. Elegant and simple tastes ; intellectual studies coupled with active pursuits ; the use of wealth without ostentation ; patience under poverty, which was held disgraceful only where it was the consequence of sloth ; an intelligent interest in the management of public affairs, widely diffused among all classes, and deemed essential to the character of a good citizen ; habits of reflection and discussion, which prepared the mind for meeting every danger with discerning fortitude ; a disposition to conciliate friendship by disinterested liberality. These were some of the advantages which entitled Athens to be called the school of Greece ; which commonly enabled an Athenian to adapt himself more readily than other men to new circumstances, and to execute whatever he undertook with peculiar ease and grace ; which had opened the most distant seas and lands to the Athenian arms ; had erected a mighty empire, and ensured an immortal renown ; and which made the country worthy of all the sacrifices that her sons could offer her. — Such, in the judgment of Pericles, or of Thucydides, was the fair side which Athens now presented. There was however a reverse, with some very different features, which the orator did not wish to exhibit, but which the historian displays in the events of his history.

Early in the following summer (B. C. 430) Archidamus again entered Attica, with an army composed in the same proportions as that of the last campaign. It seems to have been his intention in this inroad to make up for the time which had been lost in the preceding one, through the vain hope of intimidating the Athenians, and to make them feel what they did not sufficiently dread. After he had remained in the plain on the west and the north side of the city, long enough to destroy the hopes of the next harvest, the fruit trees, the pride of the Attic soil and the growth of many years, and all the works of human industry which were

left in his way, he advanced along the maritime region south of Athens, as far as the mining district of Laurium, where however he could not have found time to do any serious damage; the miners might take refuge with their property in Anaphlystus.¹ He then crossed over to the eastern coast, and continued his ravages as far as the plain of Marathon. This he is said to have spared, not on account of the more recent recollections which might have endeared and hallowed it in the eyes of every patriotic Greek, but through respect for the old tradition, which represented it as the place where his ancestors, the Heracleids, had found hospitable shelter, and had vanquished the enemy of their race.² The ancients themselves were not agreed whether it was from a similar motive that he exempted the groves of the Academy from the general devastation, — as consecrated to a hero³, who had aided the sons of Tyndareus in recovering their sister — or whether he and his troops respected the sanctity of the olive trees⁴, which, according to the Attic legend, had been planted here with slips taken from that which first sprung up in the citadel at the bidding of Athene.⁵ The invaders remained forty days in Attica — a term nearly sufficient to enable them to carry their ravages into every corner; yet it was believed that their stay would have been longer, if the land had not during the same time been visited by another scourge, still more horrible than war, and scarcely less appalling to the enemy which witnessed it than to the sufferers themselves.

It was only a few days after they entered Attica, that a pestilential disease began to make its appearance in Pitæus. The novelty of its symptoms — for such epidemics seem to have been then as rare, as they have been familiar in modern times to the same countries —

¹ See Xenophon De Vectig. iv. 43. 45.

² Diodor. xii. 45.

³ Academus, or Echedemus. Plut. Thea. 32. Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 992.

⁴ Called *μωγαι*, from the fate (*μωγεω*) of Halirrothius, son of Poseidon, who attempted to cut down the original tree, but mortally wounded himself with his own hatchet.

⁵ See Vol II. p. 300. This is the account given by Philochorus and Androtion in the Scholiast on Sophocles Œd. C. 697.

raised a suspicion in the multitude that emissaries of the enemy had poisoned the water in the cisterns¹; for wells had not yet been sunk in Piræus. But as it spread and reached the city, and its victims rapidly multiplied, it soon became evident that the art of man neither had produced, nor was able to overcome it. That it took its rise in Nubia, and was propagated through Egypt and western Asia to the *Ægean*, was a report, which Thucydides appears to adopt; and the place of its first outbreaking in Attica indicates that the contagion came from abroad. It may nevertheless have been connected, as Niebuhr believed², in some mysterious way, with the volcanic convulsions which were unusually frequent and violent about the same time; though Attica was but slightly affected by them — for the earthquakes felt at Athens are not said to have damaged any part of the city — and other regions of Greece, which suffered much more from them, do not appear to have been visited by the pestilence. But at Athens many causes conspired to aggravate its malignity, and to aid its destructive power. According to the authors followed by Diodorus, an uncommonly wet winter had been followed by a singularly hot summer, which was not tempered by the usual refreshment of the periodical winds.³ We do not know whether this statement is consistent with the remark of Thucydides, that the season in which the pestilence broke out was more free from ordinary diseases than any in the memory of men. But whatever may have been the state of the atmosphere, that of the men who breathed it was peculiarly adapted to widen the ravages of an epidemic. The multitude which had migrated into the city the year before, was now swelled by a fresh throng, driven in by the invading army which was sweeping the country. Dwellings were not easily to be found for this new population. The largest houses in Athens were probably too small to lodge many guests.

¹ The same suspicion fell upon the Jews in the plague of 1348.

² Vol. ii. p. 273.

³ *XL*. 58.

Some perhaps of the last comers, but ill screened from the heat during the day, were exposed without shelter to the unwholesome night air. But the stifling closeness of the temporary cabins, and the apartments in the towers, in which the greater number of the strangers were pent up, was more generally 'pernicious. The change of habits and of diet, which with many was probably both scanty and bad — even if there was no ground for the opinion which attributed a preternatural ill quality to the fruits of the year¹ — tended to dispose their frames to receive the contagion and to sink under the disease; and the gloom and despondency by which their spirits must have been depressed from past losses and the unpromising condition of their private affairs, may have contributed to the same effect.

The character of the sickness, as described by Thucydides, who himself experienced it, does not coincide in all points with that of the modern plague. Some symptoms of the latter, which in modern descriptions are most prominent, he mentions very slightly, and in ambiguous terms; while he dwells much upon others, which seem to have been peculiar to the Attic pestilence. His account of it is the history of its progress, from the head, where it first showed itself, to the lower extremities of the body. The pain and inflammation of the head, redness of the eyes, foulness of the breath, and bloody tinge of the tongue and throat, which accompanied it in its first stage, were followed, as it descended to the chest, by sneezing and hoarseness, and soon after by a hard cough. In the region of the heart its presence was marked by distressing qualms, discharges of bile, and a convulsive hiccup. As it sank still lower, it in like manner disordered the intestines; and, where it did not prove fatal, it frequently took such a hold of the extremities as to deprive the patient of the use of them, while others lost their sight from the violence of the first attack. The cutaneous eruptions are very slightly mentioned, and only with reference to

¹ Diodor. xii. 58.

the appearance of the body, not to any painful sensation.¹ That which he describes most feelingly is the burning inward heat, which rendered even the slightest covering insupportable, the unquenchable thirst, the continual restlessness, which banished sleep. Delirium is not said to have accompanied any stage of the disorder; but those who recovered, sometimes lost their memory and consciousness. They were however seldom attacked a second time, and never in so malignant a form. Most of those who died were carried off on the seventh or the ninth day. All other maladies terminated in this, which appeared to prey equally upon the robust and the infirm. No remedies showed more than fallacious signs of partial success; and the despondency which seized the patient with the first symptoms, as it made him hopeless of relief, made him careless about the means of counteracting the evil.

The general aspect of the city was perhaps more hideous and frightful than that of modern cities afflicted by a like calamity. Thucydides does not mention any precautions taken by public authority to prevent the spreading of the infection. And though such precautions are always partially eluded, their entire absence must have cost many lives, as well as have filled the city with horrible spectacles. Not only the streets and public places, but the sanctuaries which had been occupied for shelter, were strewed with corpses; which when, as frequently happened, no friendly hand could be found to burn them, seem to have been suffered to lie. And it was observed that neither dogs, nor carrion birds, would touch them, and that the latter were not to be seen in the city so long as the pestilence lasted. Another consequence of this neglect was, that acts of violence were frequently committed by the relatives of the deceased, who had not the means of paying them

¹ On the other hand Cantacuzenus, in his description of the plague of 1347 (Hist. iv. 8.), though he servilely imitates Thucydides, dwells much on the various tokens, and particularly on the appearance and treatment of the impostumes (*ἀποστήματα*). See also Colletta's description of the plague at Noja in 1816. *Storia di Napoli*, Libr. viii. c. 18.

the last offices of piety. The funeral pile which had been raised for one was pre-occupied by the friends of another; or a strange corpse would be thrown upon a pile already burning. But still more dreadful was the sight of the living sufferers, who goaded by their inward fever and quenchless thirst, rushed naked out of their dwellings in search of water, less that they might drink, than that they might plunge into it, and thus relieve themselves from both their torments at once. Hence the wells and cisterns were always surrounded by a crowd of wretches, struggling, or dying, or dead.

The moral consequences of the plague of Athens were in many respects similar to those which have been always witnessed on such occasions, and which have been so vividly described by Boccacio, Manzoni, and De Foe. The passions of men were freed from the usual restraints of law, custom, and conscience, and their characters unfolded without reserve or disguise. The urgency of the common danger, as it seemed to interrupt all prospects of honourable industry and ambition, and to reduce the whole value of life to the enjoyment of the passing hour, operated as an assurance of impunity to encourage the perpetration of every crime. But at Athens, when the sanctions of human laws had lost their terrors, there were no restraints, for the multitude at least, sufficient to supply their place. The moral influence of a religion, which regarded the gods only as the dispensers of temporal good and evil, was universally relaxed by the calamity which fell indiscriminately upon the best and the worst.¹ There seems to have been as little of the spirit of benevolence among individuals, as of parental solicitude on the part of the state. The only exceptions to the general all-engrossing selfishness which are mentioned by Thucydides, were some persons of extraordinary generosity,

¹ Cantacuzenus (u. s.) exhibits only the reverse — a general increase of piety and virtue. Yet it seems from the last words of his description (*ἡ μὲν πᾶσι ἀνδράσιν εἶχε, καὶ ἀθροιστάς τινι ψυχῇ*) that, if he had thought proper, he could have told of some exceptions.

who—as he says, from a sense of honour—ventured their lives to attend upon their sick friends. A striking contrast to the sublime charity, which has made the plagues of Milan and of Marseilles bright spots in the history of religion and humanity.

Under these circumstances Pericles had perhaps less difficulty than he would otherwise have found, in maintaining the cautious policy of the last year. But he again soothed the public mind by an expedition against Peloponnesus, which he commanded in person. A fleet of 100 galleys, with 4000 heavy-armed Athenians on board, was joined by 50 from Chios and Lesbos; and 300 horse were embarked in transports, now for the first time formed out of old ships. With this force, while the enemy was still ravaging Attica, he sailed to the coast of Epidaurus, wasted the greater part of its territory, and made an unsuccessful attack upon the town. He then slowly coasted the Acté, ravaging the fields of Trœzen, Haliaë, and Hermione. Then crossing over to the coast of Laconia he stormed the town of Prasiæ, and gratified his troops with the plunder, and with the spoil of its territory. But here his operations seem to have been stopped by the pestilence, which raged in the fleet as in the city; and he returned soon after the Peloponnesian army had quitted Attica. Yet in the hope of overpowering the tedious and expensive resistance of Potidæa by a strong reinforcement of the besieging army, two of his colleagues, Hagnon and Cleopompus, were ordered to sail thither with the troops which he had brought back. Phormio with the forces under his command had already left Chalcidicé. The two generals on their arrival prosecuted the siege with great vigour. But all their attacks were repulsed; and the disease which they had brought from home in the fleet, spread over the camp, which had hitherto been free from it. After it had carried off 1050 men out of the 4000 in forty days, they sailed away with the remainder, leaving the same force which they had found there, but now en-

feebled by sickness, to continue the blockade of the town.

These sufferings and losses began to make the people impatient of the war, and angry with its author ; and the enemies of Pericles were not backward in taking advantage of this turn in the public mind. They prevailed so far that an embassy was sent to Sparta with proposals of peace, which were rejected, as prompted by weakness and fear. This repulse only increased the general irritation ; and Pericles thought it necessary to convene an assembly, and to try the power of his eloquence in cheering and soothing the people. He exhorted his hearers not to let their domestic calamities either damp their zeal for the service of the commonwealth, or shake their confidence in its strength. He expostulated with them on the injustice of the displeasure which he had incurred, and appealed to their own sense of his ability, patriotism, and integrity. Nothing had yet happened to change his opinion as to the necessity and expediency of the war ; nor ought they to let their sober convictions be unsettled by their private misfortunes, or by an unforeseen disaster ; but to show themselves worthy of the greatness of their country, by forgetting their own sufferings in their anxiety for its honour and welfare. Far from retracting the assurances of success with which he had encouraged them to enter into the war, he thought he had underrated their resources. He might have reminded them that, as the sea was all their own, their empire was not confined to the territories of their present subjects, but might be extended in any quarter to which they thought fit to turn their arms. Compared with this unbounded range, Attica itself ought to be no more valued than a little flower-plot, the superfluous ornament of a rich man's estate. All they had lost might soon be recovered, if they only preserved their independence, without which no possession could be long secure. The confidence with which they had begun the war was no vain presumption, but grounded

on a clear consciousness of their own superiority in forethought and presence of mind. The lofty eminence on which their country stood, and in which every citizen felt an honest pride, was naturally exposed to envy and hatred, and could not be maintained without great efforts and sacrifices. But however hard it might be to keep, they could not now descend from it with safety. They had no choice but between empire and glory on the one hand, and on the other a yoke, galling as that which they had laid on their subjects. For they ought not to deceive themselves as to the real character of the dominion which they exercised. It was a kind of tyranny; there might be wrong in the getting, but there was danger in parting with it. Let them not dream of security in an inglorious, unambitious, unmolested repose. Those who suggested such thoughts were the most pernicious of counsellors. The enemy's invasion was a consequence which they foresaw when they resolved upon the war; the pestilence an unexpected addition to its evils, which, he was aware, had somewhat biassed their feelings against him, but with as little reason, as he could claim the merit of any sudden stroke of prosperous fortune. Let them imitate the virtue of their fathers, who owed their imperishable renown to the constancy with which they had faced misfortunes, hardships, and dangers; and, laying aside all thoughts of a dishonourable peace, let them present a bold countenance to the enemy, and patiently endure the calamity sent by the gods.

The people was convinced, but not satisfied. No further attempt was made at negotiation; but the enemies of Pericles believed that they might overthrow him, though they could not reverse his measures. He was brought to trial, probably at the expiration of his office of general, and on charges connected with it, though Plutarch and Diodorus relate that he was deprived of it by the sentence which condemned him. Thucydides only says that he was fined: the amount of the penalty was variously stated by other authors; perhaps gradually exaggerated

from 15 to 50, and even to 80 talents. The name of Cleon, soon to become infamously notorious, appears among his prosecutors, as before among his most clamorous opponents. But when the popular discontent, which had been blindly irritated by the misery of the times, had thus vented itself on the most conspicuous object, reason resumed its sway, and Pericles recovered his habitual ascendancy. He was restored to his office, or rather, it would seem, elected in due course among the generals for the ensuing year.

In the following winter the garrison of Potidæa, hopeless of relief, since they found that the invasion of Attica did not, as they had expected, draw off the besieging forces, and reduced to the last extremity of famine, the use of human flesh, proposed capitulation to the Athenian commanders, Xenophon, son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, and Phanomachus. The siege had already cost 2000 talents. The camp was suffering, and had still more to apprehend from the rigour of the winter. Perhaps the generals were not acquainted with the condition of the besieged. They therefore granted very favourable terms: the garrison, and all the inhabitants to be allowed to quit the place, and proceed to what quarter they would, with a fixed sum of money for the journey, and the women with a change of apparel. But at home the generals were reprimanded for having acted without consulting the people; the more severely, as it was discovered that they might probably have forced the garrison to surrender at discretion. A colony of a thousand Athenians was sent to occupy the lands and houses of the expelled Potidæans.

In the beginning of the next summer (B. C. 429), a Peloponnesian army was again assembled at the Isthmus, under the command of Archidamus. But instead of invading Attica, which was perhaps thought dangerous on account of the pestilence, he gratified the wishes of the Thebans, by marching into the territory of Platæa, where he encamped, and prepared to lay it waste. But before he had committed any acts of hostility, envoys

from Platæa demanded an audience, and, being admitted, made a solemn remonstrance against his proceedings in the name of religion. They reminded the Spartans that, after the glorious battle which secured the liberty of Greece, Pausanias in the presence of the allied army, and in the public place of Platæa, where he had just offered a sacrifice in honour of the victory, formally reinstated the Platæans in the independent possession of their city and territory, which he placed under the protection of all the allies, with whom they had shared the common triumph, to defend them from unjust aggression. They complained that the Spartans were now about to violate this well-earned privilege, which had been secured to Platæa by solemn oaths, at the instigation of her bitterest enemies the Thebans. And they adjured him, by the gods who had been invoked to witness the engagement of Pausanias, as well as by those of Sparta, and of their violated territory, to desist from his enterprise. Archidamus in reply admitted the claim of the Platæans, but desired them to reflect that the rights on which they insisted implied some corresponding duties; that, if the Spartans were pledged to protect their independence, they were themselves no less bound to assist the Spartans in delivering those who had once been their allies in the struggle with Persia, from the tyranny of Athens. Yet Sparta, as she had already declared, did not wish to force them to take a part in the war which she was waging for the liberties of Greece, but would be satisfied if they would remain neutral, and would admit both parties alike to amicable intercourse, without aiding either. The envoys returned with this answer, and, after laying it before the people, came back, instructed to reply: that it was impossible for them to accede to the proposal of Archidamus, without the consent of the Athenians, who had their wives and children in their hands; and they should have reason to fear either the resentment of their present allies, who on the retreat of the Spartans might come and deprive them of their city; or the

thebans, who under the cover of neutrality, might find another opportunity of surprising them. But the Spartan, without noticing the ties that bound them to Athens, met the last objection with a new offer. "Let them commit their city, houses, and lands, to the custody of the Spartans, with an exact account of the boundaries, the number of their trees, and all other things left behind, which it was possible to number. Let them withdraw, and live elsewhere until the end of the war. The Spartans would then restore the deposit entrusted to them, and in the meanwhile would provide for the cultivation of the land, and would pay a fair rent to the owners." It is possible that this proposal may have been honestly meant; though it is as likely that it was suggested by the malice of the Thebans. For it was evident that the Plataeans could not accept it without renouncing the friendship of the Athenians, to whom they had committed their families, and in the most favourable contingency, which would be the fall of their old ally, casting themselves upon the honour of an enemy for their political existence; while, nevertheless the speciously liberal offer, if rejected, would afford a pretext for treating them with the utmost rigour. Thus the Plataeans probably perceived; and therefore, when their envoys returned with the proposal of the Spartans, requested an armistice, that they might lay it before the Athenians, promising to accept it if they could obtain their consent. Archidamus granted their request; but the answer brought from Athens put an end, as might have been expected, to the negotiation. It exhorted them to keep their faith with their ally, and to depend upon Athenian protection. Thus urged and emboldened, they resolved, whatever might befall them, to adhere to the side of Athens, and to break off all parley with the enemy, by a short answer, delivered not through envoys, but from the walls: that it was out of their power to do as the Spartans desired. Archidamus, on receiving this declaration, prepared for attacking the city. But first,

with great solemnity, he called upon the gods and heroes of the land to witness, that he had not invaded it without just cause, but after the Plateians had first abandoned their ancient confederates; and that whatever they might hereafter suffer would be a merited punishment of the perverseness with which they had rejected his equitable offers. Religion being thus satisfied, he bent all his thoughts on the object of the expedition.

His first operation, after ravaging the country, was to invest the city with a palisade, for which the fruit trees cut down by his troops furnished materials. This slight inclosure was sufficient for his purpose, as he hoped that the overwhelming superiority of his numbers would enable him to take the place by storm. The mode of attack which he chiefly relied upon, was the same which we have seen employed by the Persians against the Ionian cities.¹ He attempted to raise a mound to a level with the walls. It was piled up with earth and rubbish, wood and stones, and was guarded on either side by a strong lattice-work of forest timber, the growth of Cithæron. For seventy days, and seventy nights the troops, divided into parties which constantly relieved each other, were occupied in this labour without intermission, urged to their tasks by the Lacedæmonians who commanded the contingents of the allies. But as the mound rose, the besieged devised various expedients for averting the danger. First they surmounted the opposite part of their wall with a superstructure of brick — taken from the adjacent houses which were pulled down for the purpose — secured in a frame of timber, and shielded from fiery missiles by a curtain of raw hides and skins, which protected the workmen and their work. But as the mound still kept rising as fast as the wall, they set about contriving plans for reducing it. And first, issuing by night through an opening made in the wall, they scooped out and carried away large quantities of the earth from the lower part of the

¹ Vol. II. p. 169

mound. But the Peloponnesians, on discovering this device, counteracted it, by repairing the breach with layers of stiff clay, pressed down close on wattles of reed. Thus baffled, the besieged sunk a shaft within the walls, and thence working upon a rough estimate, dug a passage under ground as far as the mound, which they were thus enabled to undermine. And against this contrivance the enemy had no remedy, except in the multitude of hands, which repaired the loss almost as soon as it was felt. But the garrison, fearing that they should not be able to struggle long with this disadvantage, and that their wall would at length be carried by force of numbers, provided against this event, by building a second wall, in the shape of a half-moon, behind the raised part of the old wall, which was the chord of the arc. Thus in the worst emergency they secured themselves a retreat, from which they would be able to assail the enemy to great advantage, and he would have to recommence his work under the most unfavourable circumstances. This countermure drove the besiegers to their last resources. They had already brought battering engines to play upon the walls. But the spirit and ingenuity of the besieged had generally baffled these assaults; though one had given an alarming shock to the superstructure in front of the half-moon. Sometimes the head of an engine was caught up by means of a noose; sometimes it was broken off by a heavy beam, suspended by chains from two levers placed on the wall. Now however, after the main hope of the Peloponnesians, which rested on their mound, was completely defeated by the countermure, Archidamus resolved to try a last extraordinary experiment. He caused the hollow between the mound and the wall, and all the space which he could reach on the other side, to be filled up with a pile of faggots, which, when it had been steeped in pitch and sulphur, was set on fire. The blaze was such as had perhaps never before been kindled by the art of man; Thucydides compares it to a burning forest. It penetrated to a great distance within the city;

and if it had been seconded, as the besiegers hoped, by a favourable wind, would probably have destroyed it. The alarm and confusion which it caused for a time in the garrison were great; a large tract of the city was inaccessible. Yet it does not appear that Archidamus made any attempt to take advantage of their consternation and disorder. He waited; but the expected breeze did not come to spread the flames, and—according to a report which the historian mentions, but does not vouch for—a sudden storm of thunder and rain arose to quench them.

Thus thwarted and disheartened, and perhaps unable to keep the whole of his army any longer in the camp, he reluctantly determined to convert the siege into a blockade, which it was foreseen would be tedious and expensive. A part of the troops were immediately sent home: the remainder set about the work of circumvallation, which was apportioned to the contingents of the confederates. Two ditches were dug round the town, and yielded materials for a double line of walls, which were built in the intermediate space on the edge of each trench. The walls were sixteen feet asunder; but the interval was occupied with barracks for the soldiers, so that the whole might be said to form one wall. At the distance of ten battlements from each other were large towers, which covered the whole breadth of the rampart. At the autumnal equinox the lines were completed, and were left, one half in the custody of the Boeotians, the other in that of their allies. The troops who were not needed for this service were then led back to their homes. The garrison of the place at this time consisted of 400 Platæans, and 80 Athenians; to the latter we may probably attribute the greatest share in the skill and presence of mind which were displayed in the defence of the town. A hundred and ten women had been retained, when all the useless hands were sent to Athens, to minister to the wants of the men. In this state Platæa awaited the work of time, and the chances of the war.

While the siege was proceeding, the Spartans engaged in another expedition, with the view of shutting out the Athenians from the western seas, by crushing or terrifying all their allies on that side of Greece. Among these the Acarnanians, from their power and position, were the most important.¹ Their connection with Athens had arisen out of a quarrel between the Corinthian colony of Ambracia, and the town of Argos on the Ambracian gulf, which, from the hero Amphilocheus, son of the Argive prophet Amphiaraus, who was revered as its founder, took the epithet of the Amphilocheian, as the whole territory in which it stood, which was inhabited by a people of the same race, was called Amphilochia. Notwithstanding the legend which explained their name, the Amphilocheians were barbarians. Those of Argos, weakened and distressed by calamities of which we have no more precise account, invited a body of new settlers from Ambracia, and in time acquired the Greek language. Yet the union never became complete; and the Ambracians, with a perfidy of which we have too many instances in the history of the Greek colonies, turned their hosts out of doors, and made the city their own. The outcasts placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, as their subjects. But still deeming their united strength insufficient for the recovery of the city, both applied for aid to Athens, which willingly sent a squadron under Phormio to co-operate with them. Thus reinforced they stormed Argos, and reduced the Ambracian settlers to slavery. A mixed population of Amphilocheians and Acarnanians occupied their place. Henceforward the Acarnanians became allies of Athens; the Ambracians mortal enemies to the Amphilocheian Argives.

The Athenians, as we have seen, had strengthened

¹ It is proper to apprise the reader that we have not thought ourselves bound to follow the order of Thucydides, which, though suitable for a contemporary history, and therefore in his work not deserving the censure of Dionysius (*ad Pomp.* 13.), can only perplex and weary the reader in a modern narrative of the same events. We have therefore endeavoured as much as possible to bring together the transactions of successive years relating to the same political object.

their interest in Acarnania by expelling the tyrant Evarchus from Astacus in the first summer of the war. In the following winter he was reinstated by a Corinthian armament, which afterwards attempted to reduce some other towns on the Acarnanian coast, but without success ; and on its passage homeward the troops, having been landed in Cephallenia, were defeated with some loss, through the treachery of the natives, which however proved that they had no wish to abandon the Athenian cause. Equal fidelity was displayed by Zacynthus, when in the next summer it was invaded by a Peloponnesian fleet of 100 galleys, with 1000 heavy-armed Lacedæmonians on board, under command of Cnemus, the Spartan navarch, or high admiral. He ravaged a great part of the fertile island ; but the inhabitants, who were chiefly of Achæan blood, and hence ill disposed toward the Spartans, were not to be forced or terrified into submission. Later in the same year (430) Acarnania was threatened with invasion, by an army in which the Ambracians, with their own troops, had engaged a body of Chaonians and other barbarians of the neighbouring regions of Epirus. But the first object of the invaders was the reduction of Argos ; and here, though they met with no resistance in the field, they were baffled in all their attacks upon the town, and were compelled to return home.

The danger to which their allies in the west were exposed led the Athenians, in the course of the following winter, to send Phormio with a squadron of twenty galleys to Naupactus, where he was to guard the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, and as well to prevent the passage of all Corinthian vessels, as of all bound for Corinth and other hostile ports. He was still on this station in the summer of 429, when the Ambracians with their barbarian allies concerted a new expedition, to be directed, not as the former against Argos, but against the heart of Acarnania. To ensure its success they prevailed on the Spartans to co-operate with them by sea and land ; holding out the prospect that the

subjugation of Acarnania would be followed by that of Zacynthus and Cephallenia, perhaps by the fall of the hated Naupactus, and thus the western seas would become almost inaccessible to the Athenian arms. Corinth warmly entered into the views of her colony, and promised active assistance. The plan of the campaign was, that a Peloponnesian fleet should sail to Leucas, and being there joined by the squadrons of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, should strike such terror into the maritime towns of Acarnania, as might prevent them from sending succours to their brethren of the interior against the force which was to invade them by land. Before the fleet which was to sail from Corinth was yet in readiness, the Spartans despatched their admiral Cnemus, with 1000 men of arms, in a few galleys, to Leucas. He arrived there safe, having escaped Phormio's notice, and found the squadrons of the northern allies assembled; but as the fleet from Corinth had not yet joined them, he forthwith put himself at the head of the army collected for the invasion of Acarnania. It consisted, beside the Greek troops — those which he had brought, and those of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia — of barbarians, drawn, probably by the hope of booty, from the tribes of Epirus and of the central highlands: Chaonians, Thesprotians, Molossians, Atintanians, Paravæans, and Orestians; some led by their native princes; the Chaonians, who, like the Thesprotians, had no king, by two chiefs of a privileged race, holding a yearly command. Perdiccas of Macedon, though, through causes which will shortly be explained, he was now nominally in amity with Athens, secretly sent 1000 men to join the expedition, who however arrived too late. With this force, the precise amount of which is not stated, Cnemus marched against Stratus, the principal city of Acarnania.

The Acarnanians, threatened at once by land and sea, were unable to unite their forces, and sent to beg succours from Phormio; but while the enemy's fleet was expected from Corinth, he could not leave his

station, without risk of losing Naupactus. Thus Stratus was left to its own means of defence. The invaders advanced in three divisions; the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians in the centre; the Leucadians and Anactorians on the right, the Ambracians, and the Peloponnesian troops, with Cnemus himself, on the left. The three divisions marched so far apart as to be sometimes out of each other's sight. The Greeks advanced in order, taking their usual precautions to avoid a surprise, until they should have found a position near the city suitable for an encampment. But the barbarians were led forward with blind impetuosity by the Chaonians, who were reputed the most warlike of their tribes, and who, confident in their own prowess, hoped, without the trouble of encamping, and before the Greeks came up, to carry the place at the first assault. The Stratians, informed of their disorderly approach, laid an ambush near the walls, and sallying forth to meet them, attacked them in front, while their troops in the ambuscade took them in the flanks. A great slaughter was made among the Chaonians; and the other barbarians, seeing them routed, fled without stopping till they had rejoined their Greek allies, who on hearing of the disaster halted, and united their separate columns into one corps. The Stratians, who had not yet received any reinforcement, were not strong enough to attack them in close combat; but their light troops galled them with their missiles — a species of warfare in which the Acarnanians excelled — and harassed them so that Cnemus took advantage of the night to retreat to the banks of the Anapus, ten miles from Stratus. Here he obtained leave of the victors to fetch away his dead, and then marched off to Cœniadæ, which had sent some troops to join him, and disbanded his army. He himself proceeded to Leucas.

In the meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet, the terror of which had prevented the Acarnanians from uniting their forces for the relief of Stratus, and thus perhaps had saved Cnemus and his army from destruction, had

to encounter an unexpected hindrance. As it advanced along the coast of Achaia, it was watched by Phormio, who however did not attempt to impede its progress, until it had passed through the mouth of the gulf, and had reached Patræ, whence it was to cross over to the coast of Acarnania. The commanders could not at first believe that it was Phormio's intention, with his twenty galleys, to attack them, who numbered seven-and-forty; and even when they saw him observing and following their movements, they were not convinced of his purpose, until they had put out to sea from Patræ in the night, and saw the Athenians the next morning coming to meet them from the mouth of the Evenus. As they had not looked for a sea-fight, their ships were not in fit condition for one, but were encumbered with soldiers for the invasion of Acarnania. But seeing that an engagement was inevitable, they prepared to receive the enemy's attack. They ranged their ships in a circle, the largest which they could form without leaving any opening, the sterns turned inward. Within they placed all the small craft which accompanied them, and five of their best sailers, to move as occasion might require. The Athenians advanced in a single line, and as they made the round of the circle with threatening demonstrations, gradually reduced it to a narrow compass. But Phormio had ordered that none of his ships should begin the attack until he gave the signal. He foresaw that the enemy would not be able long to preserve his order, and that the ships and boats would run foul of one another; and he expected that a wind, which commonly blew out of the gulf about sunrise, would complete their confusion. All turned out as he calculated. As the breeze got up, the Peloponnesian galleys, straitened in their room, were driven against one another; from the various accidents that ensued an uproar arose, which drowned every word of command; the rowers, from want of practice, were unable to use their oars in the swell of the sea, and the galleys no longer obeyed the rudder; in the midst of this disorder Phormio gave

the signal for attack. The enemy could offer no resistance ; all who were not sunk in the first-onset, took to flight ; the Athenians gave chase, and captured twelve galleys with the greater part of the crews. Those which escaped proceeded to the Elean arsenal of Cyllene, where they were joined by Cnemus, who brought with him the squadron which had been assembled at Leucas. Phormio carried his prizes into the harbour of Molycrium, and after raising a trophy on the nearest Rhion, (as each of the two points at the mouth of the gulf was called) and dedicating one of the captured vessels to Poseidon, he returned to Naupactus.

The news of so great a victory gained by the enemy in spite of so vast an inequality of numbers, was received in Sparta not so much with surprise, as with indignation ; for it seemed certain that it must have been owing to some misconduct of the Peloponnesian commanders. The inexperience of the Spartans in nautical matters was such, that they could not even conceive the full extent of the advantage afforded by superior skill. They therefore sent three of their citizens, Timocrates, Brasidas, the hero of Methone, and Lycophron, as counsellors or colleagues to their admiral, with instructions angrily worded, to prepare for fighting a second battle better, and not to let himself be driven off the sea by a few ships. On their arrival at Cyllene, these commissioners, with Cnemus, applied themselves to the refitting of the ships engaged in the last action, and to the procuring of reinforcements from the allies. Phormio, aware of these preparations, sent despatches to Athens, to announce his victory, and the enemy's preparations, and to request that as large a force as could be spared might be ordered to join him immediately, as he expected a battle from day to day. But through some strange infatuation his request was treated with as much neglect, as if either little had been done, or there was little to fear ; and the weightiest interests of the commonwealth were postponed to an object, in which it had at the utmost but a very remote concern.

Only twenty galleys were sent to support Phormio against the whole strength of the Peloponnesian navy ; and even this little reinforcement was delayed till it became useless. A Cretan of Gortys, named Nicias, allied by hospitable ties to the state ¹, found means of prevailing on the people to let him employ this squadron in his own island against Cydonia, to which he was hostile from private motives, and which he promised to reduce under the power of Athens. The Cydonians however suffered no harm but the ravaging of their territory ; but the squadron was long detained by contrary winds on the coast of Crete, and lost the opportunity of an important service.

For in the meanwhile the Peloponnesians had equipped a new and formidable fleet of seventy-seven galleys, not like the former with a view to operations on shore, but for naval action ; and had sailed to the Achæan port of Panormus, just within the Corinthian gulf, where a land force had been previously assembled. Phormio on the other hand moved with his twenty ships out of the gulf, and stationed himself on the western side of the northern Rhion, while the enemy was drawn up a little to the east of the opposite point, not far from Panormus. The channel between the two points is not quite a mile broad. The Peloponnesians, schooled by their recent disaster, were resolved not to venture out into the open sea ; Phormio, who saw no chance of victory or of safety except in ample searoom, was equally determined to avoid entangling himself in the straits. And in this position the two parties remained, manœuvring, and practising their men, for six or seven days. But now the Spartan commanders, fearing the arrival of a reinforcement from Athens, resolved to bring the enemy to an engagement without further delay. Yet they found their men so cowed by the remembrance of the late defeat, that they thought proper first to assemble and cheer them, by such arguments as the case supplied. It seems to have been held as indisputable, that the

¹ Πιότις. A kind of voluntary consul.

success which generally attended the Peloponnesian arms by land, was the result of superior courage. And building on this ground the orators could persuade their hearers, that the loss of the first battle was to be ascribed, partly to the want of due preparation, partly to mischances, partly to the imperfection of their nautical skill. But now that their inherent superiority in valour would be sustained by a preponderance of force, by the most judicious precautions, and by increased experience — the more valuable because dearly bought — they might safely trust that their new commanders would lead them to victory. Phormio on his side did not want topics for animating his people. He had often told them, that no force could be brought against them which they were not able to face ; and, especially after their last achievement, they were possessed with the belief, that no Peloponnesian fleet, however it might outnumber, could overpower them. Yet when they saw the great armament with which they were now about to contend, their courage began to sink, and Phormio's rhetoric was needed to revive it. He endeavoured to persuade them, that the enemy had no better ground of confidence than the advantage which experience gave him in land battles, which was of no avail at sea : that he betrayed his own misgivings by the pains he had taken to secure so great a superiority of numbers ; and would be more dismayed when he found that it did not daunt the Athenians, than disposed to use it with effect. He added that it should be his care to avoid fighting in a space too narrow for those evolutions in which they excelled, and that to this end he meant to keep outside the gulf.

But he had to deal with an enemy who knew that he might be forced to abandon this resolution. At day-break the Peloponnesian fleet was seen moving eastward along the shore, the right wing taking the lead, in a column of four ships abreast. The object of this manœuvre was to threaten Naupactus, and thus to draw Phormio round the Molycrian point, and then, suddenly facing about, to coop him in, and capture the whole

squadron. But to provide against the contingency by which some of his ships might get the start of their assailants, and make their escape to Naupactus, twenty of the best sailers in the Peloponnesian fleet were placed in advance of the column, to intercept the fugitives. The object was attained only in part. Phormio, as was expected, was alarmed for the safety of Naupactus, and in spite of himself was fain to follow the enemy by a parallel movement along the opposite coast, where a body of Messenians from Naupactus was on its march to support him. The Peloponnesian commanders no sooner saw his whole squadron within the gulf, in a single file, close to the shore, than they ordered their column to turn and advance, in a long line, at the utmost stretch of speed, to the attack. Nine of the Athenian ships were driven ashore, one was taken with its whole company: the other crews for the most part escaped by swimming; but the empty vessels would all have been captured or destroyed, if the Messenians had not come up, dashed into the sea in their armour, and forced the victors to abandon several of their prizes. But the remaining eleven, which had outstripped this attack, and made for Naupactus, were briskly chased by the squadron in advance. All however but one got the start of their pursuers, and found time to face about, and form in a line in front of a temple of Apollo, close to the port. The single galley in the rear was chased by a Leucadian, which was far in advance of the squadron, and had the Spartan Timocrates on board. It happened that just before them a merchant ship was riding at anchor. The Athenian captain, by a dextrous and happy manœuvre, suddenly wheeling round it, struck his antagonist on her broadside, full in the centre, and sank her. The Peloponnesians, in the other galleys, who were coming up in disorderly haste, as to a certain victory, and had already begun to raise the præan, were disconcerted at this spectacle. Some who were near the Athenian line stopped short, to wait for those behind; some, incautiously pushing forward, and not acquainted

with the coast, ran upon shoals. The Athenians, seeing the enemy thus exposed, thought no longer of defence; by a simultaneous impulse the shout of battle rose, and the word was given for attack, in every ship. The Peloponnesians, after a short and feeble resistance, fled toward Panormus. The Athenians took six of the nearest, and recovered those of their own which had been abandoned by their crews on the first attack of the Peloponnesians, and taken in tow. The only prize which the Peloponnesians retained, was the galley which they had captured with its crew. With this they decorated the trophy which they raised on the Achæan Rhion. The Athenians raised theirs near the spot from which they had advanced to the attack which gave them the more glorious and useful victory. The wrecks and the dead, those of the enemy as well as their own, were left in their power. Among the corpses which they restored on the usual application, was that of the Spartan Timocrates, who, when the Leucadian galley was sinking, fearing perhaps to fall into the hands of the enemy, killed himself, and was carried by the waves into the harbour of Naupactus. After this discomfiture the Peloponnesian commanders, dreading the appearance of a fresh squadron from Athens, stole away in the night, and with their whole force, except the Leucadian contingent, made for Corinth.

The season was too far advanced — it was now October — to permit them to prosecute their naval operations, even if their prospects had been more encouraging. Yet before the crews were disbanded for the winter, Cnemus, Brasidas, and their colleagues, entertained a plan, suggested by the Megarians, of striking a deadly blow at the heart of Athens, by surprising Piræus, which was left open and unguarded, as secure from all danger, so long as Athens was mistress of the sea. The men were to take each his oar, and seat-cover¹, which seems to have been indispensable to

¹ With an appendage called by Thucydides *ροπαρίδις*, which has been commonly supposed to have been a thong for fastening the oar to the peg

the Greek rower, and to cross the Isthmus to Megara. In the port of Nisæa they would find forty galleys, which they were immediately to man, and make straight for Piræus. The plan was perfectly practicable, and, if as much vigour had been shown in the execution as in the conception, would perhaps have ended the war in a few hours. The crews reached Nisæa in the night, and forthwith put to sea, as was proposed. But instead of proceeding to Piræus, the commanders—though with whom the blame rested does not appear—as if afraid of the greatness of the enterprise, bent their course to Salamis. There they made themselves masters of three ships, which were stationed at the fort of Budorum, the headland fronting Megara, to blockade its port; the men were ashore; they also attacked the fort, and ranged over the island for waste and booty. But in the meanwhile fire signals conveyed the alarm to Athens, where it excited universal consternation. In the city all believed that the enemy had sailed into Piræus; at Piræus it was supposed that he had over-run Salamis, and was close at hand. With the dawn the whole force of the city marched down to Piræus; and, while a part kept guard there, the rest embarked, and sailed to Salamis. The invaders did not wait for their coining, but carried away their spoil and the three prizes to Nisæa, with the greater haste as their ships, which had been long laid up, were hardly seaworthy. Thence they returned as they came to Corinth. To the Athenians this alarm was a wholesome warning, and induced them to secure

of the row-lock. But in an excellent essay on the subject at the end of the second volume of Dr. Arnold's *Thucydides* a new conjecture is proposed as to its nature and use. In the same essay the Scholiast's interpretation of *ἀντηρίον*, a seat-cover, is vindicated, on mechanical principles, by an author who has handled an oar. Even without this explanation, which seems completely satisfactory, we should not have thought our ignorance on any point connected with the ancient vessels, a sufficient ground for substituting a new and totally unauthorised meaning for one which has at least some authority to rest upon. May it not however be added, that a *κλίνη*—for such, according to the Scholiast, the seatcover was—might often be very useful, even out of the vessel, to the rowers, who, except on very extraordinary occasions, such as that mentioned by Thucydides, iii. 49., always slept on shore, and commonly in the open air?

Piræus with chains at the mouths of the harbours, and other suitable precautions.

Not long after the departure of the Peloponnesians Phormio was joined by the squadron, which, more to his glory than his loss, had been so imprudently detained in Crete. And when the enemy had laid up their fleet for the winter, he sailed to Astacus, and with eight hundred men, half Athenians, half Messenians, marched into Acarnania, to establish the Athenian interest more firmly in Stratus, and some other towns, where there was a party disaffected toward it. Some obnoxious individuals were forced into exile; Coronta was obliged to receive one of its banished citizens, who was a partisan of Athens. These arbitrary acts may perhaps have left an impression which afterwards proved injurious to the Athenian cause. But Phormio returned to Naupactus, leaving no appearance of hostility in any part of Acarnania, except Cœniadæ, which was too strong in its marshes to be attempted at this season; and in the spring he sailed away triumphantly, with his prisoners and prizes, to Athens.

During the summer of 429 the Athenians — apparently dispirited by their domestic calamity — engaged in no offensive operations, except an expedition against the towns of Chalcidice and Bottiæa, which was conducted by Xenophon, and two colleagues.¹ This expedition, which was first directed against the Bottiæan town Spartolus, with a prospect of obtaining possession of it by concert with a party of the inhabitants which favoured the Athenians, proved extremely disastrous. The opposite party procured succours from Olynthus; and in a battle fought near the town, though the Athenians were victorious with their heavy infantry, they were compelled by the enemy's superiority in cavalry and light troops to fall back upon their baggage, and at last were completely put to the rout and driven

¹ Diodorus (xii. 47.) only mentions Phanomachus, who was employed with Xenophon in the siege of Potidæa, as his colleague in this expedition. Plutarch, Nic. 6., Calliades.

into Potidea. All the generals fell, with 600 men, and of 2000 foot and 200 horse.

This check was probably the immediate result of greater movements, which took place in the autumn, in the same quarter. Before we relate them, we must go back a little to explain the state of affairs out of which they arose. After the Persians had been driven out of Europe, the countries north of Macedonia, which had once been subject to them, fell under the dominion of the Odrysian Thracians. Their territory extended from the mouth of the Nestus to the Danube, and inland to a distance which Thucydides describes as a journey of thirteen days for a foot traveller of rapid motions, setting out from Byzantium toward the upper course of the Strymon. This great tract comprehended a number of savage hordes and of Greek cities. The Greeks acknowledged the sovereignty of the Odrysian kings by the payment of tribute: the barbarians both by tribute, and by service in war. Thucydides remarks as a peculiar feature in the Thracian customs, which distinguished them from those of the Persians, that among the Thracian tribes it was the fashion for the great to receive, and for their inferiors to pay. To a modern reader the remark must appear more singular than the custom. But at the Odrysian court, as the power of the monarchy increased, this usage was more rigidly enforced; no favour could be obtained, either from the king or his nobles, without a gift. The ordinary royal revenue was paid partly in money, partly in presents, of gold and silver ornaments or vessels, and stuffs of various materials and workmanship, with other articles for luxury or use; and Thucydides estimates the whole amount, when it had risen to the highest, at not much less than 1000 talents. But in the reign of Sitalces, who ruled this great empire at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, these exactions were more moderate; though his dominions were more extensive than his successor's, who perhaps extorted more from the Greek cities. Teres, the father of Sitalces, had raised the

Carpathus, and he rose to the highest pitch of power by his connections. His son cultivated the friendship of the Greeks, and had married a sister of Nymphodorus, a prince of Athens, who exerted great influence over his royal brother-in-law.

Sitalces, from the vicinity of his dominions to the Athenian possessions in the north of the Ægean, might be a formidable enemy, or a useful ally; and as soon as the war broke out, the Athenians made it one of their earliest cares to court his alliance. His connection with Nymphodorus opened the way. Nymphodorus had thwarted the Athenian interests, and was deemed an enemy: but his hostility yielded to a flattering invitation, and to the honours which were paid to him at Athens. He concluded an alliance with the Athenians in the name of Sitalces, and persuaded them to bestow the title of an Athenian citizen on Sadocus, the king's son; while on his own part he undertook to prevail upon Sitalces to send a body of Thracian cavalry and light troops to the aid of the Athenians, to subdue their revolted subjects in Chalcidice.¹ He likewise mediated peace and an alliance between Athens and Perdiccas, who found himself so distressed by the war², while his throne was threatened by rivals at home, that he made great promises in return for this intercession to the Odrysian king, who no doubt observed the national usage, and sold his good offices as dearly as he could. The Athenians restored Therma to Perdiccas³, and he aided them in their war against his old friends the Chalcidians.

This alliance between Athens and Sitalces alarmed the Peloponnesians, and probably induced them the

¹ Aristophanes (Acharn. 141. foll.) humorously exaggerates and ridicules the Athenomania of Sitalces and his son.

² From Polyænus (ili. 4. 1) one might be led to suspect that Phormio had penetrated into Macedonia as far as *Cyrrhus*. A town called *Cyrrus* on the coast of Chalcidice is we believe nowhere else mentioned.

³ They had taken it from him (Thuc. i. 61.), and did not now for the first time cede it to him in sovereignty — which most schoolboys now know would not be expressed by ἀποδοῦναι.

sooner to carry into effect a design, which had been conceived before the beginning of the war: to enter into league with Persia, and to supply the scantiness of their own resources by Persian subsidies and succours. A negotiation was set on foot with Pharnaces, the Persian satrap of the provinces on the Hellespont, who undertook to give any envoys who might be sent to him from Peloponnesus, conduct to his master's court. An embassy was appointed in 430, consisting of three Spartans, Aneristus the son of Sperthias, Nicolaus son of Bulis, and Stratodemus, Aristeus, the Corinthian whom we have seen so active at Potidæa, Timagoras of Tegea, and an Argive named Pollis, who had no commission from his own city, but perhaps represented the wishes of a party. The envoys first repaired to the court of Sitalces, for the twofold purpose of inducing him to abandon the alliance which he had formed the year before with Athens, and of obtaining the means of proceeding safely to the Hellespont. They did not indeed succeed in their main object, but after discharging their commission they were permitted to continue their journey. But at this time there were two Athenian ambassadors at the Oërysian court, who represented to their new fellow citizen, prince Sadocus, that the Peloponnesian envoys were going on an errand which might do great hurt to the city to which he had now the honour to belong, and persuaded him to send after them, and arrest them. It was done. The six envoys were overtaken at Bisanthe, as they were about to cross the Hellespont, and delivered up to the two Athenians, who carried them to Athens.

What follows combines horrors which are but too familiar in Greek history, with a train of occurrences almost strange enough for romance. The Spartans had begun the war with deeds of extraordinary atrocity. They had put to death all the prisoners whom they took at sea in merchant ships, and not only Athenians, or subjects of Athens, but citizens of neutral states, and

had even deprived them of the rites of burial.¹ The Athenians seized the opportunity which now presented itself, of retaliating for these cruelties, by ordering the envoys to immediate execution, and treated their corpses with similar indignity. But the motive which Thucydides assigns for this step, was fouler than revenge. He believes that it was the apprehension which the Athenians felt, of detriment which they might suffer from the ability and active spirit of Aristeus, if he should escape from their hands; and that the rest were sacrificed chiefly to give a decent colour to this baseness. But the fate of two out of the three Spartans, whether their death was to be laid immediately to the account of their companion, or of their country, was marked by a singular and tragical coincidence. It will be remembered that before the Persian invasion the heralds of Darius had been put to death with cruel mockery, at Sparta, as well as at Athens.² Some years after, the conscience of the Spartans smote them for this breach of a sacred privilege, which seemed the more heinous, as the hero Talthybius, Agamemnon's herald, had a temple, and was highly venerated, at Sparta. A series of ill omens convinced them that the state would never prosper, until they had atoned for the murder of the Persian heralds. Yet as no individual had a greater share in the guilt than another, it was necessary that the victims who were to expiate it, should offer themselves spontaneously. At length two citizens declared themselves willing to sacrifice themselves for their country. These were Sperthias son of Aneristus, and Bulis son of Nicolaus, both men of good birth and great wealth. They presented themselves at the court of Xerxes, and announced their purpose of making satisfaction with their own lives for the blood which their countrymen had sacrilegiously shed. Xerxes is said to

¹ It had been commonly supposed that Herodotus, vii. 137., alluded to these cruelties, in which case Aneristus would have taken an active part in them. But Mueller (*Dor. Append. ii.* p. 440.) assigns a different and more probable meaning to the passage.

² Vol. II. p. 237.

have dismissed them with a wise and magnanimous reply: "He would not acquit the Spartans by imitating their impiety." Sperthias and Bulis returned safe to Sparta; their sons, Aneristus and Nicolaus, ambassadors to Persia, perished, as we have just seen, at Athens, by a fate closely resembling that of the Persian heralds.

Sitalces did not redeem the pledge which Nymphodorus had given, that he would help the Athenians to make an end of the war in Chalcidice, before the autumn of 429. But then, instead of sending succours, he came in person at the head of a numerous host. He had not only his own engagement to fulfil, but to punish the faithlessness of Perdiccas, who had not performed the promises by which he induced Sitalces to reconcile him with the Athenians, and to abandon the cause of his brother Philip. The Athenians also had reason to complain of the aid which Perdiccas had lent to their enemies in the invasion of Acarnania; and they sent ambassadors to urge Sitalces to his meditated expedition, and to promise that, on his arrival in Chalcidice, he should find an Athenian armament ready to co-operate with him both by sea and by land. The king collected the whole force of his realm: the Getes, and the neighbouring tribes from beyond Hæmus (the Balkan), all mounted bowmen, armed after the Scythian fashion; the Thracian Nordes south of the Balkan, and those of the Pæonian race which acknowledged his sway; he also induced several of the Thracian mountaineers who preserved their independence in the valleys of Rhodope, some by pay, others by the hope of plunder, to enter into his service; and as he advanced toward the borders of Macedonia, his numbers were continually augmented by bands of volunteers, attracted by the same motive; so that when after crossing the mountain range called Cercine, by a road which he had cleared in a former expedition against the Pæonians, he halted, near the Macedonian frontier, at Doberus, he found himself at the head of not less than 150,000 men, of whom a third were cavalry; the rest a motley crowd, in which the

mountaineers of Rhodope, who were armed with short swords, were the most formidable band. He was accompanied by Amyntas, son of Philip, the brother of Perdiccas, whom he intended to place on the throne of Macedonia, and he directed his march first into the province which had been Philip's appanage.

The expedition of Sitalces is the first event which gives some insight into the internal condition of Macedonia. The country contained the elements of a great power; but they were scattered, and therefore feeble. The custom of bestowing appanages on the younger princes, always weakened, and often endangered the throne, as it afforded means and temptations, such as had given occasion to Philip's rebellion. Large tracts in the upper country were subject to native princes, who owned the royal authority, but in a spirit like that of the great chieftains in a feudal kingdom. The full dominion of the sovereign was confined to the lower provinces near the sea, which, as he had no navy, were exposed to the attacks of the Greeks, who were in possession of a great part of the coast. There was little internal commerce; for there were no regular roads. The people lived mostly in open villages; fortified places were rare: there was scarcely any organised military force.

The Odrysian king, therefore met with little resistance. The people of the districts through which he passed took refuge with their property either in the few fortresses which were at hand, or in the natural strongholds of the country. In the province which had been Philip's, the presence of his son opened several of the towns to the invader: one, Eidomené, was taken by storm; but Europus made so vigorous a defence, that Sitalces raised the siege, and proceeded through Lower Macedonia toward Chalcidice, without even turning aside to the royal residence at Pella, which lay not far off on his right. In the meanwhile Perdiccas, who had no infantry which he could think of opposing to the Thracians, sent to the upper provinces for a body of cavalry,

which came to his assistance. It was excellent in quality, being well mounted, and armed; but deficient in numbers. Wherever it charged, the Thracians gave way; but the little troop was soon surrounded by the motley crowd, and forced to fight its way out; so that at length it was found necessary to leave the enemy in undisturbed occupation of the country, which he ravaged. Not only Perdiccas, but the Greeks north of Thermopylæ, were alarmed for themselves; and even farther to the south the enemies of the Athenians did not feel secure. But on entering Chalcidice Sitalces found, not the Athenian armament which was to have supported him, but envoys with presents and excuses, to cover the real motive of this breach of promise, which was, that the Athenians did not expect that he would have kept his word. He wasted the territory of the Chalcidians and Bottiæans for eight days, with a part of his army, while the rest was collecting spoil in Macedonia; but he could not think of attacking the Greek towns. The season was growing rude; his provisions were beginning to fail: it was time to retreat. On entering Macedonia he had sent envoys to Perdiccas, to claim the fulfilment of his promise; but Perdiccas discovered a cheaper way to be rid of him. He secretly gained over Seuthes, the king's favourite nephew, by promising him the hand of his own sister Stratonice, with a large portion. Seuthes urged his uncle to depart without delay; he probably needed little persuasion; and thus the only fruit of this formidable expedition was a marriage — for Perdiccas kept his promise to Seuthes — between an Odrysian prince, who afterwards mounted the throne, and a Macedonian princess.

But this third year of the war was marked by an event more important to Athens and to Greece. In the middle of it¹, Pericles was carried off by a lingering

¹ Two years and a half after the commencement of the war (Thuc. ii. 65.), near the end of September or the beginning of October, 429. He was therefore no doubt living at the time of the imprudent counsel taken in the affair of Nicias the Cretan, though he may have been too ill to attend to public business. He survived the fall of Potidæa eight or nine months.

illness, which was perhaps connected with the epidemic, but seems not to have exhibited any of its violent symptoms. Possibly the pestilence only struck him by depriving him of his two legitimate sons, his sister, and many of his most valued relatives and friends. His eldest son Xanthippus was a worthless and undutiful youth, who, discontented with his father because he refused to supply his extravagance, assailed him with ridicule and calumny. His death was little to be regretted ; but when it was followed by that of his more hopeful brother Paralus, the father's firmness, which had supported him under his other losses, gave way and as he placed the funeral wreath on the lifeless head, he sobbed aloud, and melted into tears. He had still indeed one son remaining, Aspasia's child ; but he was excluded, by the law which Pericles himself had proposed, from the privileges of an Athenian citizen, and therefore could not represent his father's house. Seeing therefore his name and race threatened with extinction — a thought of intolerable bitterness to a Greek — he petitioned the people to interpose its power. Plutarch says that he wished to repeal his own law ; this was at least unnecessary ; and the people conferred an honour as well as a privilege, when it legitimated his natural son, permitting him to be enrolled in his father's phratry, and to take the name of Pericles. It proved a calamitous boon.

Pericles seems to have died with philosophical composure. He allowed the women who attended him to hang a charm round his neck ; but he showed it with quiet playfulness to a friend, as a sign to what a pass his disorder had brought him, when he could submit to such trifling. When he was near his end and apparently insensible, his friends, gathered round his bed, relieved their sorrow by recalling the remembrance of his military exploits, and of the trophies which he had raised. He interrupted them, and observed, that they had omitted the most glorious praise which he could claim : " Other generals had been as fortunate ; but he

had never caused an Athenian to put on mourning." ¹ A singular ground of satisfaction, notwithstanding the caution which marked his military career, if he had been conscious of having involved his country in the bloodiest war it had ever waged. His death was a loss which Athens could not repair. Many were eager to step into his place ; but there was no man able to fill it ; and the fragments of his power were snatched up by unworthy hands. He died, when the caution on which he valued himself was more than ever needed to guard Athens from fatal errors ; and when the humanity which breathes through his dying boast, might have saved her from her deepest disgrace.

¹ Plut. Per. 38. The interpretation which Plutarch puts upon these words in the next chapter, — as if they referred to the moderation with which he treated his political opponents, — is a sign of surprising forgetfulness or inattention : since at c. 18. he records a favourite saying of Pericles, which clearly ascertains the meaning of his last words. He used to tell the Athenians, that as far as depended on him, as their general, they should be immortal.

CHAP. XXI.

FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR.

THE ravages of the pestilence continued in Attica for two years without any abatement; and in the fourth summer of the war, 428, the country was again invaded by a Peloponnesian army under the command of king Archidamus. The policy which prudence had dictated to Pericles was maintained after his death, partly perhaps through the weakness and depression caused by the sickness, and partly because the enemy's presence had now become more familiar, and no longer excited the same emotions. The Athenians contented themselves with annoying the enemy, as opportunity offered itself, with their cavalry, which prevented his light troops from spreading over the country, and infesting the immediate neighbourhood of the city, and forced them to keep within the shelter of the heavy infantry. At the same time they equipped a fleet, of forty galleys, which prepared to sail round Peloponnesus, under the command of Cleippides and two colleagues.

But in the mean while they were threatened in a distant quarter with a blow, which, if it had taken effect, not only would have immediately weakened their power, but might have proved ruinous in its remote consequences. We have already mentioned, that before the war broke out Mitylene had only been prevented from casting off the Athenian yoke by the reluctance which the Spartans felt to break the Thirty Years' Truce. The motives which led to the design still continued; and the altered state of affairs now opened a fair prospect of success. Several causes conspired to render a part of the Mity-

lenæans eager for a revolution. The government was still in the hands of an aristocracy which traced its origin to the Boeotian conquerors of the island; the civil wars which were made memorable by the names of Pittacus and Alcæus, seem only to have been contests between rival factions of the nobles; and the commonalty appears never to have acquired much legal weight in the constitution, but yet to have grown strong enough to excite jealousy in the rulers. Knowing that their privileges were not viewed with a favourable eye at Athens, they had perpetual reason to dread that their too powerful ally might encourage their subjects to revolt. But beside this motive, which could only sway the ruling caste, there was another which might be more generally felt, as interesting to Mitylenæan patriotism. Though fear of the Persians, and the misconduct of Pausanias, had driven them into the Athenian alliance, they probably could not forget the time when Mitylene had carried on successful wars with Athens, and had exercised a supremacy over the other towns of the island, like that of Athens over her confederacy, and it would seem in quite as oppressive a manner. For we are informed¹ that they punished their allies who attempted to revolt, by prohibiting them from instructing their children in letters and music, and thus degraded them to the rank of helots; a remarkable anticipation of the policy of similar governments in later times. These recollections of their city's ancient greatness, became the more painful, as the predominance of Athens gained ground, and threatened to swallow up all remains of their independence. When they first disclosed their wishes to the Spartans, it is probable that the answer which they received was such as might encourage them to renew their application at a more seasonable juncture; and the Boeotians, with whom they were connected by national affinity, as well as by political sympathy, would not fail to inflame their animosity against Athens, and to strengthen their

¹ *Ælian*, v. H. ix. 17.

resolution by promises of support. Yet their enterprise required great caution as well as boldness. It was necessary that, before they openly renounced the Athenian alliance, they should be well provided with the means of defence; and Mitylene could scarcely be secure, unless she became mistress of Lesbos. These were objects which demanded the longer time, as every step toward them was to be carefully concealed from the Athenians. Preparations however were going forward; the building of new ships; the enlargement and strengthening of fortifications; the filling up of harbours, which would afford shelter to the enemy. In the spring of 428 these works were far advanced, and agents had been sent into the Euxine, to bring a supply of stores and corn, and a body of light troops. At the same time the population of Mitylene was receiving continual additions from the smaller towns subject to her influence, from which, by persuasion or force, she transplanted their inhabitants within her own walls. Still much remained to be done before matters could be ripe for a hostile declaration; and when the Lesbian contingents were called for, Mitylene sent ten galleys to Athens. But the intent of her preparations had become too manifest to escape the notice of her neighbours, and among them she had rivals and enemies. Methymna, the second city in the island, and Tenèdos, had motives for dreading her success, and sent information to Athens of her designs. Their report was confirmed by the graver testimony of some of her own citizens, whom the heat of party spirit made traitors to the commonwealth. One Doxander had, it appears, been disappointed in his hope of marrying his sons to two heiresses, who succeeded to the large estates of their father Timophanes.¹ His pretensions gave rise to a violent feud, and for the sake of revenge, he joined in attesting the meditated rebellion. But the Athenians, afflicted by war and pestilence at home, were as reluctant to believe this intelligence, as at another time they would

¹ Aristot. Pol. v. 4.

have been quick to take advantage of it. They first tried the easiest and mildest course; they sent envoys to remonstrate with the Mitylenæans, and to induce them to desist from their suspicious preparations. These envoys returned to Athens when Cleippides was on the point of setting out on his expedition against Peloponnesus, and brought word that the Mitylenæans would not comply with their injunctions. The Athenians, being now convinced of the danger, resumed their wonted activity; and hearing that a festival of Apollo was at hand, which was usually celebrated at some distance from Mitylene by the whole population, they instantly despatched Cleippides and his squadron with instructions to take this opportunity of surprising the city; or, if he failed in this attempt, to command the Mitylenæans to surrender their ships, and demolish their walls, under pain of immediate hostilities. At the same time they seized the ten Mitylenæan galleys which had joined their fleet, and put all the crews into prison. But the Mitylenæans received timely notice of their danger from a friend, who, having crossed over to Eubœa, found a merchantman at Geræstus, which with a fair wind reached Lesbos before the Athenian armament. They had only time to raise some slight works for the defence of their unfinished walls and imperfectly closed harbours, before Cleippides arrived, and proposed the alternative of submission or war. They did not hesitate in their choice; but after a faint show of resistance, being desirous of gaining time, requested an armistice, for the purpose of sending an embassy to Athens, which the Athenian commanders, feeling their forces inadequate to the siege of the city, readily granted. Among the envoys was either Doxander or one of his partizans, who, repenting of his late treachery, was now willing to make reparation, by retracting his former statements, and persuading the Athenians that his countrymen were innocent of the designs he had imputed to them. But the falsehood was not believed, and the

embassy returned with an answer which put an end to negotiation, and left the Mitylenæans no hopes but in their own courage and the aid of their allies. They relied chiefly on the succour which they expected from Peloponnesus. For at the same time that their envoys had set sail for Athens, they had despatched a galley with ambassadors to Sparta; and though they had secured the subservience of the whole island, except Methymna, and had even gained the advantage in an engagement with the Athenians by land, they did not keep the field, but waited for relief. And in this policy they were confirmed by the arrival of a Spartan named Meleas, and Hermæondas, a Theban, who had been sent before the revolt was declared, but had not been able sooner to elude the vigilance of the Athenians, and make their way into the town; and now induced their friends to send another galley with envoys, to accompany them on their return to Greece, and enforce, if necessary, the first application. The Athenians therefore were permitted quietly to entrench themselves in two encampments on the south side of the city, and to blockade the two harbours formed by the little island on which the old town was built, which was separated by a narrow channel (now closed up) from the main land, while their fleet, stationed at some distance from the city¹, secured a constant supply of provisions for

¹ At Malea. There is, as readers of Thucydides know, a considerable difficulty in determining the position of this Malea, which Thucydides describes as north of Mitylene, while Strabo gives the same name to the southernmost cape of Lesbos, about seven miles from Mitylene. Plehn (Lesbiaca, p. 18.) thinks it clear that Thucydides made a mistake. But this, on such a point, is quite incredible. Dr. Arnold on the contrary much more probably infers from the whole narrative of Thucydides, that there were two points on the east coast of Lesbos called Malea: a repetition, to be sure, somewhat singular at so short a distance, but not on that account to be deemed incredible, particularly as we see in the local worship of Apollo an occasion which might have given rise to it. Indeed Plehn himself furnishes an argument, which appears to us more forcible than most of Dr. Arnold's. He observes, p. 16.: "Aristoteles de Cœcia, quem a Thebæ campo flantem a Lesbuis Ἐχθαίαν vocari ait, ἰνοχλαί δὲ τὸν Μιτυληναίων λιμένα, μάλιστα δὲ τὸν Μαλοῖντα. Traxit portus nomen illud a campo Maloente Apollini sacro, quem commemorant Thucydides et Hellenicus apud Steph. Byz. Uter portuum Mitylenæorum id nomen gesserit definire non possumus, quia, ubi locus Apollini sacer situs fuerit ignoramus." But, as the plain of Thebe was north-east of Mitylene, it seems impossible to doubt that the harbour most exposed to the wind which

the camp. The inactivity of the Mitylenæans did not indeed prevent their Lesbian allies from marching to their assistance; and their united forces were sufficient to confine the enemy, on the land side, to a narrow space immediately adjacent to his camps. But the Athenians were emboldened by the passiveness of the besieged, as they did not know its motive; and their allies, attributing the conduct of the Mitylenæans to weakness or fear, did not venture to imitate their example, or to withhold the assistance which the Athenians called for.

The envoys who sailed first from Mitylene found, on their arrival in Peloponnesus, that the invading army had already returned from the invasion of Attica. And as the Olympic festival was at hand, the Spartans bad them proceed to Olympia, and there urge their petition in an assembly of deputies from the allied states, to be held at the close of the games. When the time came, they pleaded their cause in a harangue which, if it has been faithfully represented by Thucydides, turned in great part on a question of political morality. They labour to vindicate themselves from an imputation, which they were aware they might seem to deserve, of a breach of faith toward the Athenians. They show that their relation to Athens, though it had begun with an act of their own choice, had long ceased to be one of mutual confidence and good-will; that, although they and the Chians had been permitted to retain a nominal independence, while the other allies were reduced to undisguised subjection, they could not consider this as a favour, but as an effect of policy, by which the subjugation of the rest was accomplished with the greater ease and de-

blew from it, was the northern one. On this side of Mitylene therefore must have been the sanctuary of Apollo Μελίαις, where the Athenians hoped to have surprised the Mitylenæans, and the Malea where their fleet lay. The only points which — perhaps from the want of geographical details — still remain a little obscure are: that Thucydides speaks of the Mitylenæan envoys (ii. 4.) as λαβόντες τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναυτικόν, when their course lay southward, and again, c. 5., says of Meleas and Hermæondas, that they sail in ἀέρος, which might seem to imply in each case that those who eluded the observations of the Athenians had to sail past them.

cency ; nor could they expect to be spared any longer than might suit the interest of Athens. " If the peace had lasted a few years more, the remains of their liberty would probably have been extinguished. It was therefore with full right that they seized the first opportunity of preventing an aggression which nothing but the want of opportunity had delayed. They had been desirous of entering into alliance with Sparta, before the war; now they had been invited by the Bœotians, but had been forced to declare themselves before their preparations were complete, and could have no hopes of safety unless the Spartans would not only admit them into the confederacy, but make a vigorous effort in their behalf. Weakened as Athens now was by war and pestilence, if the Peloponnesians would but again invade Attica this summer both by land and sea, she would be compelled to withdraw her forces from Lesbos, and would be deprived of a great part of the revenues which enabled her to prosecute the war. The eyes of the Greeks were turned toward Sparta, and they would judge from her conduct on this occasion how far they might trust to her as their deliverer."

These arguments were addressed to a willing audience : Mitylene was adopted as an ally, and the Spartans were roused to an extraordinary exertion. They directed that the contingents which had been lately disbanded, should be speedily reassembled at the Isthmus ; and their own arrived there first. They immediately began to make preparations for transporting a fleet across the Isthmus into the Saronic gulf. But their ardour was not seconded by their allies, who after having spoiled the Attic harvest were now busied with their own, and reluctantly obeyed the summons to a fresh expedition.

But the spirit of the Athenians rose as usual against the pressure of difficulty and danger. They had already sent a squadron of thirty galleys round Peloponnesus, under Asopius, a son of Phormio. Acarnania was the ultimate object of his expedition, and he had been appointed to gratify the Acarnanians, who had requested

that a son or kinsman of Phormio might be placed in command among them. * But on his way he stopped to ravage the maritime districts of Laconia, and was thus employed while the Spartans were at the Isthmus. And now the Athenians resolved to show that without recalling either this squadron, or the armament at Mitylene, they were ready to encounter any naval force which Peloponnesus could send out against them. They forthwith equipped a fleet of a hundred galleys, manned partly with their own citizens — those of the two highest classes being alone exempted from serving on this occasion — and partly with aliens ; and coasting the Isthmus exhibited it to the astonished Spartans, and then proceeded to make descents on various parts of the Peloponnesian coast. The Spartans, when they saw such a display of that power which the Mitylenæan orators had represented as reduced to extreme weakness, began to waver ; and hearing that the enemy was ravaging their own territory, while their allies delayed to join them, they returned home. The Athenians, having accomplished the purpose of their short expedition, followed their example. The state of their finances forbade them to keep such an armament at sea longer than was absolutely necessary. For the time the whole number of their ships in actual service, fell but little short of that which had been employed in the first summer of the war, which Thucydides estimates at 250, a source of expence which, with the siege of Potidæa, had nearly drained the treasury. It was probably on this account that Asopius, after he had stayed as long as he thought proper on the coast of Laconia, sent back the greater part of his squadron, and with twelve galleys pursued his voyage to the west, where, after an unsuccessful attempt upon Æniadæ, he fell in battle with a part of his small force, which he seems to have pushed too far into the interior of the Leucadian territory.

In the meanwhile the Mitylenæans made an expedition against Methymna, which they hoped to take with the help of a party among the citizens who were friendly

to their cause. This enterprise failed ; but before they returned home they marched in succession to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eressus, where they strengthened the fortifications, and secured the ascendancy of their partisans. After their retreat the Methymnæans made an expedition against Antissa, but were defeated with great loss. These occurrences induced the Athenians in the autumn to send a body of a thousand heavy infantry under Paches, who, on his arrival at Mitylene, carried a wall across the land side of the city, and built forts in some of the strongest positions ; so that before the end of the winter Mitylene was completely invested by land and sea. But the growing expense of the siege rendered it necessary to impose an extraordinary property tax at Athens, which produced 200 talents ; and a squadron was sent out under the command of Lysicles and four colleagues to levy contributions from friends and foes. In the second year of the war a squadron had been sent for the same purpose to the coasts of Caria and Lycia, which were hostile to Athens, and gave shelter to privateers which infested her commerce. But the commander Melesander was slain in Lycia, where he had advanced into the interior¹ ; and Lysicles, with a great part of his troops, met with the like fate in the vale of the Mæander, where he was overpowered by a body of Carians, and of the Samians who still kept possession of Anæa.

The Athenians had been too fully occupied with their own affairs to think of making any attempt for the relief of Platæa. The brave garrison had begun to suffer from the failure of provisions ; and, as their condition grew hopeless, two of their leading men, Thærnetu a soothsayer, and Eupompidas, one of the generals, conceived the project of escaping across the enemy's lines. When it was first proposed, it was unanimously adopted : but as the time for its execution approached, half of the men shrank from the danger, and not more than 220 adhered to their resolution. The contrivers of the plan

¹ Thuc. ii. 69.

took the lead in the enterprise. Scaling ladders of a proper height were the first requisite ; and they were made upon a measurement of the enemy's wall, for which the besieged had no other basis than the number of layers of brick, which were sedulously counted over and over again by different persons, until the amount, and consequently the height of the wall, was sufficiently ascertained. A dark and stormy night, in the depth of winter, was chosen for the attempt ; it was known that in such nights the sentinels took shelter in the towers, and left the intervening battlements unguarded ; and it was on this practice that the success of the adventure mainly depended. It was concerted, that the part of the garrison which remained behind should make demonstrations of attacking the enemy's lines on the side opposite to that by which their comrades attempted to escape. And first a small party, lightly armed, the right foot bare, to give them a surer footing in the mud, keeping at such a distance from each other as to prevent their arms from clashing, crossed the ditch, and planted their ladders, unseen and unheard ; for the noise of their approach was drowned by the wind. The first who mounted were twelve men armed with short swords, led by Ammeas son of Coræbus. His followers, six on each side, proceeded immediately to secure the two nearest towers. Next came another party with short spears, their shields being carried by their comrades behind them. But before many more had mounted, the fall of a tile, broken off from a battlement by one of the Plataeans, as he laid hold of it, alarmed the nearest sentinels, and presently the whole force of the besiegers was called to the walls. But no one knew what had happened, and the general confusion was increased by the sally of the besieged. All therefore remained at their posts ; only a body of three hundred men, who were always in readiness to move toward any quarter where they might be needed, issued from one of the gates in search of the place from which the alarm had arisen. In the mean while the assailants had made themselves

masters of the two towers between which they scaled the wall, and, after cutting down the sentinels, guarded the passages which led through them, while others mounted by ladders to the roofs, and thence discharged their missiles on all who attempted to approach the scene of action. The main body of the fugitives now poured through the opening thus secured, applying more ladders, and knocking away the battlements: and as they gained the other side of the outer ditch, they formed upon its edge, and with their arrows and javelins protected their comrades, who were crossing, from the enemy above. Last of all, and with some difficulty — for the ditch was deep, the water high, and covered with a thin crust of ice — the parties which occupied the towers effected their retreat; and they had scarcely crossed, before the three hundred were seen coming up with lighted torches. But their lights, which discovered nothing to them, made them a mark for the missiles of the Platæans, who were thus enabled to elude their pursuit, and to move away in good order.

All the details of the plan seem to have been concerted with admirable forethought. On the first alarm fire signals were raised by the besiegers to convey the intelligence to Thebes. But the Platæans had provided against this danger, and showed similar signals from their own walls, so as to render it impossible for the Thebans to interpret those of the enemy. This precaution afforded additional security to their retreat. For instead of taking the nearest road to Athens, they first bent their steps toward Thebes, while they could see their pursuers with their blazing torches threading the ascent of Citheron. After they had followed the Theban road for six or seven furlongs, they struck into that which led by Erythræ and Hysiaë to the Attic border, and arrived safe at Athens. Out of the two hundred and twenty who set out together, one fell into the enemy's hands, after he had crossed the outer ditch. Seven turned back panic-struck, and reported that all their com-

panions had been cut off: and at day-break a herald was sent to recover their bodies. The answer revealed the happy issue of the adventure.

When the Spartans found themselves forced to abandon the design of invading Attica a second time in the summer, they nevertheless resolved to send succours to Mitylene, and directed their allies to equip a fleet of forty galleys, which their admiral Alcidas was to conduct in the course of the next summer to Lesbos. But to keep up the spirit of the Mitylenæans, a Spartan, named Salæthus, was despatched early in 427, to give them notice of these preparations. He contrived to make his way into the city through the Athenian lines, by ascending the course of a torrent. He found affairs in a state which called for his presence. Scarcity began to be felt among the people; the thought of a capitulation had already presented itself, and there were many to whom it was by no means unwelcome. Salæthus announced himself to the magistrates as charged, not only to carry the good tidings, that next summer, while Alcidas sailed to their relief, a Peloponnesian army would invade Attica, but in the mean time to take upon himself the direction of their civil and military affairs; and he was suffered to regulate them at his discretion.

When the summer came, the Spartans fulfilled their promise. They sent Alcidas with the fleet, forty-two galleys, to the aid of Mitylene, and then proceeded to invade Attica, under the command of Cleomenes, who acted in the place of his nephew Pausanias, son of the exiled king Pleistoanax, who was still in his nonage. Archidamus was probably kept at home by illness.¹ The Peloponnesians lingered in Attica, until the want of provisions compelled them to retire, and having time to penetrate into almost every corner, committed ravages only less destructive than those of the second invasion, which found many parts untouched. They protracted their stay, because they expected to receive intelligence

¹ If he had been already dead Agis would probably have commanded the army.

of the operations of Alcidas. But the tidings for which they waited were long delayed, and when they came, crushed all the hopes with which they had begun the campaign.

They had entrusted the command of the naval armament to a man very unfit for such a post, though he might have been useful in an inferior station. He seems to have possessed all the wariness of the Spartan character in a degree bordering on timidity, without any of the energy which sometimes relieved it. Instead of pushing vigorously forward to the main end of the expedition, he lost time on the coast of Peloponnesus, chiefly intent, it would seem, on eluding the observation of the Athenian cruisers; and he succeeded in reaching the Cyclades unobserved. But here he received news that Mitylene had already surrendered to Paches. Nevertheless, as this might prove a false rumour, he proceeded as far as Embaton, a port in the territory of Erythræ, where the bad tidings were fully confirmed. Mitylene had fallen only seven days before: perhaps not more than the time which he had wasted.

It was the fault, or the misfortune, of Salæthus. Ignorant of the state of parties at Mitylene, or thinking it necessary, at all hazards, to make an attack on the Athenian line, as he had begun himself to despair of the promised succours, and the provisions of the town were nearly spent, he in an evil hour determined to entrust the commonalty with the arms of the regular infantry, which the policy of the government had hitherto reserved for the class which had privileges as well as a country to defend. But the new soldiers, instead of sallying out to attack the enemy, collected in armed groups, became clamorous for bread, and declared that unless the wealthy citizens would open their granaries, and distribute their hidden stores among the famishing people, they would make their own terms with the Athenians. Either the supposed stores did not exist, or it was known that this demand was merely a pretext. The ruling body, dreading a capitulation

lation from which they would be excluded, hastened to make the best which under such circumstances they could obtain. They agreed to surrender the city, and to cast themselves on the mercy of the Athenian people, and immediately to open their gates to the army; but Paches permitted them to send an embassy to Athens, and engaged that until the pleasure of the Athenians should be known, he would not deprive any Mitylenæan either of life or liberty. Yet while his troops entered the town, the principal leaders of the revolt, unable to contain themselves, took refuge at the altars. Paches soothed their fears, and, under a promise of respecting their persons, removed them to safe custody in Tenedos, to await the return of their envoys, who were sent according to the agreement to Athens. Salæthus had found a hiding-place in the town.

Such was the state of Mitylene when Alcidas arrived at Embaton. He immediately held a council of war, to decide on the course which he should adopt. Teutiplus, the commander of the Elean contingent, suggested a bold, yet promising plan: to sail with all speed to Mitylene, and surprise the conquerors in the midst of their security. But Alcidas knew that he had been sent to raise the siege, and, this being no longer possible, thought that this part of his commission was at an end. He had with him some Ionian refugees, who with the Lesbian envoys, urged him to take possession either of Cumæ, or of one of the Ionian cities, which might be made the centre of a general insurrection among the subjects of Athens on the Asiatic coast, who contributed the largest part of her revenues, and were all impatient of her rule. But this was too bold a step for the prudence of Alcidas, who thought he should be safer on the coast of Peloponnesus than on that of Ionia, and had reason to fear that the enemy might be already in pursuit of him. He therefore bent his course southward, though still along the coast. The chief fruit which his expedition had hitherto yielded, was the capture of a number of prisoners,

chiefly Ionians, who, little expecting to see a Peloponnesian fleet in their waters, had taken the enemy for Athenians, and had thus fallen into his hands. When he touched at Myonnesus, near Teos, he thought himself bound to observe the bloody rule which Sparta had laid down, and ordered most of these unhappy men — who, as he had been lately assured, were at heart his friends — to be put to death. But at Ephesus he was met by envoys from the Samians of Anæa, who expostulated with him on the contrast between such proceedings and the language of a state which professed to be contending for the liberties of Greece. And he was so far moved by their remonstrances as to release most of his surviving prisoners. And now, with more vigour than he had shown in his outward voyage, he quitted the coast, and pushed across the open sea for Peloponnesus.

His fear of pursuit indeed was not groundless. He had been seen while he lay among the Cyclades, by the two Athenian state-galleys, the *Salaminia* and the *Paralas*, which hastened with the information to Paches, who had been already advised, from Erythræ, and other quarters, of the enemy's presence on the coast of Ionia. The danger seemed great to the Athenians, who did not know the character of Alcidas; for, as the Ionian cities had never been permitted to repair their fortifications since they had been dismantled in the Persian war, the smallest evil which he might have inflicted was to plunder them as he passed; the greatest would have been done if he had followed the advice of his Ionian counsellors. Paches, therefore, who had already reduced Antissa, deferred the subjugation of Lesbos, and immediately set out in pursuit of Alcidas, whom he chased as far as Patmos; but there finding that the enemy was too far ahead to be overtaken, he turned back, and at a more leisurely rate proceeded along the coast towards Lesbos.

He had been called to the assistance of one of the parties by which Colophon had been for some time

divided. Colophon itself had been taken, in the second year of the war, by a Persian force under the command of Itamanes, who came as the ally of one of its factions. Their adversaries, and all who dreaded Persian government, took refuge in Notium, the port town of Colophon, which was only about two miles distant from the upper city. Here they lived secure, until discord arose among them, and the animosity of one party toward their fellow-citizens proved stronger than their aversion to the barbarians. They procured a body of auxiliariæ — partly Arcadian mercenaries, the rest barbarians — from the satrap Pissuthnes, and with their aid expelled their opponents, who, it may be collected from Aristotle¹, consisted chiefly of the old population of Notium. And now they invited the party which was in possession of the upper town to share the government with them, and, as Notium was unfortified², inclosed one quarter with a wall by way of a citadel for the garrison. Such was the condition in which they were found by Paches, when, at the request of the weaker side, he appeared before Notium. As he could not well spare time for a siege, and was not scrupulous about the means of attaining his object, he invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians, to a parley, under a solemn engagement, that if he did not approve of the terms offered to him, he should be conducted back safe to the citadel. Hippias came out, but was immediately arrested by Paches, who at the same time, by a sudden attack, made himself master of the citadel, and put the whole garrison to the sword. To crown his perfidy he led Hippias within the wall, and then, as if his pledge was redeemed, had him cruelly executed.³ He now

¹ Pol. v. 2. Notium and Colophon contrasted in their political bias as Piræus and Athens.

² This may be inferred from the narrative of Thucydides, as well as from the general remark, iii. 33. about the state of the Ionian cities. Schneider's blunder (in his note on Xenophon, Hell. i. 5. 7., where he confounds this Notium with a place in Chios, which Strabo describes as an open beach with a roadstead, ὁρμαῖος αἰγιαλός) will not much surprise the learned reader, though it may deceive an uninformed one.

³ Pierced with arrows. Possibly however not from mere wantonness, but under the influence of some superstitious fancy, suggested by the consciousness of his perfidy.

restored Notium to the party which had sought his aid. They were afterwards strengthened by a body of Colophonian refugees, whom the Athenians collected from their various places of exile, and settled at Notium under institutions closely resembling their own.

On his return to Mitylene, Paches proceeded to reduce those parts of the island which still held out. And we cannot but suspect that he only waited for this consummation of his conquest, to break the agreement which he had made with the Mitylenæans. He now sent home the greater part of his forces, and with them the suppliants whom he had removed to Tenedos, and others of the citizens who appeared to have been most deeply implicated in the rebellion. Salæthus, who had been discovered, and might have been put to death as an enemy, was also reserved for the doom which he might meet with at Athens. There he attempted to save his life by offering, among other things which he was probably unable to perform, to induce his countrymen to raise the siege of Platæa. But the people, incredulous, or too eager for revenge, ordered him to immediate execution. The next question to be decided was the fate of his fellow-prisoners, and of Mitylene. It would probably have been rigorous, if it had been determined only by the natural feelings of resentment excited by the danger with which the revolt had threatened Athens, and by the expence it had occasioned, at a juncture when her treasury was nearly exhausted, and she was enfeebled by her domestic calamity. It was a blow aimed at her existence in the season of her deepest distress, and, as every Athenian would argue, by the most favoured of her allies. But the assembly which met to deliberate on the question, was swayed by a man, who since the death of Pericles had been gradually rising to power, and who acquired an infamous celebrity as the foremost among the Athenian demagogues and sycophants of his age, Cleon, the son of Cleænetus. He was of reputable, though not of high condition; a tanner by trade; but he seems to have entered early

upon the political career, and to have found it more lucrative, as well as more dazzling, than his honest occupation. His abilities were very slender; he possessed no knowledge, political or military, to qualify him for the direction of public affairs, nor any talents, but of the lowest order. His eloquence, if he could be said to have any, was of a kind strongly contrasted to that with which Pericles was used to command the popular assembly. It was impetuous and coarse; set off with a loud voice, and with vehement and unseemly gesticulations, which before him no orator had ever ventured to use. The attitude which the ancient usage had prescribed in an address to the people was calm and grave, earnest and majestic, and varied with but little action. Cleon was first seen to throw open or cast aside his upper garment, to clap his thigh, to rush from one side of the speaker's stand to the other.¹ It was perhaps to the contrast which his language and manner exhibited to the ancient style of oratory, that he first owed his success. The people probably found the same kind of relief in his homely diction and vulgar deportment, after their attention had been strained by the lofty and refined eloquence of Pericles, as was afforded by the burlesque drama which often immediately followed the most sublime tragedy. Unhappily on the political stage the farce became at last the leading part of the entertainment. Cleon, though master of impudence which nothing could abash, seems to have been not wholly unconscious of his own emptiness and incapacity; and he strove to cover his intrinsic feebleness by a show of energy, which cost him no effort, and was exerted at the expense or the risk of the state. He wished to be known as the blunt, straightforward man, of resolute counsels, and strong measures; who kept the good of the people steadily in view, and who would always take the shortest course to arrive at it. He thus gained credit for plain good sense and honest patriotism, while he watched every turn of the popular inclination, that

¹ Plut. Nic. 8. Compare Æschines Timarch. p. 4.

he might anticipate or go beyond it. During the latter years of Pericles he had been distinguished among his opponents by the boldness and activity with which he attacked the great man's person and administration.¹ At the time of the first Peloponnesian invasion he loudly seconded the popular clamour which called on Pericles to meet the enemy in the field. No reputation was ever secure from his calumnious invectives. He professed himself the devoted friend of the poorer citizens, cherished their envy and jealousy of the rich, and accustomed them to consider their personal interests as the sole end of the state. It appears to have been he, who not long after the death of Pericles raised the pay of the jurors from one obolus to three.² It belonged to the character and policy of Cleon, to treat the allies of the commonwealth with despotic harshness, as subjects who had no rights that could be allowed to interfere with the will of their sovereign, and were bound to submit without a murmur to all his exactions. Probably indeed he had private motives, beside the affectation of patriotic zeal, for taking the most violent side in every question which arose between Athens and her confederates. The more he was dreaded as an advocate of stern measures, the more important it was to retain or silence him. He barked, as well as fawned, for food.

It was therefore not difficult to foresee what course he would pursue in the case of Mitylene. The interest both of his popularity and of his more sordid cupidity required that he should inflame and satiate the vindictive humour of the people; and he succeeded in carrying through a decree, that not only the prisoners sent by Paches, but all the adult citizens of Mitylene, should be put to death, and the women and children enslaved. This ferocious order was despatched the same day. But on the next, when the passions which had been heated by the debate were a little cooled, many of those

¹ Hermippus (Plut. Per. 33) compared his attacks on Pericles (δὲνχθης αἰθρῆς Κλίαν) to those of a horse-fly, or other biting and importunate insect.

² See Boeckh. St. d. Ath. ii. c. 15.

who had voted with the majority began to recoil at the thought of such a sweeping massacre, and to wish that they could recall the hasty sentence. The Mitylenæan envoys and their Athenian friends took advantage of this turn in the public mind, and induced the presiding magistrates, who perceived the general feeling, to call another assembly, and put the question again to the vote. Cleon again came forward to support the decree which he had moved the day before. Though the speech which Thucydides ascribes to him probably affords no specimen of his style of oratory, it undoubtedly represents the vein of his arguments. To shame the people out of its humanity, he does not scruple to assert, that a democratical government which is liable to such sudden changes of mood, is unfit to rule an empire. He repeats an observation which Pericles is said to have made for a different purpose, that the Athenian dominion was a tyranny, resting on force, not on the affections of its subjects. "Lenity and indulgence toward rebels were not only in themselves injurious to such a power, but would now afford an example of levity, which would destroy all the stability of the laws, and would stimulate the vanity of clever and ambitious men, to seek reputation by continually overthrowing what had been maturely resolved on the proposal of another. His own opinion remained unchanged; and he could not conceive how any one, who was not either seduced by the desire of displaying a perverse ingenuity, or swayed by mercenary motives, could question the justice and expediency of the decree. Mitylene had been guilty, not simply of revolt, but of a malignant, wanton conspiracy, against an ally who had distinguished her among all her confederates by peculiar honours and privileges. As the offence was aggravated, the punishment ought to be severe. Nor was there any ground for making a distinction — which would only encourage offenders by supplying them with pretexts easily fabricated — between the class which had been active in the rebellion, and that which by its ac-

quiescence had shown itself willing to share the risk of the enterprise, and had in fact co-operated with its authors. If such aggressors were allowed to hope for impunity, there would be no end to the labours, the dangers, and the losses of the commonwealth, which would be involved in a series of contests, in which victory would be unprofitable, defeat calamitous. A signal example was necessary to convince those who might be tempted to similar misdeeds, that no arts, either of eloquence or of corruption, would avail to screen them from vengeance."

The cause of the Mitylenæans was pleaded by Diodotus, who had most strongly opposed the decree in the previous assembly, and who was perhaps just sufficiently connected with them to give some colour to Cleon's insinuation of corrupt motives. He repels it only by some general remarks, on the odiousness and mischievousness of such vague imputations, which he observes, were so readily caught up by an Athenian audience, as to render it a service full of difficulty and danger to offer them good advice. But as to the question then before them, he is willing to let it rest on the ground which his adversary himself has taken. He will not attempt either to defend or to excuse the conduct of the Mitylenæans. He is ready to admit that they have deserved the utmost rigour of Cleon's decree. But he is prepared to show, that, although such a punishment might be just, it would not be expedient for Athens to inflict it. Nothing could be more judicious than this line of argument, on an occasion when it was evident that the humane feelings of his hearers were already roused, but many might want to be furnished with reasons for indulging them, and the rest would only be exasperated by any attempt to vindicate the objects of their resentment. He therefore reminds them, "that no punishments ever devised had been able to put a stop to crimes; since the rigour of the laws, to whatever degree it might be stretched, could never extinguish the hope of impunity, by which men were

buoyed up in their criminal enterprises. The cravings of passion, with the encouragement afforded by the capriciousness of fortune, would always lead them to face the most terrible dangers. It was with states, as with individuals. None ever embarked in a war without what seemed to it a reasonable prospect of success; and none would ever be restrained from such undertakings by their knowledge of the evils which they would incur from a defeat. But the treatment which they had to expect from their enemies would have great weight in determining the duration of the contest. Men who might soon be reduced to submission upon moderate terms, if they despaired of mercy would hold out to the last. And thus the extreme vengeance which Cleon proposed to inflict on Mitylene, though it would not deter other cities from following the example of her revolt, if they had strong hopes of a happier issue, would certainly prevent them from yielding, when they were once engaged, as long they had strength to resist. Every war, of the same kind, into which Athens might hereafter be drawn would be prolonged, as a struggle for life, to the last gasp; and when she had conquered at a great expence of blood and treasure, she would find, instead of useful subjects, a solitude and a ruin. But if it was impolitic thus to deprive herself of the advantages which she would reap from the timely submission of her refractory allies, it would be the height of folly, as well as of injustice, to involve the commonalty of Mitylene, which had brought about the surrender, in the same sentence of extermination with the authors of the rebellion, and so to estrange the affections of the only class which she could anywhere call her friends. It would be wiser, if they were culpable, to draw a veil over their offences. On these solid grounds, and without any appeal to their pity or their indulgence, he would advise them to rescind their decree: to put the prisoners whom Paches had sent, upon their trial; but to spare the rest of the Mitylenæans and leave them in possession of their city."

The arguments of Diodotus, or his cause, prevailed, The decree was repealed, yet only by a small majority ; which, as the force of reasoning seems to preponderate on his side, indicates that political calculations had little to do with the decision, and that it was a victory hardly gained by humanity over anger ; a victory indeed which can claim no praise, where the struggle was so shameful : yet the fury of the Athenians, though carried to so dreadful an excess, is less hateful than the cold blooded cruelty of Sparta. The decree of mercy was no sooner passed, than it was despatched in a galley which had been provided, by the care of the Mitylian envoys, with food prepared to be used on board, and was plied by men who were urged to extraordinary efforts, as well by the importance of the service as by the promise of great rewards ; and, as they rowed without intermission, resting by turns for meals and sleep, and were not retarded by contrary winds, they gained ground rapidly on the other galley, which had started twenty-four hours sooner, but being charged with so dismal an errand, was not speeded by the goodwill of her crew. It however arrived first ; and Paches had already opened the decree of death, and was on the point of executing it, — in another hour perhaps the streets of Mitylene would have been flowing with blood — when the countermand came. But the prisoners at Athens — upwards of one thousand persons — were all sacrificed to the vengeance of the people, as Cleon had proposed, without even a form of trial. Mitylene was deprived of all remains and show of independence. Her walls were razed, her navy seized, she was no longer allowed to retain the rank of a tributary state. The whole island, except the territory of Methymna, was parcelled out into three thousand shares, of which a tithe was consecrated to the gods ; the rest were allotted to Attic colonists, to whom the Lesbians who were allowed to cultivate the land paid a fixt and uniform rent. If, as is most probable, the greater part of this land had been the property of the Mityliæans executed at Athens,

the new tenants may have gained more by the transaction than their landlords.

The fate of Paches himself was singular and mysterious. On his return to Athens, when the time came for rendering the usual account of his conduct in the office which he had so ably and successfully filled, instead of the rewards which might have been expected by a victorious general who had delivered his country from a pressing danger, he was brought to trial on some charge, the particulars of which are not recorded, and either having been convicted, or perceiving that he had no chance of a favourable verdict¹, stabbed himself mortally, in the presence of his judges. Hence in the declamations of later times the name of Paches was often coupled with those of Miltiades, and Themistocles, and Aristides, to illustrate the envy and ingratitude of the Athenian people. On the other hand there was a story, not indeed resting on good authority, but yet not contradicted by any better, which represents Paches as having grossly abused his power at Mitylene, and as having been prosecuted at Athens by the victims of his lust and cruelty.² The temper of the Athenians renders such a case possible; but no impartial historian will venture to adopt either account of the matter as a ground for praise or blame.

By this time the remaining garrison of Platæa was reduced to the last stage of weakness. The besiegers might probably long before have taken the town without difficulty by assault. But the Spartans had a motive of policy for wishing to bring the siege to a different termination. They looked forward to a peace which they might have to conclude upon the ordinary terms of a mutual restitution of conquests made in the war. In this case, if Platæa fell by storm, they would be obliged to restore it to Athens; but if it capitulated, they might allege that it was no conquest.

¹ *ὡς ἡλίκιστα*. Plut. Arist. 26; compare Nic. 6.

² Agathias Epigram. 57 ed Niebuhr. Anthol. Gr Jacobs, tom. iv. p. 34. The subject is more fully discussed in a paper in the Cambridge Philological Museum, vol. ii. p. 226.

With this view their commander protracted the blockade, until at length he discovered by a feint attack that the garrison was utterly unable to defend the walls. He then sent a herald to propose that they should surrender, not to the Thebans, but to the Spartans, and on condition that Spartan judges alone should decide upon their fate. These terms were accepted, the town delivered up, and the garrison, which was nearly starved, received a supply of food. In a few days five commissioners came from Sparta to hold the promised trial. But instead of the usual forms of accusation and defence, the prisoners found themselves called upon to answer a single question: Whether in the course of the war they had done any service to Sparta and her allies. The spirit which dictated such an interrogatory was clear enough. The prisoners however obtained leave to plead for themselves without restriction; their defence was conducted by two of their number, one of whom, Laco son of Aimnestus, was *proxenus* of Sparta.

The arguments of the Platean orators, as reported by Thucydides, are strong, and the address which he attributes to them is the only specimen he has left of pathetic eloquence. They could point out the absurdity of sending five commissioners from Sparta, to inquire whether the garrison of a besieged town were friends of the besiegers; a question which, if retorted upon the party which asked it, would equally convict them of a wanton aggression. They could appeal to their services and sufferings in the Persian war, when they alone among the Bœotians remained constant to the cause of Greece, while the Thebans had fought on the side of the barbarians in the very land which they now hoped to make their own with the consent of Sparta. They could plead an important obligation which they had more recently conferred on Sparta herself, whom they had succoured with a third part of their whole force, when her very existence was threatened by the revolt of the Messenians after the great

earthquake. They could urge that their alliance with Athens had been originally formed with the approbation, and even by the advice, of the Spartans themselves; that justice and honour forbade them to renounce a connection which they had sought as a favour, and from which they had derived great advantages; and that, as far as lay in themselves, they had not broken the last peace, but had been treacherously surprised by the Thebans, while they thought themselves secure in the faith of treaties. Even if their former merits were not sufficient to outweigh any later offence which could be imputed to them, they might insist on the Greek usage of war, which forbade proceeding to the last extremity with an enemy who had voluntarily surrendered himself; and as they had proved, by the patience with which they had endured the torments of hunger, that they preferred perishing by famine to falling into the hands of the Thebans, they had a right to demand that they should not be placed in a worse condition by their own act, but, if they were to gain nothing by their capitulation, should be restored to the state in which they were when they made it.

But unhappily for the Platæans they had nothing to rely upon but the mercy or the honour of Sparta: two principles which never appear to have had the weight of a feather in any of her public transactions; and though the Spartan commissioners bore the title of judges, they came in fact only to pronounce a sentence which had been previously dictated by Thebes. Yet the appeal of the Platæans was so affecting, that the Thebans distrusted the firmness of their allies, and obtained leave to reply. They very judiciously and honestly treated the question as one which lay entirely between the Platæans and themselves. They attributed the conduct of their ancestors in the Persian war, to the compulsion of a small dominant faction, and pleaded the services which they had themselves since rendered to Sparta. They depreciated the patriotic deeds of the Platæans, as the result of their attachment to Athens,

whom they had not scrupled to abet in all her undertakings against the liberties of Greece. They defended the attempt which they had made upon Plataea during the peace, on the ground that they had been invited by a number of its wealthiest and noblest citizens, and they charged the Platæans with a breach of faith in the execution of their Theban prisoners, whose blood called for vengeance as loudly as they for mercy.

These were indeed reasons which fully explained and perhaps justified their own enmity to Plataea, and did not need to be aided by so glaring a falsehood, as the assertion, that their enemies were enjoying the benefit of a fair trial. But the only part of their argument that bore upon the real question, was that in which they reminded the Spartans, that Thebes was their most powerful and useful ally. This the Spartans felt; and they had long determined that no scruples of justice or humanity should endanger so valuable a connection. But it seems that they still could not devise any more ingenious mode of reconciling their secret motive with outward decency, than the original question, which implied that if the prisoners were their enemies, they might rightfully put them to death; and in this sophistical abstraction all the claims which arose out of the capitulation, when construed according to the plainest rules of equity, were overlooked. The question was again proposed to each separately, and when the ceremony was finished by his answer or his silence, he was immediately consigned to the executioner. The Platæans who suffered amounted to 200; their fate was shared by twenty-five Athenians, who could not have expected or claimed milder treatment, as they might have been fairly excepted from the benefit of the surrender. The women were all made slaves. If there had been nothing but inhumanity in the proceeding of the Spartans, it would have been so much slighter than that which they had exhibited toward their most unoffending prisoners from the beginning of the war, as scarcely to deserve notice. All that is very signal in this transac-

tion, is the baseness of their cunning, and perhaps the dulness of their invention.

The town and its territory were, with better right, ceded to the Thebans. For a year they permitted the town to be occupied by a body of exiles from Megara, and by the remnant of the Platæans belonging to the Theban party. But afterwards — fearing perhaps that it might be wrested from them — they razed it to the ground, leaving only the temples standing. But on the site, and with the materials of the demolished buildings, erected an edifice 200 feet square, with an upper story, the whole divided into apartments, for the reception of the pilgrims who might come to the quinquennial festival¹, or on other sacred occasions. They also built a new temple, which together with the brass and the iron found in the town, which were made into couches, they dedicated to Heré, the goddess to whom Pausanias was thought to have owed his victory. The territory was annexed to the Theban state lands, and let for a term of ten years. So, in the ninety-third year after Platæa had entered into alliance with Athens, this alliance became the cause of its ruin.

The fleet with which Alcidas had escaped from the coast of Ionia was afterward dispersed by a storm off Crete, but was again assembled in the port of Cyllene, where the admiral found a squadron of thirteen galleys from Leucas and Ambracia, and Brasidas, who had been sent to aid him with his counsels. The armament thus strengthened was destined to act on the coast of Corcyra, where affairs were in such a state as afforded a prospect, that, while the Athenians had only a squadron of twelve galleys at Naupactus, the island might be detached from their influence.

We have seen that, in the sea-fight which was one of the occasions of the war, the Corinthians had taken 250 Corcyræan prisoners, whom they treated with great indulgence, in the hope of gaining them over to their interest. They afterwards sent them back to Corcyra,

¹ See Vol. II. p. 353.

nominally ransomed for 800 talents, on security given by their friends at Corinth, but in truth on no other condition than that of restoring the Corinthian ascendancy in the island. In this undertaking they engaged the more readily, as most of them belonged to that class for which such a revolution would open the way to power; and they at length succeeded in forming a party strong enough, in an assembly which was attended by envoys from Athens and from Corinth, to procure a decree, which revived the old system of neutrality between the belligerents; so that though the Athenian alliance was not renounced, the Peloponnesians were to be treated as friends. The democratical party was headed by one Pithias, who, though not formally appointed by the state, or recognized by the Athenians, assumed the character of their *proxenus*. The party which had gained a step by the decree, now proceeded to try its strength, by arraigning Pithias on a charge of making Corcyra subservient to Athens. But he was acquitted; and being thus assured of his superiority, he laid hold of a handle which was perhaps supplied by the contiguity of some private property to certain public domains, or by the tenure on which these were occupied by private persons, and convicted five of the wealthiest among his adversaries, of having cut stakes on ground sacred to Zeus and to the hero Alcimous. The legal fine for every stake was a *stater*¹; and, perhaps through long connivance or dormancy of the law, the whole penalty which each of the defendants had incurred was of ruinous amount. With the ensigns of suppliants they besought the people to allow them to pay it by instalments; but Pithias, who was a member of the council, prevented them from obtaining this indulgence, and was preparing to use the advantage which his station afforded him, to reverse the decree of neutrality, when his adversaries, maddened by their personal losses, and by the threatened defeat of their plans, collected a

¹ Probably the silver one of four drachmas; if it had been the gold stater, of twenty drachmas, this would have been remarked.

band of conspirators, who suddenly rushed into the council-chamber, and despatched Pithias, and about sixty others. The consternation excited by this outrage was such, that some of his party took refuge on board the galley which had brought the Athenian envoys, and accompanied them to Athens. The conspirators, whose strength was probably measured by their boldness, became masters of the assembly, and carried a motion for closing their ports against all but single vessels of the belligerent powers. At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to justify their proceedings, and to induce the refugees there to remain tranquil. But the Athenians arrested both the envoys and all their countrymen who had yielded to their persuasions or threats, and lodged them in custody in Ægina. In the mean while the party which had gained the upper hand in Corcyra, encouraged by the arrival of a Corinthian galley with ambassadors from Sparta, fell upon the commonalty, which at first was put to the rout, but in the following night, took possession of the citadel and the other eminences in the city, and collected its forces there, and in one of the harbours called the Hyllaic. The other harbour was in the power of their adversaries, as well as the agora adjoining it, where most of them lived. The next day was chiefly spent by both parties in procuring reinforcements. The slaves, whom each invited by the promise of freedom, mostly joined the commonalty; their opponents brought over 800 auxiliaries from the continent. The day after, the struggle began; and the oligarchs, overpowered by the commonalty, which was strong in numbers and in position, and actively supported by the women, were driven to the necessity of setting fire to the houses in the agora. The conflagration repelled their enemies, but caused great damage, especially to the property of merchants, and if it had been favoured by the wind, might have destroyed the whole city. The night brought a pause, during which the Corinthian galley, and most of the foreign auxiliaries who saw the cause of their friends

declining, made their escape. But the next day an Athenian general, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, arrived with twelve galleys and 500 Messenians, from his station at Naupactus. He interposed to put an end to the contest: and concluded a solemn agreement between the parties, by which ten of the principal authors of the late convulsion were to be brought to trial — which however they did not wait for — no one else was to be molested, and an alliance, offensive and defensive, was contracted with Athens. Peace being thus restored, Nicostratus prepared to depart: but the leaders of the commonalty requested him to leave five of his galleys with them, and to take away five which they would man for him instead. Having gained leave, they signified their intention of putting their enemies on board. They, fearing that they were to be sent to Athens, took refuge in a sanctuary of the Twins. Nicostratus in vain endeavoured to allay their fears; and the opposite party, interpreting their refusal as a proof of some treacherous design, rose, and searched their houses for arms, and, but for the intervention of the Athenian general, would have slain some who fell in their way. Upon this those who had hitherto remained quiet, betook themselves as suppliants to the sanctuary of Heré; and the popular leaders were so alarmed at their numbers, which were upwards of 400, that they induced them to let themselves be carried over to Ptychia, a little island not far off, where they were supplied with provisions.

Three or four days after this transaction, while the hopes and fears of the parties were still in the same state of suspense, the Peloponnesian fleet under Alcidas and Brasidas, fifty-three galleys, arrived in the channel. They anchored for the night in the harbour of Sybota on the main land; and the next morning pushed across toward Corcyra. Their appearance threw the party till then triumphant into dismay and confusion. While the Athenian squadron set out in good order to meet the enemy and hold him in check, they manned sixty of

their own galleys, and sent them out in succession as they were got ready ; but not without misgivings, which were justified by the event. For two immediately went over to the enemy, and in others the crews began fighting with one another. The Peloponnesians, seeing their disorder, divided their own force, and with twenty galleys attacked the Corcyræans as they came up in small numbers, while the remaining three and thirty encountered the Athenian squadron. But as Nicostratus by superior tactics avoided their centre, where he must have been surrounded and overpowered, and having taken them in flank sank one galley, they formed into a circle, and stood on the defensive. And now the Athenians were about to repeat the manœuvre which Phormio had practised so successfully in the Corinthian gulf, when the twenty galleys, which had been mastering the Corcyræans almost without resistance, at the sight of this danger came up and joined the main body. The Athenians, unable to make head against such a force, fell back, but in good order, so as to give their allies time for retreating. And thus the battle terminated, leaving the Peloponnesians masters of thirteen Corcyræan galleys, and of the sea. The Corcyræans were alarmed lest the enemy should make use of his victory to attack the city, or at least to deliver the prisoners in Ptychia, and they removed them back to the sanctuary of Heré, and made preparations for defence. But Alcidas, though he had an able counsellor, was supreme in command ; it was near sunset ; and he withdrew, without attempting to strike another blow, to Sybota.

The next morning Brasidas pressed him to make for the city, where all was in terror and disorder ; but Alcidas preferred the safer operation of disembarking his troops at the headland of Leucimna, and ravaging the country ; to the great relief of the democratical party, which, expecting an early attack, had entered into negotiation with its adversaries, and had prevailed on some of them to embark in their remaining serviceable galleys — now reduced to thirty — for the defence of the

city. About noon, as if he had exhausted every opportunity of action, Alcidas sailed away to his station, and at nightfall he received intelligence, conveyed by fire-signals from Leucas, of the approach of an Athenian armament — sixty galleys, which had been sent under the command of Eurymedon, to protect Corcyra. He now lost no time ; but pushing by the shore under cover of the night, reached the Leucadian isthmus, and had his ships hauled over to the other side, and so pursued his voyage homeward in security.

The arrival of the Athenians, and the enemy's departure, released the democratical Corcyreans from every restraint that prudence had hitherto laid on their vindictive passions, which were only exasperated by the danger they had just escaped. The Messenians brought by Nicostratus were now for the first time admitted within the walls ; and the thirty galleys which had been manned for action in the harbour fronting the main land, were ordered to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour. On their arrival all the partizans of the oligarchy who had helped to man them, were secured. But in the meanwhile a bloody prelude to more tragical scenes had begun in the city, with the murder of several who fell in the way of their triumphant enemies. An attempt was then made to entice the suppliants out of the sanctuary by the promise of a legal trial. It was a mere mockery ; and all who trusted to it, were condemned to death. The rest, when they saw their fears verified by the fate of their friends, became desperate, and destroyed themselves on the holy ground ; some by hanging themselves on the boughs of the sacred trees. But even this was only a signal for a more general massacre, which lasted seven days — as long as the Athenian commander stayed to encourage it with the presence of his fleet and by his own implied approbation — and in which the ties of religion, of common humanity, and even of domestic affection, were all, in various forms, violated and profaned. In one sanctuary the suppliants were walled in, and died of hunger ; from others they

were dragged out to death. A father was known to have dipped his hands in the blood of his child. Political enmity, though the ordinary motive of these murders, was often, during this season of anarchy, only a pretext, which enabled many to revenge their personal injuries, or to get rid of troublesome creditors. When Eurymedon sailed away, hatred and revenge were almost forced to rest, for want of work. A remnant indeed of the vanquished party amounting to about five hundred still survived ; but it had escaped to the opposite coast, and there having seized some forts, both kept possession of the continental territory of the state, and by continual excursions harassed its adversaries in the island, interrupted their commerce, and even cut off their necessary supplies ; success which in the end, by inspiring the assailants with hopes of a still deeper and more permanent revenge, hurried them on to their own destruction.

The consideration of such dire excesses as we have been relating induced the Greek historian to pause, and, in a digression which is perhaps the most instructive part of his work, to lay open the deep and spreading root which yielded these bitter fruits ; in other words, to describe with searching minuteness the character and progress of that spirit of party, which, though it had long prevailed among the Greeks, and had already manifested itself in many terrible deeds, had never before broken out in a form quite so hideous, as it displayed in the massacre of Corcyra. This therefore Thucydides looks upon as the opening of a new period in the history of the Greek factions ; when, as the same causes continued to operate with increasing malignity, scenes which had before been rare, and were viewed with wonder and horror, grew common and familiar. Yet he was aware that, so long as human nature remained the same, mankind would never cease to be afflicted, in various modes and degrees, with the same evils, and that the picture which he draws of his countrymen belongs, in its great outlines, to all ages and nations.

We have seen how the old aristocracies sank, and that they made way either for a tyranny, or for a more or less comprehensive form of oligarchy, and frequently in the end for a democracy. Even in those states in which a democracy was never established, there was a commonalty which contained the germ at least of a democratical party, and only needed favourable circumstances to unfold it. And where a popular government was most firmly settled, there was always a class, composed partly of members of the ancient aristocracy, partly of citizens who had more recently risen to opulence, which viewed it with jealousy, and only waited for an opportunity of overthrowing it. But though there were everywhere seeds of discord, tranquillity might long be preserved, where either party was decidedly predominant. The less it had to fear from the other, the milder would be its rule, and the less it provoked the desire of a revolution. The more nearly the two parties balanced each other, the more difficult it was to avoid a contest, and the less probable that it would be kept within moderate bounds. But when Sparta and Athens had engaged in a struggle which called forth their whole strength, and induced them willingly to receive all who sought their alliance, the greatest inequality between the parties in other states became of little moment, since it might be compensated by foreign aid. And hence jealousy was kept constantly awake on the one side, and impatience easily roused on the other. Their conflicts grew more frequent, their mutual animosity more implacable. The war also contributed in another way to the same effect, as it ruined private fortunes, drained the sources of the general prosperity, spread a gloom over the prospects of many, and diverted their attention from the pursuits of peaceful industry. Thus by degrees the evil rose to that frightful height which Thucydides describes. The ties which bound men to their political associates were felt to be stronger than those either of country or kindred; those who kept clear of such engagements, incurred the resentment of both parties.

The most violent men took the lead, and gave the tone. He was accounted the staunchest partizan and the best counsellor, who was most reckless and ruthless in compassing the destruction of his adversaries; one who rather aimed at providing for the safety of his associates, so as both to abstain and escape from aggression, was looked upon as a lukewarm and suspicious friend. Defensive counsels were scorned as weak and timid; the only use of vigilance was held to be, to watch for opportunities of striking a blow. Courage and rashness, prudence and cunning, changed places in the vocabulary of party. Every fresh example of vindictive rage led to a still higher strain of revenge and cruelty, and stifled all movements of pity and remorse in those who took part with the sufferers. Every new breach of faith weakened the impulses of generosity, shook the confidence of open and unsuspecting natures, and enforced the arguments of those who denounced moderation as cowardice, and candour as folly. The most liberal professions of an adversary were no otherwise regarded, than as if they either betrayed his weakness, or covered some hostile design. The most solemn oaths were viewed only as means of gaining time for a future attack; and were broken with the greater pleasure, if they had been so far trusted, as to lull the opposite party into a temporary security. The poison of incurable suspicion perverted every noble feeling, and paralysed every right intention. Yet the deepest cunning often overreached itself; and those who were conscious of their own inferiority in artifice, were the more likely to forestall the machinations of their adversaries by the blind impatience of their fears. That it thus undermined all the moral foundations of civil society, piety, benevolence, justice, and honour, was the most baneful effect of the Peloponnesian war.

CHAP. XXII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH YEAR OF THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE GENERAL PACIFI-
CATION OF SICILY.

THE two leading states themselves, though they contained germs of discontent which afterwards unfolded themselves in civil discord, were at this time exempt from the evils which their struggle occasioned in Corcyra. The internal state of Sparta seemed most prosperous : for the signs of her inward decay had scarcely yet begun to appear. Athens was still suffering from the plague, which, after having considerably abated for a twelvemonth, broke out with fresh malignity in the fifth winter of the war (427) accompanied by earthquakes, which shook the city, Eubœa,* and Bœotia, but more especially Orchomenus. This second attack lasted a year ; and from first to last the sickness carried off 4400 of the citizens who served in the regular infantry, 300 out of the 1000 who composed the equestrian order ; and a number of the remaining population which Thucydides could not pretend to ascertain. This void was indeed gradually filled up in the course of nature ; but it seems to have been attended by one pernicious consequence, which continued to be felt long after the cause had ceased ; as it produced a relaxation of the laws which prescribed the conditions of the Athenian franchise. Many gained admission to its privileges by fraud : and though these surreptitious enfranchisements may have supplied the state with a number of useful citizens, it is probable that a large portion of those who thus crept in could have shown as little title on the score of merit as of birth, and possessed no more of the spirit of the ancient sons of Athens than of their blood. The

good would have been obtained without the evil, if the thinned civic population had been recruited, by an honourable decree, from the most reputable and deserving of the aliens.

But Athens, as well as Sparta, enjoyed a degree of internal tranquillity which counterbalanced the evils of war and pestilence. The popular government was so firmly established, that as no man of sound judgment, even if he had the will, could conceive the faintest hope of subverting it, so the suspicion of such a design could not easily be instilled into any but the weakest minds. Men of the highest birth, fortune, and abilities, though not, perhaps satisfied with the way in which the public affairs were managed, were not the less zealous in the service of the commonwealth; and the people, though often misled by unworthy favourites, on the whole steadily preferred the ablest men—the more willingly if they were also recommended by wealth and noble descent—to the most important posts. And thus, though Cleon could often carry his measures in the assembly, the fleets and armies were commanded by men of a very different stamp. Such were Demosthenes and Nicias, who, in the summer of 426,¹ were appointed to conduct two expeditions, one destined for the west of Greece, the other for the Ægean. Nicias, one of the wealthiest citizens of Athens, and a prudent and successful general, led an armament of sixty galleys, with 2000 heavy armed on board, against the island of Melos, which, alone in the Ægean, refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Athens, and adhered to its old connection with Sparta, which it regarded as its parent state.¹ Nicias ravaged the island, but was not able to reduce the town, and probably abandoned the attempt the sooner that he might take part in an attack upon Tanagra, where he was to act in concert with an army which was to march from Athens. The object seems to have been chiefly to retaliate for the waste which Attica had suffered, by inflicting like devastation on the fertile plain of Tanagra:

¹ See Vol. I. p 277.

for when Nicias, having disembarked his troops at Oropus, was joined near Tanagra by the whole force of Athens, under Hipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon, though they gained a victory over the Tanagræans and a body of Thebans who came to their assistance, no farther use was made of this advantage. Hipponicus and Eurymedon marched back to Athens, and Nicias, after ravaging the coast of Locris, returned with his fleet.

The Athenians were probably induced to undertake this expedition to Bœotia, in addition to their regular inroads upon Megara, by the exemption which they enjoyed this year from the usual Peloponnesian invasion. The Peloponnesian army, now led by Agis who had succeeded his father Archidamus, only advanced as far as the Isthmus, where it was stopped by a series of earthquakes, which were thought to signify that the gods forbade its progress. These convulsions extended to some distance under the bed of the Ægean, and produced partial inundations; such as may in ancient times have left their traces in the mythical traditions of Attica and Bœotia. The Spartans however were not entirely inactive this summer. At the request of the Malians of Trachis, who were reduced to extreme weakness by the incursions of their neighbours, the mountaineers of Œta, they sent a body of colonists, consisting partly of their own citizens, partly of Laconians, and founded a new city, which they named Heraclea, not quite a mile from the ancient Trachis. The sanction of the Delphic God had been duly procured, and all Greeks with the exception of Ionians, Achæans, and a few other races, were invited to take part in the colony, which, as the power of Sparta promised security, soon became populous. The situation appeared to be eligible under a double aspect; for its vicinity to the Athenian possessions in Eubœa—with a view to which an arsenal was built close to Thermopylæ—and as lying on the high road to the more northern dependencies of Athens. Yet the jealousy of the Thessalians, and the enmity of

the *Ætæan* tribes on whose territory the colony encroached, dispelled both the hopes and fears which it excited at first, and wore down its strength by incessant hostilities; while the arrogance and harshness of the Spartan governors drove a part of the population to seek a habitation elsewhere.

A little later in the summer Sparta was induced to make an effort to counteract the Athenian movements in the west. At the same time that Nicias embarked on his expedition to Melos, a squadron of thirty galleys, under Demosthenes and Procles, was sent round Peloponnesus, and having been joined by fifteen *Corcyræan* ships, and by troops from *Zacynthus* and *Cephallenia*, proceeded to attack *Leucas*, where its operations were supported by the *Acarnanians*, who had assembled their whole force—except that of *Æniadæ*—in the hope of at length crushing a dangerous and troublesome neighbour. The *Leucadians* kept within their walls, while their territory was ravaged by this overpowering force; and the *Acarnanians* requested Demosthenes to lay regular siege to the town. But it happened that at the same juncture he was urged by the *Messenians* of *Naupactus* to undertake an expedition against *Ætolia*. He had private motives for desiring to oblige them, for he was connected with them by ties of friendship and hospitality; but he was chiefly attracted by the prospect of opening a road through *Ætolia*, by which he might penetrate with an army of foreign troops into the heart of *Boëtia*. This was an object, if not more important, yet more tempting to his military ambition, than a slow and uncertain siege. He therefore neglected the wishes of the *Acarnanians*, and sailed away to *Sollium*, where he communicated his plan to them, and requested their co-operation. This, as was natural, they refused. The *Corcyræan* galleys also returned home; so that Demosthenes, when he sailed round to *Æneon*, a town of the *Ozolian Locris* on the *Crisæan gulf*, the point from which he intended to begin his march, had only his *Messenian*, *Zacynthian*, and *Cephallegenian* auxiliaries at his command, beside 300

Athenians, who however were a band of the finest troops Athens could furnish, and had perhaps been induced to embark as volunteers by the personal influence of Demosthenes. With this force he immediately advanced into Ætolia; but in the interior he expected to be joined by the whole strength of the Locrians, whose aid was peculiarly valuable, from their knowledge of the country, and because their own weapons and mode of fighting resembled those of their Ætolian neighbours. On the first day after crossing the border he made himself master of three Ætolian towns or villages, Potidania, Crocyleum, and Tichium; and at this last place halted, and sent away the booty which he had collected to the Locrian town Eupalium. His plan was, first to reduce the part of Ætolia belonging to the Apodotian horde¹, which lay immediately north of Locris; and then, if the terror of his arms should not awe the rest into submission, after having returned to Naupactus, to make a second expedition into the territory of the Ophionians, which lay more to the north-east, and extended to the vale of the Sperchius, and finally to invade the Eurytanes, the most powerful, fierce, and barbarous of the Ætolian tribes. But before he advanced further, he wished to wait for the Locrians, whom he needed the more, as among his own men he had very few light troops. On the other hand, the Messenians urged the expediency of prosecuting his march without delay, and carrying the villages, which were unfortified, and lay wide apart, before the Ætolians should have collected their forces. Demosthenes, elated with the easy conquests which he had already made, complied with this advice, and moved onward to Ægitium, a village town situate about ten miles from the coast among high hills. He captured it without resistance; for the inhabitants had retired to the top of the mountains above the town. But the Ætolians, who had received early intelligence of the meditated expedition, were already on their march with the whole force of the country, which was even

¹ See Vol. I. p. 4.

joined by the Ophionian tribes of mount Œta, the Boienses, and Callienses, whose seats approached the Malian gulf. They came upon the invaders at Ægitium, and descending from the higher ground on several sides at once, assailed them with a shower of missiles. The Athenians could only repel their attacks by charges very fatiguing to heavy armed infantry on such ground, but which the Ætolians practised in this mode of fighting could easily elude. Yet as long as the small body of bowmen which Demosthenes had brought with him, was able to ply the assailants with their arrows, they were kept in check. But when the commander of this little corps was slain, and the men having spent their arrows were dispersed, the heavy armed troops were left exposed to attacks which at length they had not strength to resist, and they sought safety in flight. The country through which they had to retreat was rugged and intricate; unknown to them, but familiar to their pursuers, who were equipped and trained for traversing it with speed: their guide, a Messenian, had already fallen. Many were overtaken, and killed in their flight; still more lost their way, and perished in the pathless ravines into which they fell.* A number took shelter in a wood, where they could find no outlet, and were suffocated by the flames which the enemy kindled around them. A great number of the allies and 120 of the Athenians, among them their general Procles, were slain. The rest effected a narrow escape to Œneon, and after having recovered the bodies of their comrades, sailed to Naupactus, and shortly after to Athens. Demosthenes, dreading the displeasure of the people, remained behind at Naupactus.

The Ætolians, proud of this achievement, and desiring to revenge themselves on the Messenians of Naupactus, who had brought the invader into their country, sent three ambassadors — one for each of their principal tribes — to Corinth and Sparta, to solicit assistance; and in the beginning of autumn a Peloponnesian army, under three Spartans — Eurylochus, as commander in chief,

and Macarius and Menedæus in a subordinate capacity — marched to Delphi. Their whole force, when they had been joined by five hundred heavy armed from the newly founded Heraclea, amounted to three thousand. From Delphi Eurylochus made proposals of neutrality or alliance to the Ozolian Locrians, through whose rugged territory his road lay to Naupactus. Those of Amphissa, who, from their neighbourhood and hostility to the Phocians, feared that, in case of refusal, they should be exposed to the first attack and the hardest treatment, both complied with his demands themselves, sending hostages to Delphi, and prevailed upon most of their kindred tribes to give the like security, and to join their forces to the Peloponnesian army. Eurylochus, having lodged the hostages at the Dorian town of Cytinium, set forward, and on his march reduced some of the Locrian towns which had refused to renounce their alliance with Athens. In the territory of Naupactus he met the Ætolian army, and with their united forces they ravaged the land, and made themselves masters of an unfortified suburb. The town itself was in great danger: as its population, reduced by its recent disaster, was unequal to the defence of its walls. The Peloponnesians however did not immediately begin the siege; but proceeded to take the town of Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but subject to Athens, which gave its name to the northern Rhion. But on receiving intelligence of the approaching invasion, Demosthenes had gone into Acarnania, and, though with difficulty, had prevailed on the Acarnanians to lay aside their resentment, and to send a thousand heavy armed troops with him to the relief of Naupactus. This reinforcement he introduced into the town by sea; and Eurylochus, when he heard of its arrival, deemed a siege hopeless, and dismissed his Ætolian forces. The rest, instead of marching home, he cantoned in the adjacent part of Ætolia. For he had been induced by the Ambracians to promise his support in a fresh expedition which they meditated against the Amphilochean Argos and Acarnania.

It was⁴ winter before the Ambracians were ready to fulfil their part of the compact. They then invaded Amphiloehia with 3000 heavy infantry, and took up a strong position at a place called Olpæ, standing on a hill near the sea, which in ancient times had belonged to the Acarnanians, and had been fortified by them as the seat of their national court of justice. It was here that they were to receive the succours promised by Eurylochus; and he no sooner heard that they had posted themselves at Olpæ, than he collected his troops, and marched to join them. In the meanwhile the Acarnanians had sent their forces to defend Argos, and the Amphiloehians had encamped at a place called Crenæ (Wells), on the skirt of the hills which border the Ambracian gulf, and south of Argos, with a view to intercept the Peloponnesian army. At the same time as an Athenian squadron of twenty galleys had just arrived in the western sea under Aristoteles and Hierophon, the allies sent to solicit aid from them, and also despatched a messenger to Naupactus, to invite Demosthenes to take the command of their army. On the other hand the Ambracians at Olpæ, apprised of these preparations, and fearing that Eurylochus might be prevented from joining them, and that they might themselves be surrounded by the enemy, sent home to desire that the whole force of the city might march to their assistance. Eurylochus however, who met with no resistance in his passage through Acarnania, which had been drained of its whole military strength for the expedition to Argos, eluded the observation of the enemy at Crenæ, and effected a junction with his allies at Olpæ; and the whole army encamped on another point of the same hill, called Metropolis, a name perhaps connected with the ancient importance of Olpæ. They had not been long in this position, before the Athenian squadron entered the Ambracian gulf and came to moorings near the foot of the hill occupied by the enemy; and Demosthenes likewise arrived at Argos with 200 Messenians and 60 Athenian bowmen. He was now formally elected commander in

chief of the allied army, which consisted mainly of Acarnanians, as the greater part of the Amphilochians were kept at home by the invasion of their territory. The whole force with which he marched against Olpæ did not equal that of the Peloponnesians and their allies. The two armies remained in presence of each other five days parted by a ravine. On the sixth they prepared for battle. Whether the combatants were still parted by the same ravine, or had changed their ground does not appear. But Demosthenes had on his right a hollow way covered with a thicket: and foreseeing that the enemy's superiority in numbers would enable them to outflank him, he here posted 400 men, between heavy and light troops, in ambuscade. The issue proved the sagacity of these dispositions. In the heat of the battle the left wing of the Peloponnesians commanded by Eurylochus himself, having turned the enemy's right, which was occupied by Demosthenes with the Messenians and the Athenian bowmen, was taken in reverse by the troops which started from their ambush, and was soon completely routed. Eurylochus himself and Macarius were slain; and terror and confusion spread through the rest of the line, except the right wing, where the Ambracians were victorious, and pursued the flying enemy to Argos. But in their return from the pursuit, they fell in with the Acarnanians who had defeated the main body, and with difficulty made good their retreat to Olpæ.

The victory cost the conquerors about three hundred men: on the other side the loss was great: and Menedæus, on whom the command devolved after the death of his colleagues, found himself reduced to the embarrassing alternative of sustaining a blockade both by land and sea, or of attempting a retreat before a victorious enemy. In this strait, when he applied according to custom for leave to bury his slain, he also sounded Demosthenes and his Acarnanian colleagues on the subject of his retreat. They were not unwilling to grant him the permission which he desired, but only for the Peloponnesian troops,

so that the Ambracians and the mercenaries should be excluded from the treaty and kept ignorant of it. The Acarnanians perhaps only considered the advantage which they should have over the Ambracians when abandoned by their allies. Demosthenes calculated the discredit which such an instance of perfidy and meanness would throw on the Peloponnesian cause in the west. Neither of these reflections moved Menedæus or the Peloponnesian officers to whom these terms were proposed, though they must have known that their situation was not hopeless, since they might expect speedy succours from Ambracia. In fact the whole force of Ambracia was already on its way towards Olpæ, though it had not heard the news of the battle, and Demosthenes, having been informed of its approach, had sent one division of his army forward, to secure the strongest positions and lay ambushes in its line of march, and was preparing to follow with the others when the Peloponnesians, issuing from the camp in small parties, under the pretext of gathering herbs and firewood, as they proceeded, quickened their pace, and were soon discovered to be in full retreat. The comrades whom they had left behind, when they perceived this, set out with the utmost speed to overtake them, and the Acarnanians, whose generals alone were in the secret, in pursuit of both. At first they fell upon both indiscriminately, and would not listen to their generals, who told them of the agreement concluded with the Peloponnesians, but threatened them as traitors; at length however they were induced, as far as they could, to single out the Ambracians, of whom they slew about two hundred. The rest made their escape into the adjacent territory of the Agræans, and were hospitably received by the king Salynthius.

In the meanwhile their countrymen, who were on their march to join them, had encamped for the night on a hill which lay in their road named Idomene, occupying only one of its two summits. The other, without their knowledge, was seized by the troops which Demosthenes had sent on before the main body. He himself having set

out in the evening from Olpæ, reached Idomene before sunrise with one half of his army, while the other made a circuit over the Amphilocheian mountains. At day-break he fell upon the Ambracians, who had not yet risen, and were so little prepared for an attack, that they at first mistook the enemy for their allies: an error on which Demosthenes had calculated, and had therefore placed the Messenians in the first ranks, that their Dorian speech might deceive the sentinels. The greater part of the Ambracians were slain on the spot; and of those who escaped this slaughter most met with death in some other form. Some, entangled in a mountainous region, where they could not find their way, but where every step was familiar to their pursuers, who had also the advantage of being lightly armed, were cut off by the parties which had been posted in ambuscade. Others reached the shore of the gulf at the time when the Athenian squadron was sailing by, and they preferred to commit themselves to the waves and to the mercy of the Athenians, rather than fall into the hands of their barbarous enemies, the Amphilocheians. A very small number made their way to Ambracia.

The Acarnanians marched back with the spoils of the slain to Argos. The next day a herald came from the Ambracians who had taken refuge among the Agræans, to apply for the burial of those who had fallen in the retreat from Olpæ. He was struck with surprise by the pile of arms which he saw; and this led to an explanation which unfolded to him the whole extent of the recent disaster. His feelings broke out in an exclamation of grief and astonishment; but he was too much oppressed by the magnitude of the evil to execute his commission, and only carried back the mournful tidings. It was the heaviest loss, Thucydides observes, that any Greek city suffered within the same space of time during the war; and he did not venture to record the numbers which were reported to have fallen, because they seemed incredible in comparison with the extent and power of Ambracia. But he had no doubt that, if

the victors had wished to prosecute their advantage, the town must have yielded to the first assault. Demosthenes was eager for this consummation of his success. But the Acarnanians had begun to reflect, that what had hitherto been their principal danger was now completely removed, and that there was room to apprehend one of a different kind. They foresaw that if Ambracia was taken it would be occupied by the Athenians, who had indeed been useful allies, but might prove more troublesome neighbours than the weakened and humbled Ambracians. Perhaps the recollection of Phormio's arbitrary proceedings¹ contributed to put them on their guard. They therefore adopted more moderate counsels. They dismissed the Athenians and Demosthenes with the most honourable marks of their gratitude. A third of the spoils of the slain was assigned to Athens. If it had reached its destination, it would perhaps have afforded means of estimating the loss of the Ambracians more exactly; but the vessel or vessels in which they were sent were captured. Three hundred panoplies were reserved for Demosthenes, who, after these brilliant achievements, no longer fearing the displeasure of the people, carried them home and dedicated them in the Athenian temples. But after the departure of their allies the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians granted an unmolested retreat to the Ambracians and the Peloponnesians, who had withdrawn from the dominions of Salynrius to Æniadæ, and concluded a treaty of peace and alliance for a hundred years with Ambracia, on terms of mutual defence; but so limited as not to require either party to join the other in hostilities against their old allies. The Amphilocheians recovered the hostages and places which the Ambracians had wrested from them. The Corinthians sent a garrison of three hundred men for the protection of their depopulated colony.

The next campaign (425) opened with brighter prospects for Athens. The pestilence had now dis-

¹ See above, p. 159.

appeared; and, either in gratitude for relief, or to hasten its approach, the Athenians, in the course of the preceding winter, probably to fulfil the command of the same oracle which had been partially obeyed by Pisistratus¹, purified the island of Delos, the seat of the god, who, it was commonly believed, both sent and stayed such diseases. Perhaps it was thought prudent to counteract an opinion which the Delphic oracle may have rendered prevalent among the Greeks, that Apollo sided with the Peloponnesians. His sacred island was now completely freed from pollution by the removal of all remains of the dead who had been interred in it; and it was decreed that in future it should never be profaned by the death or the birth of any human being: the sick and the pregnant were to be removed in time to the adjacent islet of Rhenea, which was divided from Delos by so narrow a channel, that Polycrates, in the height of his power, had consecrated it to Apollo, by uniting the two islands with a chain. As it might be hoped that this expedient would appease the wrath of the god, other ceremonies were instituted for the purpose of propitiating his favour. An ancient festival, described in one of the Homeric hymns as celebrated by a great concourse of the *long-robed Ionians*, who resorted to Delos, with their wives and children, to delight the eye and ear of Phoebus by trials of strength, dancing, and music, was now revived, and made quinquennial; and a horse race was added to the games. It was on one of these occasions that Nicias, having been appointed to conduct the sacred chorus and the victims which were sent from Athens, displayed his wealth and munificence in an extraordinary manner. The chorus had usually landed at Delos in the midst of a crowd of spectators, and was forced to begin the hymn in honour of the god amidst the preparations for its solemn march. Nicias landed with his chorus on Rhenea; and the next morning the channel between it and Delos was seen crossed by a bridge magnificently

¹ Vol. II. p. 68.

decorated, over which the procession moved in orderly state toward the temple. After the games he dedicated a brazen palm tree, and purchased a piece of ground, the profits of which he devoted to sacrificial banquets for the Delians, on the light condition of praying for the prosperity of the founder.

In the following spring (425) Athens discovered none of the languor of recent convalescence ; but, as if her enemies at home could not afford sufficient employment for her returning vigour, addressed herself with fresh energy to a distant and wider field of action, where she had hitherto made only some faint efforts, which we have not yet noticed, because they were not immediately attended with any important consequences. It was toward Sicily that she now began to direct her views more steadily and earnestly. We have seen that even in the time of Pericles this object had kindled ambitious hopes in some of her more ardent and enterprising spirits, which that cool and cautious statesman is said to have repressed. Yet it kept so firm a hold on many minds, that it may be said to have contributed its share to the various occasions of the Peloponnesian war ; for the part which Athens took in the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra was mainly determined by the convenient position of the island with regard to a Sicilian expedition ; and the importance of her struggles for Acarnania and the adjacent islands, to which the victories of Demosthenes gave the turn which has been just described, ultimately depended on the same object. And as henceforward the affairs of Sicily become more and more intimately connected with the history of Greece, this may be the most suitable place for taking a review of the leading events which affected the condition of the island in that period of the Peloponnesian war on which we are entering.

Gelo survived the battle of Himera only about a couple of years, during which he reigned in great prosperity at Syracuse. He granted peace on moderate

terms to the Carthaginians¹; and to express their gratitude for his forbearance they sent a crown of a hundred talents of gold to his wife Damarāta, who was believed to have seconded their suit with her intercession. While his victory was recent, and his power and reputation at their height, he thought it expedient to strengthen his dominion by giving it the appearance of legal authority. He called an assembly of the citizens to meet in arms, appeared in the midst of it unarmed, and made a harangue in vindication of his past conduct. It was a piece of mockery, not more hazardous, though somewhat less impudent, than Sylla's affectation of submission to the laws.² The Syracusan tyrant had secured himself, as we have seen, by the discordant interests and passions of the people over which he reigned, and still more effectually by a large body of mercenary troops, on whom he had conferred the freedom of the city.³ It may easily be believed that in such an assembly the victorious general who condescended to assume the character of a citizen, and, as if before his equals, to render an account of his proceedings, was received with acclamations of applause, and greeted as a benefactor, deliverer, and king, by the admiring multitude. He displays the same policy in the last acts of his life. He directed that the law which restrained the expense of funerals should be observed in his own case; and accordingly his remains were interred without pomp, but in a sepulchre of royal magnificence. The multitude attended his obsequies to a distance of five-and-twenty miles from the city, and heroic honours were decreed to his tomb. He had made provisions for securing the succession in his line, notwithstanding the dangers to which it was exposed by his premature death. He left an infant son, and three brothers, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus. Hiero, the eldest, he appointed to govern Syracuse during the minority of

¹ If we may believe Plutarch, *Apophth. Reg. et Imp.*, one of the conditions which he exacted was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to their Moloch or Cronus.

² Plut. Syll. 34.

³ Diodor. xi. 72.

his heir¹; but he intrusted Polyzelus with the guardianship of the young prince, and, to balance the power of Hiero, invested him with the command of the army, and directed that he should marry his widow Damarrata.² His brothers carried his will into execution; but the jealousy which he had no doubt foreseen, and to which he probably trusted for the safety of his son, soon caused an open breach between the regent and the guardian. Hiero endeavoured in vain to get rid of his brother, who was formidable both on account of his station and of his popular character, by employing him in foreign expeditions³, while he secured himself by taking a body of mercenaries into his service. Polyzelus, finding his position at Syracuse unsafe, withdrew to seek protection from his wife's father, Theron, who, while he himself ruled at Agrigentum, had committed the government of Himera to his son Thrasydæus. Hiero at first prepared to make war upon Theron, on account of the shelter which he afforded to his rival; but the quarrel was unexpectedly brought to an amicable issue. The Himeraeans were impatient of the government of Thrasydæus, which seems to have been violent and oppressive; and they engaged in a conspiracy against him, which was headed by Capys and Hippocrates, two of Theron's kinsmen.⁴ Hiero was on his march against Theron, when the conspirators opened a negotiation with him, and offered to betray Theron into his hands. But it would seem as if Hiero thought that the immediate advantage which he might derive from their treason would be outweighed by the danger with which the fall of the Agrigentine dynasty might threaten his own; and, instead of accepting their offers, he, by the intervention of the poet Simonides, betrayed them to Theron. This generous sacrifice became the cement of a firm alliance between the two princes. The two chief conspirators fled to

¹ Boeckh on Pindar, Ol. ii. p. 118.

² Schol. Pindar, Ol. ii. 29.

³ These expeditions are variously described by Diodorus, xi. 48., and the Scholiast on Pindar, Ol. ii. 29.

⁴ Schol. Pind. Ol. ii. 173.

Camicus: Himera was severely punished for her meditated rebellion; and a body of Dorian colonists was sent to supply the place of the citizens who were sacrificed to Theron's revenge. Theron mediated between Polyzelus and his brother, and united his house with the royal family of Syracuse by new ties of affinity: he bestowed his niece on Hiero, while he himself married a daughter of Polyzelus.¹

Hiero's reign was no less prosperous, and perhaps even more brilliant, than his predecessor's. The Tuscans had infested the coasts of Lower Italy with their piracies, and Cuma implored Hiero's protection against them. He sent a fleet which, by a signal victory, crushed the maritime power of the piratical states.² A part of the Tuscan spoil, dedicated to Zeus at Olympia, spread the renown of the conqueror over Greece, and still preserves a record of his triumph.³ After the death of Theron, his successor Thrasydæus, who, in his father's lifetime, had instigated Polyzelus against his elder brother, made war upon Hiero, and collected all the forces of Agrigentum and Himera against Syracuse. Hiero however gained a decisive victory; and Thrasydæus, whose authority rested only upon force, was compelled to quit his dominions, and retired to Greece. He sought shelter at Megara; but through some causes of which we have no account was there condemned to death.⁴ After the expulsion of her tyrant, Agrigentum recovered her democratical constitution, and made peace with Hiero. Hiero aspired to a higher glory than that of a conqueror: he is said to have been ambitious of the honours which Grecian piety paid to the founders of cities.⁵ He removed the inhabitants of Naxos and Catana to Leontium, where they found a kindred population, which it seems was compelled to

¹ Timæus in Schol. Pind. at the beginning of Ol. ii.

² Diodor. xi. 51. The Schollast on Pind., Pyth. i. 137., mentions the Carthaginians as allied in this war with the Tuscans.

³ In the inscription of the helmet found at Olympia in 1817. See Boeckh on Pindar, p. 225.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 53.

⁵ Ibid. xi. 40.

receive them. At Catana he planted a new colony composed of 5000 Syracusans, and as many Dorians, who were invited both from Peloponnesus and from other Sicilian towns.¹ He changed the name of the city to Ætna, and greatly enlarged its territory at the expense of the neighbouring Sicels.² As the colonists were all Dorians, he prescribed a form of government for them, founded on the leading features of the Spartan institutions. But they continued not the less subject to him; and his main object was undoubtedly not an empty title, but to secure an independent principality for himself or his family, if Gelo's heir should ever succeed to the throne of Syracuse. And he therefore committed the government of the newly founded city, first to his son Dinomenes, and afterwards to the most trusty of his friends. He seems to have extended his views beyond Sicily: he protected the Italian Locrians, when they were threatened by Anaxilaus of Rhegium³, and it must have been with ambitious motives that he instigated his sons to question the integrity of their virtuous guardian, Micythus, who, after satisfying the young men and their friends by a clear account of his administration, refused to resume the management of their affairs. He collected his private property and quitted the city, accompanied by the applause and regret of the people, and ended his days in honour at Tegea.⁴ The consequence was perhaps what Hiero had expected, though he did not live to reap any benefit from it: that the sons of Anaxilaus, having lost the main support of their authority, were not long after expelled from Rhegium.⁵ Hiero's government at home was not so mild and popular as Gelo's; he is charged with violence and rapacity; perhaps he also took more delight than Gelo in the display of his grandeur. He was an active and successful competitor for the most expensive honours of the Grecian games, and his liberality drew the greatest

¹ From Gela and Megara according to the Scholiast on Pindar, *Pyth. i.* 190.

² Diod. xi. 76.

⁴ Diod. xi. 66.

³ Epicharmus in Schol. Pindar, *Pyth. l. 98.*

⁵ *Ibid.* xi. 76.

poets of the age, Simonides, Bacchylides, Pindar, and Æschylus, to his court, where Epicharmus and the philosopher Xenophanes were also admitted to a familiar intercourse with him.¹ Pindar, while he celebrates his wealth and munificence, his institutions and victories, his taste and his virtues, intersperses this praise with delicate warnings, which indicate that Hiero did not bear his high fortune with perfect moderation.² His intimacy with Simonides, whom, as we have seen, he intrusted with important commissions, was celebrated in antiquity. But if the poet ever offered him such advice as we find under his name in one of Xenophon's dialogues³, it may have come too late, after Hiero had established a system of terror, and had destroyed all the security of private intercourse by the employment of spies and eavesdroppers⁴, and sacrificed several of his friends to slight suspicions.⁵ He died in the city which he had founded, and there received the same honours as Gelo earned from that in which he reigned.⁶

Polyzelus was already dead ; but Gelo's son was still living, and seems to have been acknowledged as the rightful heir to his father's power, though he was not yet of age to wield it. Thrasybulus therefore succeeded Hiero in the government. But Aristotle's language would lead us to believe that he ruled not in his own name but as the minister or favourite of his nephew, whom it is said he endeavoured to corrupt, that he might afterwards supplant him ; and the resistance which the friends of the young prince opposed to his ambitious designs is described by Aristotle as the occasion of the revolution by which the dynasty of Gelo was soon after overthrown.⁷ But it is difficult to reconcile these hints with the more explicit account of

¹ Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. He fined Epicharmus for having used some indecorous language in the presence of his wife : and joked with Xenophanes on his ridicule of Homer.

² See Boeckh on Pindar, p. 106.

³ The Hiero. See Schneider's Introduction.

⁴ *Ἰσχυροκρατία*. Aristot. Pol. v. 9.

⁶ Diodor. xi. 66.

⁵ Plutarch, De Adul. et Am. 27.

⁷ Pol. v. 8.

Diodorus, unless it be supposed that Thrasybulus, on the death of Polyzelus, became the guardian of his nephew, and, after having made him odious and contemptible by inflaming and indulging his passions, set him aside, and usurped the supreme authority. Diodorus says nothing of Gelo's son; but simply relates that Hiero was succeeded by Thrasybulus, and that the cruelty and rapacity of the new ruler provoked his subjects to revolt. The principal forces which he had to bring against Syracuse consisted, beside foreign mercenaries, of the *Ætnæans* or *Catanians*, who were attached by gratitude and interest to his house. With these troops, which together amounted to 15,000, he for some time kept possession of the two quarters of Syracuse called *Achradina* and the *Island*, which were enclosed each by separate fortifications, while the rest was occupied by his adversaries. But the *Syracusans* applied for assistance to *Gela*, *Agrigentum*, *Himera*, and *Selinus*, which probably desired the overthrow of the monarchical government at Syracuse to insure the stability of their own political institutions, and to the *Sicel tribes* of the interior, which were hostile, not indeed to the tyranny, but to the house of the tyrants, who had encroached on their territories, and threatened their independence. All contributed succours, some of ships, others of land forces, which seem to have enabled the insurgents to outnumber and overpower Thrasybulus both by land and by sea. He was defeated with great loss in a sea-fight and in a battle fought in the suburbs; and finding his affairs desperate negotiated with his revolted subjects for leave to abdicate his authority and to retire into exile. The *Syracusans* only wished to be rid of him, and he withdrew to the Italian *Locri*, where he ended his life in peaceful obscurity. With him the dynasty sank to rise no more. We hear nothing further either of the son of Gelo, or of *Dinomenes* son of Hiero, though he survived his father. The expulsion of the last tyrant was celebrated with an annual festival of liberty, and a democratical constitution was esta-

blished ; and this example was followed throughout all the Greek cities of the island.

But the revolution did not terminate with these political changes. The power of the tyrants had been maintained partly by foreign mercenaries, and partly by adherents whose attachment was purchased by the extinction or the humiliation of an opposite faction. The time had now come when those who had been thus deprived of their country and their property might hope for restitution and revenge, and when the safety of the newly established governments might seem to require that the work of the tyrants should be completely undone, and that their friends should no longer be suffered to retain the privileges and influence which they owed to their favour. At Syracuse Gelo had incorporated more than 10,000 foreign mercenaries among the citizens ; and after the expulsion of Thrasybulus more than 7000 of the number were still enjoying the franchise. They were now viewed with jealousy, as they had perhaps always been with aversion, and one of the first measures after the restoration of liberty, was to disfranchise the whole body. But, as men who owed their fortunes to their swords, they were too proud of their valour and military skill, and too confident in their numbers and union, tamely to submit to such a degradation. They seized the two quarters of the city which had been held during the previous insurrection by Thrasybulus, in which perhaps their dwellings principally lay, and here were able to defend themselves against their adversaries, who were worsted, notwithstanding their superior numbers, in every attempt which they made to dislodge them. But at sea the Syracusans were victorious, and by land they were able to blockade their enemies, and reduced them to great distress. In the mean while they seem to have exerted themselves to supply the defects of their own discipline and tactics, and formed a band of 600 picked men, which mainly determined the issue of the struggle. For the mercenaries, though successful as long as they remained on the defensive, were defeated

in a pitched battle, which, pressed perhaps by hunger, they ventured to give without the city, probably on ground where the enemy could make full use of his superior force, and where the 600 rendered such important services, that they were afterwards rewarded each with a chaplet, and a mina of silver, as the authors of the victory. The vanquished indeed do not appear to have been crushed by this blow; but it forced them to renounce their claims, and to evacuate the city. Similar contests took place about the same time in many other towns; and perhaps the events of Syracuse contributed to bring them to a similar issue. Every where the foreign intruders were compelled to give way, and by a general agreement they were permitted to settle in the territory of Messana.

The Sicels who had helped to overthrow Gelo's dynasty, took the opportunity which the revolution afforded them of recovering the territory which Hiero had wrested from them, and annexed to his colony at Ætna. They were aided by the Syracusans, who were hostile to Ætna as the "favoured seat of their tyrants, and by the old inhabitants of Catana, who had been transplanted to Leontium. The Sicels at this time very generally acknowledged the authority of a chief named Ducetius, whose proper dominions had perhaps been narrowed by Hiero's encroachments. He made an agreement with his allies for a partition of the Ætnæan territory. The colonists however defended their possessions, and did not yield till they had been defeated by the confederates in several engagements. But finally they abandoned the town, which was re-occupied by its ancient inhabitants, who restored the name of Catana, and threw down the monument which had been raised over the grave of Hiero. But the expelled colonists, having taken possession of a town in the interior, ten miles from Catana, called Inessa, gave the name of Ætna to their new settlement, and revived the honours of Hiero as its founder. About the same time (458) Camarina, which had remained desolate ever since it

was destroyed by Gelo, was rebuilt and inhabited by a colony from Gela.

After these events the Greek cities continued for some years at peace with one another; but the revolution which delivered them from their tyrants left many causes of discontent and mutual animosity which never ceased to disturb their internal tranquillity. The great changes which took place in the state of property, when the adherents of the fallen dynasties were dispossessed, and their estates restored to the ancient owners, only excited the murmurs of a large class, which found that it had gained nothing but political rights by the convulsions which had made others rich; and there were ambitious men ready to lay the foundations of a new tyranny in the claims or wishes of the disappointed and needy multitude. Such appears to have been the origin of the commotion, which about the year 452 agitated Syracuse, and threatened to plunge it into a civil war. An aspiring demagogue, named Tyndarides, had formed a strong party among the poorer citizens; and, unless his character and designs have been misrepresented, aimed at usurping the supreme authority. But his adversaries were powerful enough to bring him to trial before a tribunal which did not shrink from condemning him to death. His partisans attempted to rescue him, as he was led to prison to suffer his sentence. But the tumult was quelled, and he was slain with many of his followers, by a body of the wealthier class. It is said to have been with the view of counteracting the machinations of such demagogues that a mode of proceeding answering to the Athenian ostracism was introduced at Syracuse, called *petalism*, from the olive leaves on which the names of the obnoxious citizens were written, as on the potsherds at Athens. The term of exile at Syracuse was only five years. If the whole account which Diodorus gives of the origin and the effects of the Syracusan institution was not so confused as to render all conjectures on the subject extremely uncertain, we might believe that the *petalism* was first adopted by the higher

class as an engine of attack on the popular leaders, and afterwards turned against the contrivers. According to Diodorus, so many of the most eminent citizens were sent into exile by this process, that a general terror seized the leading men, and the persons best qualified for the service of the state withdrew entirely from public affairs, which thus fell into the worst hands; and the evils which arose from this change were so manifest, that the people soon repealed the law of petalism.¹ If the remedy was so speedily applied, the disorder cannot have been very dangerous, and the public spirit must have been generally healthy; and accordingly Aristotle appears to speak with approbation of the manner in which Syracuse was governed after the expulsion of the tyrants.² Diodorus describes it as flourishing in wealth, notwithstanding its internal dissensions; and in 451 a Syracusan fleet was sent out to punish the Tuscans, who had renewed their piracies. They bribed the Syracusan admiral to spare them; but on his return he was punished as a traitor, and his successor with an armament of sixty galleys ravaged the coast of Etruria, and the islands Cyrenus and Æthalia (Corsica and Elba), which then belonged to the Tuscans, and carried home many captives and a rich booty.

In the mean while the Sicel chief Ducetius was raising a power which soon became formidable to his Greek neighbours, as well in itself, as on account of the abilities and the designs which he unfolded. He had begun, as we have seen, by recovering the share which belonged to him in the territory of Catana. He afterward made himself master of Morgantia, the ancient capital of a kindred tribe, the Morgetes. By his energy and success he won the confidence of his nation, and he seems to have perceived that nothing but union was wanted to form it into a state, which, under an active and prudent prince, would be able to maintain its independence, and

¹ xi. 87.

² Pol. v. 8. Λακισταίμοιοι πλείστας κατάλυσαν τυραννίδας, καὶ Συρακηνῶσι παρὰ τοῦ χρόνου ὃν ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς.

perhaps to give laws to the whole island. He founded a new city called Menæus, to which he drew settlers by grants of land in the surrounding district, and afterwards having induced all the Sicel towns, except Hybla, to unite under his government, he obtained their concurrence in a more important undertaking. His native place, Menæ, was situate on high ground, not adapted to a great city. But at a little distance, in the plain, was an ancient and revered sanctuary of two deities, one of whom—Pales, the goddess of shepherds—was honoured at Roine, where her festival coincided with the birthday of the city. Two boiling sulphureous springs, which gushed up to the brim of two volcanic craters, without ever overflowing, within the consecrated ground, and were believed to attest the presence of two kindred powers, heightened the awe of all who approached the sanctuary of the Palic deities. It was a spot to which the oppressed fled for refuge, with the certainty of finding a secure asylum; and where the most solemn contracts were ratified by oaths, which it was believed had never been broken with impunity. Ducetius seems to have thought that the sanctity of the place fitted it for the site of a new city, in which the Sicels might recognise a common capital of the nation. He transported Menæ into the plain; but enclosed a space capable of containing a much larger population; and settlers were found in abundance, attracted as well by the fertility of the soil, as by the fame of the sanctuary, from which the new city took the name of Palice.

Ducetius now felt himself strong enough to attempt some offensive movements against the Greeks. He recovered Ætna—the ancient Inessa—from Hiero's colonists, who seem to have retained their monarchical government, as we read that their ruler was treacherously murdered by Ducetius. The Sicel prince then laid siege to a fortress called Motyum, belonging to the Agrigentines, who obtained succours from Syracuse. But the allied forces were defeated and driven out of their entrenchments. Motyum fell into the hands of Ducetius.

The Syracusans seem to have required that their generals should conquer: they punished Bolco, who had commanded in the last campaign, as a traitor, and in the following spring they sent out a large force under another general, who was ordered to subdue Ducetius. He executed his commission, and in a hard-fought battle routed and dispersed the Sicel army. Ducetius was left with a small band of followers, which, as his affairs grew more and more hopeless when the victorious Syracusans were joined by the Agrigentine forces which had recaptured Motyum, was thinned by frequent desertions. At last, finding that he was in danger of being betrayed to the enemy, he resolved on a bold expedient. In the dead of night he quitted his retreat, alone and unobserved, and rode to Syracuse. In the morning he was found in the posture of a suppliant, on one of the altars in the agora. An assembly was called to deliberate on the treatment which he should receive. Counsellors were not wanting to recommend the most rigorous course; but the people was unanimous on the side of mercy. The suppliant was conveyed to Corinth, where he was enjoined to reside during the rest of his life.

But the exile had never renounced his hopes, or soon felt them revived. Five years after his deportation he quitted Corinth, procured or feigned the sanction of an oracle for a new colony, and arrived in Sicily with a numerous band of followers, which he led to a site on the north coast of the island, called Caleacte (Fair Strand), and here proceeded to found a new city. He was joined by some of the Sicels and by Archonides, the ruler of Herbita. His return was the cause or pretext of a war between Agrigentum and Syracuse: the Agrigentines complained of the lenity which had spared so dangerous an enemy. Their secret motive was probably jealousy of the growing power of Syracuse, which had been greatly augmented by conquests in the Sicel territory. Most of the other Greek towns sided with one or the other of the rival states, and it was evident that the dominion of Sicily depended on the issue of the

struggle. A battle was fought near the banks of the Himera, and the fortune of Syracuse was again triumphant. The Agrigentines were defeated with the loss of 1000 men, and were fain to sue for peace, and to acknowledge the supremacy of Syracuse, which was now established over all the Greek, or at least over all the Dorian cities of the island, except Camarina. A few years after she was delivered from her apprehensions on another side by the death of Ducetius, who was cut off by sickness in the midst of his ambitious projects. The Syracusans attacked all the Sicel towns in succession; and it must have been in this war that Palice was destroyed¹, if, as Diodorus asserts, the last which held out was one called Trinacia, which was defended with desperate valour, but was at length stormed and rased to the ground.

Such was the state of affairs in Sicily when the Peloponnesian war broke out. Syracuse was bound to the Peloponnesian cause, not only by her filial connection with Corinth, but by her jealousy of the maritime power of Athens, even if no rumour had reached her of the ambitious views which the Athenians had begun to direct toward Sicily. But the cities of Chalcidian origin, which were averse on national grounds to the predominance of a Dorian state, and saw their independence and even their existence threatened by the power of Syracuse, regarded the contest which was beginning in Greece between the Ionian race, to which they themselves belonged, and the Dorians, with opposite feelings, and hoped to find a protectress in Athens. Whether such hopes had encouraged the Leontines to betray their impatience of the supremacy of Syracuse, or they had been wantonly attacked, does not appear. But in the fifth year of the war (428) they were engaged in a struggle with Syracuse, in which the Dorian and Chal-

¹ Wesseling's conjecture on Diodor. xi. 90., that his author had related the particulars of the fall of Palice in one of his lost books, would only be necessary, if it was possible to place any reliance on the memory or accuracy of Diodorus.

cidian cities of the island took part with their natural allies ; all but Camarina, which it would seem, through jealousy of her powerful neighbour, sided with the Leontines. The Syracusan confederacy was the stronger, and its armament blockaded Leontium by land and sea, and reduced the Leontines to such distress that, seeing no prospect of relief at home, they applied for succour to Athens. The embassy which they sent on this occasion was memorable, both for the important consequences which ensued from it, and because it was headed by the celebrated Gorgias, one of the earliest and the most eminent among the men who reduced oratory to an art and philosophy to a profession. Sicily was the birth-place of Greek rhetoric. The great increase of litigation which arose from the expulsion of the tyrants, through the claims of those whom they had deprived of their property, gave a new impulse to the practice of forensic eloquence, and led several ingenious men to study the principles on which its efficacy depended, and to frame rules and precepts for learners. Gorgias had been preceded by Corax and Tisias ; but he unfolded and illustrated their system, and combined his rhetorical exercises with philosophical speculations derived from the Eleatic school, and with others of an ethical nature which afforded topics for declamation. The Athenians are said to have been captivated by his elaborate harangues, though they had undoubtedly much better models at home, and the eloquence of their great orators was removed as widely as possible from the frosty glare which seems to have marked the compositions of Gorgias. In private too he delighted the most gifted and aspiring of the Athenian youth, both by his rhetorical exhibitions and by his dialectic subtilties ; and as he demanded a high price for his instructions, he found his stay at Athens so profitable, that he was induced to repeat his visit, and to enlighten other parts of Greece with his new wisdom.

He was no less successful in the discharge of his commission, which indeed would have been safe enough

in the hands of a less brilliant orator: for it met the wishes of the Athenians. They granted the request of the Leontines; yet the state of their own affairs — for they were still suffering from the pestilence, and their treasury was drained by the growing expenses of the war — and the novelty of the enterprise inclined them to caution. They contented themselves with sending twenty galleys under Laches and Charœades, not without the hope of making a useful diversion in favour of their allies, but chiefly with the view of exploring the state of Sicily, and of ascertaining what encouragement it held out to their schemes of conquest. The squadron sailed to Rhegium, which, after the expulsion of the sons of Anaxilaus, had been much agitated by contending factions, but was at this time ruled by a party friendly to the Athenians. To Athens indeed it was naturally attached as a city of Chalcidian origin; and this attachment was strengthened by its enmity to Locri, which was in part, as we have seen a Spartan colony, and was an ally of the Peloponnesians. At Rhegium therefore the Athenian commanders took their station, and waited for opportunities of action. The Rhegians were not able to furnish any considerable reinforcement to their armament, and their first operations were of little moment. An expedition which they made in the winter after their arrival against the Æolian islands, failed in its main object, the reduction of Lipara. Yet their presence seems to have animated their Sicilian allies to more vigorous efforts, and perhaps relieved Leontium for a time by drawing off the Syracusan squadron which blockaded it. But in the following summer they gained a more important advantage, which compensated the loss of their general Charœades, who was killed in an engagement with the Syracusans. Laches, now sole commander, landed a body of the allied troops on the Sicilian coast, and marched against the fort of Mylæ, in the territory of Messana. It was garrisoned by two of the Messanian tribes, probably not much less than

half of their whole force. They attempted to draw the invaders into an ambush ; but were defeated with great loss, and were finally compelled not only to surrender the fortress, but to join the allies in marching against Messana. This part of the capitulation seems to indicate that the Messanians were divided between two parties, one of which wished well to the Athenians, and was encouraged to declare itself by the success of their arms. Messana itself, on the approach of the enemy, offered no resistance, but gave hostages and other securities for its obedience. It does not appear to have been required to admit the Athenians within its walls. Laches was equally successful in a descent which he made in the same summer on the Locrian coast, where he defeated the forces sent to encounter him, and made himself master of a fort on the river Halex. But he failed in an expedition which he led in the following winter against the Sicel town Inessa, where the Syracusans garrisoned the citadel. Some of the Sicels had been encouraged to revolt from Syracuse, and joined the Athenians in this expedition. But the citadel baffled their assaults, and in their retreat they were attacked by the garrison, and suffered considerable loss. This check was soon after in some degree compensated by another successful descent on the Locrian territory. But in the mean while the main end of the war seemed as distant as ever. The Leontines found themselves still pressed both by land and sea : though the naval force which Syracuse employed against them was small. They had therefore again sent to Athens, and solicited more active succours, and the Athenians had resolved to send a fresh squadron of forty galleys. Three generals, Pythodorus, Sophocles, and Eurymedon, were appointed to the command. The first was sent immediately with a few ships to supersede Laches ; who on his return from an expedition which he had made against Himera and the Æolian isles, found his successor at Rhegium.

The new commander seems to have been either less

able or less fortunate than Laches : and during the interval in which he waited for his colleagues, who were to follow with the main force, the Athenian interest lost more ground than it gained in Sicily. Pythodorus was defeated by the Locrians in an expedition which he made against their territory soon after his arrival. And in the spring of 425 he lost the most valuable fruit of the last campaign. A squadron of twenty galleys, half Syracusan, half Locrian, took possession of Messana, befriended by the party adverse to Athens, while the Locrians invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole force. Their hostility was inflamed by a body of Rhegian exiles, who hoped to be restored to their country. And perhaps it was the unsettled state of Rhegium which prevented the Athenians from defending Messana, where the enemy now stationed their fleet and prepared to strengthen it with such reinforcements, as might enable them to counteract the movements of the invader.

Such was the state of affairs in Sicily at the beginning of the summer of 425, when the Peloponnesian army under the Spartan king Agis invaded Attica, and committed its usual ravages. And now Sophocles and Eurymedon set sail with the forty galleys which had been promised to the Leontines. They were accompanied by Demosthenes, who, though after his return to Acarnania he had not been invested with any command, had obtained leave to embark with the two generals, and to use the services of the fleet as occasion might offer on the coast of Peloponnesus. But the generals were directed to touch at Corcyra, where the friends of Athens were again threatened by the refugees, who had taken up a strong position in the island, and expected the arrival of a powerful Peloponnesian armament. Demosthenes had not yet disclosed the particulars of his plan, which demanded secrecy ; but when the fleet had reached the coast of Messenia he announced his design of occupying the point, called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium, but more anciently and generally

known by the name of Pylus ; as it was commonly believed to have been the residence of Nestor. It was the rocky headland at the northern entrance of the bay now called Navarino, separated by a very narrow channel from the island of Sphacteria, and accessible only by one or two narrow passes on the land side. Demosthenes had conceived the project of fortifying this point, and of intrusting it to a garrison of Messenians from Naupactus, which his personal influence would enable him easily to procure, and which, as its deadly hatred of Sparta insured its fidelity and zeal, would also have a peculiar advantage for annoying the enemy in the use of the same dialect ; for the exiled Messenians had preserved their Dorian idiom in all its purity.

But Sophocles and Eurymedon^{*} could not, or would not, enter into the views of Demosthenes. They had received intelligence that a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty galleys was already arrived at Corcyra, and they were eager to overtake it. They would therefore have pursued their voyage, if they had not been forced by stress of weather to put into the harbour of Pylus. Demosthenes now urged them to assist him in carrying his design into effect. But they seem to have received no orders at home to limit their authority, and they professed not to be able to perceive the force of the arguments by which Demosthenes endeavoured to prove the expediency of the undertaking. "Any other lone headland of Peloponnesus would serve as well, if he was bent on putting the city to the expense of fortifying one." Their real motive was perhaps as much jealousy as the fear of delay. Demosthenes, finding them deaf to his remonstrances, applied to the inferior officers ; but with as little success ; they were probably no less anxious than their chiefs to proceed to the object of the expedition. But as the weather continued to detain them, the men, feeling the time heavy on their hands, began to think that they could not divert themselves better than by setting about the work which Demosthenes proposed.

The commanders did not interfere : which indeed would have been directly contrary to the orders of the people ; and the work, once begun, was carried on with the greater ardour on account of the difficulties which were to be overcome. They had brought no masons tools with them ; but they found abundance of stones, which they gathered and put together, as they might happen to square with each other : and when mud was wanted to fill up the interstices, they supplied the place both of hods and trowels with their hands. The only fear was lest they should be interrupted by the enemy before their work was completed ; and this thought spurred them to use their utmost efforts to put the weakest side of the ground in a state capable of defence. Pylus was only fifty miles from Sparta. But the Spartans were celebrating one of their festivals ; their army was in Attica, their fleet at Corcyra ; and they did not think it worth their while to bestir themselves for the sake of repelling an enemy whom they expected easily to dislodge at the first assault. The Athenians therefore were allowed to finish their rude wall as far as was necessary to make it tenable. It was the labour of six days ; and then, the weather being fair, Sophocles and Eurymedon prosecuted their voyage with all speed, leaving five galleys with Demosthenes to guard the fortress.

The news of the occupation of Pylus induced Agis to withdraw his army immediately from Attica, where indeed he could not have remained much longer, as the invasion had been made earlier than usual, while the corn was still green, and the troops were beginning to suffer both from the scarcity of provisions, and the extraordinary severity of the weather. He quitted the country fifteen days after he had entered it, the shortest stay which an invading army made there during the war. After his return the Spartans lost no time in marching to Pylus ; and they were accompanied by the forces of the districts adjacent to the capital, which had not been employed in the expedition to Attica. The other Lacedæmonians required a little longer time before they

could leave home again. But orders were sent round Peloponnesus to all the allies to bring up their contingents as soon as possible, and the fleet was recalled from Corcyra. It was transported across the Leucadian isthmus, and thus passing unobserved, reached Pylus while the Athenians were lying at Zacynthus. Demosthenes having been apprised of its approach, despatched two out of the five galleys which had been left with him, to Zacynthus, to inform Eurymedon and his colleague of his danger. In the mean while the Spartans prepared to overwhelm his little garrison by attacking the fort at once on the sea and the land side, and if they should not immediately carry it, designed to take precautions for excluding the Athenian fleet, when it came, from the harbour, by a bar of galleys placed at each entrance. The island Sphacteria they immediately occupied with a body of heavy-armed troops.

On the other hand Demosthenes made every provision which prudence suggested, and his situation permitted, for meeting the danger. His whole force consisted of the crews of his three remaining galleys and of forty Messenians, who happened to have come very opportunely in two small privateers. They were regularly armed, and they had some other arms on board their vessels, which served, though scantily, to equip the Athenian sailors. The three galleys he hauled up under the fort, and protected with a stockade. The main body of his little garrison he distributed round the walls on the land side. But it was on the side of the sea that he expected the most formidable assault, at the point where the landing indeed was difficult, but the weakness of the fortifications was likely to tempt the enemy. Here, with sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, he himself came down and drew up his men at the water's edge. He cheered them by pointing out the advantages of their position, which counterbalanced the enemy's superiority in numbers, and warned them that their safety entirely depended on the resistance which they made to his landing. The attack began on all sides at once; but, as

Demosthenes foresaw, the main effort was directed against the quarter where he and his little band were posted. The nature of the shore permitted only a few ships to approach at a time : but as the fleet consisted of forty-three, they continually relieved each other, and the Athenians were pressed during the whole day by an uninterrupted series of assaults. One galley was commanded by Brasidas, who distinguished himself above all the assailants by his courage and zeal. As he saw that some of his companions were deterred by the danger of wrecking their vessels on the rocky shore, he loudly exclaimed against the parsimony which was sparing of timber, when the enemy was to be dislodged from the soil of Laconia ; exhorted the allies to sacrifice their ships to the good of Sparta, to whom they owed so much, and set an example of self-devotion, by ordering his master to run his galley ashore, and advanced foremost on the landing-steps. He immediately became a mark for the missiles of the Athenians ; and after having sustained the brunt of the battle, and received many wounds, at length sank backward into his ship ; while his shield dropped from his arm into the sea, and was afterward taken up by the enemy, to form the most glorious part of their trophy. The fight however was maintained till nightfall, and was renewed the next morning, and kept up during a part of the day ; but before the second evening the assailants were forced to own themselves baffled by an enemy who was fighting on the element where they had been always used to conquer, while they were in possession of that in which alone, as they had been willing to believe, the Athenians had any chance of victory. They now resolved to change their plan of attack, and on the third day sent some ships to Asine, to fetch timber for constructing engines, with which they proposed to make an attempt on the fort from the side of the harbour, where the landing was easier, though the wall was stronger.

But in the mean while the Athenian fleet arrived from Zacynthus, augmented to the number of fifty by a rein-

forcement of four Chians, and of some from the squadron stationed at Naupactus. The harbour and Sphacteria being in the possession of the Peloponnesians, they sailed away to moor for the first night at a little island not far from the coast, named Proté. The next day they returned, either to give battle in the open sea, if the enemy should come out to meet them, or to attack him in the harbour. The Peloponnesians neither sailed out, nor made any attempt to close the mouths of the harbour; but allowed themselves to be surprised by the Athenians, while a part of their ships were still on shore, and had not yet been manned. The rest no sooner met the enemy than they were put to flight; five were taken, one with its whole company, many shattered; and the Athenians chasing them to the shore tried to carry off those which they found there empty. But the dread of a loss which would leave their comrades in Sphacteria utterly defenceless, roused the Spartans to desperate exertions. They pushed into the sea to regain their empty vessels, and after a hard struggle succeeded in rescuing all but the five first taken. With these the Athenians at length sailed away, erected their trophy, and received the usual acknowledgments of victory, and now began to keep a strict watch over the island, to prevent the men who were shut up there from receiving succours or making their escape.

The whole number of the regular troops which had been last left there amounted to 420: of these a considerable part were Spartans of the best families; and they were attended by light-armed Helots. When intelligence of their situation reached Sparta, it caused a degree of consternation and perplexity which can scarcely be understood, unless as a sign that the Spartan franchise was beginning to be confined to a smaller number, and that the life of a Spartan was growing more and more valuable. The ephors themselves proceeded to the camp at Pylus, to ascertain the state of things with their own eyes. The whole of the allied forces was by this time assembled there; but as the Athenians were

masters of the sea, they could give no help to their troops in the island, and the prospect of reducing the fort was now much less hopeful than at first. Only one way remained of saving so many precious lives, which might soon be cut off either by hunger or the sword: the way of negotiation. And at the request of the Spartans the Athenian generals granted a truce, to enable them to send an embassy to Athens. The terms of the armistice itself were dictated in the spirit of a victorious enemy. The Spartans were to place their whole navy in the hands of the Athenians at Pylus, until the return of the ambassadors, who were to be conveyed to Athens and brought back by an Athenian galley, when it was to be restored in the same condition. Hostilities were to cease on both sides; but the Athenians were to keep up the blockade of the island, only allowing certain rations of bread, meat, and wine to be sent in daily to the besieged, under their own inspection. If any of these articles should be infringed, the truce was to be considered at an end. The ships, about sixty, were delivered up; and the ambassadors were conducted to Athens.

The proposals which they made when they were admitted to an audience before the people, included no other condition than the recovery of the men in the island, as the price of peace and alliance. As a few years before the Athenians had sued for peace, the Spartans imagined that it would now be accepted as an equivalent for the object of their own desires. Yet the tone of the address attributed to them, is that of a humbled enemy, who appeals to the generosity, as well as to the policy, of his victorious antagonist. The Athenians are admonished to remember the fluctuating chances of war, which might still afford the garrison of Sphacteria means of escape, and might soon reverse the relative position of both parties. They are exhorted to grant peace on moderate terms, and thus to confer an obligation on Sparta which would insure her friends, as the loss of her citizens now in danger would in the

her with implacable enmity ; and to earn the gratitude and goodwill of the other Greeks, who were tired of the conflict, and uncertain to which of the two rival powers their miseries were to be imputed, but would hail Athens as their benefactress, if she put an end to them, now that the decision rested entirely with herself.

Unhappily the Athenians were more inclined to follow the example of the Spartans, than to take their advice. They were intoxicated with their unexpected good fortune, as their enemy had been elated by their temporary distress. The men in the island they looked upon as already their own, and consequently that they might always command peace ; but the present seemed a favourable opportunity for exacting some further concessions. Yet they would probably have been more moderate in their demands, if their counsels had not still been swayed by Cleon, who was perhaps personally averse to peace, or saw that the most extravagant terms would be most agreeable to the mood of the assembly. He prevailed on it to decree an answer, which required that the men in the island should surrender themselves with their arms — an aggravation of the disgrace — and be conveyed to Athens ; to be restored to their country, only after the Spartans should have reinstated the Athenians in the possession of all the places which had been ceded, in a moment of urgent peril, as the price of the thirty years' truce, and that when these preliminaries had been executed, a treaty of peace should be concluded, for any term which might seem fit to the parties. These conditions were not only degrading to the honour of Sparta, but such as she would most likely have found it impossible to fulfil ; so that the probable result would have been a disgraceful sacrifice of the very object for which she was treating without any equivalent. It was dangerous to the reputation of Sparta among her allies to be known to listen to such terms : and the envoys did not venture to lower the dignity of their state, by publicly making any larger

offers before they knew whether they would be accepted ; but desired that commissioners might be appointed to treat with them in private. This proposal Cleon construed into a proof of double dealing, for which alone the veil of secrecy could be sought, and induced the people to reject it. On this the ambassadors, deeming negotiation hopeless, quitted Athens. On their return, the truce being at an end, the Spartans demanded the restitution of their ships. But the Athenians, alleging that the truce had been infringed by some acts of hostility — in the judgment of Thucydides frivolous pretences — refused to restore them. Hostilities were renewed with redoubled activity and bitterness. The island was watched in day-time by two Athenian galleys, which were continually cruising round in opposite directions ; and at night the whole fleet, now increased to seventy sail by a reinforcement from Athens, was moored round the coast, unless the state of the weather prevented it from lying in the open sea. The Peloponnesians made repeated attacks on the fort, less with the hope of reducing it, than of finding some opportunity of delivering their besieged friends.

But gradually a change took place in the situation and prospects of the two parties. The Athenians began to feel their own position irksome and embarrassing, and to lose much of the confidence with which they had looked forward to a speedy surrender of the island. They were themselves suffering from the scarcity both of victuals and water ; for Pylus contained only one small spring in the citadel, and many of the troops were forced to drink the brackish water which they got by digging into the beach. The narrowness of the room in which so great an armament was crowded, and the difficulty of landing, which compelled the crews to go on shore for their meals by turns, aggravated the inconvenience of their situation. On the other hand, notwithstanding all the vigilance of their cruisers, the Lacedæmonians in the island continued to be supplied with provisions. Their commander Epitadas had care

fully husbanded those which he had received during the armistice, which lasted about twenty days, and after it expired, means were found of introducing fresh supplies. Large rewards, or high prices, were offered by the Spartan government to all persons who carried in flour, wine, cheese, or other food suited to the emergency; and the helots were excited by the promise of freedom. They showed the greatest courage and address in accomplishing their purpose: sometimes sailing to the back of the island in the night, more especially when the weather was too rough for the enemy to keep his station there, and running their boats fearlessly on shore, a liberal allowance being made for their losses: sometimes reaching the island by diving within the harbour, dragging after them bags filled with a nutritive mixture of bruised seeds and honey, and by other devices eluding the Athenian guardships. And thus between two and three months passed away, after the blockade had begun, without any progress having been made.

The reports brought to Athens of the state of things at Pylus created both impatience and alarm. There was reason to fear that the prey after all might slip through the hands which seemed to grasp it. If winter should find the parties in the same position, it would be difficult to victual the fort, and scarcely possible to maintain the blockade of the island, and prevent the escape of the besieged. The offers which Sparta had made looked more tempting now that they were withdrawn, and many began to regret that they had been rejected. Cleon felt that the growing discontent of the people was pointed against himself, and at first tried to pacify it by denying the truth of the accounts which had been brought from the scene of action. But when the persons whose veracity he thus called in question desired that, if they were not believed, other agents might be sent to ascertain the truth, Cleon himself was appointed with a colleague to this office. The commission was embarrassing to him; for he saw that he

should not be able to lie without being detected, or to speak truth without convicting himself of calumny. He therefore shifted his ground, and anticipating the wish which he perceived to be prevailing, of quickening the operations of the besieging forces, he advised the people not to lose time in procuring further information, but, if they were satisfied as to the truth of the reports brought to them, at once to send some man of spirit, who would force the besieged Spartans to surrender. "If their generals had been any better than women, they would not have suffered so easy a conquest to be so long delayed; had he been in office, it would have been already done." Every one knew that the taunt was aimed at Nicias, who was one of the generals of the year, and whom he hated as his rival in popular favour; the boast excited some ironical murmurs in the assembly: "If he thought the thing so easy, let him try." Nicias, catching at the sneers of the multitude, gravely proposed that he should take any force which he might think necessary, and make the attempt: "he had full leave from the generals." Cleon, not supposing at first that Nicias was in earnest, declared himself ready to engage in the undertaking; but when he found that the proposal was meant seriously, he began to recede: "he did not wish to usurp the functions of Nicias." But Nicias solemnly renewed his offer, and called upon the assembly to attest it. The multitude enjoyed the visible perplexity of their swaggering favourite, and the more he shrank from his undertaking, pressed him the more loudly to fulfil it. He found at last that the humour of the people was not to be resisted or eluded, and he made up his mind to yield with a good grace. He resumed his intrepid air, and declared that he was ready to face the Lacedæmonians; that he did not even require a single Athenian to accompany him. He would take only the Lemnians and Imbrians who were then at Athens, a body of targeteers which had just come from Ænus, and 400 foreign bowmen; and with this force, added to that which they had

already at Pylus, within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedæmonians away prisoners, or kill every man."

Again the assembly was amused by language which sounded like an empty vaunt; yet it did not shrink from entrusting Cleon with the command and the forces which he required. Even those who best understood the man's character, were glad to see him engaged in an undertaking, by which, if he succeeded, he would confer an important advantage on the commonwealth, or, if he failed, and so lost either his life or his influence, it would be delivered from a still greater evil. But since those who thought thus were probably the few, we might be surprised by the levity shown by the majority in an affair of such moment, and in which they took so deep an interest, if the whole transaction had not been placed in a different point of view by another circumstance, which proves that Cleon's presumption was not so great as it at first appeared, nor rather that there was much more of cunning than of rashness in his conduct. He had learnt, and perhaps it was generally known, that Demosthenes, urged by the growing difficulties of his position, had already formed the design of attacking the island, and he had the prudence to request that this able and experienced general might be joined with him in command. And thus, without any extravagant confidence in his own military skill, he might reasonably hope, that, bringing a considerable reinforcement to Pylus, and aided by the preparations, the judgment, and vigour of his colleague, he might further rather than impede the enterprise, the honour of which, if successful, he should be able to appropriate to himself. The appointment of Demosthenes as second in command, which was granted by the assembly, removed the apprehensions which even the most thoughtless must have felt, if the issue of the expedition had been left to depend entirely on the abilities of Cleon.

The forces indeed which Demosthenes had already at

his disposal seem to have been quite sufficient for his purpose ; but he had hitherto been deterred from using them. The strength of the besieged was not exactly known to the Athenians, who believed their numbers to be smaller than they really were. But on the other hand they were formidable as the flower of the Spartan warriors, who were commonly deemed almost invincible ; they might be expected to dispute every inch of the ground, and had the advantage of a strong position. The island was uninhabited, and thickly covered with wood, which, as it concealed the amount of the besieged forces, would enable them to watch all the movements of the enemy, so long as he kept on open ground, and to profit by all his mistakes, while it screened them from his attacks, or, if he ventured into it, would expose him to be cut to pieces in detail. This was a danger with which Demosthenes was deeply impressed by the remembrance of his disaster among the forests of *Ætolia*. But not long before Cleon's arrival, this obstacle had been cleared away. A party of Athenians, having landed on a corner of the island, to take their meal, lighted a fire, which happened to catch the adjoining wood ; and the flames were spread by the wind, until almost the whole island was left bare. The enemy's numbers now became visible ; and the Athenians perceived that the prize was more valuable than they had imagined ; and, the main difficulty having been removed, Demosthenes had collected all the succours he could draw from the nearest allies of Athens, and was in the midst of his preparations for invading the island, when he received a message from Cleon to announce his approach ; and soon after the new general arrived.

The first step taken by the two commanders was to send a herald to the enemy's camp, to propose that the besieged should surrender themselves and their arms, on condition of being detained in mild custody till the conclusion of a general peace. The proposal was rejected ; and another day only was permitted to intervene, before the blow was struck. The main body of the

besieged, commanded by Epitadas^{*} himself, was stationed near a spring in the central and most level part of the island. Thirty men guarded a post near one of its extremities, and another small force occupied the northern point, facing Pylus, where the ground was naturally strong both on the sea and the land side, and was defended by an old rude fortification. The heavy-armed Athenian troops to the number of 800, embarked in the night, and a little before day-break landed in two divisions on opposite sides of the island, and immediately proceeded at full speed to surprise the nearest post, where they found the thirty who guarded it just starting from sleep, and snatching up their arms — for the approach of the enemy's ships to their usual station had excited no alarm — and cut them all to pieces. With the dawn the light infantry, which formed the bulk of the army, disembarked: 70 ships' companies, all but the rowers of the lowest order¹, with such arms as they could find: 800 bowmen², and as many targeteers², with as large a part of the garrison of Pylus as could be spared from the walls. The plan of Demosthenes was to distribute his light troops in detachments of between 200 and 300^{*} men, to occupy the highest ground on every side of the enemy, and annoy him with their missiles, while the heavy infantry came slowly up. Epitadas and his little band soon found themselves assailed in all directions by showers of arrows, javelins, and stones, from a distance at which, under the incumbrance of their heavy armour, they were unable to overtake the assailants. They desired to meet the Athenian heavy-armed, who were advancing toward them, to provoke, but not to accept a combat; but the incessant attacks of the parties which hung on their flanks and rear, prevented them from ever coming to close quarters with those who were in front. By degrees their strength began to be spent in unavailing onsets, and their spirit to flag. The assailants, who at first quailed before the

¹ Θαλάμιοι

² Πίλτασται, from the short buckler called πίλτη.

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invincible Spartans, and kept aloof, observing their resistance slacken, and emboldened by success and by their own visible superiority of numbers, now redoubled their efforts, and poured down upon them with a simultaneous charge, and a deafening shout. The Lacedæmonians were encumbered and impeded by the broken shafts of the weapons which had pierced through their armour; they were almost blinded and choked by a cloud of dust which rose under the trampling of the crowd from the ashes of the recently consumed wood; all orders were drowned in the enemy's clamour; their minds were perplexed by the confusion of the scene, and the various pressures of the danger. At length, rallying all the force which toil and wounds had left in them, they closed their ranks and made for the fort at the north end of the island. When the enemy saw them give way, he pressed them more hotly than ever; but the greater part made good their retreat, and having reached the fort, took their stand with their comrades on the side where it was most open to attack: and as the nature of the ground prevented the Athenians from encompassing them, they now enjoyed a temporary relief, and suffered perhaps less than the assailants from the heat and the toil of the protracted struggle.

The day was wearing, the combatants growing faint from thirst and fatigue, and yet the issue of the conflict did not seem to have been brought a step nearer, when the commander of the Messenian auxiliaries proposed a new attempt to the Athenian generals. If they would entrust him with a few archers, and other light troops, he would try to find a passage which would bring him upon the enemy's rear. And accordingly, with such a detachment as he required, he began his march from a point of the coast not in view of the fort, and having with great difficulty wound his way along the foot of the cliffs, he at length mounted by a side which, on account of its strength, had been left unguarded, and suddenly appeared on the high ground at the back of the Lacedæmonians, who found themselves in a position

which Thucydides compares to that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. As their hopes sank under this new danger, the ardour of the Athenians revived at the sight of the Messenians, on the height : and they pushed forward to overpower the divided and enfeebled resistance of the disheartened garrison. It was evident that it could not hold out much longer, and that if the slaughter once began it would only end with the destruction of the vanquished. But this was not the object of the Athenian generals ; they wished to carry as many as they could prisoners to Athens. They therefore checked their troops, and suspended the attack, while by the voice of a herald they called on the Lacedæmonians to lay down their arms, and surrender at discretion. Most of those who heard the summons lowered their shields, and waved their hands, in token of compliance, and soon the commanders on both sides came to a conference. Epitadas had been slain ; Hippagretas, the second in command, lay wounded without signs of life ; Styphon, who according to Spartan usage had been appointed to succeed if his superiors fell, treated with Cleon and Demosthenes. He desired leave to send over to consult his countrymen on the main land as to the course which he should adopt. The Athenians would not let any of his men leave the island, but themselves sent for heralds from the Peloponnesian camp to bear Styphon's message. After a few inquiries had been interchanged, an answer was finally brought to the effect " that the Lacedæmonians in the island were at liberty to act as they thought fit, so as to preserve their honour." This was construed by Styphon and those with whom he deliberated as a permission to accept the terms offered by the Athenians ; and they surrendered ; in all 292, and of these about 120 were Spartans. Within twenty days, according to his promise, Cleon returned with his prisoners to Athens. What part he had taken, either as general or soldier, in the combats of Sphacteria, Thucydides does not intimate, otherwise than by his silence ; but it is probable that the more clear-sighted viewed the

whole affair in the same light with the comic poet, who under a homely figure represented Cleon as silyly purloining the laurels of Demosthenes.¹ But the result of his success was not the less important, and, through the new aliment which it ministered to his self-confidence, it was ultimately attended, as will be afterward seen, with the very advantage, which would have consoled the best patriots if he had totally failed. The immediate effect was to raise the spirit of the Athenians, to deject the Spartans, and to astonish the rest of Greece. That Spartans, with arms in their hands, and sufficient food, should surrender themselves prisoners, was something new to the Greeks, who expected that they would all have died at their posts, and could hardly believe that the survivors were men of the same stamp with the slain; though, as one of them remarked, when he was insultingly asked at Athens whether his comrades who had fallen were of the true Spartan blood, they died, not in close combat, but as the dart or the arrow happened to speed. The Athenians resolved to take the utmost advantage both of the capture they had made, and of the footing which they had gained at Pylus. They declared that, if the Peloponnesians should again invade their territory, they would put their prisoners to death; and they garrisoned Pylus — from which the Peloponnesians withdrew their army after the reduction of the island — with a body of Messenians, who, as Demosthenes had foreseen, found abundant opportunities of annoying their hereditary foes in the land of their fathers. The Spartans were distressed and alarmed; for Pylus was an asylum for fugitive helots, and might become the focus of a dangerous revolt; and they again sounded the dispositions of Athens toward peace; but the demands of the enemy rose so high, that, after several attempts, the negotiation was again dropped.

The Athenians now resumed their offensive operations with increased activity, and, having secured themselves

¹ Aristophanes Eq. 54. l.

Πράην γ' ἱμοῦ
Μάζαν μιμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ Λακωνικῆν,
Πανουργότατά ποις περιδραμὼν, ὑπερπάσας,
Αὐτὸς παρίθκει τὴν ὑπ' ἱμοῦ μιμαχμίην.

at home, made the enemy feel the weight of the naval superiority. An armament of 80 galleys with 2000 heavy-armed Athenians, and horse-transport with 200 cavalry, together with auxiliaries from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus, was sent under the command of Nicias and two colleagues to invade the territory of Corinth, and the eastern side of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians had received early notice of the expedition, and its object, from some of their friends at Argos, where, as in a neutral state, it was easy to procure information concerning the counsels of Athens; and they had made preparations to meet the threatened attack, as well as they could without knowing the precise point against which it would be directed. They posted their forces in the Isthmus, that they might bring the speediest succour either to the north or the south side of their territory; but they feared most for Crommyon on the Megarian border. But Nicias having put out from Piræus in the night, arrived off the Peloponnesian coast by daybreak, and landed his troops on an open beach, seven or eight miles south of Corinth, but not more than two or three from the position of the Corinthian army. Above this landing place, about a mile and a half from the sea, stood the ancient village of Solygia, memorable, as we have seen, in the early history of the Corinthian Dorians.¹ The Corinthian generals, Battus and Lycophron, were immediately apprised by signals of the enemy's presence. Yet they seem to have apprehended that this movement was no more than a feint, and that Crommyon was the real object of the invaders. They therefore left one half of their troops at Cenchræ, for the protection of the northern border, and Battus, with one battalion, marched to defend Solygia, which was unwall'd, while Lycophron proceeded directly to the shore, where he arrived just after the Athenians had landed. A warm action ensued, in which, after several vicissitudes, the Athenians were victorious, chiefly through the support which they received from their cavalry, the

¹ Vol. I. p. 274.

enemy having none. Lycophron himself was slain, and the right wing, in which he fought, lost about 200 men. But the rest of the army retreated in good order, and took up a position on the higher ground not far from the shore. The Athenjans did not pursue them, but contented themselves with spoiling their slain enemies, taking up their own dead, who were a little short of 50, and raising a trophy. In the meanwhile the troops left at Cenchreæ, though at first, being separated from the field of battle by a low ridge of Mount Oneum¹, they could not see the peril of their countrymen, were alarmed by the cloud of dust which rose above the hill, and set out for the scene of action. Corinth too sent forth her citizens who had been left at home as past the age of service; and Nicias, hearing of the approach of these fresh troops, and thinking it probable that they might soon be reinforced by their nearest Peloponnesian allies, embarked his men in haste, and sailed away. His departure was indeed so hurried that he was obliged to leave two of his own slain whom their comrades could not find, in the power of the enemy; and the effect of this omission marks both the character of the general and the manners of the age. The possession of the slain — as on it depended the satisfaction of some most urgent claims of Greek piety — was the ordinary test of victory or defeat. The party which was forced to solicit the enemy's leave to inter its dead, was held to acknowledge itself worsted. Yet Nicias did not hesitate to sacrifice the honours of victory, by sending a herald on shore to recover the two corpses. It is difficult to say whether his predominant motive was the fear of the gods, or of men. For though there was a strong tincture of superstition in his character, he was no less habitually governed by the dread of affording any handle for calumnies which might injure him in public opinion.

The Corinthians seem to have had some reason for expecting an attack on Crommyon. Nicias shaped his course next to that quarter; but he did not make any

attempt on the town, which was probably too well defended¹; but after having ravaged the territory, and passed the night there unmolested, he the next day made for the coast of Epidaurus. Here his views were not confined to temporary plunder. He carried a wall across the isthmus which connected the rocky peninsula of Methone with the main land, and behind it erected a fort, where he left a garrison, which from this central position was enabled to make continual inroads into the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Haliaë. He then returned home.

In the meanwhile Eurymedon and Sophocles, on their way to Sicily, had stopped, according to their instructions, to succour their friends at Corcyra, who were again threatened by the remnant of the contrary faction. The refugees were not more than 500, and they had engaged about a hundred other adventurers in their service; but they were formidable from the spirit with which they were animated by revenge and despair. After having applied in vain to Sparta and Corinth for aid, they crossed over to Corcyra, burnt the ships from which they landed to cut off all hope but that of victory, and intrenched themselves on a hill called Istone, from which they carried on an incessant warfare against the city, so as to deprive their enemies of all benefit from the land. The events which have been related put an end to their prospects of foreign support, and exposed them to the undivided hostility of the Athenian armament. The Athenians attacked them in their stronghold, and made themselves masters of it, but not of its defenders, who took refuge in a higher part of the mountain. But seeing that their situation was now utterly hopeless, they agreed to surrender themselves to the Athenians. No conditions were made on behalf of their auxiliaries; but their own doom was to be decided by the sentence of the Athenian people, and they were to be kept in custody, until they should be sent to Athens for trial, in the

¹ Diodorus indeed (xii. 65.) relates that he took the fortress; but this is disproved by the silence of Thucydides, iv. 45.

isle of Ptychia ; and it was stipulated that an attempt to escape should be considered as an infraction of the agreement. The leaders of the opposite party were afraid that their thirst of vengeance might be disappointed by the lenity of an Athenian tribunal, and they contrived a stratagem for getting the prisoners into their own hands. They found instruments who, under the mask of friendship, induced some of these unhappy men to believe that the Athenian generals intended to deliver them up to their enemies, and persuaded them to make their escape, for which they offered to provide a vessel. The artifice was the more specious, and its authors felt the more secure of impunity if not of success; as the Athenian commanders had not disguised their reluctance to let prisoners of such importance be conducted to Athens by another. And hence, when the fugitives were arrested, the whole body, as having violated the agreement, was abandoned to their adversaries, who immediately proceeded to glut their revenge. The victims were lodged in a spacious building, and then led out bound together in companies of twenty at a time between two rows of armed men, who, as they passed, aimed their blows, each at the object of his personal hatred ; and none escaped for want of an executioner. Behind them were other ministers of blood, who with scourges urged the faltering steps of those who shrank from the deadly vista. But after three bands had been thus dispatched, their surviving friends, who at first supposed that they had only been transported to another prison, learnt their fate and their own danger. They now called on the Athenians, if they would not save their lives, at least to put them to death themselves ; and declared that they would neither go out, nor suffer their enemies to enter. Though they were unarmed, the murderers had no mind to force the doors, and close with them, but mounted on the roof, and made an opening through which they attacked them with their arrows, and with the tiles of the building. The greater part of the prisoners hastened to baffle the malice of

their enemies by putting an end to their own lives ; yet it was not without difficulty that they found instruments of death, some in the weapons discharged at them, others in the cordage of some couches, or strips of their own garments, with which they strangled themselves. Night fell upon the scene of blood, but did not stop the work, either of slaughter, or of self-destruction. But when the next day dawned, there remained only a heap of corpses, which were piled in carts, and carried out of the city. The free women who were taken in the stronghold of Istone were made slaves. It was some consolation to humanity that this massacre was followed by a long period of tranquillity ; for no antagonists were left, capable of giving umbrage to the popular party ; and its fury is less odious than the barbarity of the Athenian generals, who sacrificed so many lives to their pitiful jealousy. Their commission having been thus executed at Corcyra, they proceeded to Sicily.

In the course of the following winter Artaxerxes died, and was succeeded by Xerxes II., his only legitimate son, who after a reign of forty-five days¹, was murdered by one of his half brothers, Sogdianus, or Secyndianus. The assassin mounted the throne, but did not keep possession of it much more than six months. He was then deposed and put to a cruel death by Ochus, another of the seventeen natural children of Artaxerxes, who reigned for many years under the name of Darius II. The death of Artaxerxes interrupted a prospect which had just opened upon the Athenians, of entering into friendly relations with the court of Persia, or at least of diverting it from giving assistance to their enemies. Aristides, one of the officers whom they sent out from time to time to raise contributions from their allies, arrested a Persian named Artaphernes, as he was passing through Eion on the Strymon, on his way to Sparta with a commission from the king. He was brought

¹ According to Ctesias Pers. 45. But this period is probably a little too short. See Mr. Clinton, F. H. II. p. 315.

to Athens, and the royal letter which he carried was opened and translated. The substance of its prolix contents was a complaint, "that Artaxerxes could not understand what the Spartans were aiming at: they had sent many envoys to him, but the messages which they bore had been all at variance with one another; he therefore desired them to send a new embassy back with Artaphernes, to clear up their meaning." The Athenians hence conceived hopes of supplanting their rivals in the good graces of the Persian king; though not long before they had given shelter to one of his revolted subjects, Zopyrus, the son of that Megabyzus who, after suppressing the Egyptian insurrection, had himself been driven into rebellion by the treachery and weakness of the court. He was regarded by Athens as a benefactor on account of his honourable treatment of his Athenian prisoners, and his son was hospitably received; but soon after fell in an attempt which he made to put the Athenians in possession of Cænus, where he had interest which he vainly exerted in their favour.¹ Artaphernes was sent in a galley to Ephesus, accompanied by an Athenian embassy; but on their arrival they heard of the death of Artaxerxes, and the envoys returned home.

The next year (424) Attica enjoyed a breathing time; for the Peloponnesians were deterred from their customary invasion by the threat of the Athenians, to retaliate on the prisoners of Sphacteria. They probably abstained without much reluctance from an expedition from which they could no longer expect any solid advantage; and the views of Sparta were now turned to a new quarter. Freed from their ordinary domestic plague, the Athenians now prosecuted the offensive operations of the last campaign, which in fact only carried out the plan suggested by Demosthenes, and partially executed in the occupation of Pylus. Nicias with two colleagues took the command of an armament of sixty galleys, composed in other points nearly like that of

¹ Ctesias Pers. 43.

the past year, but destined to assail Sparta in her most vulnerable side, by wresting the island of Cythera from her dominion. When Demaratus accompanied Xerxes to Greece, he advised him, instead of attacking Peloponnesus from the north, to send a squadron, and take possession of Cythera, and to carry the war at once into the heart of Laconia. It was the apprehension of such a danger, so the Spartan informed the king, that led Chilon, a Laconian sage, to wish the island buried in the sea. For though it possessed harbours, which Laconia wanted, and afforded a desirable shelter for the merchant vessels which visited its coast from Egypt and Africa, the service which it might render to an enemy who commanded the sea, was greater than any benefit which it could yield to Sparta. The Spartans, fully aware of its importance, kept a garrison there, and sent over a governor every year. The administration of these governors was perhaps often no less oppressive than that which, as we have seen, contributed to the decay of the colony at Heraclea. There was a party among the Cytherians who were disaffected to Sparta, and Nicias was probably acquainted with their disposition before he set out; for as soon as he arrived at Cythera he opened a secret communication with them, to which he was perhaps mainly indebted for the ease with which he conquered the island. He detached a squadron of ten ships, with 2000 Milesians, against the port town of Scandea on the south coast, which was immediately taken, while with the main body of his troops he landed on the north coast and marched against the principal city Cythera¹, where he found the whole force of the island drawn up before the lower town. But after a short resistance they fled to the upper town, and soon after capitulated, without any other express condition than that their lives should be spared; but no doubt in secret reliance on the mediation of Nicias, to which

¹ Without more information on the geography of Tzerigo it is difficult to reconcile the description of Thucydides with Pausanias (iii. 23. 1), who represents Cythera as the upper town, of which Scandea, distant only ten stades, was the port.

they probably owed the extraordinary indulgence with which they were treated by the Athenians. With the exception of a small number whom it appeared unsafe to trust, and who were led away to Athens, they were allowed to retain possession of their lands, subject only to a tribute so light as to be little more than nominal. But an Athenian garrison was stationed in the island; and the fleet, before it sailed away, stayed seven days on the opposite coast of Laconia, inflicting ravages which might be considered as a foretaste of the evils to be expected from the recent conquest.

The Spartan government was dismayed and bewildered by the novelty and variety of the dangers by which it saw itself suddenly encompassed. It was usually slow in its deliberations, and now found itself obliged to provide at once for many emergencies. It saw itself engaged in a contest for which its institutions were not adapted, with an enemy whose enterprising spirit baffled all the calculations of ordinary prudence. It began to distrust its own fortune, and to dread the effect which its misfortunes might produce on the subject population. It felt the necessity of resisting the invaders; but it feared to risk any considerable part of its forces by a general engagement, lest some disaster, like that of Pylus, should ruin the last hopes of the state. It remained therefore strictly on the defensive, only strengthening the garrisons of the exposed districts, and for the first time raised a squadron of 400 horse, and a body of bowmen, to watch and retard the rapid movements of the enemy. The Athenians therefore, as they ravaged the maritime region, met with no force capable of withstanding them; and on one occasion, when one of the enemy's bands stationed on the eastern coast of the Laconian gulf, ventured to fall upon their light troops, which were scattered in quest of plunder, it was repulsed by the heavy infantry with a loss which gave the victors occasion to raise a trophy. On his return to Athens Nicias ravaged the district of the Laconian Epidaurus, and then proceeded along the coast to Thyrea, where

the outcast Æginetans had been planted by the Spartans after they were expelled from their own island. Thyrea itself stood on an eminence about a mile from the sea. But the new colonists had begun to fortify a lower town by the water side, suited to their ancient maritime pursuits, and they were assisted in the work by a party of Lacedæmonians which was stationed in the neighbourhood. They were thus engaged when the Athenian armament appeared. The Æginetans abandoned the unfinished fortifications, and took refuge in the upper town, and besought the Lacedæmonians to aid them in defending it. But the danger appeared too great to their allies, who retreated to a height from which they could watch the issue in safety. The Athenians, as soon as they landed, advanced with their whole force against Thyrea, which they stormed and committed to the flames. The surviving Æginetans were carried to Athens, and with them a Lacedæmonian officer, named Tantalus, who commanded in the town. He was consigned to the same custody with his countrymen from Sphacteria. The suspected Cytherians were transported to various islands. But the ill-fated Æginetans were all put to death; victims of the hatred which had been inflamed by their ancient prosperity, and which their subsequent humiliation and sufferings could not appease.

While the Athenian arms were thus prosperous in Greece, their operations in Sicily were unexpectedly brought to a close, which, if they had known their true interest, would have been regarded as the most fortunate event of the year. During the preceding summer, while Eurymedon and Sophocles were detained at Pylus, the war had been carried on in Sicily with various success. The Syracusans had reinforced their squadron stationed at Messina, and the Locrians were anxious to bring the Athenians to an engagement before their greater armament arrived, hoping for a victory which would leave Rhegium altogether defenceless; and they again invaded its territory with their whole force, that they might be ready to seize the first opportunity of attacking it both

by sea and by land. But the engagement which they desired was brought on under unfavourable circumstances against their will, and though on their side upwards of thirty galleys were opposed to sixteen Athenians and eight Rhegians, they were defeated; only indeed with the loss of one ship; but this check induced them to withdraw their forces from the Rhegian territory. Soon after however the Athenians in their turn were baffled in an attempt which they made to seize the Syracusan fleet at Cape Pelorus, and again, when they attacked it on its passage to Messina, were foiled by the enemy's manœuvres. They were then called away to support their interest at Camarina, which was threatened by some practisings of the Syracusans, and in their absence the Messanians made an expedition by sea and land against their Chalcidian neighbour Naxos. But the Naxians, encouraged by the appearance of the Sicels, who came in great numbers to their aid, repulsed the invaders with much slaughter; and Messina was supposed to be so weakened by this blow, as to hold out the prospect of an easy conquest. Accordingly the Leontines and their allies attacked it by land, supported by the Athenians, who moved against it at the same time with their ships. But the Messanians, with a small body of Locrians who had been left in the place, made a sally upon the assailants, who were routed with great loss, and would have suffered still more severely, if the Athenians had not landed, and driven the enemy back within his walls.

After the arrival of Eurymedon and Sophocles the war in Sicily seems to have been still less marked by any important events. But the presence of the Athenian armament began to awaken a prudent and patriotic jealousy in the Sicilian Greeks, which appears to have been cherished and directed chiefly by the exertions of a clear-sighted and liberal Syracusan, Hermocrates the son of Hermon. In the summer of 424, an armistice was concluded between Gela and Camarina, which was followed by a congress of deputies from all the

Sicilian states, who met at Gela to discuss their claims, and to settle the terms of a general pacification. Most of those who took a part in the debate, contented themselves with urging the pretensions of the cities which they represented. But Hermocrates took a larger view of the subject, and drew the attention of the assembly to the common danger and interest of the Sicilian Greeks. He observed that the "question before them did not turn upon the ordinary advantages of peace, or upon the easiness of adjusting their conflicting claims; but on the urgent necessity of delivering Sicily from a great evil which was manifestly impending over it. It was evident that the Athenians, under the specious pretext of succouring their allies, were watching for an opportunity of establishing their dominion over the whole island. They had begun by sending a force just sufficient to foster the internal dissensions of the islanders; but there was reason to apprehend that when they saw the Sicilians exhausted by protracted warfare, they would come with a more powerful armament, and overwhelm all parties. It was impossible to believe that the Athenians had any other motive for interposing in their domestic quarrels; or that it was their antipathy to the Dorian race, or their affection for the Chalcidians, as their kinsmen, which had brought them so far from home. They assuredly cared little about either side, but much about the things which were the objects of the contest, and which they hoped to make their own. It would be attributing to them an extravagant degree of generosity, to suppose that they had incurred the expense and risk of an expedition to Sicily, out of a pure desire to protect their Chalcidian allies, from whom they had never received any service in their own wars. It was time therefore for all who valued their independence to suspend, if they could not entirely compose, that discord which had afforded the Athenians a pretext for their dangerous interference, and to unite in ridding their common country of these ambitious strangers. And as this object could only be attained by a general peace, so

there was no state which had any certainty of gaining rather than of losing by the continuance of war. If indeed there was any which might reasonably entertain such an expectation, it was his own city ; but she was ready to renounce all her prospects of aggrandisement for the safety of the whole Sicilian nation. Let the rest imitate her example, and be willing to make concessions to their fellow-countrymen, who, however they might differ in their origin, were all natives of the same soil, girt by the same sea, and linked together by the common name of Siceliots, rather than place themselves at the mercy of a foreign power which was equally hostile to all. Let them for the present conclude a long, if possible, a perpetual peace among themselves ; and for the future let them not only unite in repelling invaders from their shores, but no less carefully abstain from inviting strangers to interpose, either as allies or mediators, in their differences."

This wise counsel was adopted ; and a general peace was made on terms which did not require a long negotiation. All parties were to retain their possessions ; only Syracuse was to cede Morgantina to the Camarinæans, who were to pay a stipulated sum for it. The allies of the Athenians announced their intention of concluding this treaty to the Athenian generals, and informed them that the benefit of it, so far as regarded the cessation of hostilities, would be extended to them. It would seem from the sequel that the opinions of the Athenian commanders were divided as to the course which they should pursue, and that Eurymedon was not so easily satisfied as his colleagues. But the resolution which prevailed was to acquiesce in the proceedings of their allies ; and having commended their conduct, and ratified the treaty, they sailed home. But they were received there with as much indignation as if they had involved the state in some disaster, or had betrayed some of its most valued possessions. They were charged with having accepted bribes, as the price of abandoning

the conquest of Sicily; and Eurymedon was fined, his two colleagues banished. The people was so elated with its recent good fortune, that, as no enterprise was now too great for its ambition, so it neglected all proportion between its means and its ends, and would not hear of any obstacles which nature or man could oppose to its success.

CHAP. XXIII.

FROM THE GENERAL PACIFICATION OF SICILY TO THE
PEACE OF NICIAS.

THE events related in the preceding chapter had reduced Sparta to a state of despondency which even exceeded the measure of her real danger and distress. Only one ray of hope broke the gloom of her prospects; but henceforth it continued to brighten them, until their colour was totally changed. For this favourable turn in her affairs she was indebted chiefly to the courage and ability of Brasidas. But it was the alarm generally diffused by the recent successes of the Athenians, both among their enemies and their dependants, that furnished him with this new opportunity of serving his country. The revolted towns of Chalcidice, when they saw Athens prevailing, and her rival almost at her mercy, dreaded lest they should be the next objects to feel the weight of her arm. Their neighbours who had not yet cast off the yoke, feared that it would now become more galling than ever. They saw that Chios had been lately compelled to soothe the jealousy of the Athenians by demolishing her new fortifications, and to throw herself upon the good faith of her suspicious ally for the maintenance of that degree of liberty which she had hitherto enjoyed.¹ Perdiccas too, though still nominally in alliance with Athens, was agitated by similar apprehensions, and he had need of foreign succours to subdue a refractory vassal, Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians.² These motives induced them all to concur

¹ Thuc. iv. 51.

² The relation in which the Lyncestian kings stood to those of Macedonia is described by Thucydides, ii. 99. "To the Macedonians belong the Lyncestians and the Elimiots, and other nations of the upper country, which are indeed allied and subject to the Macedonians properly so called, but are governed by kings of their own."

in persuading the Spartans to send a body of Peloponnesian troops, to be maintained at the cost of the allies, commanded by some Spartan of approved capacity, to attack the Athenian possessions in the neighbourhood of Macedonia and Thrace. The proposal came opportunely; for Sparta was not only in great need of some expedient for drawing off the enemy who was pressing her at home, but was glad of an occasion for employing a part of her helot population in foreign service. It was a ~~surer~~ and more useful way of relieving herself from the fears which they excited in the present state of her affairs, than the method of secret assassination, to which she had resorted on a former occasion.¹ She now gave full arms to 700 helots, and placed them under the command of Brasidas, who was eager to undertake the enterprise. To these he added as many troops as he could engage, by pay and by the attraction of his name, from other parts of Peloponnesus. He was still busied with these levies somewhere between Sicyon and Corinth, when an opportunity presented itself to him of checking the progress of the Athenian arms in another direction.

Megara had for several years been afflicted at once by a foreign and a civil war. While her territory was regularly ravaged twice a year by her Attic neighbours, a body of refugees, no less hostile to the party which ruled in the capital, was in possession of Pegæ, and infested the neighbourhood by their incursions; and it was deemed necessary for the safety of the city that Nisæa should be occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison. In 427, after the fall of Mitylene, the Athenians under the

¹ See Vol. I. p. 312. Thucydides does not precisely mark the time of this horrible deed, and it has been generally supposed that it took place immediately before the expedition of Brasidas. So Diodorus (xii. 67) understood Thucydides. But — not to mention the difficulty of believing that the government would have ordered the massacre of the helots at a time when it was able to employ them advantageously in the foreign service, for which Brasidas was so scantily provided with troops — the words *καὶ τότε* (iv. 80) seem distinctly to refer the massacre to a different period from that in which the 700 helots were sent out. That the *αἰχμῶν* in the same sentence can only mean the helots, need not be remarked — except for persons who are unable to read Thucydides without a translation; and even such a reader might infer its meaning from the fact mentioned, v. 34.

command of Nicias had taken possession of the island of Minoa, which was separated by a narrow channel from the main land, and covered the harbour of Nisæa. Nicias with his engines took two towers at the mouth of the harbour, and as the channel at the other end ran into shallows which were crossed by a bridge, he built a wall to secure the island from inroads on this side. The blockade of Nisæa was thus rendered much more rigorous than before, when Budorum in Salamis was the nearest station for the Athenian galleys, and the population of Megara henceforth suffered still greater privations. As the public distress increased, the people began to listen more patiently to the suggestion, that it might be relieved at least from one part of its evils by the recall of the exiles; and their friends—for they had many in Megara itself—were soon emboldened openly to urge this proposal. But the leaders of the democratical party, who knew that the return of their adversaries would be fatal to themselves, determined to avert it at any cost; and when they saw that they could not much longer depend on the patience of their partizans, they entered into a secret communication with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates and Demosthenes, and concerted a plan for betraying the city to the Athenians. As the first step toward this end it was agreed that they should be put in possession of the long walls which ran down to Nisæa, which would prevent the Peloponnesian garrison from interfering. For this purpose the two generals sailed to Minoa in the night, and, having left their ships there, crossed over to the main land, where Hippocrates with 600 heavy-armed concealed himself in a brick ground near one of the long walls, and Demosthenes with a body of Platæans, light armed, and of the young Athenians whose ordinary service was confined to the circuit of Attica,¹ placed himself in ambuscade within a piece of consecrated ground still closer to one of the gates which opened into the space between the city and Nisæa. The

¹ Περίπαλοι. See Vol. II, p. 51. and an essay in the Philological Museum, vol. ii, p. 400.

Megarian conspirators had devised a stratagem for procuring this gate to be thrown open whenever they would during the night. They had obtained leave to carry a boat down to the sea along the trench on the outside of the wall, on the pretext of a nocturnal adventure against the enemy, in which, the better to elude his observation, they desired to avoid the harbour. This practice had been begun, to lull suspicion, a long while before; and now the boat having been let through early in the night was brought back as usual before day-break to the gates near which the Athenians were posted. It was no sooner within the passage, so as to prevent the gates from being shut, than they started from their ambush, and rushed in, aided by their Megarian friends, who overpowered the men on guard. Demosthenes and his band entered first, and were almost immediately attacked by a part of the Peloponnesian garrison, which was near enough to hear the alarm. But the Platæans kept the gates, till all their comrades had passed through; and the Peloponnesians did not long maintain their ground. The greater part took to flight as soon as they discovered that the enemy was supported by the Megarians; for in the confusion of the darkness and the struggle, they imagined that the treachery was general, and that the whole force of Megara would soon be upon them. This impression was confirmed by the Athenian herald, who, of his own accord, made a proclamation, like that of the Thebans when they surprised Platæa, inviting all Megarians to side with the Athenians. Before morning every post on the long walls was abandoned, and the Peloponnesians fled to Nisæa. Soon after the Athenians were joined by a body of 4000 heavy-armed, and 600 cavalry, who as had been preconcerted marched by night from Eleusis. And now their friends in Megara attempted to effect their main purpose. They assembled in arms, and, affecting an impatient desire to meet the enemy, required that the city gates should be opened for them. In this way they were to admit the Athenians, and that they might not be confounded with their ad-

versaries in the tumult which was likely to ensue, they had anointed themselves with oil. They were just on the point of accomplishing their design, when it was betrayed to the opposite party by one of their associates. Without disclosing their knowledge of the plot, those of the adverse faction counteracted it first by remonstrances against the imprudence of seeking an engagement with a superior enemy, and at last by a declaration, that they would resist every attempt to open the gates. The conspirators were not strong enough to carry their point by sheer force ; and the Athenian generals, perceiving that some hindrance had occurred which thwarted their views on the side of Megara, determined immediately to invest Nisæa. Workmen and tools were forthwith fetched from Athens ; the trees and buildings of the suburbs supplied materials ; the houses served here and there as a rampart, and by the joint labours of the whole army the work was carried forward so briskly, that by the evening of the second day the circumvallation was nearly completed. But the garrison seeing itself entirely destitute of provisions — for it had received its daily rations from the city — believing itself betrayed by the Megarians, and having no hope of speedy succours from Peloponnesus, resolved to make the best terms it could with the enemy. It surrendered the place on condition of being set at liberty on payment of a stated ransom, with the exception of the Spartan commander, and the other Lacedæmonians among them, who became prisoners at discretion. The Athenians immediately proceeded to secure their new acquisition ; and, among other precautions, threw down a part of the long walls at the end by which they abutted on that of the city.

A little patience — the first virtue of a besieged garrison — would have saved Nisæa. Brasidas had heard of its danger, and was marching to its relief, with a body of troops which he had obtained for this purpose from Corinth, Sicyon, and Phlius, together with his own levies ; and he had also sent into Bœotia for suc-

cours, which were directed to meet him at the Megarian village of Tripodiscus. The Theban government had already been roused by the same alarm, and had raised all its forces to protect a place so important to its own safety. Its army was on its march at Platæa when it received the summons, and as the whole force was no longer deemed necessary, a detachment of 2200 foot and 600 cavalry was sent forward to join Brasidas, while the rest returned home. Brasidas arrived at Tripodiscus in the night, and there first heard of the surrender of Nisæa. But before the Athenians had intelligence of his approach, he pushed forward with 300 picked men to the gates of Megara, Professing that he had good hopes of recovering Nisæa, he desired to be admitted into the city, which was the real object of his anxiety. But both parties agreed in refusing his request; the one because it feared that he would recall their exiled enemies; the other because, knowing the feelings of its adversaries, it dreaded a struggle which might expose the city without defence to the Athenians. And as it was to be expected that a battle would soon take place between the hostile armies, each faction, hoping for the success of its friends, tacitly determined to wait the issue.

Brasidas was aware of this critical state of the public mind at Megara, and saw that it was not to be decided by words. At daybreak he was joined by the Bœotian reinforcement, which raised his army to upwards of 6000 infantry, and he first despatched the Bœotian cavalry to fall upon the enemy's light troops, which were scattered over the plain, where they had been always used to range with impunity. They were driven down to the sea, but were then protected by their own cavalry; and a skirmish ensued, in which, though the Bœotian commander lost his life, neither side gained a decided advantage. Brasidas now moved forward with his whole force, and having chosen his ground in the plain, drew up his men in order of battle. Here he

waited for the enemy; and he foresaw that whether he should gain a victory, or they should decline an engagement, the effect would be equally favourable to his cause at Megara. The Athenian generals on their part wished to encourage their friends by presenting a bold countenance; but they secretly shrank from risking a battle against superior numbers, and they hoped to attain their end by drawing up their troops in front of the long wall. The result proved the sagacity of Brasidas. His advance was considered as a proof of well-grounded confidence; the inaction of the Athenians as a confession of weakness. Their friends were seized with consternation, and suffered the adverse party to open the gates to Brasidas and the principal officers of his army, and to confer with them on the means of securing the Spartan interest in Megara. And though, soon after, both armies withdrew from the Megarian territory, and, as no garrison had been introduced into the city, the parties were apparently restored to their previous situation, the popular leaders found their influence so much weakened that those who had been most notoriously concerned in the conspiracy fled, and the rest of the party consented to recall their exiles from Pegæ. An ineffectual attempt was made to bind them by solemn oaths to the observance of a general amnesty. But the oligarchs were no sooner restored to power, than they disarmed the commonalty under pretext of a review, and having selected a hundred of their principal adversaries, compelled the commonalty itself to condemn them to death; and for the purpose both of insuring and of more fully enjoying their triumph, they caused the extorted votes, instead of being given according to usage in secret, to be taken openly. After this revolution the oligarchy, which, Thucydides intimates, was extremely narrow¹, subsisted at Megara for a longer period than such governments were commonly able to stand; a result it would appear, rather

¹ We think this is implied by the words of Thucydides, iv. 74. even according to the reading *γὰρ ολίγη*.

of the natural hatred to Athens, than of the wisdom of the rulers.

About the same time that the affairs of Megara were thus settled Brasidas set out on his expedition to Macedonia. He had not been able to raise more than a thousand mercenaries in addition to his seven hundred helots. With this little army he proceeded to the Trachinian Heraclea, and from thence sent a messenger to Pharsalus, where he or Sparta had friends or partizans, on whose good offices he relied for a safe passage through Thessaly. The Chalcidians and Perdiccas had also friends among the Thessalians who were ready to assist their ally, and several of them came to meet him at Melitea, a town of Achaia Phthiotis, a long day's march from Pharsalus. The Thessalian nation however, so far as it formed one body, was the ally of Athens; and to march through its territory without leave was according to Greek nations a hostile proceeding, which seemed peculiarly dangerous in such a country for a handful of troops without cavalry. But the friends of Brasidas were men of extensive influence; and there was no authority in Thessaly which could at once call out its forces to check the intrusion. Nevertheless on the banks of the Enipeus he found a number of Thessalians, friendly to the Athenian interest, who expostulated with him on the unjust aggression with which he was violating their territory. When however his conductors disclaimed all intention of escorting him farther against the will of their countrymen, professing to have known nothing beforehand of his coming, and to have been merely desirous of discharging the common duties of hospitality; and Brasidas himself—though he alleged that he came as the friend of the Thessalians, and with no hostile aim against any but the Athenians, and that he did not know of any rupture that had taken place between the Thessalians and his countrymen, to prevent them from passing through each other's land—still declared that he neither would nor could advance without their consent, the remonstrants, apparently satisfied with these assurances, withdrew. Brasidas, now, following the advice of his guides, instead

of stopping, made a forced march, and reached Pharsalus the same day. By the rapidity of his movements, and the interest and directions of his friends, he was enabled to cross the central plains without interruption, to the mountain region of Peræbia at the foot of the Cambanian hills. Here his Thessalian guides took their leave of him; but, probably through their influence, the Peræbians conducted him through their country to Dium, the first Macedonian town on their frontier.

Perdiccas desired immediately to employ Brasidas for his own object, the conquest of Lyncestis; and he offered to furnish pay for half his troops. Brasidas was induced to accompany him as far as the borders of Lyncestis; but here he disclosed intentions quite foreign to the king's wishes. He proposed, before they invaded the dominions of Arrhibæus, to try whether he might not be persuaded to enter into alliance with Sparta, and into an amicable compromise with Perdiccas. The Lyncestian prince was willing to accept his mediation; and there were envoys from the Chalcidian cities in the camp, who warned him that Perdiccas might prove a less constant and zealous ally, when he had gained all his ends, and saw all his dangers removed. Brasidas also felt that he had come not to make enemies but to win friends for Sparta, and that he should be defeating the purpose of his mission by gratifying the ambition or resentment of Perdiccas. But the Macedonian king assumed the tone rather of a master than an ally. "He had not brought Brasidas to be an arbitrator in his quarrels, but to fight his battles; it was for this he maintained the half of his troops; and it would be a breach of faith, if while he received his wages he should enter into negotiation with his enemy." But the Spartan persisted in his resolution, and in spite of the remonstrances of Perdiccas had an interview with Arrhibæus, who finally prevailed on him to withdraw his forces from Lyncestis. Perdiccas vented his displeasure by reducing the amount of the pay which he furnished, from the half to a third.

Brasidas was perhaps the less inclined to prosecute this expedition, as objects of greater importance demanded his attention elsewhere. The Athenian possessions in Chalcidice and on the coast of Thrace were the chief mark of his enterprise; and he had received invitations which induced him, immediately after quitting Perdiccas, to make the first attempt upon Acanthus, an Andrian colony, near the isthmus of mount Athos. His little army was strengthened by a body of Chalcidian auxiliaries, and he appeared before the town just before the vintage. Within parties were divided in the usual manner, but perhaps with less than the ordinary animosity. There was one — an oligarchical minority — which had invited him, and warmly contended for opening the gates to his army. The mass of the people was almost suspended between two opposite feelings; impatience of the Athenian dominion, and dread lest, if they should connect themselves with Sparta, they might lose their political constitution, and still remain subject as before, though to a different power. These wishes and fears were so nearly balanced that a slight motive was sufficient to turn the scale; and in this state of things apprehension of the damage which the invading forces, if provoked to hostility, might do to their fields and vineyards, powerfully inclined the Acanthians to listen to the friends of Sparta. Brasidas obtained leave to enter the city alone, and to plead his own cause in the popular assembly. He was well aware of the prejudices and suspicions which he had to encounter; he possessed a full share of the Spartan prudence, and was gifted with an easier flow of speech than was commonly found among his countrymen, or had been led by the new emergencies of the times to cultivate his talent in a manner more agreeable to the taste of the age than to the institutions of Lycurgus. That the yoke of the Athenians was an evil, from which all their subjects must eagerly desire to be delivered, he assumes as universally admitted; and only thinks it necessary to apologise for the tardiness of the Spartans in sending

the succours which he had brought. But he affects to be surprised that the Acanthians, for whose sake he had accomplished a difficult and dangerous march, should have shut their gates against his army, and should not have received him with joy as a protector and an ally ; and complains that their coldness has not only disappointed him but alarms him, lest it should elsewhere be construed into a token, either that his force was inadequate to the object of his enterprise, or that his professions of restoring liberty to the oppressed, covered some ambitious and unjust designs. To satisfy his audience on both these points, he does not scruple to assert, that, with the troops which he had brought from Peloponnesus, he had delivered Megara from the Athenians, who, though superior in numbers, declined the battle which he offered ; and he informs those who might suspect the purity of his intentions, that before he left home he had bound the Spartan magistrates by the most solemn oaths, to respect the independence of every city which he should bring over to their alliance ; probably another politic falsehood, though with a greater mixture of truth, by which he claimed for himself the whole merit of an engagement which had really been required from the Spartan government by the Chalcidian envoys.

He then proceeds to quiet the fears of the Acanthian commonalty by assuring them, that he is not come to espouse the interests of any party, and that he should deem it an encroachment on their rights which he was sent to vindicate, if he attempted to alter an established form of government in favour either of the few, or the many.¹ This would be to imitate the example of Athens, and would be doubly odious in those who reprobated

¹ The Scholiast of Thucydides on iv. 86. explains τὸ τάττειν παρῆς by τὴν πᾶσιν ἐκάστοις πολιτικὴν καταλύσας. And it seems necessary to adopt this interpretation for the sake of the argument. Brasidas would disclaim an intention of establishing oligarchy or democracy, not because of his respect to the constitution of Sparta, which he could not mean to make a model for his new allies, but because it was inconsistent with his liberal professions to change their hereditary institutions. It would have been difficult to make the democratical Acanthians believe that the Spartan constitution resembled their own ; which Dr. Arnold thinks was his meaning.

her conduct, and were therefore obliged, as well by regard to their own reputation and interest as by their oaths, to observe an opposite course. And finally he enforces his arguments with a threat, which touched a great number of his hearers in their personal capacity. He could not patiently suffer them to reject the boon which he offered, and from motives of prudence, though they secretly wished well to his cause, to continue to augment the Athenian revenue by their tribute, and thus to injure Sparta, and obstruct the liberation of Greece. He must endeavour by ravaging their territory to force them to declare themselves, and to prevent them from sacrificing the general welfare to their selfish fears. But he hoped they would be better advised, and would learn the glory of having taken the lead in the cause of liberty.

The Acanthians, who had much experience of Athenian oppression, but none of Spartan duplicity, and who in Brasidas saw a representative of his countrymen whose character and language were suited to inspire confidence, swayed partly by the desire of independence, partly by the fear of immediate loss, and perhaps not a little by the reflection that they had already taken a step which might provoke the resentment of Athens, after a long debate came to the resolution of renouncing the Athenian alliance. The votes on this occasion were taken secretly; a precaution which probably contributed to decide the majority; and before the Peloponnesian troops were admitted into the city, Brasidas was obliged to take the same oath which he professed to have exacted from the ephors before his departure from Sparta.¹ Not long

¹ Whether he himself had already taken the same oath at Sparta before he set out, as the position of *ἐπιστῶντα* in Thuc. iv. 88 (see Dr. Arnold's note) seems to intimate, must depend on the circumstances under which the oath was required from the Spartan government. If these were such as Brasidas represented to the Acanthians, there would certainly, as Dr. Arnold observes, be no reason why the government should have required such an oath from him. But if, as seems much more probable, the oath was really required by the Chalcidians, it would be quite conceivable that they might have required it from Brasidas as well as from the government. Whether Thucydides, after the language which he had put into the mouth of Brasidas, would in this manner have alluded to a fact somewhat at variance with it, is a different question.

after, the neighbouring town of Stagirus followed the example of Acanthus.

In the meanwhile the Athenians were engaged at home in an undertaking similar to those by which they had so greatly distressed the enemy in Peloponnesus, and which promised no less important advantages. Immediately after his retreat from Megara Demosthenes had sailed with a squadron of 40 galleys to Naupactus, to be in readiness for taking part in an extensive plan which had been concerted for a general revolution in Bœotia. Some partizans of Athens had agreed to betray the port of Siphæ on the Corinthian gulf, in the territory of Thespiæ, into her power. Chæronea, on the borders of Phocis, was to be delivered up by a body of refugees from Orchomenus, to which Chæronea belonged; and these exiles were prepared to give active assistance in other ways, and at their own charge had begun to levy troops in Peloponnesus. In Phocis too there was a party which knew and favoured the design. The Athenians on their part undertook to seize and fortify the sanctuary of Apollo, called Delium, on the coast opposite Eubœa, at about five miles from Tanagra. It was settled that these movements should take place on the same day, in order that the attention of the country might be distracted, and its force divided. If they were successful, it seemed probable that even if the oligarchical governments throughout Bœotia were not immediately overthrown, they would not be able to stand long, while three points at remote extremities of the country were occupied by the enemy, and afforded so many rallying-places for the disaffected, from which incessant inroads might be made into the heart of the land. Demosthenes therefore was sent to Naupactus that he might collect a body of troops from Acarnania and the other western allies, and at the appointed time might sail up the Corinthian gulf to take possession of Siphæ, while Hippocrates marched from Athens into Bœotia. The affairs of the Acarnanians appear to have prospered after the happy termination of their war with

Ambracia. The year before, with the aid of the Athenians stationed at Naupactus, they had made themselves masters of Anactorium, had expelled its Corinthian inhabitants and occupied their place with Acarnanian settlers; and not long before Demosthenes arrived they had compelled Œniadæ to join the Athenian alliance. In the interval preceding his intended expedition to Bœotia he assembled all the forces of the allies in the west, and marched against Salynthius king of the Agræans, whom he reduced to subjection, and was thus left at leisure to complete his preparations for his approaching enterprise.

It was in the autumn, soon after the revolt of Acanthus, that he set sail for Siphæ with 400 heavy-armed Athenians, a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, and some from the newly conquered Agræans. But he found the plan completely disconcerted. A mistake was made either by himself or his colleague as to the time of their joint operations; and he arrived at Siphæ before Hippocrates had left Athens. In the meanwhile a Phocian of Phanoteus, named Nicomachus, had betrayed the secret to the Spartans; the Bœotians were put on their guard, and before any diversion was made on the side of Delium, marched with all their forces against Siphæ and Chæroneæ, which they secured so as to prevent the malcontents from stirring. They had already returned from this expedition, when Hippocrates, who had drawn out the whole serviceable population of Athens, citizens and aliens, both residents and sojourners, came to Delium, which he immediately proceeded to fortify. He enclosed the consecrated ground with a ditch, a rampart, and a palisade, for which he found materials in the adjacent vineyards, and strengthened the work with stones and bricks taken from the neighbouring houses. The holy ground was surrounded on most sides with a screen of buildings; in one part where a gallery once stood, but had now gone to ruin, Hippocrates surmounted the rampart with wooden towers. The labour of the multitude assembled in the

Athenian camp had nearly finished the intrenchment by the afternoon of the third day after it was begun. The troops were then ordered to set out on their march homeward. The light infantry for the most part went forward, and made straight for Attica ; but the heavy-armed halted at about a mile from Delium to wait for the general, who stayed behind to give orders for the regulation of the garrison and the completion of the works.

In the mean time the Bœotian army had assembled in the district of Tanagra, not far from the place where the Athenians had halted, which belonged to Oropus, and was therefore, politically considered, Attic ground. For this reason most of the Bœotarchs¹, who were all present, were unwilling to attack the retreating enemy, who was no longer in Bœotia, but within his own confines. But Pagondas, one of the two Theban Bœotarchs, and supreme in command, was eager to give battle. Yet he did not venture to exert his authority against the judgment of his colleagues, without the general approbation of the army, and he therefore harangued it in separate divisions, to rouse its patriotic pride and resentment. He reminded them, that the Athenians were not the less enemies and invaders because they had just recrossed the border ; that to abstain from resenting such an aggression as they had suffered, would be no less unwise than dishonourable ; their passiveness would only provoke a repetition of the insult. The neighbour whom they had to deal with was not content with petty encroachments on their territory : the Athenians aimed at nothing short of the subjugation of all Bœotia ; and the example of Eubœa might warn them of the treatment which they had to expect if they should ever become subject to Athens. Nothing would encourage the Athenians more than to find that they might at any time invade Bœotia with impunity, if they could effect their retreat to Attic ground before they were overtaken. It became the descendants of the brave men who con-

¹ See Vol. I. p 424.

quered at Coronea, to repeat the lesson which their forefathers gave to the Athenians in that glorious field ; and the god, whose sanctuary their enemy had profaned, would guide them to victory.

Having thus inspirited his troops, he led them at full speed to seek the enemy ; for the day was now far advanced ; and on reaching a place where the two armies were only parted by a ridge, made his dispositions for the battle. Hippocrates was still at Delium when he received the first intelligence of the approach of the Bœotians. He immediately despatched orders for putting his army in battle array, and soon after came to the field. At Delium he left about 300 horse, partly for the protection of the place, but likewise with instructions to look out for an opportunity of suddenly charging the enemy in the heat of the action. The Athenian line was scarcely formed before the Bœotians appeared on the top of the ridge, where they halted to take breath while Pagondas again addressed them with a few animating words. His forces, which amounted to about 7000 heavy and 10,000 light infantry, with 500 targeteers and 1000 horse, were drawn up, not in any uniform order, but according to the varying strength or military usages of the confederates. The Thebans, who occupied the right wing, stood five-and-twenty deep : the cavalry and light troops were stationed at the two wings. The Athenian heavy infantry was about equal in number to that of the enemy, and was drawn up in a uniform line of eight deep ; and each wing was flanked by a squadron of cavalry. But they were almost entirely destitute of light troops, which did not at this time enter into the composition of an Athenian army ; and out of the multitude, which had accompanied the regular forces to Delium, many, who went not to fight but to work, were wholly unarmed, and most of the rest had continued their march homeward.

Hippocrates had scarcely time to cheer his men by setting before them the advantages of victory, which would deliver Attica from future invasions of the

Bœotian cavalry — the main support of the Peloponnesians in their past invasions — and by recalling the remembrance of their triumph at Œenophyta, before the enemy raised the pæan, and was seen descending from the top of the ridge. The Athenians advanced running to meet them, and a warm action ensued, though at each end of the two lines, a part of both armies was kept unemployed by the nature of the ground, being on opposite banks of two rapid brooks. The Athenians in the right wing broke the ranks of the Bœotian left; and the Thespians who were stationed there were surrounded by the enemy and suffered considerable loss. But the mass of the Theban division bore down all resistance, and drove the Athenians before it as it moved steadily forward. Yet the event of the battle was decided more by chance than by either prudence or valour. Hippocrates, we have mentioned, had left a squadron of horse at Delium, to surprise the Bœotians by a sudden charge. But the Bœotian general had been apprised of his intentions, and had taken precautions to counteract the threatened movement; and perceiving the distress of his own left, he had sent two brigades of cavalry round by the back of the ridge which he had crossed to its relief. The victorious Athenians when they saw this squadron appearing on the height above them imagined that a fresh army was on its march to pour down upon them, and this delusion concurring with the success of the Thebans soon spread irreparable confusion throughout the whole Athenian line. The army was completely dispersed, some of the fugitives taking the direction of Delium, some making for Oropus, some for Parnes, and other quarters. A body of Locrian cavalry, which came up as the rout began, aided the Bœotians in the slaughter of the flying enemy, which would have been much more destructive if it had not been stopt by the night. But near a thousand of the heavy infantry, and a still greater number of the irregular troops and followers of the camp, were left in the field; and Hippocrates himself was among the slain. The conquerors lost less than

500 men. The spoil served to adorn the Theban agora with new edifices and statues.¹

The next day the fugitives who had escaped to Delium and Oropus, found means of returning to Attica by sea; and the Bœotians when they had raised their trophy, taken up their dead, and spoiled those of the enemy, marched to Tanagra and turned their thoughts toward the recovery of Delium, which was still occupied by an Athenian garrison. But they left a guard on the field of battle in the hope of extorting a high price for the usual permission to bury the slain. The Athenian herald who was sent to ask it, on his way to the enemy's camp, was stopt by a Bœotian herald, who desired him to turn back, since his errand would be fruitless, until he himself had delivered the message with which he was charged to the Athenians. This was a complaint against the sacrilegious occupation of the temple at Delium, which the Bœotians alleged was contrary to the national custom hitherto observed by all Greek states in their wars with one another, of sparing the temples in the enemy's territory. The Athenians had turned the sanctuary of Apollo into a fortress, and had profaned it with all the acts of ordinary life; they had polluted the holy water, which before had always been reserved for sacred rites, by applying it to common uses. In the name of Apollo and of the deities who were his partners in the consecrated ground, they bade the Athenians withdraw from it, before they asked for anything which it was in the power of the Bœotians to withhold.

But on the other hand the Athenian herald was instructed to reply, that the Athenians had only occupied Delium in the prosecution of a just war, and had committed no wanton damage there. That, according to the laws of Grecian warfare, the temples in an enemy's country belonged to the invader who had taken possession of the district in which they stood; and he was only bound to treat them with due reverence as far as he was able. The Bœotians, when they conquered their

¹ Diodor. xlii. 70.

present territory, had not scrupled to seize the temples which before belonged to another people. It was the same right which the Athenians claimed in the small tract which they had now made their own, and which they meant to keep ; as they would any other which they might be able to conquer. The water they had used to supply their natural wants ; and they trusted that the gods would pardon an involuntary encroachment on their property. If there had been any breach of piety, it was in the proposal of the Bœotians, to barter the bodies of the dead for things sacred to the gods. The ground which they had conquered was no longer to be considered as a part of Bœotia, but, while they held it, as Attic soil ; and therefore they could not fairly be called upon to cede it as the condition of recovering their dead.

The Bœotians sent a reply, in which they seem wilfully to have confounded the position of the Athenians at Delium, with that of their slain in the territory of Oropus, which they acknowledged to belong to Attica. " If the Athenians were in Bœotia, they must quit it before they could reasonably expect any indulgence from the Bœotians ; but if, as they pretended, they were on their own ground, the Bœotians had nothing to do with a matter pertaining to a foreign soil." A dilemma which can only have been meant for the ear, and signified nothing more, than that it was their pleasure to reject the application of the Athenians.

But as this extraordinary proceeding did not produce the desired effect, they prepared to recover Delium by force. They thought it necessary to send for dartmen and slingers from the Malian gulf ; and after the battle they had received a reinforcement of 2000 Corinthians, together with the Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa and some Megarian troops. Yet they made many fruitless attempts upon the rude fortifications of Delium, and at length owed their success to a new engine, with which they kindled so fierce a flame against that side of the wall which had been constructed chiefly of timber, that

its defenders could not keep their posts, or prevent the enemy from entering. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, but the greater part of those who escaped the sword took refuge in some ships which were lying in the harbour, and were carried back to Attica. Immediately after the capture of Delium, which took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, another herald came from Athens to solicit for the remains of the slain; and the Bœotians no longer withheld them.

To complete the disastrous consequences of this Bœotian campaign, Demosthenes, when he was repulsed from Siphæ, crossed over to the coast of Sicyon, and proceeded to land his troops, as his galleys came in. But as they happened to follow each other very wide apart, the division first landed was attacked by a superior Sicyonian force, routed, and driven to its ships, with some loss both of lives and prisoners, while the rest were still at a distance; and instead of booty, the fleet only carried away the slain, when they had been obtained from the victorious enemy. These reverses were chiefly important, because they occurred at a time when many of the distant subjects of Athens were only restrained from revolt by their fears, and were anxiously watching the progress of her arms, and when all her reputation was needed to counterbalance the efforts of Brasidas.

Though it was now winter, the season, which hindered the enemy from sending succours by sea for the defence of their possessions, rather encouraged than checked him in his military operations; and he was meditating a blow more hurtful to Athens than any which she had suffered during the war. Amphipolis was not only in itself on account of its wealth and magnitude one of her most valuable tributaries, but was still more important on account of its position, which commanded the only passage by which a hostile land force from the south could reach the Thracian coast, which, with its subject towns and gold mines, was one of the main sources of her revenues. One of her ge-

nerals, named Eucles, had already been sent to ensure the fidelity of Amphipolis by his presence; and the historian Thucydides was associated with him in command, with an especial view to the protection of the towns north of the Strymon. Thucydides, whose father Olorus was a descendant, probably a grandson, of Miltiades, and had married a lady of the same name and most likely of the same blood with the Thracian princess, Hegesipyle, the wife of Miltiades, had come, either by inheritance or by marriage, into the possession of a rich estate in the gold mines of Scaptesyale, near the coast north of Thasos, to which they belonged before they were seized by the Athenians. It was probably the influence which he had acquired in this quarter by his property and connections, rather than his abilities or his military experience — though he is said to have held a command on some preceding occasions — that induced the people to send him with a squadron to the coast of Thrace. He was stationed at Thasos, about half a day's sail from the mouth of the Strymon, when Brasidas moved, with a body of auxiliaries in addition to his own troops, from the Chalcidian town of Arnæ, to surprise Amphipolis. He had been urged to this attempt by the promises held out to him at Argilus, a small town a little to the south of the Strymon. The Argilians, who had in some way given umbrage to Athens, were themselves desirous of casting off their dependence on her, and wished for their own security to draw their powerful neighbour Amphipolis into the like revolt. They had an additional motive in the connection which they had formed with her through a number of their own citizens who had been admitted to her franchise; and this connection gave them hopes and means of effecting their purpose. The Argilian Amphipolitans promised their aid toward reducing their adopted city under the power of Brasidas. But he knew that his success would depend on the secrecy and rapidity of his movements; and he so calculated the time of his march as to arrive at Argilus in the course

of the night after he left Arnæ. He was admitted at once into the town, and before morning was conducted by his Argilian friends to the bridge which crossed the Strymon near Amphipolis. Partly by surprise, partly by force, and partly with the help of his Amphipolitan partizans, he made himself master of it, and immediately occupied the open ground which lay between the city and the river. Many of the citizens had houses in this quarter; and the invasion was so sudden, that a great number of them had not time to take refuge within the walls, and fell into the enemy's hands. Eucles saw himself threatened both from within and from without. The citizens of Athenian blood formed but a small part of the population; the rest were either disaffected or lukewarm, and so great was the alarm and confusion created by the occupation of the populous suburb, and the flight of its inhabitants, that Brasidas, if he had not suffered his troops to be detained by the pillage, but had advanced immediately to the gates, might, it was generally believed, have taken the city. A despatch was sent without delay to Thucydides for succour; and as the enemy contented himself with overrunning the suburban district, quiet was in some degree restored within the walls, and the friends of Athens maintained the ascendancy. But Brasidas, who at first relied on the strength of the party which had invited him, seeing that it was not quite so powerful as he had hoped, began to fear that his enterprise would be utterly defeated by the arrival of Thucydides, whose authority and personal influence, both among the Greek towns on the Thracian coast, and among the tribes in the interior, would encourage the partizans of the Athenian government to look for effectual protection. He therefore sent a herald to demand the surrender of the city, upon terms which relieved all classes of the inhabitants from their worst fears. All who would, whether Athenians or of different race, were allowed to quit the town with all their movable property within five days. The rest would remain in the unmolested enjoyment both of their es-

tates, and of all their civil and political rights. This proposal, at a time when the prospect of relief appeared very uncertain, met the wishes of all. The Athenians, who if the city was taken or betrayed had the worst to fear, were glad to withdraw in safety, and without much pecuniary loss. Of the rest the greater number felt no attachment to Athens, and were only anxious to preserve their property and franchises, while many whose friends had been taken in the surprise of the suburb were delighted with the prospect of recovering them. The partizans of Brasidas, seeing the bias of the public mind, threw off the mask, and openly seconded his proposal; and the Athenian general, when he attempted to interpose his authority, found that it had lost all its weight, and was compelled to witness the surrender of the city.

On the evening of the same day Thucydides, with seven galleys which he happened to have with him at Thasos, when he received the despatch from Eucles, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon, and learning the fall of Amphipolis proceeded to put Eion in a posture of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas attacked the next morning, both from the river and the land, without effect; and the refugees who retired by virtue of the treaty from Amphipolis, found shelter at Eion, and contributed to its security. The historian rendered an important service to his country; and it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances. Yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile; and he was only restored to his country in the season of her deepest humiliation by the public calamities. So much only can be gathered with certainty from his own language; for he has not condescended to mention either the charge which was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which he may either have suffered, or avoided by a voluntary

exile. A statement very probable in itself, though resting upon slight authority, attributes his banishment to Cleon's calumnies; that the irritation produced by the loss of Amphipolis should have been so directed against an innocent object, would perfectly accord with the character of the people and of the demagogue. Posterity has gained by the injustice of his contemporaries; and he himself found consolation for the losses and sufferings of his exile, in the consciousness of his admirable labours, and in the presentiment of imperishable fame. It was to the liberty which he acquired by his exclusion from public duties that he owed the opportunities he enjoyed of collecting the materials of his history from the best sources, and of obtaining access to persons and places which during the war could not have been visited by an Athenian who had not lost his country. With a greatness of soul equal to the strength of his mind, he mentions his misfortunes only to record this advantage, which he and his readers have derived from them.

The acquisition of Amphipolis opened a wide field for conquest and negotiation to Brasidas; and his activity justified the dismay with which the Athenians were struck by their loss. His winning manners, liberal professions, and equitable conduct, enhanced the effect produced by his success on the subjects of Athens. They flattered themselves with the hope that the disaster of Delium had given a fatal shock to her power; and the longer Brasidas pursued his victorious career, the more easily he gained credit for his assertion, that the whole force of Athens had shrunk from a contest with his little army at Megara. The desire of change, and the enthusiasm excited by a new, untried ally, worked strongly in his favour; and the disposition to revolt became so general, that many towns vied with each other

¹ It seems quite as probable that he was condemned to death, as to exile. Nobody decently acquainted with the Greek language would infer from the expression of Thucydides, v. 23, that he was banished for twenty years, even if the fact mentioned by Pausanias, i. 23 §. 2, did not afford a clear indication of the contrary. The point is fully discussed by Krueger, *Leben des Thukydides*, p. 48. fol.

for the honour of being the first to breach their walls. The Athenians were not so immediately to check this spirit, as the season prevented them from sending an armament strong enough to overawe it, though they made the best provision they could for the defence of those points which seemed to be in the greatest danger. But Brasidas also was in want of troops, as well as of ships. The latter of these wants he endeavoured to supply himself, by building some galleys on the Staymon; but he applied in vain for a reinforcement to Sparta, where several of the leading persons in the state were jealous of his glory, and the wish to recover the prisoners generally prevailed over every other motive.

Immediately after the surrender of Amphipolis, Perdiccas, desirous perhaps of healing the breach which had been made between them by the expedition to Lyncestis, came to the camp, and lent his aid toward the reduction of some towns in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis. Myrcinus was won from the Edonian Thracians, through some feud in which their king Pittacus lost his life, and soon after the Greek towns of Galepsus and Oesyme submitted. Brasidas next marched against the semi-barbarous tribes, of various origin, which inhabited several small towns in the peninsula of Athos. Most of them surrendered to him: but one, named Dium, and the Greek town of Sané, on the isthmus, made such an obstinate resistance, that he was obliged to content himself with ravaging their fields. He was soon called away by a more important enterprise. A small party at Torone, on the coast of the peninsula west of Athos, notwithstanding the presence of an Athenian garrison, offered to put him in possession of the town. He arrived a little before day-break, within two or three furlongs of the walls, observed by none but his friends, who were waiting to receive him. They proposed to introduce a small number of his men, and then to throw open the gates for the rest of the army. Twenty men were selected for this adventure; but only

seven had the courage to persevere, and follow their guides into the city. This little band first mounted to the top of the hill on which the city stood, and overpowered a guard which was stationed on it. They then proceeded to open a postern, and to force the gates nearest to the agora, where about fifty Athenian soldiers were sleeping. Brasidas, while he advanced slowly with the army, sent forward a hundred targeteers, to rush in through the first gates which they might find open, as soon as they should see the preconcerted fire-signal. Some of them were let in at once through the postern by their Toronæan partizans, who then raised the signal, and threw open the gates leading to the agora for the rest. Brasidas and the army followed with an appalling war-cry: some of his men reached the top of the walls by a scaffold which had been placed for raising stones to repair them; all were soon within, and Brasidas led the main body to occupy the higher parts of the town. The fifty Athenians, though attacked at once in front and in the rear, made their way with the loss of a few lives to the fort of Lecythus, which stood on a point of land connected with the town by a narrow isthmus, and was held by an Athenian garrison; and here those Toronæans, who were attached by private or political interests to the cause of Athens, likewise took refuge. When morning came, Brasidas was in secure possession of Torone, and now sent a heräld to Lecythus, to invite the citizens who had fled thither to return to their habitations, and to require the Athenian garrison peaceably to evacuate the fortress, and depart with their property. This offer they rejected, but demanded a day's truce for burying their dead. Brasidas granted two days, which were spent on both sides in fortifying the houses on the outskirts of the town and of the fortress. In this interval the Spartan general convened an assembly of the people, in which he vindicated the conduct of his friends: "They were not to be looked upon as traitors, and had not been impelled by any sordid motives, but had received him as a public benefactor and deliverer;

nor on the other hand did he condemn those who had adhered to the Athenians; if they returned, they should experience the same friendly treatment as their fellow-citizens; and he doubted not that, as they would find Sparta a better ally than Athens, they would soon become more attached to her than they had been to her enemy."

On the third day he began the attack of Lecythus. Its fortifications were very imperfect or decayed; but the besieged had strengthened them as well as they could by means of the contiguous houses and of palisades; and for one day they repulsed all the enemy's attacks. But on the next Brasidas prepared an engine to discharge combustibles against their wooden defences. To guard against this danger the garrison erected a wooden tower on one of the houses in the most exposed quarter, in which they placed a number of men with casks of water and great stones to crush the engine or quench the fire. But the roof of the house could not sustain the weight laid on it, and fell in with a startling crash. The Athenians on the adjacent wall were not so much alarmed as grieved by the disaster; but those at a greater distance, believing that the enemy had entered at the breach, abandoned the parapets, and fled to their ships, which lay in the harbour. Brasidas took advantage of the panic, and made himself master of the place. All who could not escape on board the Athenian galleys and boats were indiscriminately put to the sword. The conqueror razed the fortress, leaving only a temple of Athene, to whom he dedicated the vacant ground; and, choosing to ascribe his sudden success to her miraculous interposition, he honoured her with the reward which he had promised to the first man who should scale the wall.

Such was the state of affairs in the spring of 423, when a year's truce was concluded between the belligerent powers. Athens, alarmed by the conquests of Brasidas, desired time to make preparations for stopping his progress, but was not averse to the thought of a

peace, by which she might more surely retrieve what she had already lost. Sparta considered the recovery of her citizens as the most valuable fruit she could reap from the victories of Brasidas, and thought that the loss of them could never be compensated by the most brilliant success of his arms; and hoped that the Athenians, when they had tasted the sweets of peace after such a hard struggle, would be more inclined to deliver up the prisoners for the sake of a permanent peace. The articles of the truce were either framed or adopted at Sparta in a general congress of the Peloponnesian confederates, and were then ratified by the Athenians. The first two articles related to a subject of great importance, though not immediately connected either with the first occasion of the war, or with the motives which gave rise to the truce. The first provided for the free use of the Delphic temple and oracle, from which the Athenians and their allies appear to have been excluded during the war, and Sparta engaged to use her influence with the Phocians and Bœotians to procure their consent. The second article seems to imply, that the Athenians had either discovered or, suspected, that a part of the sacred treasures, which had been so many years in the keeping of their enemies, and which at the beginning of the war had been openly treated, in the consultations of the Peloponnesians, as property which they might lawfully borrow for their own uses, had really been embezzled or misapplied. It is stipulated, that the Lacedæmonians and their allies will lend their aid, as far as they have any authority, to detect all such abuses. The other articles determined the basis of the treaty — by which each party retained its possessions during the truce — and the boundaries of the Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Trœzen, and Nisæa, forbade all communication between Cythera and the main land, and the harbouring of fugitives, whether slaves or free-men; and there was one which restrained the Spartans and their allies from the use, not only of ships of war, but of all sailing vessels, and even limited those which

they were allowed to employ to a certain tonnage ; a remarkable concession to the maritime supremacy of Athens, which seems to attribute to her the legitimate sovereignty of the sea. The main end of the truce was expressed by a clause, which provided for the security of the ministers who should pass to and fro to negotiate a lasting peace, and directed that all differences which might arise on doubtful points should be settled by arbitration. On the side of the Peloponnesians the articles were ratified by envoys from Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, who must have represented the other confederates of the peninsula. Negotiations were immediately opened for a final termination of the war.

But in the meanwhile Brasidas was pursuing his successful career ; and only a day or two after the truce was ratified at Athens, Scione, in the peninsula of Pallene, without waiting for the approach of his army, renounced the Athenian alliance, and invited him into her walls. He crossed over in the night from Torone in a skiff which was escorted by a galley, so as either to resist or elude an enemy, and on reaching Scione, called an assembly of the people, in which, after the usual professions of disinterested zeal for the liberties of Greece, he applauded the courage of the Scionæans, who, though their situation was that of an island, since, while Potidæa was in the hands of the Athenians, they could receive no succours by land, had spontaneously thrown off the yoke, and had thus given a pledge of the constancy with which they would brave every danger in the cause of Sparta and of freedom. The Scionæans, delighted with his praises, with the consciousness of a gallant enterprise, and of the assurances which he gave them of its happy issue, not only decreed a crown of gold as the reward of his efforts for the liberty of Greece, but thronged around him to present him with fillets, and to greet him with such congratulations as were usually offered to one who had gained the prize at the public games. He left a few troops for their protection ; and soon after transported a larger force across the gulf, in the hope

of making himself master of Mende and Potidæa — and in both places he had a party in his interest — before succours should arrive from Athens, where he knew that the revolt of the towns in Pallene would excite the same alarm and indignation as a rebellion in one of the islands. But his operations were interrupted by the arrival of a galley, with a Spartan and an Athenian commissioner on board, who were sent to give notice of the truce. By the fundamental article, which provided that the parties should retain all their possessions, the towns which had before entered into alliance with Sparta were for the time sheltered from the vengeance of Athens. But it appeared that Scione had revolted after the truce was concluded ; according to the calculation of Thucydides himself, two days later ; and the Athenian commissioner insisted that it had no claim to the benefits of the treaty. But Brasidas, assigning an earlier date to the revolution at Scione, contended that it was entitled to the same protection as the other allies of Sparta. At Athens the news of this last revolt excited the fiercest resentment ; and Cleon instigated the people to send an expedition against the rebellious city. Envoys came from Sparta, to remonstrate against such a proceeding, and to require that the question should be submitted to arbitration. But the Athenians were too angry to bear this delay, or to expose their right to such a risk. As the acknowledged sovereigns of the sea they thought themselves insulted by the revolt of a town in an insular situation, and were impatient to show that the power of Sparta could not screen the offenders. Cleon — who probably reproached them with the lenity which they had shown to Mitylene — prevailed upon them to pass a decree, that Scione be taken, and every man in it put to death.

In the meanwhile its example was followed by its neighbours of Mende ; and Brasidas thought himself justified in receiving them as allies, partly on the ground that they offered themselves spontaneously, and partly because, even if he was accused of infringing the truce

he had similar charges to bring against the Athenians. It was the firmness which he had displayed on the behalf of Scione, that inspired the Mendæans with confidence; yet they would not have ventured on so rash a step, if they had not been urged by the interested solicitations of a few leading men, who had opened a secret negotiation with Brasidas before the truce, and dreaded detection. The Athenians were fired with fresh indignation by this new rebellion, and prepared for the reduction of both cities; and Brasidas, expecting a speedy attack, conveyed the women and children from the two threatened towns into Olynthus, and sent over 500 of his own regular infantry, and 300 Chalcidian targeteers, under the command of Polydamidas, to protect them.

Perdiccas, as we have seen, had thought it prudent, after the capture of Amphipolis, to pay his court to Brasidas, and to aid him in some of his subsequent operations; and after the revolt of Mende he prevailed upon him once more to join his forces to a Macedonian army which was about to invade Lyncestis. Perdiccas had also engaged a body of Illyrian auxiliaries in his service, who were to meet him when he had entered the dominions of Arrhibæus. The troops which he had collected partly from Macedonia, and partly from the adjacent barbarous tribes, amounted to a numerous host; and the Greek towns within his territories furnished a small corps of heavy infantry. Those which Brasidas could spare, after providing for the safety of his allies on the coast, together with all that he could draw from the Chalcidian towns, Acanthus, and other places, only made up their number to about 3000 men. The Macedonian cavalry, with that of their Chalcidian allies, fell a little short of a thousand. Arrhibæus was prepared to defend his territories, and, soon after the allies had entered Lyncestis, before they were joined by the Illyrian mercenaries, gave them battle. He was defeated with great loss; but the mountainous region afforded a near and safe refuge to the remnant of his

army ; and the victors waited two or three days on the field of battle for the arrival of the Illyrians. But as they did not then appear, Perdiccas was desirous of advancing to plunder the Lyncestian villages. Brasidas on the other hand, uneasy about the fate of the towns which he had left in great danger, made the delay of the Illyrian reinforcement an argument for an immediate retreat. Perdiccas vehemently resisted this proposal, and the difference between the two chiefs again grew into a quarrel, when tidings came that the Illyrians had been induced to enter into the service of Arrhibæus. As their numbers were not known, and they were esteemed among the most warlike of the barbarians, Perdiccas himself now thought it advisable to retreat. But Brasidas with the Greek troops occupied a camp at a considerable distance from the Macedonian army ; and Perdiccas was either unable immediately to confer with him on his altered plans, or, through feelings of offended pride, neglected to take the first opportunity of communicating them. The day past, while Arrhibæus, with his Illyrian auxiliaries, was on his march to attack the invaders, before any orders had been given for the retreat, and before Brasidas was informed of the king's intention. But in the following night, a panic spread through the Macedonian camp ; the enemy, whose strength was greatly exaggerated, was believed to be close at hand ; and the whole army took to flight so suddenly that Perdiccas was forced to follow before he could apprise his ally of his departure. The next morning Brasidas found himself deserted by his friends, and threatened with attack by the barbarians, who were now too near to be avoided. He had to retreat before an enemy greatly superior in numbers, through a valley terminated by a narrow mountain pass, the only outlet by which he could issue from the territories of Arrhibæus. In this emergency he formed his little army into a hollow square, inclosing the light troops, placed some parties of his youngest men in reserve, to act if needful on the offensive, and selected 300 as a rear

guard, with which he himself prepared to face the enemy, and sustain the first shock of his charge.

He then animated his troops with a short address. He reminded the Peloponnesians — the helots had perhaps been left behind — that the dereliction of their allies ought the less to dishearten them, as they belonged to states, which had been founded by the valour of the few, who thus earned and maintained their dominion over the many. As to the barbarians who were approaching, they had already made trial of the Lyncestians; and the others, when they came to the proof, would not be found more formidable; though their fierce aspect, and wild cries, and threatening gestures, might strike terror so long as they were new to the eye and ear. All this was no more than the empty show by which an undisciplined multitude, without either rules of war or principles of honour, sought to conceal its weakness, and to scare its enemies, who must always conquer, if they were prepared to resist.

As he began his retreat, the barbarians came up with their usual clamour, expecting an easy victory over a yielding foe. But when they found their first onset steadily repulsed, and were repeatedly charged by the parties in reserve, while in the intervals of quiet they gained the army continued to retreat in good order, they were soon dispirited; and, leaving a small part of their force to hover on the rear of the Greeks, the main body pushed forward to overtake the flying Macedonians, and to secure the defile through which Brasidas was to pass. They made such speed as to cut off many of the Macedonian stragglers; and when Brasidas came up, he saw the heights which bordered each side of the pass already occupied by a small body of the barbarians, while the rest were proceeding to surround him. But before they had quite completed this movement, he ordered his band of 300 to go before at full speed and dislodge the party which had possession of one of the heights. This was happily accomplished;

and before the barbarians had recovered from the confusion into which they were thrown by this attack, the Greeks, under cover of their victorious comrades, had cleared the defile, and, having crossed the Lyncestian border, prosecuted their march unmolested through the dominions of Perdiccas, and the same day reached the Macedonian town of Arnissa. On the road they now overtook a part of the baggage which had been left behind by the fugitives, whose desertion had exposed them to their recent peril, and they at once gratified their resentment and their love of plunder, by slaughtering the oxen which drew the carts, and by seizing every thing of value that fell in their way. This hostile proceeding made a deeper impression than might have been expected on the mind of Perdiccas, who, probably coupling it with the disregard which Brasidas had shown to his interests, and ascribing it to his animosity, began to conceive a jealousy and aversion toward his Peloponnesian allies, which nearly balanced his inveterate hatred and dread of the Athenians, and disposed him to seek a reconciliation with his old enemy, which might rid him of his dangerous friends.

Brasidas led his army back to Torone; and on his arrival learnt that Mende was already taken by an Athenian armament, which had been conducted against it in his absence by Nicias and Nicostratus. The Athenian generals had suffered a check before Mende in an attempt to dislodge Polydamidas from a strong position; but within the town the two parties soon began to disclose the opposite feelings with which they viewed the approach of the Athenians; and when the Spartan commander attempted, somewhat roughly, to enforce obedience, the bulk of the citizens flew to their arms, fell upon the foreigners and their oligarchical partizans, and opened their gates. The Peloponnesians and all who adhered to them, supposing that the tumult was preconcerted with the enemy, took refuge in the citadel. The Athenians, who were close at hand, rushed into the town and plundered it, as one taken by

storm; and it was with difficulty that the generals succeeded in preserving the lives of the inhabitants. They might indeed think themselves treated with unwonted clemency; for they were permitted, after having punished the authors of the revolt who remained in their power, to retain their ancient constitution. The citadel was invested, and the Athenian generals then marched against Scione. Here they succeeded in dislodging the enemy from a strong position outside the walls, and immediately began to break ground for a siege. While they were thus employed, the garrison of the citadel at Mende, having forced their way through the Athenian intrenchments, reached the sea-side, and under cover of night, with a slight loss, threw themselves into Scione.

While the siege was in progress, Perdiccas concluded a negotiation, which he began soon after his return from Lyncestis, with Nicias and his colleague, who immediately called upon him for a proof of his sincerity. A reinforcement, under the command of Ischagoras, was known to be on its march to join Brasidas; and Nicias required the king to exert his influence in Thessaly to interrupt it. This Perdiccas was now disposed to do for his own sake; and he induced his Thessalian friends—the same powerful men, who, against the general wishes of the nation, had conducted Brasidas through the country—to stop the passage of the troops. Ischagoras himself was allowed to proceed, accompanied by two colleagues, and by several other Spartans, who were sent to take the command in the revolted towns. Thucydides remarks, that these officers were all young men, and that to appoint persons of their age to such stations was a breach of the Spartan law or usage. The ephors probably perceived, and Brasidas himself may have suggested, that the service was one which required the energy of the prime of life, rather than the tardy prudence of a more advanced age; and perhaps the elder Spartans generally viewed his expedition, and the contest which he had begun in so remote a quarter,

with no favourable eye. He entrusted the government of Amphipolis to Clearidas, and that of Torone to Pasitelidas. Nicias and his colleague, when they had completely invested Scione, leaving a sufficient garrison in the camp, led their armament home.

The truce expired in the spring of 422 ; but hostilities were suspended, and negotiation carried on, some months longer. Brasidas seems never to have thought himself bound by the truce ; for before the end of the winter, he made an attempt to surprise Potidæa by night ; but was baffled by the vigilance of the Athenian garrison. He would have been glad to throw an additional obstacle in the way of peace, which threatened to interrupt his brilliant career and to consign him to a state of irksome inaction. From selfish motives of a baser kind, Cleon was no less desirous of prolonging the war, which afforded him constant opportunities of exciting the passions of the multitude, calumniating his adversaries, and enriching himself by extortion or peculation. After his fortunate adventure at Pylus, his influence had risen at home ; and though in the same year his character and artifices were laid bare by the comic poet Aristophanes, in a dramatic satire which it might have seemed impossible for any reputation to sustain ; and though, soon after, chiefly through a combination of the higher classes who formed an equestrian order which included a large share of the wealth and of the best spirit of the city, he was compelled by a legal prosecution to disgorge a sum of five talents, which he had extorted from some of the insular subjects of Athens ; still in the assembly he was able to efface the impression which had been made at the theatre and in court, and continued to sway the counsels of the state. Fortunately he was himself intoxicated with his success, and had begun to conceive a high opinion of his own military talents. He had probably more than once contrasted the energy which he had displayed in his famous expedition with the negligence of Thucydides, and the tardiness of Nicias,

and had persuaded both himself and others that he was the only man capable of arresting the progress of Brasidas, and of recovering the ground which had been lost in the north. He no longer desired the aid of a more experienced general, but persuaded the people to entrust him with the sole command of a squadron of 30 galleys, with 1200 heavy-armed, and 300 horse, the flower of the Athenian troops, and a still larger force of Lemnians and Imbrians, the finest men that the islands could furnish.

Amphipolis was his ultimate and principal destination; but in his way he touched at Scione, and having taken on board a part of the besieging force, he crossed over to a port not far from Torone. Here he discovered that Brasidas was not in the town, and that the garrison left in it was inadequate to its defence; and he immediately landed with his main body, and marched against it, while ten galleys sailed round to surprise it on the side of the harbour. The enemy's weakness favoured him in both operations. He first assaulted a new wall with which Brasidas had enclosed a part of the outskirts. Pasitелidas and his little garrison were almost overpowered by superior numbers, when they were alarmed by the approach of the squadron which was entering the harbour, and, as the less important post, abandoned the suburb. But they were not in time to prevent the Athenians from landing, while the assailants scaled the unguarded wall, and poured into the heart of the town. Cleon sold the women and children as slaves, but sent all the men who survived the first medley, among whom was Pasitелidas, prisoners to Athens. They amounted in all to no more than 700 men, and were afterwards released by treaty or exchange. Perhaps the bulk of the population was absent with Brasidas, who hastened to the relief of the place, but was stopt within seven or eight miles of it by the news of its capture.

It can scarcely be denied that in this affair, though there were few difficulties to overcome, Cleon had

shown as much skill and promptitude as the occasion required ; and he probably proceeded with a heightened esteem for his own military capacity, to the mouth of the Strymon, where he took up his head-quarters at Eion. Before he made any attempt upon Amphipolis, he was desirous of procuring all the reinforcements he could collect ; and sent envoys to Perdiccas to demand a body of auxiliaries, and others to Polles, king of the Odomantian Thracians, to raise as many mercenaries as they could among his subjects. Brasidas was at this time at Amphipolis, with a force which, though about equal in numbers to that which Cleon had brought, was very inferior both in the quality and the equipment of the men, the greater part of whom were barbarians. Cleon was aware of his advantage in this respect ; and it does not appear to have been any sense of his personal inferiority which prevented him from seeking the enemy. But he seems to have been unable to devise any plan of attack, but that which he had found successful at Pylus and Torone : and only hoped to make himself master of Amphipolis by dint of numbers. While he waited for reinforcements, instead of making approaches to the town, or attempting to draw the enemy into an engagement, he undertook an expedition against Stagirus, where he was repulsed, and another, in which he succeeded, against Galepsus. His troops, who had been used to different generals, and had been from the first displeased with his appointment to the command, began soon to vent their impatience and contempt in murmurs which reached his ear, and induced him to try to divert them by a march toward Amphipolis. Brasidas, who expected this movement, had posted himself with a division of his forces on an eminence called Cerdylum, which was separated by the river from that on which Amphipolis stood, and commanded a view of the whole country down to the coast. From this position he watched Cleon, who advanced with his army from Eion, until he halted on the high ground immediately above

the city, and as he saw no enemy stirring, went forward to survey the lake formed by the Strymon, and the position of Amphipolis toward the north. While he was enjoying this view, Brasidas, who, as soon as he saw the Athenians in motion, had descended from Cerdylum, and had entered the city, was preparing to take advantage of the enemy's error. He selected a band of 150 men, to make a sally upon the Athenians at the most favourable moment, while Clearidas supported him with the main body; and having communicated his plan to Clearidas, and addressed some words of encouragement to the troops, he stationed them near the gates through which they were to be led out. His movements of preparation had all been observed by the Athenians from above, and some of them approached so near to the gates as to be able to see the feet of the men and horses behind. The intelligence was brought to Cleon, who was still indulging his curiosity at a little distance, and having returned, and ascertained the fact with his own eyes, he immediately sounded a retreat. He had so little expected an attack, that when the enemy appeared at first to remain motionless, he expressed his regret that he had brought no scaling-ladders to storm the town. He had placed himself in a situation from which it was impossible to retreat without danger. Yet the superiority of his force might perhaps have enabled him to draw off the whole with little loss, if he had kept one division to face the enemy, while the rest moved away. But he set the whole in motion at once, and so as to expose the soldiers unshielded side. Brasidas no sooner observed the first indications of this movement, which he had been waiting for, than he ordered the nearest gates to be thrown open, and sallying forth with his picked men, ran up the hill, and charged the enemy's centre. Clearidas followed with the rest of the army through another gate, and attacked the Athenian right wing, on the rear of the column. Their left, which was foremost on the road to Eion, broke away and escaped; but the centre was almost

immediately routed, and Brasidas was proceeding to support Cleonidas, when he received a mortal wound. Cleon too, who from the first moment of the attack had thought of nothing but flight, was overtaken by the javelin of a Myrcinian targeteer. Yet even after his death the right wing, having the advantage of the rising ground, defended themselves for some time ; but at length they were surrounded by the enemy's cavalry and light troops, and compelled to follow their comrades in the general route. The victors lost only seven men, while about 600 fell on the side of the Athenians. The Amphipolitans interred Brasidas within their walls — an extraordinary honour in a Greek town — with a magnificent funeral, which was attended by the whole army. They commemorated his death by annual games, and offered sacrifices at his tomb, as to a hero ; a tribute of respect which appears the less extravagant, as even his enemies thought him worthy to be compared to Achilles.¹ At once to display their gratitude and admiration toward him and their enmity to Athens, they conferred on him the honours of a Founder, which they had hitherto paid to Hagnon, whose monuments were all destroyed. The remains of the Athenian army returned home.

Earlier in the summer a reinforcement of 900 heavy infantry had been sent out from Sparta, under the command of Ramphias, to join Brasidas. Ramphias was detained for a time at Heraclea by the disordered affairs of the colony, and there received the news of the battle of Amphipolis. Yet he continued his march, and advanced far into the interior of Thessaly ; but at Pierium he was stoppt by the friends of Athens or of Perdiccas ; and as he saw that the object of his expedition was frustrated by the death of Brasidas, and knew that his government was strongly bent on peace, he deemed it advisable to acquiesce and to return to Sparta. Immediately after the battle of Amphipolis hostilities had been suspended by tacit consent between the two belligerents, and early in the winter negotiations were renewed. All

¹ Plato, *Conviv.* p. 221.

things now seemed to conspire in favour of peace. The Athenians, whose arrogance had been much lowered by their last year's disasters in Boeotia, and who had since been alarmed by the spirit of revolt which they saw spreading among their allies, were now by their recent defeat more than ever disposed to treat on moderate terms. The Spartans, notwithstanding their successes abroad, had been suffering the worst evils of war from the enemy's presence in their country; and they were in continual dread of the effect which it might produce on their disaffected subjects and serfs. Their desire of recovering the prisoners of Sphacteria remained unabated; but they had another motive to incline them toward peace, which was becoming stronger every day. Their thirty years' truce with Argos was near expiring; and the Argives demanded the cession of Cynuria, as the first condition of its renewal. Their hostility, combined with that of Athens, was more than the power of Sparta could withstand; and there was reason to suspect that some of her Peloponnesian allies had already conceived the design of abandoning her, and uniting themselves with Argos. All these arguments had now their full weight on both sides, since the fortunate event which had removed the two men who had been most actively opposed to peace, the chosen instruments, according to a lively image of Aristophanes, employed by the god of war, to crush and confound the general prosperity and tranquillity. And two of the persons whose station and character gave them the greatest weight in the councils of Sparta and Athens, were strongly impelled by different motives to concur in bringing the war to a close.

The Spartan king Plistoanax, who had been driven into exile on the charge of receiving a bribe from Pericles, had at length been recalled to Sparta. But it was commonly believed that he had recovered his station by arts like those which had caused his fall. The Spartans had been repeatedly enjoined by the Delphic oracle with mysterious threats to bring back the descend-

ant of Hercules ; and they at length gave way to the declared will of the god, and reinstated the banished king with sacred rites, such as according to their traditions had been employed in the first inauguration of the Heracleid princes. But the enemies of Plistoanax attributed the interposition of the oracle to his gold, with which as they pretended he had corrupted the prophetess and her brother Aristocles. Every new reverse which Sparta experienced, and every danger which threatened her, was imputed to the divine anger provoked by this impious fraud ; and hence Plistoanax wished for the return of peace, which would deprive his enemies of the main handle by which they turned the superstition of his countrymen against him.

At Athens the death of Cleon had left Nicias in undisputed possession of the influence due to the mildness of his disposition, to the liberal use which he made of his ample fortune, and to his military skill and success, which after the downfall of his presumptuous rival were perhaps more justly appreciated. Nicias was desirous of peace both for the sake of Athens and on his own account. He was naturally timid and prone to superstition ; and from the very beginning of his public life, notwithstanding his wealth, prosperity, and popularity, he seems to have been constantly haunted by a secret foreboding of some calamitous reverse. Caution was the leading principle of his conduct both at home and abroad. As he did not know from what quarter the dreaded evil might come, he not only imitated the prudence of Pericles in his military enterprises, but endeavoured to propitiate the gods by daily sacrifices, the people by his splendid munificence, and the sycophants by frequent bribes. He is said to have kept a domestic soothsayer, avowedly with a view to the service of the state, but really to obtain the earliest warning of every danger which might threaten his private affairs. And the more effectually to avert the envy to which his fortune was exposed, he affected, like Pericles, to devote himself entirely to public duties ; he was never to be seen at the entertainments

of his friends, and confined himself to the society of a very narrow circle at home. Those who were admitted to his closest intimacy took pains to spread the belief that he sacrificed all the enjoyments of life to the interests of the commonwealth, and that even his health was impaired by his unremitting application to business. Nicias therefore desired peace, because it was the state which seemed exposed to the fewest risks, and in which his private interests would be most secure under the shelter of universal prosperity. As one step toward this end he had endeavoured to conciliate the confidence of Sparta by the good offices with which he softened the captivity of her citizens at Athens; and he was thus enabled to assume the character of a mediator between the two states.

Yet the negotiation was beset with great difficulties, and it was thought necessary to intimidate or to urge the Athenians by a show of preparation for a fresh invasion of Attica, accompanied by a threat of seizing a post for permanent occupation. But after many conferences the basis of a treaty was at length settled in the spring of 421, on the footing of a mutual restitution of conquests made in the war; and as the Thebans would not admit that Platæa belonged to this class, on the ground that it had been freely surrendered, it was stipulated that Athens should keep Nisæa, which she had acquired by a similar transaction. A treaty framed on this basis was soon after ratified by the two leading states, and was accepted by all the allies of Sparta, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians, who declared themselves dissatisfied with its terms.

It was a treaty of peace for fifty years. It provided in the first place for the common and free enjoyment of the national sanctuaries and for the independence of the Delphians, and directed that all differences which might arise between the parties should be peaceably decided. The most important articles related to the towns on the coast of Thrace which had surrendered to Brasidas, and were in the power of Sparta. She engaged to restore

Amphipolis to the absolute dominion of the parent state, and to deliver up the others, among which were Argilus, Stagyrus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But their inhabitants were to be allowed to withdraw, if they would, with their property, and they were to be subject only to the ancient tribute assessed by Aristides. In other respects they were to be suffered to remain neutral, though at liberty to enter into alliance with Athens. Another clause provided for the safety of Micyberna, Sane, and Singe, which were probably known to have excited the jealousy or the resentment of the Athenians; but it was expressly declared that they might deal as they would with Scione, Torone, and Sermylus; only the Peloponnesian garrison of Scione was to be included in the general exchange of prisoners. Sparta also bound herself to restore Panactum, a fortress on the borders of Attica, which had been betrayed the summer before into the hands of the Bœotians. A power was reserved to the two leading states, of correcting by mutual consent any oversight which might have been committed by either party in the framing of the treaty.

But a very important question remained: to determine which of the contracting parties should be the first to carry it into execution, and to put the other in possession of the places and persons which it agreed to restore. This dangerous precedence was to be settled by chance; and the lot fell upon Sparta. Thucydides does not seem to have heard any complaint which he thought worth notice, of unfairness in the management of this business; but in later times Nicias was believed to have tampered with the commissioners who were entrusted with it on behalf of Sparta, and to have secured this great advantage to his country.¹ The story rests on the authority of Theophrastus, the same by whom we were informed that Pericles had the leading men of Sparta for years in his pay; but perhaps it only proves the opinion generally entertained of Spartan

¹ Plut. Nic. 10.

venality.¹ The Spartan government however immediately proceeded to perform its part in the conditions of the treaty. It released its prisoners, and sent three commissioners to the coast of Thrace to order Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis, and to require the submission of the other towns which were to be resigned to Athens. But the new allies of Sparta rejected this demand, which extinguished all their hopes, and Clearidas, to gratify the Chalcidians, ventured to disobey the orders of the ephors, alleging that he was unable to execute them. He immediately set out for Sparta, accompanied by envoys from the Chalcidian towns, to vindicate his conduct, and to ascertain whether the conditions of the treaty were irrevocably fixed. But he was obliged to return without delay, and was ordered, if he could not give possession of Amphipolis to the Athenians, to withdraw the Peloponnesian garrison. At the same time the Spartans pressed their confederate who had refused to accede to the treaty, to waive their objections. But finding them inflexible, and Argos unwilling to treat, they began to be alarmed lest either the confederacy should be dissolved, or their supremacy transferred to their ancient rival; and they saw no better way of averting this danger than to enter into a closer union with Athens, and thus to deprive both Argos and their refractory allies of their chief ground of confidence. Nicias co-operated with them for this object, which promised to strengthen his work; and his peace—as the fifty years truce was sometimes called—was soon followed by a treaty of defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta for the same period. Each state bound itself to succour the other, if its territory should be invaded; to treat the invaders as its enemies, and not to make peace with them but with the other's consent; and it was expressly stipulated that the Athenians should assist the Spartans in quelling any insurrection of their serfs.²

¹ It was to these instances of wholesale corruption that we meant to refer in the remark, Vol. I. p. 326.

² *Ἡ δὲ δαυλία ἰκανιστήται.* Thuc. v. 23.

At the end was a clause similar to the concluding article of the treaty of peace, but more strongly worded, making it lawful for the contracting states to alter the terms of their alliance by adding or taking away, as they might think fit.

As soon as this treaty was ratified, the Athenians gave the surest pledge of their pacific dispositions, by releasing the prisoners taken in Sphacteria. And thus, after it had lasted ten years, with the short interruption of the doubtful truce, the Peloponnesian war seemed to be brought to an end; and the two powers by whose rivalry it had been kindled, were suddenly leagued together more closely than they had ever been since the Persian invasion. The policy which the Spartan government thought it necessary to adopt toward the prisoners on their return, betrays the inward malady and growing danger of the state, even more than the importance attached to their liberation. Though their surrender had been tacitly, if not expressly, sanctioned by the magistrates, it was generally considered at Sparta as contrary to the spirit at least of their martial law; and fears were entertained, lest, conscious of having sunk in the estimation of their countrymen, they should disturb the public tranquillity by some attempt at a revolution. The precaution taken against this danger appears a little strange. They were degraded from their franchise, and some of them at the same time deposed from offices which they had held, and were disqualified from holding any, and even from making ordinary contracts. It is not quite clear how this severity, which must have seemed in itself unjust and cruel, could have been expected to prevent them from forming designs against the state. But possibly it was regarded as a kind of expiation of their offence; so that when they recovered their former rank, which was restored to them some time afterwards, they might once more lift up their heads among their equals without any fear of reproach.

CHAP. XXIV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TO THE CONQUEST OF
MELOS.

AMONG the various predictions which were current at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, one only, Thucydides observes, was known to have been fulfilled; and it was, that the war should last thrice nine years. He does not consider the temporary and partial suspension of hostilities which followed the treaties mentioned in our last chapter, as a sufficient ground for questioning the accomplishment of the prophecy, since it did not lead to a state of peace. The treaties were inscribed on pillars or tables of stone or brass, and preserved in the most revered sanctuaries; but they were for the most part a dead letter. This did not arise from the want of a sincere inclination for peace in the two highest contracting parties. The radical vice of the transaction was, that the Spartans had undertaken more than they were able to perform, and the Athenians would accept nothing less than they had bargained for. The treaty could not be carried into full execution without the concurrence of some of the allies of Sparta, who refused to accede to it, and though according to the acknowledged laws of the confederacy they were bound by the will of the majority, she had no means of enforcing their compliance. Several others were displeased with those parts of the treaty in which they were individually concerned, or had particular grounds of jealousy or discontent; and there was one clause in the treaty of alliance which created general offence and alarm. The power reserved to Sparta and Athens of altering its terms at their pleasure, without consulting their allies, was thought to indicate designs

which threatened the independence of the inferior states. The ancient respect for Sparta, founded on the invincible spirit with which her sons were supposed to be animated by the institutions of Lycurgus, had been much shaken by the surrender at Sphacteria, and by the feebleness and timidity afterwards betrayed by the government in the management of the war. But perhaps these causes of alienation might not have come into action, if it had not happened that at the same time Argos presented a rallying point, round which all who were adverse to Sparta might collect their forces, and securely array themselves in declared opposition. Argos had enjoyed a long period of tranquillity in the midst of the general commotion, and had been gaining strength while her neighbours were wasting themselves in a ruinous contest. But as she saw the period approaching when she might be exposed to the hostility of her old rival, she looked about her for some addition to her means of defence; and the state of Peloponnesus encouraged her to revive her ancient pretensions to that supremacy which had been long exercised by Sparta. In the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars great changes had taken place in her constitution, which tended to increase the mutual jealousy of the two states. About the same time that she reduced Mycenæ, she also recovered several other towns of her ancient territory, which she had lost in the great shock which Cleomenes gave to her power¹, as Tiryns, the asylum of her revolted bondmen, Orneæ, Midea, Hysiaë. But she treated their inhabitants with a more liberal policy than she displayed toward the Mycenæans who had exasperated her by their competition. She transplanted the greater part of them within her walls, and admitted them to an equality with her ancient citizens. The strength thus added to the commonalty encouraged and enabled it to break down all the old barriers of aristocratical privileges, and the government henceforth became more and more democratical.

¹ See Vol. II. p. 233.

Among the states which felt themselves aggrieved by the treaties none perhaps had juster cause of complaint than the towns on the northern coast of the *Ægean*, once subject to Athens, which after having been animated to revolt by the promises of Sparta, found themselves abandoned to the vengeance of their irritated sovereign. Even those for which some provision had been made in the treaty of peace, were disappointed and alarmed. The permission stipulated for the inhabitants to migrate strongly indicated the small value of the independence which was nominally restored to them. The unconditional restitution of Amphipolis not only threatened a large part of the population with the renewal of an oppressive yoke, but extinguished all hopes of relief in the more northern dependants of Athens on the same coast. Notwithstanding therefore, the departure of the Peloponnesian garrison Amphipolis held out, and the war was still carried on in this quarter. The cause of the Chalcidian towns had always been warmly espoused by Corinth, which had the greatest share in promoting their revolt. But beside the offence which she took at the treaty on their account, she resented the disregard which had been shown in it to her private interests. She had expected to recover Sollium, and her important colony Anactorium; and it would seem that the basis on which the treaty of peace was professedly framed entitled her to claim them; but the Acarnanians were perhaps determined to keep them, and they were passed over in silence. Thus estranged from Sparta, the Corinthians turned their thoughts toward a new alliance, and now resolved to execute the threat with which they had instigated Sparta to begin the war. After the congress held at Sparta on the last treaty with Athens, the Corinthian deputies were instructed to proceed immediately to Argos, and to open a negotiation for the purpose of founding a new confederacy over which Argos was to preside. Some of the persons in the highest offices at Argos adopted their views, and it was agreed that the Argive people should first pass a decree .

inviting every independent Greek state that might be willing, to enter into a defensive alliance with Argos ; and then, for the sake of secrecy, appoint a select number of commissioners invested with full powers to treat with each that should offer itself. A decree to this effect was soon after carried in the Argive assembly ; and twelve commissioners were chosen, and empowered to conclude an alliance with all Greek states, except Sparta and Athens, who were not to be admitted into the confederacy without the express consent of the people.

The first proposals came from Mantinea. The Mantineans had united some of the neighbouring Arcadian cantons in a confederacy which they governed. But this union had been effected by force, and they feared that Sparta, now that she had more leisure to attend to the affairs of Peloponnesus, might interfere to dissolve it, both on the ground of the general policy which led her to keep Arcadia as far as she could divided and feeble, and through a peculiar jealousy of Mantinea, which was under democratical government, and was at war with Tegea, her ancient and stanch ally. Argos on the other hand was both able to afford protection, and attracted Mantinea by its similar constitution. The example set by Mantinea, which seemed to show that the Spartan confederacy might be safely abandoned by all who were displeased with its chief, encouraged the other Peloponnesian allies freely to express their discontent, and tempted them to take the same course. The Spartans, alarmed by the rumour of this rising spirit of revolt, and expecting that Corinth would next follow the movement which she had planned, sent envoys to remonstrate with the Corinthians on their conduct, and to persuade them to become parties to the treaty with Athens. The envoys insisted on the obligation imposed on every member of the confederacy by an oath, to submit to the decision of the majority. But this obligation was limited by a clause which excepted cases in which " any hindrance might arise from gods or heroes." The Corinthians now availed themselves of this

exception, and contended that since they had bound themselves by repeated oaths to stand by their Chalcidian allies, this was a hindrance arising from the gods which restrained them from conforming to the will of the majority of their Peloponnesian confederates. "As to the alliance with Argos they should deliberate with their friends." There were envoys from Argos at Corinth when the Spartans were dismissed with this answer, and they urged the Corinthians to enter into league with Argos without delay. Yet the Corinthians — perhaps with the view of enhancing the value of their support — did not immediately consent, but deferred their final answer to another meeting. It was attended by an embassy, which they probably expected, from Elis, which came to conclude a separate alliance with Corinth, and then according to a previous arrangement proceeded to Argos, and procured admission for Elis into the Argive confederacy.

Sparta had provoked the enmity of the Eleans by an act to which she had been prompted by her ruling maxim, of keeping Peloponnesus divided among the greatest possible number of independent states, which led her to support the weak against their more powerful neighbours. Before the Peloponnesian war the Triphylian town of Lepreum, pressed by the arms of the bordering Arcadians, had sought aid from Elis, but could only obtain it at the price of half its territory, which it ceded to its ally. The Eleans however only exercised their sovereignty by charging the cultivators of the land with the yearly payment of a talent to the treasury of the temple at Olympia. The Lepreans patiently bore this slight burden, until the war, which brought with it other demands, afforded them a pretext for withholding the tribute; and when Elis threatened to exact it by force, they submitted their case to Spartan arbitration. The Eleans at first acquiesced in this mode of decision, but afterwards suspecting that Sparta would favour the weaker party, asserted their claims by invading the Leprean territory. The Spartans never-

theless made an award, declaring Lepreum independent, and sent a body of troops to protect it. The Eleans treated this as a conquest, by which a part of their dominions had been wrested from them, and demanded restitution as due to them according to the true construction of the agreement which was the basis of the treaty of peace.¹ It was this grievance that led them to enter into alliance with Argos; and immediately after, Corinth and the Chalcidians followed their example. But the Bœotians and Megarians were as little inclined to ally themselves with Argos as with Athens. Both indeed thought themselves ill treated by Sparta²; and Megara in particular had reason to complain that her principal port was left in the hands of her inveterate enemy: though she had taken and demolished the long walls which connected it with the city.³ But the party which had now the ascendancy both there and in Bœotia was on political grounds averse to any connection with Athens, and probably thought war with a democratical neighbour safer than peace. During the year's truce the Theban government had given a signal proof of their jealousy and aversion toward Athens. Thespizæ had been reduced to extreme weakness by the loss which it had suffered in the cause of Thebes, at the battle of Delium. Yet the year following the Thebans took advantage of the helplessness of the Thespians, and charging them with a leaning toward Athens, demolished their walls. But on similar grounds the oligarchs of Bœotia and Megara, closely united in principles and

¹ Thuc. v. 31. τὴν ἐνθήκην παραίρωντες — "alleging the agreement in which it was declared that the parties should be left at the close of the war in possession of all the places which they possessed at the beginning of it." This seems to refer to the fundamental preliminary agreement, which Thucydides describes, v. 17., in very different terms — ἐνισχυόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς & ἐκάτεροι πάλῃ μὴ ἔχειν ἀποδόντας τὴν ἐχθρὴν ποιήσθαι. Otherwise we must suppose that the Peloponnesian confederates had given each other a guarantee to this effect before the war.

² Though, as Dr. Arnold observes (Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 578.) the Bœotians were certainly not despised by the Lacedæmonians, yet both they and the Megarians might think that they had been slighted and neglected, both in the terms of the peace and in the preference which had been given to the Athenian alliance.

³ Thuc. iv. 109.

interests with one another, shrank from all friendly relations to the democratical government of Argos.

The new confederacy, which was opposed to the two most powerful states of Greece, did not yet appear to the Corinthians sufficiently strong, and they were very anxious to obtain the accession of the Arcadians, who if united under Argos would form a safe barrier against Sparta. For this purpose the concurrence of Tegea was most important, and might be expected to draw over the smaller Arcadian towns. Envoys were sent from Corinth and Argos to Tegea, to invite the Tegeans to join the Argive league. But they were attached to Sparta both by ancient recollections and by their enmity to Mantinea, and declined to take any step in opposition to their old ally. The ardour of the Corinthians was cooled by this disappointment, and they began to fear that they had embarked in a perilous undertaking. They however tried to gain Bœotia to their cause; but their persuasions could not overcome the repugnance which was there felt to the alliance with Argos. They then tried another expedient for securing the protection at least of the Bœotians against the danger which threatened them on the side of Athens. Soon after the peace an indefinite truce terminable at ten days' notice had been concluded between Athens and Bœotia, and had continued ever since. The Corinthians endeavoured to induce the Bœotians to insist on the same truce being granted to Corinth, and if this was refused to renounce it themselves. The Bœotians consented indeed to apply to Athens on their behalf; but when their demand was evaded by the answer, "that the Corinthians, as allies of Sparta, did not need any separate truce with Athens," they would not forego the benefit of the armistice, though strongly urged by the Corinthian envoys who pretended to have received their promise to that effect. Hostilities remained suspended between Athens and Corinth, but without the forms of a truce.

The summer however did not pass without warfare

The Phocians and Locrians hitherto united against Athens turned their arms against each other ; and the Lacedæmonians took the field under the command of Plistoanax to break to pieces the little empire which the Mantineans had established, under the name of a confederacy, among the cantons of the district of Parrhasia in the southern part of Arcadia. Here they had fortified a place called Cypsela in a threatening position near the borders of Laconia, from which it was a main object of Sparta to dislodge them. All the forces of Mantinea were not more than sufficient to resist this attack, and while they were sent out to guard the frontier, the capital was entrusted to an Argive garrison. But they either came too late, or were found too weak. Plistoanax succeeded in both the objects of his expedition ; he restored the Parrhasians to independence, and destroyed the obnoxious fortress. About the same time the Spartan government made a provision for the security of Lepreum, by which it freed itself from an internal source of disquietude. The helots who had served under Brasidas, on their return from Thrace, were emancipated, and shortly afterwards transplanted to Lepreum, with a body of persons of a similar class, who, under the name of *Neodamodes* (new commoners), enjoyed a franchise which had probably been transmitted to them by various degrees from servile ancestors. In the north Sciene was compelled to surrender at discretion ; and Cleon's bloody decree was carried into complete execution. The male inhabitants were put to death ; the women and children made slaves. It does not appear whether this atrocious deed was the subject of a fresh deliberation at Athens, or was ordered as a matter of course by the officer who conducted the siege. The lands of the exterminated people were granted to the Platæans who had lost the prospect of recovering their native soil.

The Delians were more fortunate. During the year's truce the Athenians, perhaps referring their reverses to the anger of Apollo, and wishing to atone for the pro-

fanation of his sanctuary at Delium, completed the purification of Delos, by removing the whole population of the island. There was some ground of ancient tradition—which Thucydides perhaps thought too absurd to record—for treating the Delians as a polluted race, unfit to be ministers of the sanctuary. Their expulsion was no doubt the effect of an honest superstition. But the manner in which it was executed seems to indicate that there was some foundation for the statement of Diodorus, that they had incurred the displeasure of Athens by their attachment to Sparta. It is easier to conceive how they might have taken such a bias, than to understand in what way they could have betrayed it. But the sequel seems to show that there was a connection between them and the Delphic oracle, which may have afforded them opportunities of injuring Athens. The Athenians, when they drove the islanders from their homes, assigned no other place for their habitation, but left them to shift for themselves as they could; and they were reduced to the necessity of accepting an asylum which was opened to them by the Persian satrap Pharnaces, at Adramyttium on the coast of Æolis. Here they remained until the summer of 421, when the conscience of the Athenians was enlightened by the Delphic oracle, which attributed the disaster that had been brought upon them by the incapacity of their general, through their own folly, to their impious expulsion of the people of Apollo: and enjoined them to recall the outcasts to their island.

The barbarous punishment of Scione was ill adapted to conciliate the other revolted towns. It probably confirmed the resistance of Amphipolis; and the Chalcidians appear to have gained ground in the peninsula of Athos.¹ The Athenians complained that Sparta did not execute her part in the treaty, began to suspect that they had been deceived, and to regret that they had restored the

¹ Thuc. v. 35. The reading *Δικτιδῆς* is unintelligible; *Δῖης* inconsistent with v. 82. Poppo's conjecture, *Χαλκιδῆς* or *αἱ Χ.*, seems the most probable.

Spartan prisoners. The Spartan government maintained that it had given a sufficient proof of its sincerity, when it restored its Athenian prisoners, and recalled its troops from Thrace, and professed to be willing to do every thing that lay in its power toward the execution of the treaty; and in return required the Athenians to evacuate Pylus, or at least to put an Athenian garrison there in the room of the Messenians and revolted helots who infested its territory. But in its anxiety to recover this important post, it had amused the Athenians with promises which it must have known to be futile, of compelling their revolted subjects to submit, and the Bœotians and Corinthians, and others of its own allies, to accept the treaty. The Athenians, seeing no step taken toward the fulfilment of these promises, would not be satisfied with the excuses which were offered instead, and were with difficulty prevailed upon to withdraw the garrison from Pylus, by the assurance that Sparta would use her utmost efforts to induce the Bœotians to restore Panactum and their Athenian prisoners; but the Messenians and their comrades were only removed to the neighbouring island of Cephallenia.

Hitherto, although the complaints of the Athenians were not unreasonable, their suspicions of the Spartan government were unfounded. But in the autumn of 421, the ephors by whom the treaties had been concluded went out of office; and among their successors were men who were adverse to the new relations between their country and Athens, and who exercised great influence over their colleagues. A congress which was held soon after at Sparta, and was attended by ministers from Corinth and Bœotia, afforded an opportunity to Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who were most eager to dissolve the connection with Athens, of concerting an intrigue for that end. After the breaking up of the congress, which a long debate brought no nearer to an agreement, they drew the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies into a private conference with some other Spartans of their party, and counselled the Bœotians, if they wished

to avoid being forced into an alliance with Athens, to make common cause with Corinth, and first to enter into the Argive confederacy themselves, and then to bring Sparta also into it. "The alliance with Argos was so desirable to Sparta, that she would be willing to purchase it even at the cost of a rupture with Athens; as she would then be able to sustain a war with any power north of Peloponnesus. But before she could safely renew the contest with Athens, it was necessary that she should recover Pylus; and for this purpose the Bœotians must consent to deliver up Panactum to be exchanged for it."

As the envoys were returning home with this message, they fell in with two of the chief magistrates of Argos, who had been waiting for them to make a similar proposal. They urged the Bœotians to unite with Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, in their league with Argos; and held out as an inducement the advantage which such a union would give them in their future transactions, whether of war or peace, with Sparta or any other state. The Bœotian envoys willingly listened to overtures which so nearly coincided with the plan of their Spartan friends¹, and the Argive magistrates, finding them so well disposed, promised to send an embassy to Bœotia. The Bœotarchs, when they heard the report of their ministers, gladly adopted the proposal of the Spartan ephors, which removed all their objections to the Argive alliance. They welcomed the embassy which soon after came from Argos, and promised to send one thither to conclude a treaty. The first step toward the execution of their plan was to make an alliance offensive and defensive with Corinth, Megara, and the Chalcidian towns, and it was agreed that Bœotia and Megara should then become confederates of Argos. It was however neces-

¹ If Thucydides did not so distinctly attribute the coincidence to chance (*κατὰ τύχην* v. 37.), and if any reason could be assigned why the two Argives should have concealed their communication, if they had any, with Sparta, we might suppose that they acted in concert with Cleobulus and Xenares. But the concealment of that fact tended rather to thwart than to promote the plan.

sary that the agreement privately made by the Bœotarchs with the Corinthian envoys should first be ratified by the four great councils of Bœotia ; but the Bœotarchs believed that they should there meet with passive acquiescence. They did not therefore think it necessary to disclose their secret understanding with their Spartan friends. But the councils were filled by men strongly averse to a breach with Sparta ; and as they apprehended that this might be the consequence of the proposed union with Corinth, they rejected the measure. The government did not now venture to make any mention of the Argive alliance, or to send the promised embassy to Argos, and without any settled design waited for a more favourable turn of affairs.

But in the course of the next winter envoys came from Sparta to obtain possession of Panactum and of the Athenian prisoners detained by the Bœotians, for the purpose of exchanging them against Pylus, and they had perhaps been instructed to suggest a new method of attaining the end which the preceding clandestine negotiations had failed to compass. The Bœotian government consented to deliver up the fortress and the prisoners to Sparta, on condition that she should conclude a separate alliance with Bœotia as she had with the Athenians. This was admitted to be a breach of the treaty with Athens, either in the spirit or the letter¹, and was therefore just what the party of Cleobulus and Xenares desired ; and it had now become powerful enough to carry this point. In the spring of 420 the treaty was concluded ; but when the Spartan commissioners came to receive the prisoners, and to take possession of Panactum, they found that it had been dismantled by order of the Bœotian government, which pleaded an ancient com-

¹ Thuc. v. 39. εἰρημίονον ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μήτε σπίνδισθαί τω μίτε πολέμειν. Yet here again no such clause occurs in either of the treaties, nor is there any which appears to require such a construction. But perhaps it was understood to be implied either in the concluding article of the treaty of alliance (ὅν δὲ τι δοκῇ κ τ λ) or in the provision made for the case in which the territory of either party should be invaded ; when neither was to conclude a peace with the enemy without the other's consent. It may however have been the subject of a distinct subsequent decree, such as the one mentioned v. 80. as following a treaty of alliance.

pact between Bœotia and Athens : that the ground on which Panactum stood should not be exclusively occupied by either nation, but should be held by both in common.

But the intelligence of these proceedings created great alarm at Argos, where their real nature and objects were not known, and it was supposed that they had taken place with the consent of Athens, and that the Bœotians had been induced to enter into the Athenian alliance. Argos did not fear the power of Sparta, so long as she could reckon on support from Athens. But she felt that she must soon be overwhelmed by a confederacy which included Sparta, Athens, and Bœotia ; and she therefore hastened to make her peace with Sparta. Two envoys, recommended by their personal or political connections, were despatched to Sparta with pacific overtures. The chief obstacle still lay in the little border district of Cynuria, which Argos wished to recover, and Sparta refused to cede. It was a question in which the Argives felt their national honour concerned ; and their envoys did not venture altogether to drop their claim ; but as the Spartans peremptorily rejected it, and would not even consent to refer it to arbitration, they devised a somewhat singular expedient for reconciling it with the more pressing object of their mission. They prevailed on the Spartan government to conclude a peace for fifty years, but to let a clause be inserted in the treaty, making it lawful for either party, at any time, when the other was not engaged in war or suffering from any epidemic sickness, to demand a combat for the possession of Cynuria, like that which was celebrated in ancient legends for the exploit of Othryades ; on the condition that the victorious champions should not pursue the vanquished beyond the border of the disputed territory. Absurd as the proposal now sounded to the Spartans, it served the purpose of a decent compromise ; and the treaty drawn up on these terms was sent to Argos for the sanction of the people, and, if approved, was to be ratified at the approaching festival of the Hyacinthia at Sparta.

But in the meanwhile the Spartan commissioners appointed to deliver up Panactum and the prisoners, met with a very angry reception at Athens. They strove in vain to demonstrate that the destruction of the fortress was equivalent to its restitution; and the Athenians were no less indignant at the separate treaty which Sparta had concluded with the Bœotians, whom not long before she had undertaken to force into their alliance. They now enumerated their other grounds of complaint, which they viewed as so many proofs of Spartan duplicity, and dismissed the envoys with a sharp answer.

There was at Athens, as at Sparta, a party which aimed at severing the ties that bound the two states together; and the irritation now prevailing in the people encouraged it to redouble its exertions. It was headed by an extraordinary man, who henceforward becomes the most conspicuous person in the history of his age, Alcibiades the son of Clinias. Though his name is mentioned for the first time on this occasion by Thucydides, and he was now but little past the age of thirty, which at Sparta and in other Greek states, as once perhaps at Athens, was the earliest at which a citizen could take part in public business, the eyes of his countrymen had for several years been turned towards him with anxious attention. Both by his father's and his mother's side he was connected with the noblest of the Eupatrids. He traced his paternal line, through Eurysaces son of Ajax, to Æacus and the king of the gods; his mother Dinomache daughter of Megacles belonged to the house of the Alcmaeonids, and he thus reckoned Cleisthenes, the friend of the commonalty, among his ancestors. His paternal ancestor Alcibiades had also distinguished himself as an enemy of the Pisistratids.¹ His father Clinias had equipped a galley and manned it with 200 men at his own charge in the Persian war, and fell at the battle of Coronæa², leaving Alcibiades a child, perhaps seven or eight years old; and Pericles and his brother

¹ Isocr. De Big. 10.

² Herod. viii. 17. Plut. Alc. 1.

³ He must have been past twenty when he served under Phormio at Potidæa in 432, and therefore could not have been less than five years old at the

Ariphron as related to him by the female side, became his guardians. He inherited one of the largest fortunes in Athens; and it was no doubt husbanded during his minority, with the same economy which Pericles exercised in his own domestic affairs. To these advantages of birth and fortune, nature added some still rarer endowments: a person, which in every stage of his life was even at Athens remarked with admiration for its extraordinary comeliness¹: a mind of singular versatility, a spirit which, like that of the people itself, shrank from no enterprise, and bent before no obstacle. Even in his childish sports and exercises he attracted notice by the signs which he gave of an inflexible energy of purpose. It was remembered that he once laid himself down before the wheels of a waggon which was passing through a narrow street, to prevent it from interrupting his boyish game.² His petulance did not even spare his masters³; and his authority decided the taste of his young companions.⁴ It may easily be believed that all the vigilance of his guardians was scarcely sufficient to keep him within the bounds of law and usage, though Plutarch could not report with confidence any of the numerous stories afterwards told of his youthful excesses.⁵ The love of pleasure was always strong in him, but never predominant; even in his earlier years it seems to have been subordinate to the desire of notoriety and applause, which gradually ripened into a more manly ambition. But his vanity was coupled with an overweening pride, which displayed itself in a contemptuous disregard for the rights and feelings of others; and often broke through all restraints both of justice and prudence.

death of his father in 447, but probably was a few years older. Mr. Clinton (Tables B. C. 423. 2.) seems not to acknowledge the force of this inference.

¹ Of which he seems to have been always extremely vain. Even as general he is said to have worn a shield inlaid with gold and ivory with the device of Love hurling the thunderbolt (Satyrus in Athenæus, xii. p. 534.). In Aglaophon's picture he was represented καλλίον τῶν γυναικῶν προσώπων. The description of his son, who aped him, quoted from Archippus by Plutarch, Alc. 1., shows that the father was likewise affected in his carriage, and perhaps in his lip: κλασανχηνύται τι καὶ τραυλίζονται.

² Plut. Alc. 2.

³ Ibid. 7.

⁴ Ibid. 2.

⁵ But the homicide in the palaestra was probably quite justifiable. Plut. Alc. 3.

At the age — not later than eighteen — when the Athenian laws permitted him to take possession of his inheritance, Alcibiades found himself his own master, with an ample fortune at his command, in the city which beyond every other in Greece abounded in fuel for his passions, and opened the widest field for his ambition, then at the height of its prosperity, in the security of peace, enriched and adorned with the fruits of conquest, commerce, and art, under the government of his kinsman Pericles. Such a person in such a place could not fail to be soon surrounded by a large circle of admiring companions, of needy parasites, and aspiring adventurers, drawn to him by various motives, but all conspiring to deceive and corrupt him by their flattery and their counsels. It was also the time when the controversies which had long been carried on in the ancient schools of philosophy had been succeeded by an interval of general lassitude, despondence, and indifference to philosophical truth, which afforded room for a new class of pretenders to wisdom, who, in a sense which they first attached to the word, were called Sophists. They professed a science, superior to all the elder forms of philosophy, which it balanced against each other with the perfect impartiality of universal scepticism; and an art, which treated them all as instruments, useless indeed for the discovery of truth, but equally capable of exhibiting a fallacious appearance of it. They offered their instructions to all who, possessing a sufficient capacity, regarded the pursuit of fame, wealth, and power as the great business of life; and undertook to furnish them with the means of acquiring that ascendancy over the minds of men, which is readily yielded to superior wisdom and virtue, by the simple force of words. As according to their view there was no real difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, the proper learning of a statesman consisted in the arts of argument and persuasion by which he might sway the opinions of others on every subject at his pleasure; and these were the arts which they practised and taught.

The democratical states, and Athens in particular, presented the most frequent opportunities for the application of these doctrines, and the highest rewards for the successful cultivation of such studies ; and the Athenian youth eagerly crowded round the most eminent masters of the new school.

The growing boldness and influence of the Sophists roused the opposition of Socrates, the founder of the Attic philosophy. Victorious in dispute, he was seldom able to counteract the allurements which they held out to the indolence and presumption of their disciples. Alcibiades was one of the young men whom he endeavoured to save from their snares ; and this contest was one of the utmost moment for the destiny of Athens and of Greece. Socrates saw in him many elements of a noble character, which might be easily perverted ; abilities which might greatly serve, or fatally injure his country ; a strength of will, capable of the most arduous enterprises, and the more dangerous if it took a wrong direction ; an ardent love of glory, which needed to be purified and enlightened ; and he endeavoured to win all these advantages for truth, virtue, and the public good. It was one of the best tokens of a generous nature in Alcibiades, that he could strongly relish the conversation of Socrates, and deeply admire his exalted character, notwithstanding his repulsive exterior, and the wide difference of station and habits by which they were parted. They not only lived for a time in a very intimate intercourse at Athens, but were thrown together in situations which tended to strengthen the hold that the sage had taken on the affection of his young friend. They served together under Phormio at Potidæa, and in one of the engagements which took place during the siege, Alcibiades, severely wounded, was rescued from the enemy by Socrates.¹ The crown and panoply, the reward of valour, appear to have been due to Socrates ; but, through the partiality which under all political institu-

¹ The impertinent scepticism of Demochares in *Athenæus* v. c. 55. is well refuted by Casaubon.

tions is commonly shown for birth and wealth, they were awarded to the young Eupatrid, though he proclaimed the superior merit of his preserver, who on the other hand attested the prowess of Alcibiades. They were again comrades at the battle of Delium; and Alcibiades, who was mounted, had an opportunity of protecting his friend from their pursuers.¹ But this intimacy produced no lasting fruits. It was the immediate object of Socrates to moderate the confidence and self-complacency of Alcibiades, to raise his standard of excellence, to open his eyes to his own defects, and to convince him that he needed a long course of inward discipline before he could engage safely and usefully in the conduct of public affairs. But Alcibiades was impatient to enter on the brilliant career which lay before him: the mark toward which his wise monitor directed his aims, though he felt it to be the most truly glorious, was not only distant and hard to reach, but would probably have diverted him from the darling objects of his ambitious hopes. He feared to grow old at the feet of Socrates, charmed into a fine vision of ideal greatness, while the substance of power, honours, and pleasure, slipped from his grasp. He forced himself away from the siren philosophy, which would have beguiled him into the thralldom of reason and conscience, that he might listen to the plainer counsels of those who exhorted him to seize the good which lay within his reach, to give his desires their widest range, to cultivate the arts by which they might be most surely and easily gratified, and to place unbounded confidence in his own genius and energy. Before he entirely withdrew from the society of Socrates he had probably begun to seek it chiefly for the sake of that dialectic subtilty, which Socrates possessed in an unequalled degree, and which was an instrument of the highest value for his own purposes. His estrangement from his teacher's train of thinking and feeling, manifested itself not so much in the objects of his ambition, as in the methods by which he pursued them.

¹ Plato, *Conviv.* p. 221.

It became more and more evident, that he had lost, not only all true loftiness of aim, but all the sincerity and openness of an upright soul; and the quality which in the end stamped his character, was the singular flexibility with which he adapted himself to tastes and habits most foreign to his own, and assumed the exterior of those whose good will he desired to gain.¹

The advice with which he is said to have urged Pericles to kindle the Peloponnesian war, may at least be considered as a genuine expression of his own recklessness in the choice of means for his ends. Popular favour was the step by which he hoped to mount to power; and to ingratiate himself with the people he stooped to flattery such as Pericles would have disdained to use²; but Alcibiades reconciled himself to the sacrifice of dignity by the consciousness of superior ingenuity and address. He would seem to have taken Themistocles for his model, and like him to have found pleasure in artifices and intrigues, so as to prefer a crooked path, even when the straight one might have led to the same end. Nevertheless, though artful and dexterous, he was far from being circumspect in his conduct, and as lightly provoked the enmity of individuals by wanton injuries and affronts, as he was sedulous in paying court to the people; and hence the feeling of mingled fondness and admiration with which he was regarded by the multitude, was early and often chilled by resentment and suspicion. Even the use he made of his wealth — which he greatly increased by a marriage with Hipparete, the daughter of Hipponicus, the richest man in Greece³ — tended as much to give umbrage to his fellow

¹ Plut. Alc. 23. "His changes were as rapid as those of the chameleon. Though that, it is said, cannot turn its colour to white; but there was no habit or pursuit which Alcibiades, to whom good and bad were indifferent, could not and would not imitate and adopt."

² Andecides, Alcib. p. 31., διατιτίλειν ἀθεόους μὲν ὑμᾶς πολυκαίον, ἑνὸς δ' ἱεσσοῦν προσηλακίζον.

³ Nepos Alcib. 2. Omnium Græca lingua loquentium divitissimum. So Isocr. De Big. 13. Πλεῖστα πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων. See Boeckh. Staats d. Ath. iv. 3. Alcibiades received a portion of ten talents with his wife, the largest that had ever been heard of: it was to be doubled on the birth of a son.

citizens, as to gain their good will. He was not only liberal to profusion in the legal and customary contributions, with which at Athens the affluent charged themselves, as well to provide for certain parts of the naval service, as to defray the expense of the public spectacles, but aspired to dazzle all Greece at the national games, by magnificence, such as had never been displayed there even by the kings of Macedonia, or by the opulent princes of Syracuse and Cyrene.¹ He contended at Olympia with seven chariots in the same race; and won the first, second, and third or fourth crown; success unexampled as the competition.² He afterwards feasted all the spectators³; and the entertainment was not more remarkable for its profusion and for the multitude of the guests, than for the new kind of homage paid to him by the subjects of Athens. The Ephesians pitched a splendid Persian tent for him; the Chians furnished provender for his horses; the Cyzicenes victims for the sacrifice; the Lesbians wine, and other requisites for the banquet.⁴ His interest was supposed to be powerful enough to induce the Elean judges to give a partial sentence in his favour.⁵ On his return to Athens he engaged Euripides, the favourite poet of the day, to compose the panegyric ode⁶, and dedicated two pictures, works of Aglaophqñ, to commemorate his victory; one representing him as crowned by the powers of the Olympic and the Pythian festival, the other as an exquisitely beautiful youth, reclining on the knees of Nemea.⁷

¹ So Plut. Alc. ii. Alcibiades himself in Thucyd. vi. 16. speaks more moderately (*ὡσαυδὺς καὶ ἰδιώτης πρῶτον*) probably to avoid an invidious comparison.

² We are not aware that the Olympiad can be certainly fixed. But it was probably Ol. 89. B. C. 424. His marriage was before the battle of Delium (Andocid. p. 30.) and his victory at Olympia was about the same time, according to Isocr. Big. 14. In the next Olympiad the chariot of Lichas was victorious. Ol. 88. seems too early for the allusion, Thuc. vi. 16. *πρῶτον ἰππίζοντι αὐτὸν καταπαισολιμῆσθαι*: not to mention that the Lesbians were then at war with Athens.

³ Athenæus, l. p. 3. Plut. Alc. 12. πολλοὺς.

⁴ Plut. Alc. 12. Andoc. p. 33 compared with Satyrus in Athenæus, xii. p. 534. But the comparison suggests a suspicion, that Satyrus amplified the fact mentioned by Andocides and Plutarch into an habitual practice: *τὰς ἐπεσημίας ὅσοι ἐτίλλονται*.

⁵ Andoc. Alc. p. 32.

⁶ Plut. Alc. 11.

⁷ Satyrus in Athen. u. s.

Reflecting men could not but ask, whether any private fortune could support such an expenditure, and whether such honours were in harmony with a spirit of civil equality. This anxiety was the more reasonable, as Alcibiades seemed to love to show that he considered himself as a privileged person, raised above the laws; and as he is said once to have disfigured a valuable animal, merely that his caprice might become the topic of general conversation¹, so it was evident that in his most illegal acts he rather sought to attract public attention, than hoped to escape it. The people cherished this wilful humour by the partial indulgence with which they repaid his flattery. His first appearance in the assembly was marked by a significant specimen of popular levity and good nature. He was passing by, when several citizens were offering donations to the treasury. He followed their example, and was greeted with loud applause. In the delight which he felt at this first taste of popularity he suffered a tame quail, which according to the fashion of the young Athenians, he carried about with him, to escape from under his cloak; and the business of the assembly was interrupted, until the bird was caught, and restored to Alcibiades;—by the same Antiochus who, first recommended to him by this trivial service, afterwards involved him in one of his greatest misfortunes.² This indeed was not quite so extravagant a condescension as was once shown to Cleon, who, one day after he had kept the assembly a long while waiting for him, entered it with a garland on his head, and begged that it might be adjourned to the morrow, because he had just sacrificed to the gods and had to entertain some strangers at home; and obtained his request.³ But the impunity with which Alcibiades was permitted to commit offences which would have been severely punished in any other citizen was both unseemly and dangerous. The violence with which he detained the

¹ Plut. Alc. 9. Where a different turn is given to the story.

² Ibid. 10. Compare Xenophon Hellen. i. 5. 11.

³ Plut. Nic. 7.

painter Agatharchus for three or four months in his house, and forced him to adorn it with his pencil¹; the blow with which, in sheer wantonness, for a sportive wager, he insulted Hipponicus, whose daughter he afterwards married²; the threats, or the plot, of assassination with which he terrified his brother-in-law Callias³; the outrages with which he revenged himself on his enemies⁴, or tried the patience of his friends⁵; might be thought frolics which did not concern the public. But the majesty of the commonwealth was violated, when he disturbed the Dionysiac festival by an assault on a competitor in the midst of the spectacle⁶; when he used the sacred vessels belonging to the state, while they were required for a public procession at Olympia, to adorn that with which he celebrated his victory⁷; when to protect the Thasian poet Hegemon from a lawsuit, he went openly to the public archives, and destroyed the record⁸; when after having compelled his wife Hipparete by his ill treatment to leave his house, and to sue for a divorce, he seized her in the presence of the Archon, and dragged her home.⁹ There were also rumours, which formed the groundwork of a comedy of Eupolis, of secret orgies, in which Alcibiades acted a principal part, and which outraged not only good manners but religion.¹⁰ Yet it would seem that some of the most prudent citizens, who observed his conduct with uneasiness, thought it best to connive at it. The light in which they viewed him is indicated by an image which Æschylus, in a comedy of Aristophanes¹¹, is made to apply to Alcibiades:—"A lion's whelp ought not to be reared in a city; but

¹ Andoc. p. 31. Demosthenes, Mid. p. 562, seems to have heard a different story.

² Plut. Alc. 8.

³ Andoc. p. 31. Plut. Alc. 8.

⁴ We allude to the story of Eupolis (Cic. ad Ath. vi. 1.) only as an illustration.

⁵ Plut. Alc. 4.

⁶ Andoc. p. 31. Demosth. Mid. p. 562.

⁷ Andoc. p. 33. See Dissen's Pindar, Excurs. i. p. 264.

⁸ Chamæleon in Athenæus ix. p. 407.

⁹ Andoc. p. 30. Plut. Alc. 8.

¹⁰ See Buttmann, Mytholog. ii. p. 164. What Thucydides says (vi. 15.) of his *παρά το λατρεῖν εὖμα κακωφιλία* was probably connected with these rumours.

¹¹ Ran. 1427.

whoever rears one, must let him have his way." Many who saw that Alcibiades was unfolding a character which could scarcely find room for itself in the midst of institutions like those of Athens, might believe that it was likely to become still more dangerous if provoked by resistance and punishment.

During the first ten years of the war Alcibiades had served, as we have seen, with honour in several campaigns; but he had acquired much more celebrity by his private adventures than by his exploits in the field, or by his appearance in the popular assembly. Though his youth did not disqualify him for taking part in the public counsels, as it did for military command, he seems to have come forward but seldom, or with little effect, so long as Cleon retained his ascendancy. His eloquence is described as almost irresistibly powerful¹; and its efficacy, which was undoubtedly much heightened by the graces of his person and manner, is said to have been rather increased than impaired by a slight defect in his voice.² But it would appear to have been slowly matured. He was fastidious in the choice of his expressions, and did not always possess a fluency of language equal to the quickness of his conceptions, so that when he spoke without preparation, he was often obliged to pause, hesitate, and recommence an unfinished period.³ This was an impediment which must have been painful to his vanity, and contrasted with Cleon's volubility, placed him under a disadvantage, which may have retarded the beginning of his political career. Yet at the time which our narrative has now reached he seems already to have distinguished himself as the author of one important measure; for it appears to have been before the peace of Nicias that he carried a decree for raising the tribute of the allies⁴, and having himself

¹ Nepos, Alc. i. Disertus, ut in primis dicendo valeret, quod tanta erat commendatio oris atque orationis, ut nemo ei dicendo posset resistere. Demosth. Mid. p. 562. λέγειν ἰδόντι πάντων, ὡς φασιν, ἵνα δυνάτατος: not expressing his own opinion, as Plut. Alc. 10. represents it.

² Plut. Alc. i. A slight lisp (τραυλότης), in which his son affected to imitate him.

³ Theophrastus in Plut. Alc. 10.

⁴ Boeckh St. d. A. iii. 15.

been appointed one of ten commissioners for that purpose, he doubled the amount at which it had been fixed by Aristides. There was perhaps no ground for the charge afterwards brought against him, of having enriched himself on this occasion by the abuse of his authority ; but the measure itself indicated that he had adopted the policy which had founded the dominion of Athens on force and terror, and that he intended to carry it to a still greater length. Cleon's death opened a broader avenue for him ; and he saw no rival but Nicias standing in his way, whose opposition he had reason to fear. Cleon indeed had left behind him a man of similar character, who pushed himself into a temporary celebrity by similar arts, and is therefore commonly represented as his successor, and as having obtained the same kind of political ascendancy. This was the lamp maker Hyperbolus ; a man of so base extraction, that if we may believe the assertion of a contemporary orator¹, his father was a branded slave, and was employed as a workman in the public mint at the same time that the son was taking a conspicuous part in the deliberations of the popular assembly. But Cleon possessed talents enough to be extremely mischievous ; Hyperbolus seems only to have had impudence and malignity sufficient to make him infamous and hateful. He was eminent enough among the public men of his day to be a mark for the comic poets, to whom his birth, condition, and character afforded inexhaustible materials for satire. But his importance is not to be measured by his notoriety. To Thucydides he appeared so contemptible, that he is only induced to mention him by the extraordinary circumstances of his death ; though the occasion by which he was driven, as we shall see, from the political stage, might have been thought memorable enough to deserve notice. Among the other competitors of Alcibiades, Andocides son of Leogoras, and Phæax son of Erasistratus, were the most prominent. Andocides was of noble family, and a pleasing though not a powerful orator : but his cha-

¹ Andocides ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1001.

racter inspired as little confidence as that of Alcibiades, whom he resembled only in his vices. Phæax was likewise of good birth, and engaging manners, but was deficient as a public speaker. The time therefore had come when Alcibiades might reasonably hope to reach the highest place "in the commonwealth, which" was itself only the first step in the scale of his ambition.

Neither Cleon nor Nicias could properly be said to be heads of a party. Cleon's strength lay in the lowest class of the people, to whose passions he ministered: Nicias was supported by all who dreaded or hated Cleon. The personal motives which led him to desire peace were indeed shared by many among them, but did not form the bond of their union. The turn which the war had taken had created a general wish for a cessation of hostilities with Sparta. Alcibiades, on the other hand, restless and sanguine, had much more to hope than to fear from war; and he exercised an extensive influence over the Athenian youth of the higher orders. But he himself saw the necessity of yielding to the universal call for peace, and would willingly have taken the lead in the negotiations which were opened with Sparta, that the treaty might be considered as his work. His family had of old been connected with Sparta by ties of hospitality, but his grandfather had broken off this relation. Alcibiades would have renewed it; and signified his wish to conciliate the Spartans by good offices towards the prisoners of Sphacteria, in which he vied with Nicias. But the Spartan government did not meet those advances; and preferred the alliance of Nicias to that of a young man who had not yet given any proofs that he could be either formidable or useful to them. Alcibiades, disappointed and provoked by the advantage given to his rival, and the slight shown to himself, endeavoured from the first to impede the negotiations for peace, by attributing perfidious intentions to the Spartans, who, he contended, only wanted to gain time for concluding a treaty with Argos, and as soon as they had secured themselves on

that state, would renew the war with Athens. He had since industriously fanned the jealousy which had been excited in the people through the improvident selfishness of Sparta; and the machinations of the Spartan party which was labouring for the same end with himself now afforded him an opportunity of taking a great step toward the execution of his designs.

He had friends at Argos, to whom he privately sent word that the Athenians were now in a temper to listen to proposals for an alliance with Argos. This indeed he perceived to be the most natural and advantageous connection for both states, though he was conscious of other motives for bringing it about. His message was gladly received at Argos; the negotiation with Sparta was immediately dropped, and an embassy accompanied by envoys from Elis and Mantinea, was despatched to Athens. The Spartan government lost no time in endeavouring to prevent this formidable coalition, and sent three ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, selected as personally acceptable to the Athenians, to make such apologies and offers as might divert them from entering into it. Endius belonged to the Spartan family with which that of Alcibiades had been anciently connected, and from which he derived his name; and he was probably chosen for the purpose of soothing and winning Alcibiades; but the consequence was that Alcibiades the more easily overreached him and his colleagues. They were first introduced to the council of Five Hundred, where they announced that they were come with full powers to terminate all differences; and their explanations and proposals were received with such approbation as to alarm Alcibiades for the effect which they might produce in the assembly of the people. Taking advantage therefore of the confidence which he gained through his relation to Endius, he assumed the character of a friend, and promised with solemn assurances to aid them in obtaining the restitution of Pylus, the main object of their mission, which he had hitherto stre-

quously opposed, and in re-establishing a good understanding between the two states; but he persuaded them that it would be dangerous to let the assembly know the extent of their powers, and made it a condition of his co-operation, that they should disavow them. The Spartans fell into this trap, and when in the assembly they were questioned as to their commission, they made the answer which had been concerted with Alcibiades. But he now convicted them of self-contradiction, and, armed with such specious evidence of their doubledealing, inveighed more vehemently than ever against Spartan insincerity, and urged the people to break off all negotiation with them, and at once to close with the proposals of Argos; and this motion would have been immediately carried, if the shock of an earthquake had not interrupted the business of the day.

The correspondence between the Spartan envoys and Alcibiades had been concealed from Nicias, whose concurrence did not appear to be needed, and he was as much surprised as he had reason to be offended by the conduct of the Spartans. Still in the assembly which was held the next day, he endeavoured to heal the breach made through their imprudence, and urged the expediency of ascertaining the intentions of Sparta before her alliance was abandoned for that of Argos. The delay required for this purpose could neither injure the interest nor the dignity of Athens, which occupied the vantage ground, and had no reason either to fear or to wish for war, while the power and pride of Sparta had suffered a severe shock. His arguments or authority prevailed on the people to send him to Sparta at the head of an embassy, which was instructed to demand satisfaction on the three most important points on which the Athenians felt themselves aggrieved: the restitution of Amphipolis, the rebuilding of Panactum, and the dissolution of the separate alliance with Bœotia. This last was the point which the Spartan government was most unwilling to concede; and when the Athe-

nian envoys insisted on it as an indispensable condition, on which alone Athens would decline to connect herself in like manner with Argos, Xenares and his party obtained a majority for returning a positive refusal. All that Nicias could carry to prevent his mission from appearing entirely fruitless, was that the existing treaties should be ratified afresh. But the issue of the embassy, when reported at Athens, excited great indignation against Sparta, and murmurs against himself as the author of the once desired and applauded peace. Alcibiades no longer met with any opposition when he renewed his motion; and a treaty was immediately concluded with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, for an alliance offensive and defensive, to last a hundred years. One of its articles provided that none of the parties should allow the enemies of the rest to pass through its territory or to cross the sea; a clause which could only concern Athens. The terms on which each was to send succour to its allies were exactly regulated. In a common war the command was to be equally shared by the confederates. No new articles were to be added but by unanimous consent.

Still this treaty was not construed as putting an end to those which subsisted between Sparta and Athens. Corinth did not enter into it, but, as the breach between Sparta and Athens grew wider, became more disposed for a reconciliation with her old ally; and she had already betrayed this change in her views, by rejecting a proposal which had been made to her, to contract an offensive alliance, in addition to her former engagements, with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea. Peloponnesus remained tranquil for the rest of the year, though in the middle of the summer it was threatened with a general outbreak of hostilities through the animosity cherished by Elis against Sparta on the score of Lepreum, which, as she could not safely vent it in any other way, she attempted to gratify by an abuse of her authority as president of the Olympic games. After the sacred truce for the festival of this summer — the ninetieth Olympiad —

had been proclaimed according to the usual form in the Elean territory, but before the heralds had arrived at Sparta, a Lacedæmonian force had marched to Lepreum, and had made an attempt upon a fortress named Phyrus, which seems to have been either in Elis or in the hands of the Eleans. They seized this pretext to sentence the Spartans to a fine, which being — according to what was called the Olympic law — proportioned to the number of the troops employed in the breach of the truce, amounted to upwards of thirty-three talents. The Spartans contended that they were not bound by the truce until it had been proclaimed to them, and that the legality of their conduct had been virtually recognised by the Eleans themselves, since the truce was proclaimed at Sparta after the act by which it was now pretended that it had been broken; and they refused to pay the penalty. Still the Eleans seem to have expected that the name of religion would at Sparta be powerful enough to extort great concessions; and they offered, if the Spartans would give up Lepreum, to discharge them from the penalty; remitting the part that belonged to themselves, and paying that which was due to the god in their stead. When this offer was rejected, they demanded that the Spartans, before they were admitted to the approaching festival, should, in the presence of the nation assembled at Olympia, solemnly submit to this sentence, and bind themselves by an oath to pay the fine at some future time. As they refused this acknowledgment, they were put under a ban, and forbidden to celebrate the usual sacrifices at Olympia by a public deputation, and to take part in the games. It was known that they would feel this exclusion very keenly, and the Eleans apprehended that they might disturb the games by a forcible irruption, and not only stationed a body of their own troops to guard the sacred ground, but obtained succours from Argos and Mantinea, and a squadron of Athenian horse. Their fears were redoubled by an occurrence which took place during the games. A Spartan named Lichas had sent a chariot to contend

for the prize ; but as on account of the ban it was not permitted to enter the lists under the name of its owner, he caused it to be described as public property of the Bœotian confederacy. His horses won ; and the Bœotian people was proclaimed victor. But Lichas, who was present, could not forbear from stepping forward, and making the real competitor known by placing a chaplet on the head of his successful charioteer. This was a breach of order, at least in a subject of the state which was excluded from the games ; and Lichas — a man of the first rank in the first city of Peloponnesus — was ignominiously chastised by the Elean lictors. Those who offered this affront could scarcely believe that Sparta would brook it ; yet the games passed off without interruption. Soon after the festival the Argives and their allies made a fresh attempt to draw Corinth over to the new confederacy. Sparta sent envoys to Corinth to counteract their efforts ; but the debate was prematurely closed by an earthquake. Yet the sentiments of the Corinthians were scarcely doubtful, and were soon more clearly discovered.

In the beginning of 419 the Bœotians gave a proof of their zeal in the cause of their allies, which indicated both how little reliance they placed on the continuance of peace, and how low Sparta had sunk in their estimation. In the preceding winter the colonists at the Trachinean Heraclea had been attacked by the united forces of several neighbouring tribes, and been defeated in battle with a great loss. The colony was reduced by this blow to extreme weakness, was unable to repel its enemies ; and its distress was aggravated by the unwise administration of the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesipidas. The Bœotian government feared that Athens might take the opportunity of seizing a place so important for the security of her northern possessions ; and thinking Sparta too much occupied with the affairs of Peloponnesus to protect her colony, without consulting her, not only put a garrison into it, but sent Hegesipidas away. The Spartans felt all the humiliation re-

sulting from such an interference, but scarcely ventured to betray their displeasure. Their attention was soon after drawn toward suspicious movements of the Athenians nearer home. Alcibiades had been appointed one of the ten generals, and with a small Athenian force of heavy infantry and bowmen marched into Peloponnesus, where he was joined by reinforcements from the allied states, and traversing the peninsula in various directions, acted as if charged with a general commission and invested with the largest powers for promoting the interests of the Argive confederacy. The most important step toward this end was to introduce or consolidate democratical ascendancy. It was partly with this view, and partly to gain a firm footing for Athenian influence in Achaia, that he persuaded the people of Patræ to connect their city by means of long walls with its port. This success encouraged him to attempt to build a fort on the Achæan Rhium. But the maritime towns on this side of the Corinthian gulf, which would have been most endangered by the accomplishment of his design, united with Corinth and Sicyon to force him to abandon it.

He however concerted a plan with the Argive government for a similar object in another quarter. Argos was separated from the Saronic gulf by the territories of Corinth and Epidaurus, and could only receive succours from Athens by a circuitous navigation. If Epidaurus was subjected to Argos, not only would the Argives be more secure, and better able, if necessary, to act on the offensive on the side of Corinth, but their communication with Athens through Ægina would be direct and easy. A pretext was discovered on which they might invade the Epidaurian territory. There was at Argos a temple of Apollo for which the Argives claimed a periodical sacrifice from Epidaurus. The ground of the claim was perhaps obsolete: the offering had been intermitted; and Argos now took up arms in behalf of the god. The return of the month, which, on account of the festival of the Carneia, was held sacred by the Dorian tribes, afforded the Argives an opportunity

of attacking their weaker neighbours when their allies would be prevented from protecting them. The month indeed was sacred among the Argives themselves ; and their religion would not have permitted them to set out on the expedition in the course of it ; but it did not oblige them to suspend operations which they might have already begun during the preceding month in an enemy's country. In order therefore to reap the full benefit which they hoped for from the superstition of others without sacrificing their own, they resolved to invade the territory of Epidaurus just before the beginning of the Carnean month. Yet it seems that some intelligence of their design had reached Sparta ; for while they were making their preparations, king Agis set out with the whole force of Lacedæmon to cross the north-western border at Leuctra. The object of his march was kept profoundly secret ; but it was probably to make a diversion in favour of Epidaurus. Perhaps it was found that there would not be time to spare for this purpose before the end of the month. At Leuctra the sacrifices did not permit Agis to cross the frontier, and he led his troops back, but sent a summons round to the allies to get their forces in readiness for an expedition as soon as the sacred month should have expired. The Argives no sooner heard of his retreat, than they began their march — on a day which they had always been used to keep holy — and made an irruption with the usual ravages into the Epidaurian territory. The Epidaurians implored the aid of their allies ; but the sacred month was now so near that it afforded some a pretext for remaining inactive, and arrested the march of others when they had reached the border. In the meanwhile a congress met at Mantinea, summoned by the Athenians, and attended by envoys from Corinth, to renew the negotiations which had been broken off the year before by the earthquake. But the Corinthian Euphidas took an early occasion to protest against the conduct of the Argives, who were prosecuting hostilities against Epidaurus, while their allies were treating at

Mantinca ; and insisted that before any further discussion took place, the Epidaurians should be delivered from their enemy's presence. The allies of Argos could not help complying with this demand ; and the Argives were induced to withdraw their forces. But as the debates of the congress led to no conclusion, they repeated their invasion of Epidaurus ; and they were not interrupted by the Spartans, who again marched as far as the frontier at Caryæ, but were again turned back ; as they professed, by the aspect of the victims, really perhaps, to avoid coming into collision with the Athenians, who sent Alcibiades with a thousand men to support the Argives. He returned when he heard of the retreat of the Spartans, and the Argive forces which had marched home on the news of the Spartan preparations were left at liberty to renew their inroads.

But though the Spartan government was not prepared for coming immediately to an open breach with Athens, it was desirous of saving Epidaurus, and in the autumn found means of sending 300 men by sea to its relief. The Argives immediately made a complaint at Athens, insisting that by the late treaty the Athenians were bound to prevent the passage of these troops over the sea, which was their own ; and they required by way of satisfaction that the Messenian garrison should be brought back to Pylus. Alcibiades supported this demand, and prevailed upon the people not only to grant it, but to order a declaration to be annexed at the foot of the treaty with Sparta, on the stone pillar on which it was inscribed at Athens, that the Spartans had broken their covenant. The Argives continued throughout the winter to harass the Epidaurians with repeated incursions, and toward the spring of 418 attempted to take their town by escalade, in the hope of finding them too weak or too much occupied with the defence of their territory, to resist ; but the assailants were baffled by the vigour of the citizens or of the Spartan garrison.

But the Spartan government now began to feel that some exertion was necessary to maintain its credit, and

to apprehend that if it remained any longer a passive spectator of the evils which Epidaurus was suffering in its cause, it would soon see itself abandoned by the smaller Peloponnesian states which were now wavering. It sent a summons to the Bœotians and its other more distant allies to assemble their contingents at Phlius; and about the middle of the summer Agis with the whole force of Sparta, together with those of the Tegeans and the other Arcadian allies, marched to join them. The Argives had early intelligence of this expedition, and having united their forces with those of Mantinea and 3000 Eleans, proceeded across Arcadia to intercept the Lacedæmonian army before it should reach Phlius, and came up with it near Methydrium. But Agis breaking up in the night eluded the enemy and joined his allies at Phlius; and the Argives marched back to defend their own territory, which they expected would be invaded by the road leading from Nemea into the plain of Argos, and posted themselves not far from the pass. The army assembled at Phlius was both in numbers and for the quality of the troops the finest, Thucydides says, that had ever been collected in Greece. But Agis resolved to distract the enemy's attention by dividing his forces. He himself with one division, consisting of Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, descended by a rugged pass over mount Lyrceum upon the western side of the Argolic plain, which he began to ravage: another corps, which included the Bœotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians, with whom was the whole of the cavalry, was ordered to take the road through Nemea on which they expected to find the enemy; the third division, composed of the contingents of Corinth, Phlius, and Pellene, was to come down upon the plain by another steep pass from the north. The result of these operations was nearly what Agis designed. The Argives, who as soon as they heard that he had entered the plain, quitted their position to seek him, found themselves separated from their city by his troops, while the two other divisions of his army threatened their flank and rear.

They had no cavalry ; for the Athenians, who were to have brought a squadron, had not yet arrived. To a discerning eye, their situation appeared alarming and almost desperate. Yet it was not generally viewed in this light by the army itself, which fancied that the Lacedæmonians being cooped up between it and the city were in much greater jeopardy. But Thrasyllus, one of the generals, and Alciphron, an Argive connected by the ties of public hospitality with Sparta, were either ignorant of the prevailing opinion, or thought the danger so pressing that they might safely neglect it, or generously resolved to sacrifice themselves for the public good ; and just as battle was about to be joined, without consulting any of their countrymen, obtained an interview with Agis, and, holding out to him the prospect of a permanent peace, prevailed on him to grant a truce of four months to the Argives, to afford time for negotiation. Agis himself took this step upon his own discretion, having only communicated it to one of the ephors who was in the camp ; and immediately, without disclosing his motives to any of his allies, drew off his forces. His authority could not be disputed ; but the army, which believed itself secure of a decisive victory, loudly murmured at its disappointment. On the other hand the Argives, who had no less confidently looked for an easy and brilliant triumph, was equally indignant at the conduct of their general, who had suffered the enemy to escape. According to the law of Argos the generals on their return from an expedition, before they entered the city, were liable to render an account of their proceedings at a place without the walls, on the banks of the Charadrus. On this occasion the troops, now become the judges of Thrasyllus, were so transported by their fury as to forget both characters, and assailed him with stones, from which he only found refuge at a neighbouring altar ; but though his life was spared, his property was confiscated by a formal sentence.

His colleagues however, and most of the persons in office, appear to have thought differently, and to have

been awed by the display which Sparta had made of her force, and were well content to observe the truce. But shortly after a body of 1000 infantry and 300 horse arrived from Athens under the command of Laches and Nicostratus, accompanied by Alcibiades as ambassador. The Argive government was with difficulty persuaded by the importunity of the Elcans and the Mantineans, who had not yet taken their departure, to grant him an audience before the assembly. There however the eloquence of Alcibiades prevailed over their prudence. He easily convinced the people that the truce, concluded without the consent of their allies, was void, and urged them to take the favourable opportunity of striking a blow while the enemy was unprepared for resistance. The allies of Argos eagerly adopted his proposal, which was to march against the Arcadian Orchomenus, where the Spartans had deposited some hostages which they had taken from several of the Arcadian towns. Yet though the Argive assembly annulled the truce and approved of the expedition, the influence of some of their leading men seems to have delayed hostilities a little longer, and the Argive troops did not set out till their confederates had sat down before Orchomenus. The town was weakly fortified, and succour uncertain. The Orchomenians made no resistance, but delivered up the hostages entrusted to them, gave others of their own to the Mantineans, and became members of the Argive confederacy. The allies then deliberated upon the next operation. The Elcans proposed that they should turn their arms against Lepreum which, though a point of no importance to the rest, was the only object in which they felt any concern. The Mantineans were desirous of gratifying their own ambition and old animosity by the reduction of Tegea. This was an enterprise of great moment to the general interests of the confederacy; and a secret correspondence which had been opened with a party in Tegea, afforded strong hopes of success. The Argives and Athenians therefore acceded to this proposal; but

the Eleans were so angry because their wishes were not consulted before any other motives, that they marched away home.

Agis on his return to Sparta had been severely censured for his imprudent concession, by which he had flung away so fair an opportunity of reducing Argos to subjection. The public resentment was still more violently inflamed by the news of the breach of the truce, and the loss of Orchomenus; and measures of extraordinary rigour were proposed against the author of this misfortune. Yet the Spartan moderation showed itself even in the heat of a just anger; for the penalty with which the delinquent was threatened did not extend beyond a fire and the disgrace of pulling down his house, and thus would have fallen short of the punishment inflicted on Thrasyllus for saving his country. But Agis by humble deprecations induced the ephors or the people to pardon his fault, pledging himself to make amends for it by his future services. They contented themselves with marking their displeasure and distrust, by the appointment of a new council of war, composed of ten Spartans, without whose sanction he was no longer at liberty to take the field.

Shortly after advice was received from Tegea that the party there friendly to Sparta, unless it was promptly supported by aid from without, must soon give way to the machinations of its adversaries, which were backed by all the weight of the Argive confederacy. This danger excited so much alarm that the whole force of Laconia was put in motion with unusual rapidity, and proceeded to the border, while the Arcadian allies were summoned to join it at Tegea. After passing the frontier Agis sent back a sixth of his army — the veterans and striplings — and while his presence restored tranquillity at Tegea, he despatched orders to the northern states, Corinth, Bœotia, Phocis, and Locris, to meet him before Mantinea. In the meanwhile with the Arcadian reinforcements he prosecuted his march into the Mantinean territory, and having encamped near a sanctuary

of Hercules, began to ravage the plain. The Argive-Athenian army, which was in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, took up a strong position, and prepared for battle; and notwithstanding the steepness of the ground Agis, eager to repair his late error, advanced to attack it, and was within reach of the enemy's missiles, when one of the elder Spartans who was near his person cried out to him, not to mend one evil with another. Struck either by the hint, or by a sudden thought of his own, Agis suddenly halted and gave orders for retreat, and marching back into the plain of Tegea set about turning the course of the waters which thence found a subterraneous discharge, so as to make them overflow the lands of Mantinea. As the diversion of these streams had frequently been a subject of contention between the Tegeans and their neighbours, he hoped that the enemy would be drawn from his position to give battle upon the even ground; and he was not disappointed. His sudden retrograde movement had astonished the Argives, both commanders and men; the men, after recovering from the first surprise, were eager to pursue, and when the Lacedæmonian army was suffered to retreat unmolested, reproached their generals with a repetition of the fault which they had committed near Argos. The commanders, perplexed by the enemy's unexpected movement, and apprehensive of some stratagem, were still more confused by the impatience of their troops: at length however they descended from their position and encamped upon the plain.

The next day they put the army in battle array, though they did not know where they might light upon the enemy. In the meanwhile Agis was returning to ascertain the effect of his manœuvre, with the design of occupying the ground where he had posted himself the day before. A projecting ridge concealed the Argive-Athenian army from his view, until by a sudden turn the head of his column came close upon it. Greater consternation, Thucydides observes, was not remembered ever to have seized a Lacedæmonian army. Yet on this occa-

sion the excellence of their system of tactics, as it was brought to an unusual test, was the more signally displayed. The line of battle was quietly and rapidly formed — every man falling into his place with his wonted ease — before the enemy could take any advantage of their vicinity. Thucydides — who has described the engagement which ensued with a minuteness which seems to indicate that he was either himself present¹; or had access to some peculiarly accurate information — still does not venture to state the numbers on either side, but observes that the superiority appeared to the eye to be on the side of the Lacedæmonians. While the commanders of the Argive confederacy animated their men with the various motives proper to each national division — the Mantineans with the danger of their native land, and the alternative of subjection or imperial rule; the Argives with the hope of regaining their ancient supremacy, the Athenians with that of disabling their old enemy from again invading their country — the Spartans needed no other incitement than the war songs² which had roused the valour of successive generations perhaps from the time of Tyrtæus; and while the foe rushed impetuously forward, they advanced with their usual steadiness to the sound of their flutes, preserving an even and unbroken front. The event of the battle was only rendered doubtful for a short time through a breach of discipline which exposed a part of the Spartan line to imminent danger. There was a constant tendency in the ancient armies, as Thucydides remarks, when they came to action, to lean toward the right wing, so as gradually to outflank the enemy's left; each man endeavouring to keep close to his right hand neighbour for the protection of his own unshielded side. This had taken place to an unusual extent before the battle began; and Agis saw his left wing — which was occupied according to a hereditary privilege by the men

¹ The eyewitness seems to speak, when he says, v. 68., τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων μάλλον ἰσχυρὸν.

² Μιστὰ τῶν πολυμένων νό.

of Sciritis¹, next to whom on this occasion were posted the Brasidean freedmen, and Neodamodes from Lepreum — in danger of being taken in flank by the Mantineans, who held the enemy's right wing. To guard against this danger he ordered the Scirites and Brasideans to break away from the main body, and move toward the left, and directed two of the polemarchs to draw off their divisions from the right wing, where they could be better spared, and to fill up the vacant space. This last command, given just as the onset was taking place, was not obeyed; and the left wing, remaining insulated, was routed and pursued with much slaughter to the baggage waggons. But the rest of the Lacedæmonian army obtained an easy victory. The mere terror of its approach was sufficient to put the greater part of the enemy to flight, and the Athenians who were in the left wing were nearly surrounded. They would have suffered a much greater loss, notwithstanding the protection which they received from their cavalry, had not Agis thought it necessary to proceed with his main body to the relief of his left wing. The victorious Mantineans did not wait for him; but in the meanwhile the Athenians had leisure to effect their retreat. The Spartans, according to their usage, made no long pursuit; and the whole loss of the enemy was not reckoned at more than 1100 men, their own at about 300.

Yet the battle of Mantinea was not only, as Thucydides observes, the most memorable that had been fought for a long time on account of the parties engaged in it, but was attended with important results. The absence of the northern allies left Sparta the whole honour of the victory; and it was rendered the more signal by the faults which had been committed by the conquerors. It effaced the impression which their disaster at Sphacteria had made on the minds of the Greeks, revived the high reputation of their military qualities, and thus gave new confidence and strength to their partizans throughout Greece. With these fruits of their victory they

¹ See Vol. I. p. 24.

seemed to be satisfied, and showed as little eagerness to push their advantage after the battle, as they had on the field in the pursuit. They countermanded the reinforcements which were coming up from the north, and returned home to celebrate the Carnean festival.

The enemy was more alert. After the battle the loss he had sustained was repaired by the arrival of 3000 Eleans and 1000 Athenians, and the allies determined to avail themselves of the leisure in which they were left by the inactivity of the Spartans, to make a more vigorous attack on Epidaurus. To this they were more especially excited by the spirit which had just been shown by the Epidaurians, who, the day before the battle of Mantinea, had made an irruption into the Argive territory, and had wasted that part of the Argive forces which was left to defend the city. To avenge this insult, while the Spartans were keeping their holiday, the confederates set about investing Epidaurus with a wall. The work of circumvallation was to be divided among them according to the amount of the national forces, and the Athenians soon completed the part assigned to them, which was the fortification of a promontory, called from a temple which stood there the Heræum. But their allies wanted zeal or patience to finish their tasks, and finally resolved to content themselves with putting a garrison drawn from each division of the army, into the Heræum. This done, all returned home.

But as soon as the festival was at an end the Spartans again took the field, and advanced on the road to Argos as far as Tegea. Here they halted, to try the effect of negotiation, for which a fair opening seemed now to be made at Argos. They were in correspondence with a party there, which desired to overthrow the democratical government, and which had acquired new boldness and influence from the defeat at Mantinea. It was concerted that the Argive assembly should be first attracted by the offer of peace with Sparta, to which in the fear now prevailing of the Spartan arms it was

strongly inclined, and that it should ~~next be drawn into~~ an alliance to secure the peace. After this it was hoped that the machinations of the oligarchical party would have freer play to bring about a revolution. In pursuance of this plan Lichas—the same Spartan who received the insult at Olympia, and who was proxenus of Argos—was sent to propose the alternative of war or peace. Alcibiades was still at Argos, where he seems to have staid to watch the turn of events. He exerted all his eloquence to keep the Argives firm in their union with Athens. But on the other side, stronger than words, were the recollections of Mantinea, and the Spartan army within two or three days march of Argos. The assembly decided for peace, and accepted the terms prescribed by Sparta. A treaty was concluded without any limitation of time, by which the hostages taken at Orchomenus were to be restored; the Athenians, under pain of being treated as common enemies of Argos and Sparta, to be required to evacuate the Epidaurian territory; the Epidaurians to be allowed to clear themselves by an oath tendered by the Argives, in the matter of the sacrifice. *All the states of Peloponnesus, both small and great, to be independent, as in old times* (a change levelled against the pretensions of Mantinea and Elis). The states to unite in repelling all foreign aggression on Peloponnesus (a provision against Athenian interference). The allies of Sparta beyond the isthmus to be on the same footing of amity and independence as those of both the contracting powers within Peloponnesus. The treaty was to be communicated to the allies of each, but not to depend upon their sanction.¹

This first success emboldened the party which carried the measure at Argos to follow it up with the proposal

¹ This seems to be the purport of the obscure clause at the end of the treaty, Thuc. v. 77. But the omission of the four words which Dr. Arnold has printed in brackets, instead of *freeing the passage from all difficulty*, would leave the following words wholly without coherence and meaning. The *οἱ καὶ ἀνιάλλων* may perhaps refer to the same precaution which the Spartans adopt with the Argive ambassadors. Thuc. v. 41. The concurrence of the Athenians would scarcely, one would think, have been provided for as a possible case.

of an alliance with Sparta, which implied a total abandonment of that hitherto subsisting with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea. As the step already taken placed Argos in a neutral position which she could not safely maintain, there was the less difficulty in persuading the people to attach itself to Sparta; and an alliance defensive and offensive was concluded for fifty years, to be open to all the other Peloponnesian states, with guarantees for their independence, and provisions for the pacific adjustment of all their quarrels. After this treaty the administration of affairs at Argos seems to have fallen entirely into the hands of its authors, who carried a series of measures dictated by their enmity to Athens. They not only obtained a decree forbidding any embassy, and even a herald, to be received from the Athenians, until they should have evacuated all the fortified places which they held in Peloponnesus, and made an agreement with Sparta, by which the parties attempted to restrain each other from making war or peace but with mutual consent; they even joined the Spartans in an embassy to Perdiccas, who, though he did not venture at once openly to break with the Athenians, was persuaded to enter into the Peloponnesian confederacy; swayed, Thucydides seems to think, in some measure by the ancient affinity between his house and the Temenids of Argos; and at the same time the engagements into which Sparta had entered with the Chalcidian towns, were renewed and ratified by the Argive government. Argive ministers were then sent to Athens, to require that the Athenian troops should be withdrawn from the Heræum. And the Athenians, who saw that they could not keep it against the will of the states which furnished the majority of the garrison, sent Demosthenes to bring their men away. He had the address to entice the other troops out of the place, under colour of a gymnastic spectacle, and locked the gates upon them. But either thinking himself unable, or not authorised to keep possession of it, he

delivered it up to the Epidaurians, who on this condition renewed their ancient friendly relations with Athens.

This change in the policy of Argos compelled the Mantineans, after a short resistance, to abdicate their sovereignty over their subject cantons. And now only one step was wanting to the accomplishment of the plan which had been concerted between the Spartan government and the party which had the ascendancy at Argos. Early in the spring of 417 this concluding step was taken, and a revolution effected, which completely united the two governments in feelings and interests. It is perhaps more surprising that it was so long delayed, than that it was easily achieved. Instruments sufficient for the work had been for some time in readiness. The Argives, when they began to cherish hopes of recovering their ancient rank in Peloponnesus, had been tempted to try a dangerous experiment, to maintain a standing army without political privileges. They wished to unite the advantage of an armed oligarchy, like that which at Sparta and elsewhere was supported by the labour of a servile population, with the equality of the citizens under a democratical constitution. For this end they raised a corps of 1000 young soldiers, who were maintained at the public expense, and were enabled and enjoined to devote their whole time to military exercises. The new corps had indeed done good service on several occasions, and particularly at Mantinea.¹ But the Argive government seems to have been guilty of great imprudence in the execution of the plan. Instead of selecting the thousand from the citizens of the lowest class, who might have depended on their pay for subsistence, they—perhaps from an unwise economy—chose young men of good fortune, who might therefore be ill affected toward the constitution, and could have no prepossession in favour of democracy. The oligarchical faction appears to have gained the thousand over to

¹ Diodorus (xii. 75.) seems to suppose that the Thousand were instituted only a very short time before the battle of Mantinea. But Thucydides (v. 67.) speaks of them as having been long established.

its views, and then to have taken the pretext of a joint expedition to Sicyon, which Sparta and Argos undertook each with 1000 men, for the purpose of strengthening the oligarchy there, to admit the Spartan troops into Argos, and with their aid to have abolished all the forms of the constitution, which they replaced by one conformable to the Spartan system.¹

The new institutions thus forced upon the people depended upon the continued support of the hands which had founded them. The supreme power in the state rested with the Thousand, and consequently with any leader who could attach them to himself. They were commanded it is said by a chief named Bryas, who, while he upheld the oligarchy, exercised a despotic power over the disfranchised commonalty, and abused it to the utmost excess of wantonness. He at length filled up the measure of his licence by carrying off a bride from a nuptial procession to his house. But he was blinded by the victim of his lust, who took refuge at an altar, and implored the protection of the people.² The author who tells this story represents this as the occasion of a popular insurrection, in which the Thousand were overpowered and massacred. But Thucydides, without mentioning any particular causes of popular discontent, relates that the commonalty, after it had recovered from the first dismay of the revolution, began to meditate the overthrow of the oligarchy, and at length took the opportunity of the great Spartan festival, the Gymnopaedia, to rise against its enemies, of whom some fell in the affray, and the rest fled from the city. The Spartans had been long apprised of the danger which threatened their friends, but had delayed sending them the aid which they called for, till the news of the insurrection arrived in the midst of the festival. They then interrupted the solemnity, and despatched a body of troops

¹ Thuc. v. 81. Compare Diodor. xii. 81. Thucydides leaves it uncertain whether the thousand Argives whom he mentions on this occasion were the *λογισταί*; but perhaps this may be inferred from Diodorus, and Plutarch, Al. 15.

² Paus. ii. 20. 2.

toward Argos. But at Tegea they received the intelligence of the total discomfiture of the oligarchs; and though they were pressed by the Argive exiles to continue their march, they preferred the claims of piety or amusement, and returned to celebrate their holiday. It would seem that the conduct of the oligarchical Argives had been such as a little to embarrass their Spartan friends; for when after the festival envoys came to Sparta, both from the defeated party and from the victorious commonalty, a long debate took place in the presence of the deputies of the confederate states; and though Sparta decided in favour of the exiles, and declared its resolution of supporting their cause, it was tardy in renewing hostilities. But in the meanwhile the people of Argos, dreading an attack, and now placing all its hopes in Athenian succour, that it might be in condition to receive them even in the last emergency, began to carry down long walls to the sea. The whole population, men, women, and slaves, put their hands to the work, and they were assisted by a body of carpenters and masons from Athens. It was some time before the Spartans heard of this undertaking, though it was known to several of the other Peloponnesian states. But as soon as they were informed of it, Agis led an army against Argos, where there was still a remnant of the defeated party with which he was in correspondence. His expectations however were disappointed in this quarter; but he came in time to take and demolish the unfinished walls, and on his return took Hysia and put the Argive garrison to the sword. Argos was now reduced to a state of miserable weakness; deprived by the civil war of the flower of its military force, threatened by the exiles who were collected near the frontier at Phlius, and agitated by fears of treachery within. To remove this last cause of uneasiness, Alcibiades was sent in the year following with a squadron to Argos, and carried away 300 persons, who were suspected of disaffection, and lodged them in some of the islands near the coast of Attica.

While Athens and Sparta remained on this equivocal footing toward each other, the revolted towns on the coast of Thrace continued to defy the Athenian power, and from time to time gained some new points. In 421 Olynthus had surprised Mecyberna; and after the encouragement which the Chalcidians received from Sparta and Argos they won possession of Dium, on the peninsula of Athos. Athens did not indeed rest quite passive. An expedition had been prepared for the reduction of Amphipolis, and Nicias had been appointed to the command. Perdiccas had promised his co-operation, and it seems to have been concerted that a land force should march through his dominions. His accession to the confederacy between Sparta and Argos defeated this plan; and the Athenians revenged themselves by blockading the coast of Macedon^a. Yet in 416, instead of making a fresh effort for the recovery of these important possessions, they concluded an armistice terminable at ten days notice with the Chalcidians¹, and in the meanwhile fitted out an armament for an object to which they seem to have been directed rather by passion than by a calm estimate of its value. A squadron of 30 Athenian galleys, with 6 Chians, and 2 Lesbians, having on board 1200 heavy-armed Athenians, and 1500 allied troops, together with 320 Athenian archers, sailed under the command of Cleomedes and Tisias, to reduce the isle of Melos, which had long irritated the pride of Athens by its independence, but perhaps at this juncture chiefly provoked her enmity by its attachment to Sparta. The influence of Alcibiades seems no less discernible in the expedition itself, than in its tragical issue. He probably wished to wound Sparta through the side of her faithful colony, and either to humble her by extorting a practical confession of her inability to save it, or to provoke her to an open rupture with Athens. The Athenian commanders, after landing their forces, did not immediately commence hostilities, but sent an embassy into the town

¹ Thuc. vi. 7.

to induce the Melians to submit. They seem to have had hopes of creating a division among the people, which might favour their operations, even if it did not immediately disarm all resistance. But the Melian government, aware of this danger, refused to permit the envoys to address the popular assembly, and would only admit them to a conference with the magistrates and the members of the oligarchy, which was probably extremely narrow. Thucydides has composed a dialogue, such as, from his knowledge of the views and feelings of the parties, he conceived might have passed on this occasion ; for there seems to be no ground for attributing to it any greater degree of historical truth. The arguments and tone of the Athenians might lead us to believe that Alcibiades himself was one of the interlocutors, if their language was anything more than an expression of the prevailing maxims of political morality.

The Athenians at the outset lay down the grounds on which they proposed to argue the question. They reject all appeals to justice as distinct from political expediency ; not because they are conscious of a flagrant wrong, but because they have made up their minds on this head, and wish to prevent a waste of words. They do not charge the Melians with any offence, or pretend to deny, that though colonists of Lacedæmon, they had not so much as taken part in any of her expeditions ; and the Melians were willing to engage to observe a strict neutrality for the future. But the power of Athens depended on the maintenance of a system, which was inconsistent with the independence of Melos. Her empire was in a great measure founded on opinion ; and its stability would be endangered if it was observed that a single island might defy her with impunity. For the world would not give her credit for such singular moderation as willingly to abstain from a conquest which lay within her reach ; but would certainly attribute her acquiescence to a sense of weakness. She was following what seemed to be the universal law of nature, in securing and strengthening her dominion, and had reason

to hope that her conduct was no less conformable to the will of the gods, than it was sanctioned by the uniform practice of mankind. The Melians vainly endeavoured to prove that the interest of Athens herself required that their neutrality should be respected, on the ground that other independent states would be alarmed and provoked by such an aggression as they were now threatened with; an argument which could only have been cogent if Athens had had a reputation for equity and moderation to maintain. The question therefore was reduced to a simple point, whether the Melians could gain any thing by resistance. And the Athenian speaker intimates to them, that their resistance, if unsuccessful, would involve them in the most dreadful calamities. They acknowledge that beside the chances of war, and the favour of the gods toward a righteous cause, they have no ground of hope but the assistance which they are entitled to expect from the parent state. They will not believe that Sparta will suffer a colony which had been true to her for seven hundred years to fall the victim of its fidelity: that even if she cannot find means of sending an armament across the sea to their relief, she will not make an effectual diversion in their behalf, either by a fresh invasion of Attica, or by an expedition like that of Brasidas. The Athenian in vain endeavours to correct the error into which they seem to have fallen with regard both to Sparta and to Athens. He asserts as a notorious fact—and the Melians do not deny it—that of all states Sparta is that which has most glaringly shown by her conduct, that in her political transactions she measures honour by inclination, and justice by expediency. She might therefore be expected, instead of being swayed by the fair names of piety or generosity, calmly to calculate the danger to which she would expose herself by the effort which would be necessary for the deliverance of a weak unprofitable island. On the other hand Athens had sufficiently shown by many examples, that she would

not be deterred or diverted from her purpose by threats, or by any attack made upon her in another quarter.

The envoys withdrew, that the Melians might deliberate on their final answer; and when they were called in again, they were informed that the Melians would not so despair of their fortune, or distrust their natural allies, as all at once to renounce an independence of seven centuries: but they repeated their offer of neutrality, and a fair compromise. The Athenians, as they withdrew, expressed their surprise at the singular infatuation which was hurrying the Melians to inevitable ruin. The siege of this town was immediately begun, and the bulk of the armament did not withdraw till it was closely blockaded both by sea and land.

The threats of the Athenians were accomplished; the hopes of the Melians proved baseless. It does not appear that so much as a thought was entertained at Sparta of stirring for their relief. The Spartans were too much occupied by the incursions with which about this time the Athenian garrison at Pylus was infesting their territory; and even these they only resented by permitting individuals to make reprisals on Athenian property. They neither aided Corinth, when on some private quarrel it renewed hostilities with Athens, nor seconded the efforts of the Argive exiles; the sacrifices, it was alleged, did not permit them to cross the border. The Melians, left to their own resources, made a gallant resistance. Twice they succeeded in surprising a part of the Athenian lines, and introduced some supplies into the town. But toward the end of 416 a reinforcement was sent from Athens to the camp of the besiegers. As the place was pressed more closely, and the miseries of the siege began to be more generally felt, symptoms of disaffection appeared within the walls; and the dread of treachery hastened the fall of the town, which surrendered at discretion.

And now the Athenians crowned their unjust aggression with an act of deliberate cruelty. They put to death all the adult citizens, and enslaved the women

and children. It would seem from the threats which Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian speaker in the conference, that the same decree which ordered the expedition had also fixed the punishment to be inflicted on the Melians, if they resisted; as had been done in the case of Scione. In either case the guilt of proposing, or at least of supporting the inhuman decree, is laid to the charge of Alcibiades, whom we thus find sanctioning and even outdoing the most hateful of Cleon's atrocities. For the case of Melos differed widely from those of Scione and Mitylene. The Athenians themselves were conscious that they had not the shadow of a right to the island; and even if the conquest had been really necessary for the security of their empire, the utmost straining of the tyrant's plea could not palliate the extermination of the inhabitants. Indeed it seems probable that they, and especially Alcibiades, were instigated to this deed rather by their hatred of Sparta, than by any abstract principle or by resentment against the Melians themselves.

The language of the Athenians in the conference at Melos has been often thought to indicate an extraordinary degree of moral obliquity, and has been attributed to the pernicious influence of the Sophists; and perhaps it is true that their doctrines lie at the bottom of the whole argument. But on the other hand it may be observed, that the Athenian speaker only rejects the obligations of justice as a rule in political transactions, and that the expediency to which he professes to sacrifice it is the good of the state. Farther than this the question did not lead him; and this conclusion, though quite untenable in theory, seems to flow from the ideas which generally prevailed among the ancients, as to the paramount claims of the public interest over every other consideration. The conduct of the Athenians in the conquest of Melos is far less extraordinary than the openness with which they avow their principles. But, unjust as it was, it will not to a discerning eye appear the more revolting, because it wanted that varnish of

sanctity, by which acts of much fouler iniquity have been covered in ages which have professed to revere a higher moral law. Their treatment of the vanquished — whatever may have been its motive — was unworthy of a civilised nation. Yet some allowance may fairly be claimed for the general rigour of the ancient usages of war. The milder spirit of modern manners would not have punished men who had been guilty of no offence but the assertion of their rightful independence, more severely than by tearing them from their families, and locking them up in a fortress, or transporting them to the wilds of Scythia. But our exultation at the progress of humanity may be consistent with a charitable indulgence for the imperfections of a lower stage of civilisation.

In the course of the same winter the Spartans at length found themselves permitted to cross the border, and not only ravaged a part of the Argive territory, but took possession of Orneæ, and lodged the exiles there. They left a small garrison for their protection, and their object seems to have been rather to provide for them than to annoy their enemies in Argos, for before their departure they concluded a truce between the two parties. The Athenians however did not permit this state of things to last long. They sent a squadron of 30 galleys with 600 men, and with this reinforcement the Argives laid siege to Orneæ. It seems that the place was not in a state fit for defence; and by a kind of tacit compromise the exiles, after having held out for a day, evacuated it, and the besiegers immediately rased it to the ground. The inhabitants appear now for the most part¹ to have been transported to Argos, and, according to the liberal policy which had been adopted in several other cases, to have been admitted to the full franchise of the city, and thus to have strengthened the democratical party.² Another effort which Sparta made

¹ Some were probably allowed to occupy the *village* of Orneæ, which Strabo (viii. p. 376.) distinguishes from the *town* of the same name.

² Mueller (Dor. ii. c. 7. *Ægnetica*, p. 49.) supposes that the whole

this winter in the way of negotiation was attended with no better success. The Athenians had sent a body of cavalry to Methone, a town on the southern frontier of Macedonia, where it was joined by a number of Macedonians discontented with the government of Perdiccas, who formed an auxiliary squadron, and with the Athenians made a series of annoying inroads into his territories. Sparta could devise no method of succouring her ally but by sending an embassy to the Chalcidians to induce them to exert themselves in his behalf. But they were not disposed to sacrifice themselves either for Sparta or for Perdiccas, and continued to prolong their precarious truce with Athens.

of the ancient population had been previously transplanted to Argos, and replaced by an Argive colony. Dr. Arnold (*Thucyd.* vol. ii. p. 838.) infers from Herodotus viii. 75, compared with *Thuc.* v. 67., that the old population was not disturbed before the occasion mentioned in the text. It seems rather more probable from Paus. viii. 27. 1. that there had been — as Wachsmuth suggests, l. 2. p. 86. — a partial removal of the original inhabitants before the Peloponnesian war.

CHAP. XXV.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF
GYLIPPUS IN SICILY.

THE tameness with which Sparta had looked on during the siege of Melos, the feeble resistance which she offered to the incursions of the Athenian garrison at Pylus, the vacillation and timidity which she betrayed in her transactions with Argos, and with her allies in Macedonia and Thrace, encouraged Athens to resume the projects of aggrandizement which the events of the war had compelled her for a time to lay aside. We have seen how ill she brooked the disappointment which she had suffered through the sudden termination to which the quarrels of the Sicilian Greeks had been brought by Hermocrates; and she had since shown that she only waited for an opportunity of renewing her enterprises in their island. Such an opportunity had appeared to present itself not long after the departure of the armament commanded by Eurymedon. The Leontines, when they saw the Athenians withdrawn, thought it expedient to prepare themselves, as well as they could, against the attacks which, notwithstanding the counsels of Hermocrates, they had always reason to apprehend from Syracuse. It seems to have been chiefly with this view that they admitted a large body of new citizens. But it was necessary to provide for these new settlers; and this could not be done without in some way disturbing the previous state of property. A proposal was accordingly made, and obtained general approbation among the commonalty, for a repartition of land. We have no information as to the precise nature of the measure, so as to be able to say, whether it was an arbitrary act of power, or the exercise of a right. The changes caused by the revolution which followed the

death of Hiero leave just as much room for the one supposition as the other. But the burden or expense of the proposed measure fell upon the rich ; and as it hurt their interest it was felt by them as a grievance. Their indignation — as we may safely conclude from the experience of all ages and countries, as well as from that of the Roman patricians — would have been just as strong if they were called upon to resign what they had occupied by abuse and held by sufferance, as if they were deprived of what they had enjoyed by the clearest of titles. But seeing themselves not strong enough to maintain their right or their wrong, before any step had been taken to dispossess them, they called in the aid of the Syracusans, and ejected the commonalty. They had now too much room to feel safe, and therefore consented to abandon Leontium, and to transfer their abode to Syracuse, where they were received as citizens. There was however a party among them which had either yielded to this sacrifice with regret, or found its new situation unpleasant, and it quitted Syracuse and returned, not indeed to the deserted city where it could not have defended itself, but to two strongholds in the Leontine territory, called Phocææ and Bricinnæ. Here they were joined by the greater part of the expelled commonalty, and together they carried on a war against Syracuse.

When this state of things became known to the Athenians in 422, about the time of Cleon's last expedition, they sent two galleys with three ambassadors headed by Phæax, whom we have already mentioned as a rival of Alcibiades, to use this handle, if he could, for the purpose of forming a new league among the Siceliots against Syracuse, and at the same time to promote the Athenian interest in the south of Italy. Phæax possessed talents well suited for negotiation, and he succeeded in his object at Camarina and Agrigentum ; but at Gela he met with such opposition as to deter him from proceeding further on the business of his mission. But on his way back he stopt at Bricinnæ to animate the resistance of the Leontines, and in Italy, on his

passage both to and fro, opened negotiations with several of the Greek cities, and even concluded a treaty with Locri, which had before refused to become a party to the peace between Athens and the Siceliots, but now, being engaged in a war with two of its colonies, thought it prudent to come to terms with Phæax.

It is not quite clear whether this was the last attempt made by Athens to regain her footing in Sicily before 415. We are informed of an embassy which seems to have been a different one, on which Andocides was sent not only to Italy and Sicily, but also to Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, for purposes similar to that of Phæax. But no distinct prospect seems to have been opened to the Athenians of again dividing the Siceliots, and threatening Syracuse, until, soon after the reduction of Melos, they received a new, and apparently an unsolicited invitation to interfere in the affairs of Sicily. A quarrel had arisen between the neighbouring cities of Segesta and Selinus, partly out of disputed claims to land in their marches, and partly it would seem out of private feuds. Selinus called in the aid of Syracuse, with which she threatened to overpower her weaker neighbour. The Segestans, who were perhaps originally more nearly related to the Phœnicians than to the Greeks, are said to have applied in vain to Syracuse and Agrigentum, and then to have sought aid from Carthage; but being rejected there also, they finally had recourse to Athens. Their envoys found willing listeners, when they represented the danger which would arise, if the Syracusans should be permitted to proceed as they had begun with Leontium; should crush the states of different origin one after another, and then should combine all the Dorians of the island in a league to assist their kinsmen in Peloponnesus against Athens. They magnified the opulence of Segesta, gave a dazzling description of the treasures contained in the temples as well as in the coffers of the state, and undertook to defray the cost of the expedition which should be sent to its relief. If the fears of the Athenians were not alarmed, their ambition was inflamed by the thought, that the power of

Syracuse might be made to serve as an instrument for subduing their Peloponnesian enemies. They knew enough of Sicily to covet it as a most valuable conquest; but not rightly to appreciate the difficulty of the attempt. Notwithstanding the ample means of information which they possess, great ignorance and many erroneous opinions prevailed among them as to the extent and population of the island. On the other hand the waste of the pestilence had been now in a great measure repaired; and during the late interval of repose they had begun to recruit their finances. They again felt the consciousness of exuberant vigour; and among the young there was a general impatience for a new field of action. The cause of the Segestans found many zealous advocates; and all that could be obtained by those who opposed it, was that envoys should be sent to ascertain the means which they had of fulfilling their promises, and to learn the state of the war with Selinus.

Alcibiades was foremost among their partizans. If an expedition should be decreed, he might hope for a share in the command, and in the distant regions of the West his ambitious imagination found an unbounded range. It wandered from Sicily to Italy, Carthage, and Africa; and he considered the subjection of these countries as a step toward the conquest of Peloponnesus and of Greece. It seems to have been while he was indulging these dreams of greatness, that he was threatened at home with a blow which would have dissipated them all. We have seen how evenly his influence balanced that of Nicias, and that before them their common rivals shrank into insignificance. Hyperbolus, who despaired of rising into the place of Cleon, so long as they both stood in his way, devised a scheme for getting rid of one. He suggested to the people that their power and dissensions were formidable to liberty, and that this was a case in which the ostracism, which had fallen into disuse, might be advantageously revived. It was perhaps through a different intrigue that a third person — either Phæax or Andocides — was associated with them as an object of public jealousy. But the

result surprised the author of the scheme, and the people itself. Nicias and Alcibiades, or according to another account Alcibiades and Phæax, united their interest against Hyperbolus; and the process by which Aristides, and Themistocles, and Cimon had been deprived of their country, was employed to deliver Athens from the most despicable of men. The people, it is said, felt that the ostracism had been debased by the indignity of the person on whom it fell, and never made use of it again. But neither Nicias nor Alcibiades had reason to rejoice in the success of their coalition.

The ambassadors returned in the spring, accompanied by some of the Leontine exiles, and by envoys from Segesta, and confirmed the account which had been given of its opulence; but they brought no more than 60 talents — a month's pay for as many galleys — as an earnest of the promised subsidies. An expedition was now decreed, for the relief of Segesta, the restoration of the Leontines, and for all other objects which concerned the interests of Athens in Sicily; and Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, were appointed to the command. The choice of Alcibiades was naturally suggested by the active part he had taken in counselling the expedition; but the talents which he had displayed in the negotiations with which he had been recently entrusted in Peloponnesus pointed him out as eminently fitted for a service in which there might be as much to be effected by the arts of persuasion as by force or military skill. Nor was it probably overlooked that his extensive connections and influence among the allies of Athens might be usefully employed in procuring auxiliaries; while among the more sober citizens there were no doubt many who were glad to see him removed to a distant field of adventure, where his restless and aspiring spirit might have ample space, and who contemplated his departure with feelings not very different from those with which they had once sent out Cleon, divided between their fears of the man and their hopes for the state. The principal motive for the appointment of Nicias appears to have been the confidence which was

inspired by his prudence and his unintermitted good fortune; his name seemed to be one of happy omen for every momentous enterprise; and if his circumstances were sometimes carried to an excess where it degenerated into tardiness or timidity, it was not more than sufficient to counterbalance the impetuous ardour of such a colleague as Alcibiades. Perhaps a latent feeling of jealousy also operated with many as an inducement for associating him with his ambitious and unsteady rival in so important a command, at so great a distance from the superintending eye of the people. Lamachus was recommended by his established reputation as a brave captain, though he had not been employed during the war in any very important commission. He seems to have been no less conspicuous for his integrity and disinterested devotion to the public service. Though he had been placed in situations which afforded him many opportunities of enriching himself — having been charged probably more than once with the collection of tribute or the levying of contributions from the subjects of Athens — he was so poor as to be forced to draw upon the treasury for the minutest articles of his simple personal expenditure incurred in the discharge of his public functions. Such a man, whose habits and character seemed to secure him from any bias toward either of his colleagues, might be thought singularly fitted to hold the balance between them, while he zealously co-operated with them in the common cause. Yet it was observed that notwithstanding his indifference to money he was not exempt from an instinctive respect for wealth, and that Nicias exercised some authority over him, as over most of the persons who were associated with him in office, by the weight of his fortune no less than of his personal qualities.

Nicias as little coveted the honour of the command, as he approved of the expedition. The state of his health was ill suited to undergo the hardships of the sea and the field. But he was still more averse to the undertaking on grounds of policy. Independent of his

prejudices against Alcibiades his disposition led him to view the measure on the dark side, and to perceive the obstacles and dangers more clearly than the means or the fruits of success. Even after the decree for granting aid to Segesta had been carried, he did not despair of opening the eyes of the people to the rashness of the enterprise; and in an assembly which was held five days after, to deliberate on the strength of the armament to be equipped, he ventured to advise that instead of entering upon the question which they were met to discuss, they should review the resolution which they had too hastily adopted. He was the better entitled to attention on this head, as he should speak against his own interest; since no one could have more honour to gain by the expedition, or less personal risk to apprehend in it. He knew their character too well to think of diverting them from their purpose by any general reflections on the imprudence of staking a present possession for an uncertain acquisition; but he would point out the unreasonableness, and the difficulties of the enterprise. They must not fancy that when they sailed to a distant war, they should leave peace at home. The enemies by whom they were surrounded had not all so much as formally suspended hostilities: but those who were now kept still by a short and hollow truce — which had been extorted by an ignominious necessity, and had bred many questions which were yet unsettled, and which had been rendered more complicated through the intrigues of a party adverse to peace both at Sparta and at Athens — would undoubtedly take the first opportunity of falling upon them, when their forces should be divided, and when they were engaged in a struggle with a state which Sparta had long been anxious to gain as her ally. They would be setting out to found a new empire while many of their old subjects were in open revolt, and others were wavering in their obedience. It would surely be time enough to send assistance to strangers, when they had provided for the security of their own dominions. From the Sicelioti they had no

thing to gain — for conquests in so remote a quarter could not be long retained — and, unless they were totally provoked them, nothing to fear; least of all in the case supposed by the Segestans, from Syracuse, which, the farther she extended her sovereignty, would find the more employment at home, and would be the less tempted to assist in overthrowing an empire which rested on like foundations as her own. Athens would be most formidable to Sicily while her reputation was magnified by distance, and she did not expose it to the risk, which it would incur on a nearer approach, of being shaken by the first slight reverse. It was thus, they had themselves been led to undervalue the power of Sparta, which was still unimpaired, as her animosity was unquenched, and only waiting for an opportunity of revenge. They might find a better use for their newly recruited strength than to lend themselves to the desperate projects of a band of exiles, whose assertions were as little to be trusted as their gratitude. But they ought to be still more on their guard against the reckless ambition of their own citizens, especially of one who cared not in what danger he involved his country to gratify his desire of a brilliant command, which would afford him the means of supporting his extravagance, and of repairing the breach it had made in his private fortune. Notwithstanding the partisans of like age and character whom he had now collected round him, the elder part of the assembly ought fearlessly to vote as the safety of Athens required; that the Sicilians be allowed to adjust their own affairs; and the Segestans in particular, as they had begun the war without consulting Athens, be left to end it, as they might, by themselves.

Though this mode of revising a decree of the people was not consistent with the established forms of the Athenian assembly, the presiding magistrate, probably perceiving signs of a general willingness to hear the subject again discussed, complied with the wish of Nicias, and put the question to the vote. Alcibiades took the opportunity of defending his own character, and the

policy of the Sicilian expedition. He claimed the merit of a wise liberality for that use of his wealth which Nicias had censured as silly extravagance. The magnificence which he had displayed at Olympia had reflected lustre upon the city, and had raised its credit at a juncture when it was commonly supposed to be exhausted by the war. He delicately touched on the offence which he had given to individuals as an unavoidable effect of the envy which always attended prosperity. He urged the success with which he had conducted the affairs of the commonwealth in Peloponnesus, as a proof of his capacity for the command with which he was now invested. The battle of Mantinea, in which so many of the ancient allies of Sparta were arrayed against her on ground which she had long been used to consider as her own, he treated as a signal triumph of dexterous negotiation. He then endeavoured to show that the enterprise on which they had resolved was neither so difficult nor so dangerous as Nicias had represented it, but that it held out a prospect of great advantages at a trifling risk. The power of the Sicilian towns had been much exaggerated. Their mixed population had been agitated by such a series of revolutions that it had not yet become firmly attached to the soil, and was destitute of the feelings which led men to unite, and to sacrifice their private interests, for the defence of their country. An invader would meet with no steady resistance, and might take advantage of their internal dissensions; and in a war against Syracuse would be sure to find allies among the barbarians whom she oppressed. The dangers with which Nicias had laboured to deter them were merely imaginary. The enemies whom they would leave behind were never less disposed to attack them and at the worst could do nothing more than invade Attica, as they might at all times: naval forces would be left sufficient to prevent any other damage. The nature of their empire required that they should be always in action and ready to comply with every call, whether from Greeks or barbarians, who sought their assistance, and

might be made instruments, of their aggrandisement. It was the condition of their greatness, that it must be always growing, and that it could not be safely confined to any limits; as soon as they ceased to attack they would begin to be threatened. Such a token of their restless activity as they would give by the invasion of Sicily would cow the spirit of the Peloponnesians: their success would probably make them masters of Greece, or at least would crush the power of Syracuse; and even failure would be attended with no danger, since their fleet, which would be more than a match for the whole marine of the island, would enable them to stay as long as they thought fit, and to retire when they would with safety. Let them not listen to the insinuations by which Nicias had attempted to set the elder citizens in opposition to the younger. The fire of youth was no less needed in their public counsels than the sobriety of age. The state would grow torpid, if its energies were not kept in constant play; and the mastery to which it had attained in the arts of war could only be preserved by an uninterrupted series of enterprises and contests.

These arguments accorded with the prevailing temper of the assembly, which passed to the order of the day; and Nicias now rested his last hopes on the effect which he might produce by a statement of the preparations necessary for the intended expedition. He observed that they were going to invade an island which contained a number of great and independent cities, abundantly furnished with the means of defence; and among them none were more powerful and better provided with every kind of arms for naval and military warfare than the two, which were the immediate objects of their hostility, Selinus and Syracuse. And neither were wanting in public or private opulence; great treasures were said to be accumulated in the temples of Selinus; and Syracuse drew a revenue from her barbarian subjects. There were in particular two important points, in which the Siceliots had an advantage over Athens; the corn they used was of their own growth, and they were

strong in cavalry. It would not therefore be sufficient to send out a powerful fleet ; it must be accompanied by a land force, capable of withstanding the superiority of the enemy's horse ; for they might find themselves unable to procure any cavalry in Sicily, except such as the Segestans could furnish. It must be remembered that the expedition in which they were about to embark, was not like those which they were used to make to neighbouring countries, where their armaments could receive supplies and reinforcements from home in a few days. They were going to a land so distant that in the winter season four months might elapse before despatches from the army could reach Athens. It was therefore necessary carefully to calculate its demands beforehand, and to provide for them amply. They would have need of a strong body of heavy-armed infantry ; of archers and slingers in great numbers to face the enemy's cavalry ; of a fleet which would keep undisputed command of the sea. And as they might be detained on their passage by contrary winds, on points of the coast where provisions were not to be purchased, they must load a sufficient number of vessels with corn, and press slaves into their service from the mills. Above all they must not go empty-handed, trusting to the vaunted riches of Segesta, which would probably prove mere words. There could be no prospect of success, nor even of safety, unless their preparations were on such a scale, as to give them a decided superiority over the enemy in every respect excepting the numbers of the heavy infantry. And they ought to make their calculations, as if they were sending out a colony to found a city in the midst of a hostile population, where, unless they obtained the upper hand on the first day of their landing, they could never gain a footing. With all these precautions they would leave much to depend on the favour of fortune ; but what he had proposed could not be omitted without rashness. If however any one present was of a different opinion, he was willing to resign his command to him.

The impression which this statement made on the assembly was just the opposite of that which Nicias intended. Instead of being discouraged by the magnitude of the preparations which he described, they thought that they had now the fullest warrant of success that his experience and judgment could give; even the elder and more cautious of the citizens now began to share the confidence of the youthful and sanguine spirits, who were attracted by the novelty of the enterprise and by the remoteness of its object: while the largest class reckoned, some upon a gainful service, and all upon a conquest which would yield an inexhaustible revenue. The few who still harboured any misgivings were ashamed to express them, and suffered themselves to be carried along by the current. Nicias was called upon distinctly to specify the amount of the force which he deemed necessary. He complied with reluctance, reserving, as he said, many particulars for a calmer deliberation with his colleagues; but as far as he could form an estimate on so short a notice, he believed that he must not ask for less than a hundred galleys together with transports, and 5000 heavy infantry, with bowmen and slingers, and all other things needful in proportion. One of the warmest advocates of the expedition, named Demostratus, now came forward with a motion, which he said would deprive Nicias of every pretext for hesitation and reserve; and on his proposal a decree was passed by which the generals were empowered to use their own discretion, both as to the force of the armament, and all the circumstances of the expedition.

The stir of preparation immediately began, both at Athens and in the ports and arsenals of the allies whose contingents were required, and the news spread rapidly through Greece. At Athens the public mind was entirely occupied by this one thought; all conversation turned upon this subject. The young greedily listened to the descriptions with which the veterans who had already served in Sicily fed their curiosity; and in the

palæstra they would interrupt their exercises to trace the form of the island in the sand, and to discuss its position with respect to Africa and Carthage. During this interval of anxious expectation the desire of looking into the future, always active among the Greeks, was unusually excited. It was a time which of itself called forth omens and prophecies; and the leaders of the contending parties at Athens seem not to have neglected the ordinary arts of working on the popular superstition. Nicias, who was himself in this respect quite on a level with the vulgar, had probably some influence among the Athenian priests; and they are said to have announced a great number of sinister auguries. An oracle directed the Athenians to fetch the priestess of Athene from Clazomenæ; it turned out that her name (Hesychia) signified *quiet*, and it was interpreted as a declaration that the gods forbad the expedition. News too was brought from Delphi of a portent which threatened the Athenian arms with some disaster.¹ On the other hand Alcibiades was not at a loss for expedients of a like nature to keep up the spirits of the people. He too had his friendly diviners, who, among their oracular treasures, found some ancient predictions, importing that the Athenians were to reap great renown from Sicily. An answer which he obtained from the temple of Ammon seemed more distinctly to foretell the conquest of Syracuse²; and one no less encouraging was brought from Dodona.³

The preparations for the voyage were nearly completed, when one morning it was discovered that the numerous stone busts of Hermes, with which the piety of private citizens and of public bodies had adorned the streets of Athens, had almost all been mutilated in the course of the night, by unknown hands. So strange

¹ Plut. Nic. 13. Paus. x. 15 5 A statue of Athene, and a palm tree, in bronze, dedicated after the battles of the Eurymedon, were stripped of a part of the gold with which they were overlaid. The Delphians attributed the loss to a vast flight of crows which attacked the images with their beaks; but they were suspected of having themselves committed the robbery, to serve at once themselves and the Syracusans.

² Plut. Nic. 13.

³ Paus. viii. 11. 12.

an occurrence would probably at any time have excited not only astonishment and indignation, but some degree of alarm; at this juncture the last of these feelings prevailed over every other. There were indeed two ways of explaining the mystery, either of which would have divested it of its most threatening aspect. It might have been an unpremeditated drunken frolic; or it might have been contrived by an enemy, for the very purpose of preventing or delaying the expedition by the terror of the omen; and it seems that the Corinthians were suspected of having made the attempt to avert the danger which impended over their colony Syracuse.¹ But no one could think this a probable suspicion; and though at any other time the deed might easily have been attributed to a sally of intemperate levity, it was difficult to believe that it had taken place by mere chance at so critical a moment. If however it had been planned, and by Athenians, the object could not have been slight which had tempted them to expose themselves to the penalties of sacrilege; and the next thought that presented itself was that a plot had been formed against the state, and that the outrage was either a pledge of union among the conspirators, or was in some other way connected with their main design. There were demagogues who foresaw the advantage which they might derive from the fears of the multitude, and who gave them a more definite direction, by representing what had happened as a prelude to a revolution by which the democracy was to be overthrown. The assembly and the council of Five Hundred held several extraordinary sittings within a few days. Commissioners were appointed to inquire into the affair²; and great rewards were offered for a discovery of the perpetrators of the sacrilege. By the same decree informers of whatever condition, free-men or slaves, citizens or strangers, were invited by a promise of impunity, to reveal any other act of impiety which had come to their knowledge.

¹ Plut. Al. 18.² Zηνουσι.

This invitation seems to have been, secretly at least, pointed against Alcibiades, who, as we have already mentioned, had incurred a suspicion—which the poet Eupolis had even made the subject of a dramatic satire—of having sometimes, in a circle of his most intimate companions, celebrated a kind of profane and intemperate orgies. It was not known what was the precise nature of these secret revels; and the ludicrous exaggerations of the comic stage would not have led to any serious proceedings; but the rumour, by its connection with the subject which now engaged public attention, had perhaps set the enemies and rivals of Alcibiades on making farther inquiries, or on fabricating new charges. Yet the first informations which were drawn forth by the decree seem not to have concerned him, but to have related to some offences committed on former occasions, when certain sacred images had been mutilated like those of Hermes, but, as it plainly appeared, merely in sport, by young men heated with wine.

The armament was nearly ready to sail, when in an assembly held by the generals—perhaps to make their last report to the people, and to fix the day of their departure—one Pythonicus rose to lay a new information. He undertook to convict Alcibiades of divulging the Eleusinian mysteries by a profane imitation of them in a private house, before uninitiated persons; and he offered to produce a slave named Andromachus, belonging to one Polemarchus—a friend it would seem of Alcibiades—who had been an eye-witness, and who, if assured of impunity, would give a decisive proof of the fact: for he would mention secrets which could lawfully be known to none but the initiated. The slave's evidence was immediately received. He described a mimic celebration of the mysteries, at which he had been present with other slaves and uninitiated persons in the house of Polytion, where Alcibiades performed the part of the Hierophant, and his companions represented other sacred personages—the Torch-bearer and the Herald—who executed the most solemn functions

in the Eleusinian rites. It seems to have been after this that Andrôcles, a man who had acquired great influence in the assembly, and an avowed enemy of Alcibiades, declared himself ready to bring forward slaves and foreigners, who could convict him of a variety of similar offences. He endeavoured to connect these charges with the mysterious mutilation of the Hermes-busts, and to persuade the people, that the whole was the result of a deep plot laid by Alcibiades and his partizans against liberty.¹

Alcibiades was desirous of being put immediately upon his trial, for all his hopes of clearing himself from the accusation depended upon his presence. Whether innocent or guilty, he saw enough of the temper of the people, and knew the malice and arts of his enemies well enough to be sure that, if he left his cause undecided, he had no chance of an acquittal. But notwithstanding the feverish state of the popular feelings, he had reason to expect a favourable verdict, if he was permitted to defend himself before the armament sailed; for he would then have a hold on the fears of the people, which he might trust more safely than either its partiality or its justice. In the army was a body of troops from Argos and from Mantinea, which had been engaged in the expedition chiefly through his interest, and would probably abandon it if he was deprived of his command; and it was in the military class of his fellow-citizens that his popularity chiefly lay. His enemies were also aware of the advantage which he would derive from these auxiliaries, and perhaps regretted that they had not reserved their charges to his absence. But as they could not themselves decently resist his demand of an immediate trial, they put forward some of their partizans, who were not so notoriously unfriendly to him, and who could advise, with an appearance of impartiality, that the expedition should not be delayed on his account, but

¹ On the order in which these charges were made see Appendix IV.

that he should come back to be tried at a more convenient time. It was in vain that he protested against the hardship of being sent out with such a charge hanging over him, while his enemies were left at leisure to calumniate him behind his back, and that he even urged the imprudence of entrusting a man who was labouring under so grave an imputation with such an important command. His remonstrances were overruled; and the trial was put off to an indefinite period.

The day at length came which had been appointed for the sailing of the fleet. The greater part of the allies and the transports had been ordered to meet it at Corcyra. Their absence did not diminish the interest of the spectacle which presented itself on the morning when the Athenian forces came down to embark at Piræus. Almost the whole population of Athens, citizens and foreigners, accompanied them to the water side, and lined the shores of the harbour. The many tender and mournful partings of relatives and friends who now took leave of one another, awakened a general feeling of patriotic anxiety, which could scarcely find room in the first glow of ambitious hope, and in the subsequent bustle of preparation, but now allayed the pride with which the Athenian spectators contemplated so magnificent a display of their power. It was hardly possible for them to reflect without uneasiness how much of the strength and wealth of Athens was about to be committed to the perils of a long voyage and a distant war. So mighty an armament had scarcely ever before issued from Piræus, or from any Greek port; and though that with which Pericles invaded Peloponnesus in the first year of the war, and which was afterwards employed against Potidæa, was not inferior in numbers, this far surpassed it in the care and cost of its equipment, which corresponded to the probable duration, and to the various objects of the expedition. The galleys were furnished by the state, but according to the Athenian law were fitted out at

the expense of the wealthy citizens who commanded them; and the captains, transported by the general ardour, vied with each other in their endeavours to engage the best seamen by an increase of the regular pay allowed by the government, and strove to distinguish themselves by the gallant show of their vessels. The like emulation prevailed both among officers and men in the land force, and displayed itself as well in the selection of the troops as in the splendour of their arms and accoutrements. To the sums thus expended from necessity or ostentation, and to those which would be required for the future supply of the service, were to be added, as Thucydides observes, all that had been provided by prudent men to meet the extraordinary emergencies of the campaign, and those which were exported by merchants and by military adventurers with a view to commercial profit; the whole of what was thus embarked amounted to a great treasure. The strangers present, while they gazed with wonder on the splendour of the armament, were no less struck by the boldness of the enterprise, and the vastness of the objects for which it was designed.

When all was got ready for the departure, silence was proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet; and, after a pause, the solemn prayers for a prosperous voyage were offered, not separately, as usual, in each galley, but pronounced by a herald, and repeated simultaneously through the fleet; and the chorus of supplication was swelled by the voices of the multitude, both of citizens, and—if there were any who wished well to Athens—of foreigners, on shore. At the same time in every ship libations were poured, both by officers and men, from vessels of gold and silver. When these rites were ended, and the pæan was sung, the armament moved slowly out of the harbour in a column, which broke up as soon as it got to sea; and it then pushed across the gulf with all the speed each galley could make, to Ægina, and thence pursued its voyage to Corcyra.

At Corcyra its whole strength was for the first time seen collected. The fleet consisted of 134 galleys, beside two Rhodians of lower rate. Athens alone furnished a hundred—sixty fighting galleys; and forty for the transport of soldiers; Chios and other allies contributed the rest. The army included 5000 heavy infantry; among whom 1500 were Athenians, selected from the regular muster-rolls: 700 were taken from the lowest class, the Thetes, to serve on board in sea-fights. Among the allies who made up the remaining number were 500 Argives, and 250 Mantineans, and mercenaries, perhaps from other Arcadian towns. The light troops were 480 archers, of whom 80 came from Crete: 700 Rhodian slingers, and 150 Megarians of the exiled party. For cavalry, notwithstanding the warnings of Nicias, the aid of the Sicilians seems to have been confidently expected; and it was thought sufficient to send a single transport with a troop of thirty horse. The fleet was accompanied by thirty vessels laden with provision, having on board beside the slaves employed in preparing it, a company of masons and carpenters, and a store of tools for fortification. A hundred boats had been pressed into the service; but a number of merchantmen, and of small craft followed on private commercial adventures. When the generals had reviewed the whole armament, they divided it into three squadrons, which they took, each one under his separate command, the more easily to preserve order, and to find shelter and entertainment on the passage; and they sent forward three ships, to learn which of the Italian and Sicilian towns were willing to receive them, but more particularly to ascertain the real amount of the subsidy which might be expected from Segesta. These ships were to return as quickly as possible, and meet them on their way.

In this order the armament crossed over to the Iapygian Foreland, and proceeded along the Italian coast to Rhegium. None of the cities by which it passed would either open their gates to the troops, or afford them a

market; at Tarentum and Locri they were not even allowed to come to moorings, or to take in water. But at Rhegium they found a still stronger proof of the alarm which they inspired. Here, as in a city of Chalcidian origin, which had actively supported them in their former expeditions, and was attached to their interest by its inveterate enmity to Locri, they had looked for a friendly reception, and ready succour. But the Rhegians would not admit them into their town; and the Athenians were obliged to encamp in a sanctuary of Artemis without the walls. Here they hauled their ships on shore, and the Rhegians supplied them with a market; but when they were urged to co-operate towards redressing the wrongs of their kinsmen, the Leontines, they refused to take any part in the war without the concurrence of the other Italiots. The Athenian generals were forced to content themselves with this answer, and anxiously waited for the report which they expected from Segesta, which would in a great measure determine the plan of their future operations in Sicily.

The news of the Athenian preparation had reached Syracuse through several channels before the armament sailed; and Hermocrates had received some private intelligence which left no room for doubt as to its destination. An assembly was held to deliberate on the rumours which had begun to spread, and which, though generally disbelieved, created some degree of anxiety. Hermocrates came forward to confirm their truth, and to offer such counsels as the occasion suggested. After assuring his audience that, incredible as the fact might appear, he had ascertained on good authority that the Athenians had fitted out a great armament, which by this time was on its way, and which under pretence of succouring Segesta and restoring the Leontines, was designed for nothing less than the subjugation first of Syracuse and then of all Sicily, he desired them not, through wilful incredulity or presumptuous confidence, to neglect the precautions required for their safety; but

on the other hand to entertain no fears of the impending invasion. The greatness of the hostile army would give them one great advantage, as it would probably unite the other Siceliots in their cause; and as experience had shown to be the ordinary issue of expeditions sent out to so great a distance from home, it should either be totally defeated, or should utterly fail of its object, the state against which it was directed would reap the glory, though the enemy should have been baffled by natural or accidental obstacles. It was thus that the Athenians had gained the largest share in the honour of repelling the barbarians, because they were principally threatened. He advised them calmly, but actively, to prepare for meeting the approaching attack; to repair and strengthen the defences of their city; to secure their dominion over the Sicels who were subject to them by fortifications and garrisons, and to endeavour to gain the independent tribes to their alliance; to send embassies over Sicily, and engage their Greek brethren to join them in warding off the common danger; and others into Italy, to make a league with the Italiots, or at least to keep them from siding with the Athenians. He even thought that it might be advisable to apply to Carthage, which he knew had long viewed the power of Athens with apprehension, and when he saw it threatening an island so near her own shores, might be roused to interpose; and no state had greater treasures at its command, or was in other respects a more powerful ally. But at least no time should be lost in sending to Sparta and to Corinth to procure succours, and to urge them to renew hostilities with Athens.— There was however another measure which he would propose, though he did not feel equally confident of obtaining their consent. He would not wait to be attacked, but would fit out a fleet, the strongest which they could collect with the aid of their Sicilian allies, and would send it victualled for a two months' voyage to Tarentum. If they arrived there before the Athenians had crossed the Ionian gulf, they might find an

opportunity, on a friendly coast, of assailing the invading armament to great advantage on its passage, and of weakening and distressing it, even if they did not strike a fatal blow. But he thought it still more probable, that by the boldness of this movement, they should so confound the enemy, who expected no resistance, that he would be detained, deliberating and collecting intelligence, at Corcyra, until the sailing season was past, or would abandon the expedition altogether. Such a result would be the less surprising, as the most experienced of the Athenian commanders, whose authority was likely to have the greatest weight with his colleagues, was averse to the enterprise, and would seize any fair pretext for giving it up.

But Hermocrates was so far from being able to carry this vigorous measure, that a large party of the assembly persisted in treating the rumour as incredible; some made a jest of it; others supposing it well founded, could see no danger; a very small number adopted his views. A popular orator, named Athenagoras, who seems to have been invested with a kind of tribunician character as the official advocate of the commonalty, not only rejected the report with scorn, but inveighed severely against its authors. It was, he observed, not at all likely, though every Syracusan ought to wish it might be true, that the Athenians would be so infatuated as, while the Peloponnesians were still hostile to them, to embark in a new war, quite as full of difficulty and danger as that which they left behind them. Should they come, they would find Sicily much better provided with means of defence than Peloponnesus; and Syracuse alone would be more than equal to twice such a force as they were said to have raised. It was impossible that they could transport to such a distance the cavalry, or the infantry, or the stores and ammunition necessary for such an undertaking. It would be a desperate one, even if they had the command of a city as large as Syracuse and in its neighbourhood; how much more, when all Sicily would be hostile to them, and when,

even if they were able to land and to keep their ground, they would be confined to the precincts of such a camp as they could form with their ships, and the scanty means at their disposal. But the greater the absurdity of such a project, the less readily ought they to impute it to a people so politic and conversant with affairs as the Athenians. It was however easy to trace these idle rumours to their fountain-head, and to see that they sprang from the criminal ambition of a restless faction, which hoped, by spreading consternation among the people, to veil its designs, and to steal its way to power. He should be at his post to protect the commonalty from the machinations of its enemies. And he ended his speech by addressing the oligarchical party in a strain of dignified reproof and expostulation on the folly and heinousness of their conduct.

One of the generals now rose to put a stop to the debate, and censured the turn which Athenagoras had given to it by his insinuations. "Even if the alarm proved groundless, they could take no harm from putting themselves on their guard. He and his colleagues would use all diligence both to ascertain the truth, and to provide for the defence of the city." It was not before the Athenians had arrived at Rhegium that the doubts of the Syracusans were removed. They then applied themselves earnestly to make preparations, as expecting an immediate attack.

In the mean while the three ships which had been sent forward from Corcyra came to the camp at Rhegium. They brought a report from Segesta, which did not surprise Nicias, so much as it disappointed his colleagues. It now appeared that the envoys who had been first sent from Athens to inspect the state of the Segestan finances, had been imposed upon by a false show of wealth which had been prepared to meet their eye. They had been conducted to the temple of Venus on mount Eryx, which was indeed rich in consecrated vessels; but as they were of silver, their value was not so great as the splendour of the display. The Athenians

however had been still more dazzled by the great quantity of gold and silver plate which they saw piled on the sideboards of the principal Segestans by whom they were entertained. But it turned out that these treasures had been borrowed for the purpose from some neighbouring cities, and that they had served in succession to adorn all the banquets at which the Athenians had admired them. When it became necessary for the Segestans to reveal their real condition, it appeared that they were unable to raise more than thirty talents, to defray the cost of the war. This disappointment increased the dejection with which the Athenian generals had been struck by the repulse they met with in their application to Rhegium. And when they now proceeded to confer with one another, Nicias proposed that they should forthwith sail to Selinus, and call upon the Segestans to supply pay, if not for the whole armament, at least for the sixty ships which they had asked for: that on this condition they should stay, until they had brought the Selinuntians, either by force or negotiation, to a compromise; but as this was the avowed object of the expedition, with this he would end it, and—unless some opportunity should offer itself of doing a service to the Leontines, or of gaining any other ally among the Sicilian cities—after having coasted the island, to exhibit the power of Athens, he would return home, and not subject the state to any further cost and risk. Alcibiades thought that it would be disgraceful to retire without having made any other use of their great armament: he advised, that they should open negotiation with all the Siceliot towns, except Syracuse and Selinus, and endeavour first to win Messana, which on account of its situation was peculiarly important; that they should excite the Sicels, subjects of Syracuse, to revolt; and persuade the rest to aid them with troops and corn; and then having ascertained the allies on whom they had to reckon, that they should attack Syracuse and Selinus. Lamachus was of opinion, that before the terror excited by their first appearance was suffered to

subside, they should sail to Syracuse, and endeavour to draw the enemy into a battle, before he had collected his strength and his courage. They would probably find the Syracusans unprepared and in dismay: they might expect to enrich themselves by much booty still left in the country; and a victory would be the most efficacious argument to decide the other Sicilian cities in their favour. For the further prosecution of the war, he would encamp at Megara, which was uninhabited, and at a short distance, whether by sea or land, from Syracuse.

It was necessary that two at least of the generals should sacrifice their opinions; and as the plan of Alcibiades was a middle course between the two extremes proposed by his colleagues, it was adopted by Lamachus much less reluctantly than by Nicias. Alcibiades then crossed over in his own galley to Messina, to try his arts of negotiation, but he could prevail no further with the Messanians, than to obtain the offer of a market for the troops outside the walls. After his return to Rhegium, the generals manned sixty galleys, with which, leaving the rest at the camp under the care of one of his colleagues, most probably Nicias, he sailed, accompanied by the third, along the coast to Naxos. Naxos opened its gates to them, and they passed on to Catana. But here was a party favourable to Syracuse which was strong enough to prevent the Athenians from being received into the town; and the squadron proceeded to the mouth of the river Terias, where it was moored for the night. The next morning it moved in a column toward Syracuse; ten galleys were sent forward to enter the Great Harbour, to ascertain the state of the enemy's naval preparations, and to observe the general features of the town, the harbours, and the neighbourhood which was to be the theatre of war. It was also ordered that, as they sailed by the town, a proclamation should be made, declaring that the Athenians were come to restore their allies and kinsmen, the Leontines, to their country, and inviting those who were residing in Syra-

cuse to quit the hostile city, and to take shelter in the camp of their friends and benefactors. No hostile navy appeared in the harbour ; but a Syracusan galley fell into the hands of the Athenians, as it was crossing over to the town with the tablets containing a list of the serviceable citizens which were kept in a temple in the outskirts : a capture, which was afterwards interpreted as an ironical fulfilment of the prediction which had promised that the Athenians should take all the Syracusans.¹ When this commission had been executed, the whole squadron returned to Catana. During the absence of the Athenians their Catanian partizans seem to have bestirred themselves, and succeeded in gaining permission for the generals to enter the town, and address the assembly, which was held to consider their proposals. Accordingly they landed with a part of their troops, and leaving them at the gates, were admitted to an audience. The attention of all Catana was attracted to the debate ; and while the people was listening to Alcibiades, some of the Athenian soldiers, straying round the walls, discovered a postern which had been walled up, but in so slight a manner that they were tempted to force it ; and, having entered unobserved, they proceeded quietly, without any hostile intention, to the market-place. But as they were followed by their comrades, their presence did not remain long unnoticed ; and being attributed to design, it struck the partizans of Syracuse with such consternation, that they immediately withdrew from the city. The opposite party, which was by far the most numerous and had probably only found a difficulty in overcoming the distrust excited by the magnitude of the Athenian armament, now met with no resistance, and carried a decree for concluding an alliance with Athens, and for inviting the generals to transfer their camp to Catana ; and the whole armament was soon after brought over, and encamped there.

Information was now received which encouraged the

¹ Plut. Nic. 14.

Athenian commanders to hope that the sight of their forces would induce Camarina to embrace their cause ; it was at the same time reported that the Syracusans were manning a fleet. They therefore sailed with the whole armament to Camarina, and in their way touched at Syracuse, where they discovered that the rumour of the Syracusan preparations was groundless. But at Camarina likewise they were disappointed. The Camarinæans showed no disposition to receive them, but pleaded the old compact, by which they were only bound to admit a single Athenian ship at a time into their harbours, unless they sent for more of their own accord. In their way back to Catana they made a descent on the Syracusan territory, and for the first time were assailed by a party of the enemy's cavalry, which cut off some of the light troops that were scattered in quest of plunder.

The course of proceeding which had been proposed by Nicias, though still the safest, could not be taken without a humiliating confession of weakness, after different designs had been disclosed. The movement which Lamachus had recommended no longer promised the same advantage, after the opportunity on which he calculated had been let slip. The success of the plan which had been adopted, depended in a great measure on the personal character and the peculiar talents of its author, Alcibiades ; and of these Athens was now to be deprived. On his return to Catana he found there the state-galley, the *Salaminia*, which had been sent with orders to convey him, and several other persons who were serving in the army, to Athens, there to be put upon their trial, on charges relating either to the mutilation of the *Hermes*-busts, or to the profanation of the mysteries.

After his departure his enemies, freed from every restraint, redoubled their efforts to inflame the passions of the multitude against him. To kindle its anger to a sufficient degree, they saw that it was necessary to work upon its fears. The foundation of their whole

scheme was the persuasion which they had contrived from the first to instil into the public mind, that the mutilation of the images was the effect, not of levity and wantonness, but of a deep-laid plot for overturning the constitution. It is the nature of such suspicions to be daily gaining strength, and to find food in the most trivial and indifferent occurrences. The profanation of the mysteries was easily believed to have been part of the same plan which lay at the bottom of the other acts of sacrilege ; and every proof that convicted Alcibiades of an offence against religion, was held to confirm the reality of his treasonable designs ; while on the other hand all discoveries which tended to strengthen the popular prejudice with regard to the affair of the images, were considered as additional evidence against him.

His rivals and enemies were not confined to one class or party. Androcles was probably instigated by a merely personal animosity ; but he was aided by Cimon's son, Thessalus, who had perhaps no motive but the hereditary feud between his family and the house of Alcibiades. Thessalus — it would seem very soon after the expedition had sailed — embodied the testimony of the slave Andromachus, and perhaps that of the witnesses produced by Androcles, in a formal prosecution of Alcibiades. But the mutilation of the busts was the subject which chiefly occupied public attention, as the most alarming sign of a conspiracy against the state. The rewards that had been offered were of themselves sufficient to attract informers ; and it was the interest of the enemies of Alcibiades to multiply informations, and to involve as many persons as they could in the charge, that the alleged conspiracy might appear the more extensive and formidable. Andromachus was followed by a new informer, an alien named Teucer, who had quitted his residence at Athens, and had retired to Megara, and now offered, upon assurance of impunity, to make important revelations both as to the profanation of the mysteries, and the mutilation of the

busts. He gave a list of eighteen persons who had been concerned in the latter offence; and all who did not make their escape before they were arrested, were condemned and put to death. Both Andromachus and Teucer were rewarded. But Pisander and Charicles, two of the commissioners appointed to conduct the inquest, declared that the information hitherto received unfolded but a small part of the plot; that the conspirators were much more numerous than Teucer's list; and that it was necessary to prosecute the inquiry with unabated diligence. This declaration, which opened a door for an endless succession of false charges and executions, diffused universal terror among the honest citizens; so that, if we might believe an eyewitness¹, the signal which announced a meeting of the Five Hundred, before whom informations were commonly laid, scared the crowd from the market-place, each dreading that he might be the next victim. Fresh discoveries were made as to the mysteries. A lady, Agariste the wife of Alcmaeonides, whom from her name we might suppose to have been a kinswoman of Alcibiades; and a slave named Lydus, successively gave evidence of new profanations committed in other houses beside that of Polytion. But still the public anxiety was most intent on the other branch of the plot; and now a witness named Dioclide^s came forward to supply the deficiencies of Teucer's information.

Dioclide^s was an impudent and reckless impostor. We have no ground but his own statement for suspecting that he had any accomplices in his villany. He could safely rely on the public credulity for an eager reception of any tale which he chose to invent; and he seems to have framed one which he thought best adapted to his two ends of popular favour and private extortion. He stated before the council that he knew the mutilators of the busts, and that they amounted to about 300 persons. Chance had led him into a street by the theatre on the night of the outrage, and he had seen about that number of men enter the orchestra, and

¹ Andocides, *Myster.* p. 6.

stand there for a time in groups of fifteen or twenty. The full moon shone upon their faces, and, as he stood concealed behind a pillar, he was able to observe the features of almost all. Though he saw no more of them that night, the next day, when the sacrilege was discovered, he concluded for what purpose they had been assembled ; and his suspicions were soon confirmed by the admission of some of them whom he recognised when he taxed them with the deed. They had offered him hushmoney ; and he had kept their secret for a month ; but as they broke their promise, he was now come to inform against them. He then gave a list of forty-two persons whom he had already recognised — reserving to himself the power of proscribing as many more as he should think fit.

It is probable that at the time when this story was told no attempt was made to sift it. Delight at so interesting a discovery, and the desire of detecting the unknown conspirators, must have been the prevailing feelings, and would leave no room for doubts or objections. Afterwards it was remembered that the night on which Diocliides pretended to have noted the features of so many persons by the light of the full moon, was a night on which the moon was not to be seen at all.¹ But the council was not in a mood for such reflections. At the head of the list made out by Diocliides were Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two of the councillors who were in the room. Pisander moved that the persons on the list should be put to the torture, that all their accomplices might be known before night ; a proceeding directly contrary to law, but which seems to have been considered as within the extraordinary powers with which the council had been invested ; and his proposal was received with general acclam-

¹ Yet this circumstance rests only on the evidence of Plutarch, Alcib. 20. who does not seem to know which of the informers it was ; and Diodorus (xiii. 2), whose account, if it was meant to apply to Diocliides, differs totally from that of Andocides ; while Andocides, who mentions that Diocliides pretended to have seen the Hermes breakers by the light of the full moon, does not intimate that he was detected in his falsehood by the real age of the moon.

ations. But the two accused councillors took refuge at the altar, and were at length permitted to give sureties for their appearance; they did not however wait for their trial, but immediately left the city. The council then proceeded in person to arrest all the others named by Diocles, and threw as many as it found into prison. It was one great object of those who desired to prolong and heighten the prevailing excitement, to persuade the people that the plot, although detected, was still subsisting, and that liberty not only had been, but was still in danger. About the same time that Diocles laid his information, news was brought that a Bœotian army was moving toward the frontier¹, and it was immediately concluded that the enemy was in correspondence with the conspirators. The council sent for the generals, and ordered them to make a proclamation, enjoining all the citizens to assemble in arms in certain public places of the city and Piræus, and to remain there all night. The presiding part of the council (the Prytanes) slept in the council-chamber, and the rest of the Five Hundred in the citadel. In the midst of this alarm Diocles was honoured with extraordinary marks of public gratitude, as the benefactor of his country. He was crowned, and drawn in a chariot to the council-house, to be entertained there among the privileged guests at the public table.

Among the prisoners who had been arrested upon his information was the orator Andocides, his father Leogoras, and many other members of his family; a family, which by its noble descent was peculiarly exposed to the suspicion of oligarchical views. One of the mysterious circumstances in the occurrence which had been the occasion of their misfortune, was that amidst the general mutilation of the Hermes-busts one very celebrated image, which had been erected by the Ægean tribes, and stood near the door of Andocides, was left

¹ On the variance between Andocides and Thucydides as to this point see Appendix IV.

entire : a fact which tended to strengthen the belief that he had been privy to the sacrilege committed on the rest. With the prospect of death—the inevitable issue of their approaching trial—before his eyes, Andocides, or one of his partners in misery, seems to have been struck by the thought of an expedient, by which he might extricate himself and his friends, and might foil Diocles at his own weapons. He resolved to turn informer himself. He adopted the evidence of Teucer, combined it with a story by which he plausibly accounted for the preservation of the *Hermes* near his own house, and cleared himself and most of his friends of all participation in the sacrilege. But he added four new names to Teucer's list, of persons who were sufficiently connected with him to confirm his credit for veracity, and yet had means of making their escape. His statement was received with the firmer confidence, as the calendar demonstrated the falsehood of that of Diocles, who confessed it, and pretended that he had been suborned by two persons, one of whom was a namesake and a kinsman of Alcibiades. This was probably another falsehood, suggested by the prejudice which he knew to prevail against all the friends of Alcibiades, and which he hoped might operate in his favour. The persons whom he named thought it prudent to go abroad ; but he was put to death, and was perhaps, among all who had been condemned in the course of these proceedings, the first who deserved to suffer.

Thucydides could not satisfy himself as to the credit due to the story of Andocides ; and it would therefore be presumptuous for any one now to pronounce upon it. But the narrative which we have still remaining from the hand of Andocides himself, in an oration composed some years after in his own defence, raises a strong suspicion that it had at most but a very slender groundwork of truth. All appears to have been artfully accommodated to the prevailing opinion, as far as was consistent with his personal objects. He chimes in with the popular suspicion, by representing the mutilation of

the images as the result of a deliberate plan ; but assigns no motive for it. And thus, although his information set the public anxiety at rest with regard to this affair, and put an end to the prosecutions grounded on it, so as to restore comparative tranquillity, it left the general apprehensions of a plot against the democracy as active as ever. The attention of the people was now directed with undivided earnestness to the profanation of the mysteries, in which Alcibiades was more immediately concerned. It does not appear that he was even charged with having personally taken a part in the other sacrilege ; possibly he was at the time absent from the city, on business connected with the expedition. But this mattered little, so long as both were believed to be links in one conspiracy. Yet great efforts were needed to induce the people to take the step, which it was the aim of his enemies to accomplish, of recalling him from his command to a trial in which the verdict was already given against him. The detriment which the Sicilian expedition would suffer from his absence, the danger which might arise from driving him to extremities, were deterrents that struck every one who was not blinded by personal hatred. It was necessary to goad the people by its fears ; and to impress it with the belief, that it was in hourly danger of an oligarchical revolution, and that it would never be safe from the machinations of the friends of Alcibiades, as long as he, though at a distance, encouraged them to rely on his support. But perhaps it would have been scarcely possible to work so far upon popular credulity, if some occurrences had not taken place at the same juncture, which powerfully confirmed the suspicion of domestic treachery. A Spartan army marched as far as the Isthmus, and remained there while some negotiation, the object of which was unknown, was carried on with the Bœotians, whose forces were perhaps still near the borders of Attica.¹ These movements were all interpreted as connected with the supposed conspiracy ; and the alarm was heightened

¹ See Appendix IV.

by the intelligence that fears were entertained at Argos of a plot against the democracy, which was there imputed to the citizens who were allied by hospitality with Alcibiades. This indeed was an almost unavoidable effect of the scenes which were now passing at Athens. But his enemies at home magnified the danger of Argos, and obtained a decree, by which those Argive citizens whom Alcibiades himself had carried away for the security of the democratical government, were consigned to the discretion of the opposite party, which put them all to death. The coincidence of so many alarming events, which were all referred to Alcibiades as the secret mover of their hidden springs, created a new panic at Athens, in which the people — now regardless of every object but that of getting their dreaded enemy into their power — passed the decree which the Salamina carried to Catana.

When we review the whole course of these proceedings at a distance which secures us from the passions that agitated the actors, we may be apt to exclaim: "In all history it will be difficult to find such another instance of popular frenzy." But the recollection that these are the very words in which Hume spoke of our own popish plot, may serve to moderate our surprise, and our censure of the Athenians.¹ Their credulity was in one respect at least less absurd than that of our forefathers, inasmuch as there was an evident, strange, and mysterious fact, on which it reposed. We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiades, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable. The readiness with which they listened

¹ It is curious enough that Wachsmuth, as if he had forgotten the history of our popish plot, observes of the Athenian proceedings in the affair of the Hermes-busts, that *their like will hardly be found in any state of mature civilisation* I. 2. p. 191.

to the suggestions of his enemies, is chiefly remarkable, as it shows the high estimate they had formed of his talents and activity, which seemed to render it credible, that he might at the same time be conducting the war in Sicily, and a conspiracy at Athens.

The strong apprehensions which were entertained of his influence with the army, were indicated by the orders which accompanied the decree for his recall ; that he should not be arrested, but only summoned to his trial. Accordingly he was permitted, together with the other persons involved in the like charges, to accompany the Salaminia in his own galley. His resolution on the course which he should take was formed almost as soon as he received the summons. He determined not to return to Athens, but, as he was no longer able to serve his country, to show how deeply he could injure it. Before he left Sicily, he took measures for defeating a plan that had been concerted with a party in Messina for betraying the town to the Athenians. At Thurii he went on shore with his companions, and concealed himself until the Salaminia sailed away. When his escape was known at Athens, sentence of death was passed upon him, his property was confiscated, and the priests and priestesses were ordered to curse him according to the forms prescribed by an ancient custom, waving red banners, with their faces turned toward the west. The priestess Theano alone refused to obey this order ; cursing, she said, was no part of her priestly functions.

The departure of Alcibiades left his colleagues at liberty to make any change which they might think fit in their plans. Lamachus was disposed to pay great deference to the authority of Nicias. Yet it seems to have been no longer a question between them, whether the war was to be carried on, nor whether Syracuse was to be the main point of attack ; nor was the course of negotiation proposed by Alcibiades wholly abandoned. But Nicias was still bent on inspecting the state of things at Segesta in person ; partly with the view of

collecting all the supplies that the Segestans could raise ; and partly perhaps with the hope of composing their differences with Selinus, and thus, it might be, of gaining one step toward a safe and honourable termination of the enterprise. The want of money may have seemed to render this voyage necessary ; though in all other respects it was a mere waste of precious time. The armament was disposed in two divisions, one under each general, which proceeded together along the north coast. At Himera they could not gain admittance ; but advancing westward they made themselves masters of a town named Hyccara, belonging to the Sicanians, who were at war with their neighbours of Segesta. On this pretext the Athenians carried away the whole population to slavery ; the real motive was no doubt the value of the captives ; with whom the fleet sailed back to Catana, while the army returned by land through the country of the Sicels. Nicias himself proceeded to Segesta, where he could obtain no more than thirty talents : but the sale of the captives yielded a hundred and twenty.

After this expedition, as the armament was not to be employed against Selinus, Syracuse appeared to be the only object remaining for its operations. Yet it was not before the autumn that the generals prepared to move against it. In the mean while they sent round to the Sicels on the coast for reinforcements, and made an assault on the town of Hybla near Gela, in which they were repulsed. The circumstances under which Lamachus had first proposed to land the army near Syracuse were now completely changed. The fears which their first appearance had raised in the Syracusans, had subsided as the expected invasion was delayed, and at length — when instead of approaching Syracuse the Athenians moved away to the most distant part of the island and then were baffled before Hybla — made way for contempt. The Syracusans called upon their generals, since the enemy would not come to them, to lead them against Catana. And their parties of horse, sent out to observe the motions of the Athenians, would ride

up to the camp, and ask whether they were come to reinstate the Leontines, or themselves to settle in Sicily. But this excess of confidence might be no less serviceable to a prudent enemy, than the dejection which it succeeded; and Nicias skilfully took advantage of it, to effect a landing and take up a position near Syracuse, without the hindrance which was to be apprehended from the Syracusan cavalry. He sent a Catanian, whom the Syracusan generals believed to be in their interest, to say that their partizans in Catana had laid a plan for burning the Athenian fleet. "Most of the Athenians were used to pass the night in the town. If the Syracusans would march with their whole force so as to reach Catana by daybreak, their friends would shut the gates on their Athenian guests, and set fire to their ships, and the Syracusans would thus be enabled easily to make themselves masters of the camp, and of the whole armament." The Syracusan generals fell into the snare, the more readily, as they had before purposed, in compliance with the public wish, to make an expedition to Catana. A day was fixed for the execution of the plan; and when it approached the whole force of Syracuse set out for Catana. The Athenian generals were apprised of their movements, and embarked their troops so as to enter the harbour of Syracuse, nearly at the same hour of the morning that the enemy reached Catana, and discovered the stratagem. While they retraced their march, the Athenians had leisure to occupy a strong position near the shore of the Great Harbour, between the river Anapus and the foot of a steep eminence, on which stood an Olympieum, or temple of Olympian Zeus, at about a mile's distance from the city, where they would be protected from the enemy's cavalry, on one side by the cliffs of the Olympieum, on the other by trees, buildings, and the Lysimelian marsh, through which the Anapus runs into the sea. They destroyed the bridge of the Anapus, inclosed their ships with a palisade, and threw up a hasty work at a point called Dascon, by which their position was most

open to attack. They were not interrupted in these operations, until the return of the Syracusan army was announced to them by the appearance of the cavalry; and it soon after came up and offered battle. But as the Athenians did not move from their position, the Syracusans fell back behind a causeway which led across the marshes to the town of Helorus on the eastern coast, and there encamped for the night.

The seeming timidity of the Athenian general, who, after landing in an enemy's country, took so many precautions to avoid fighting, revived all the confidence of the Syracusans, which had been a little abated by the vigour he had displayed in the execution of his stratagem. They concluded that he did not intend to risk a battle, and were surprised the next day to see the Athenian forces drawn out for action. The Syracusan generals hastily formed their line; but some of their men on the presumption that they would not be wanted, had been permitted to go home, and did not return till the battle had begun. They were probably superior in numbers; but their great advantage consisted in their cavalry, which was 1200 strong, of which Gela contributed 200. Selinus furnished a larger body of infantry; but Camarina only sent about twenty horse and fifty bowmen. On the other hand the Athenian army was composed of disciplined soldiers, while in the Syracusan militia there were many who had never fought before. Yet Nicias, in the harangue by which he encouraged his troops, did not think it useless to remind them that they were about to fight on ground where defeat would be destructive, since their retreat would be cut off by the enemy's cavalry. The Syracusans fought bravely; but they were for the most part so new to arms, that even a thunder-storm which happened during the engagement helped to disconcert them. They were at length put to flight; but their cavalry checked the pursuit, and enabled them to collect themselves again on the Helorine Causeway, and to retreat in good order to the city, after having sent a garrison to protect the

Olympieum. Nicias had it seems been prevented by religious scruples from stripping it of its treasures, though he was in great want of money.¹

This victory, though in itself of no great moment, for the Syracusans only lost between two and three hundred men, answered the purpose of restoring the reputation of the Athenian arms; and this seems to have been the only end that the generals had proposed to themselves in the expedition. But the battle itself proved that they could not hope to carry on the war against Syracuse without cavalry; and it was also necessary to raise fresh supplies of money before they engaged in a difficult and expensive siege. They therefore sailed away immediately after the battle, intending, while they waited for remittances from Athens, to reap the most important fruits of their victory in negotiation with the Sicilian towns, some of which they now hoped to find more compliant. With this view, after depositing their spoil at Catana, they proceeded to Messana, where they expected to gain admission with the aid of their partizans. But the treachery of Alcibiades had put the friends of Syracuse on their guard, and they had overpowered their adversaries. After staying thirteen days before the city, the Athenian generals, seeing no prospect of success, sailed away to Naxos, where they took up their winter quarters, perhaps to avoid molestation from Syracuse, and sent a galley to Athens, to solicit a supply of money and of cavalry, that they might be able to prosecute the war in the spring.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had been sufficiently humbled by their defeat to listen to the advice of Hermocrates, who easily persuaded them that their disaster was owing not to any inferiority in valour, but to the defects of their military system, and their discipline; and prevailed on them to reduce the number of their generals — the supreme command had hitherto been divided among fifteen — and to enlarge their powers, which were before so limited that neither secrecy nor subordi-

¹ Plut. Nic. 16. But compare Dr. Arnold, *Thucydides*, vol. iii. p. 522.

nation could be preserved. The people now elected three generals — of whom Hermocrates himself was one — with unlimited authority, which was secured to them by an oath. At the same time other measures were adopted for putting the army on a better footing : and envoys were sent to Corinth and Sparta, to obtain succours, and to induce them to make a diversion in favour of Syracuse, by attacking the Athenians at home. It was probably at the suggestion of the same judicious counsellor, that the Syracusans, in the course of the winter, took a precaution against the siege which was to be expected if the enemy should be victorious in the field. To render circumvallation more difficult they enlarged the circuit of the city wall, and inclosed a new quarter on the north side of the Great Harbour, taking in a Temenos, or tract consecrated to Apollo, which contained a celebrated colossal statue of the god, hence named, as was the new quarter itself, Temenites. A much more effectual precaution, that of securing the long broad ridge which sloped down toward the city from the north-west — from its commanding position called Epipolæ, as we should say, Overton — over which a besieging army must carry its line of circumvallation, was neglected or deferred. It was thought sufficient for the present to fortify the deserted site of Megara, which lay to the north of Epipolæ, and the Olympieum, where before there had been only an open hamlet round the temple. The army was also led against Catana, where it ravaged the land and burnt the camp left there by the enemy. And when it was known that the Athenians were renewing their attempt to draw Camarina into their alliance, Hermocrates was sent at the head of an embassy, to secure the Camarinæans, who had betrayed their lukewarmness in the cause of Syracuse by the scanty succours they had sent, and might be tempted by the late success of the Athenians, openly to side with them.

In an assembly which was held at Camarina to give audience to the Athenian and the Syracusan envoys,

Hermocrates exposed the shallowness of the pretext by which the Athenians attempted to cover their real designs in the invasion of Sicily. He contrasted their professions of sympathy toward the Chalcidians of Leontium with their conduct toward the Chalcidians of Eubœa, whom notwithstanding their affinity they held in degrading subjection. He complained however not of the Athenians, who merely followed the impulse of a natural ambition, but of the disunion of the Sicilian Greeks, which had encouraged such projects against their liberty, and exposed them to the danger of being separately subdued, Dorians as they were, by an inferior race. He reminded those who were jealous of the power of Syracuse, that her strength, which exposed her to the first attack of a foreign enemy, was likewise a rampart to the weaker states, and that it was idle to wish that this barrier might be strong on one side and weak on the other ; or that Syracuse might continue to protect her neighbours from aggression, and yet be so humbled as not to excite their envy. Camarina, as her nearest neighbour, was bound even by a sense of interest to lend the most active aid in warding off the danger which was removed only by the distance of Syracuse from her own door. Neutrality in her case would be equally unjust and impolitic. The relations which she had formerly contracted with the Athenians could not properly be pleaded as an excuse for letting them crush the independence of Sicily. Nor were they so formidable as to justify an unwilling accession to their alliance, which even their kinsmen of Rhegium had declined. They had shown by their late retreat from Syracuse after a victory, how little their forces were able to cope with those of the Sicilian states, if leagued together ; and now aid was to be expected from Peloponnesus. By keeping aloof from the struggle Camarina would either betray the independence of Syracuse, as well as her own ; or, if the Syracusans prevailed, would incur their just vengeance no less than by open enmity.

On the side of Athens Euphemus filled the "part

which if the occasion had arisen some months sooner, would probably have been assigned to Alcibiades. He contended that though Athens had been compelled, by the hereditary enmity of the Peloponnesian Dorians, to establish her maritime empire in her own defence, she could not be rightly charged with injustice toward her Ionian subjects, who had forfeited all claim to milder treatment, when through a pusillanimous selfishness they lent their forces to the barbarian against their common parent. The Athenians did not wish to exaggerate the merit of their sacrifices in the cause of Greece, or pretend to be governed by any more exalted views than a politic regard to their own safety. But, if tried by this test, their professions as to the designs of their present expedition might be safely believed. It was as much their interest to maintain the independence of their Sicilian allies, as a counterpoise to the power of Syracuse, as it was to deprive their subjects in the east of the means of resisting them. Yet even there policy prescribed some exceptions to their general rule, as in the case of Chios and Methymna; and several of the islanders in the western seas, on account of their position with regard to Peloponnesus, were allowed to enjoy entire independence. To the Sicilian states the power of Syracuse must always be an object for reasonable jealousy; but the fears which had been suggested of Athens — as if she could either make conquests in Sicily, or retain them, without the concurrence of the Sicilians themselves — were chimerical and absurd; and it was an affront to the understanding of the Camarinæans to call upon them to take part with the oppressors of Sicilian liberty against its upholders. It was sufficient for them to know that their interests were intimately united with those of Athens, and that they might securely take advantage of that stirring spirit, which prompted her to interpose wherever her aid was required, and which rendered her very name a restraint to ambition, and a bulwark for the helpless.

But the Camarinæans could neither shut their eyes

to the danger with which the independence of Sicily was threatened by the Athenians, nor suppress their habitual jealousy and aversion toward Syracuse; and they decided on observing a strict neutrality. The Athenians were more successful in their negotiations with the Sicel tribes. Almost all those which were independent of Syracuse joined them, and supplied corn and even money. The alliance of a Sicel chief named Archonides, who had united several cantons under his authority, mainly conduced to their success. But the Sicels subject to Syracuse were for the most part restrained from revolting by the troops which garrisoned their towns, or marched upon the points threatened by the Athenians. The success of the Athenian arms had even drawn offers of assistance from some of the Etruscan cities, which were probably animated partly by the desire of revenging their ancient defeats, and partly by the hope of sharing the spoil of Syracuse and of Sicily. The Athenian generals did not neglect these offers, and they even sent envoys to treat with Carthage; more, it must be supposed, for the purpose of counteracting or anticipating the solicitations of Syracuse, than in the hope of obtaining assistance from a power so jealous of their rivalry. As the winter wore, they shifted their quarters again from Naxos to Catana, where they repaired their camp; and they summoned the Segestans to send all the cavalry they could muster, and began to lay in stores of building-materials, to be ready for commencing the siege of Syracuse in the spring.

In the meanwhile the Syracusan envoys who had been sent to Greece found the warmest interest prevailing at Corinth in their behalf; and Corinthian ministers accompanied them to Sparta, to second their application. There they met with a new auxiliary, in the man who had been the chief author of their danger. Alcibiades, with his fellow exiles, had crossed from Thurii in a merchant vessel to the Elean port, Cyllene, and had received an invitation from the Spartan government to proceed to Sparta. Yet before he went he thought it

necessary to require a solemn pledge for his safety. He found the ephors well disposed to assist the Syracusans with their good wishes and exhortations, but backward to lend them any more solid support. An assembly which was held to deliberate on the question, afforded him an opportunity of seconding the request of the envoys with arguments more efficacious than their own, and of stimulating the sluggish enmity of the Spartans against Athens, by disclosing dangers which they had never dreamt of. After apologising for his forced opposition to the Spartan interests, and endeavouring to conciliate the prejudices of his hearers by a liberal sneer at the Athenian constitution, and by ascribing his expulsion to the party which carried democratical license to its most extravagant excess¹, he proceeded to retrace the design with which the Sicilian expedition had been undertaken; those which he himself, perhaps, in his visions of greatness had really conceived. The conquest of Sicily was to be a step to that of the Italian Greeks, which was to be followed by an attempt upon the Carthaginian empire. If these enterprises succeeded, Peloponnesus was to be blockaded with a fleet, for which plentiful materials would be furnished by the forests of Italy, and with an army raised from the Greek cities and the most warlike barbarians of the west, in addition to the present military and naval force of Athens, and maintained at the expense of the conquered countries. Thus the reduction of Syracuse would lead by easy gradations to the subjugation of Greece and to an universal empire. It was therefore before Syracuse that they must fight for the safety of Peloponnesus. And he advised them to lose no time in sending a body of troops to Sicily, but above all a Spartan commander, who would be of more use than a whole army, to direct the operations of their

¹ Thuc. vi. 89. αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα ἐξῆγον τὸν ὄχλον ὅσπερ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐξήλασαν. Dr. Arnold's opinion, that these words refer to the *high aristocratical party*, seems extremely improbable. The natural interpretation is to be sought in Thucydides, viii. 65, where the demagogue Androcles is described as the man, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην οὐχ ἥμισυ ἐξέλασιν: as Plutarch, Alcib. 19, observes, ἦν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἰχθὺς ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου.

allies, to encourage the timid, and to decide the wavering. At the same time, to show that they are in earnest and to give employment to the Athenians at home, they should openly renew hostilities, and carry war into the heart of Attica. But they should no longer content themselves with their old system of yearly inroads, which made but a slight and transient impression. If they wished really to injure the enemy, and to inflict the blow which he himself most dreaded, they would occupy a permanent post in the country, for which they would find no point more convenient than Decelea. A garrison placed there would completely deprive the landowners of the enjoyment of their property, would interrupt the working of the Laurian mines, afford a ready asylum for runaway slaves, and would not only drain most of the internal sources of prosperity, but would prove a powerful incentive to revolt among the allies of Athens, who would estimate her prospects by her domestic condition. Such was the advice which he offered, with all the sincerity of a just resentment against the country which had cast him off, and which forced him to show the warmth of his patriotism by the efforts which he made to recover it.

The Spartan government had already meditated the invasion of Attica, and was therefore predisposed to take the advice of Alcibiades on that head. But being now awakened to a sense of its imminent danger, it appointed Gylippus, a son of the exiled Cleandridas¹, to sail to Sicily with such succours as he should be able, in concert with the Corinthians, to raise immediately, and, while the rest followed, to animate the Syracusans by his presence. Gylippus accordingly directed the Corinthians to send two of their galleys to meet him at Asine on the Messenian coast, that he might begin his voyage without delay, while they completed their preparations for the relief of Syracuse. About the same time the galley which had been sent to Athens for supplies and reinforcements, arrived there: and the Athenians voted

¹ See above, p. 42.

200 talents, and a squadron of 250 cavalry, and thirty horse-bowmen, for the prosecution of the war. The men however were sent without horses, which were to be procured in Sicily. These succours were found at Catana in the spring by the Athenian armament on its return from an expedition, in which it had made an unsuccessful attempt on the Syracusan fortress at Megara, had reduced the Sicel town, Centoripa, and had ravaged a part of the enemy's territory.

It was now daily expected at Syracuse. No further precautions had been taken by the fifteen generals, who were permitted to retain their command to the end of its legal term. Hermocrates and his colleagues did not enter into office before the spring. They soon forthwith to have concerted measures for guarding the approaches of Epipolæ; and it was resolved to occupy the heights with a body of 600 picked men, under the command of Diomilus, an Andrian exile, who had probably gained experience and reputation in the wars of Greece. Before they proceeded to their station, their troops, with the remainder of the Syracusan forces, were one morning reviewed by the new generals on the level near the banks of the Anapus.

But already, the night before, the Athenians had sailed from Catana, and on the same morning had landed at a point called Leon, on the south side of the bay, which is parted from the Great Harbour of Syracuse by the ridge of Epipolæ, at less than a mile from the heights; and their fleet had been moored at the neighbouring peninsula of Thapsus, protected by a palisade which was carried across the narrow isthmus. The Athenian troops immediately at full speed mounted Epipolæ, and reached the top, where it rises into a rocky hump called Euryelus, before the enemy was apprised of their approach. As soon as it was known, the Syracusan forces set out to dislodge them: Diomilus and his corps among the foremost. But the place of the review was about three miles from the heights: they came up disordered by the march, and the Athenians had the ad-

vantage of the rising ground. The Syracusans were defeated, and lost three hundred men: Diomilus himself was among the slain. The next day the Athenians marched down toward the city and offered battle; but as the enemy did not come out, they returned to the high ground, and on the very top of Epipolæ, just before the slope toward Syracuse begins, at a point called Labdalum,¹ on the edge of the cliff looking toward Megara, set about erecting a fortress for the security of their baggage and treasure. Not long after they received the expected reinforcements of cavalry from Segesta and their other allies, amounting with their own to six hundred and fifty: and now, leaving a garrison in Labdalum, they began the work of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ near the city, in a line which was the shortest distance between the Great Harbour and the bay of Thapsus. The rapidity with which the work proceeded struck the besieged with consternation; and the generals drew up their forces to interrupt it. But as an engagement was about to begin, they observed an appearance of unevenness and disorder in their line, which induced them to retreat into the city, leaving only a squadron of horse to annoy the Athenian workmen; and this also was routed in a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry supported by a battalion of foot.

Thus checked, the Syracusans took the advice of Hermocrates, and renounced all thoughts of facing the Athenians in the field, and placed their whole reliance on the hope of baffling the besiegers by carrying a counterwork across the line of the intended circumvallation. Even the attempt might interrupt the enemy's work, and would, it was thought, be sufficiently covered by a part of their own forces. They began therefore

¹ On or near the point now called Belvedere (see the Map of Syracuse in Dr. Arnold's *Thucydides*). Mr. Hughes (*Travels*, i. p. 85. 8vo edition) is led by *Thucydides* and *Diodorus* to think that *Labdulum* was considerably lower in the descent than even Mongibellisi. The opinion of a learned traveller on such a point deserves attention. But since he only refers to the ancient authors, it would have been desirable that he should have explained how his opinion is to be reconciled with the remark of *Thucydides*, vii. 3., that *Labdulum* was not visible from the Athenian lines.

near the new quarter Temenites — not sparing the olive trees of the consecrated ground for the more sacred purpose — and while they proceeded with the erection of a wall flanked with wooden towers, they endeavoured to secure the points by which it was most easily accessible with palisades. The Athenians did not attempt to interrupt their operations, that their own might not be delayed or their forces divided. But when the Syracusans, having carried their work forward as far as seemed necessary, had returned to the city or to their tents, leaving a guard at the counterwall, the Athenian generals ordered a select band of 300 men with some of the light troops whom they put into heavy armour for the occasion, to surprise it, while they themselves with the rest of the army in two divisions, prevented any succours from approaching, and perhaps watched for an opportunity of entering the city. It presented itself; for the Syracusan guard, overtaken by the careless languor of a sultry noon, was dislodged, and fled toward the postern of Temenites, near which one division of the enemy was stationed, which rushed in pell-mell along with other fugitives.* They were indeed expelled by the Syracusans, with a trifling loss; but the whole army proceeded without interruption to the counterwork, broke down the wall, and tore up the palisades.

Still the besieged were not wholly disheartened. It was the design of the Athenian generals to prevent the repetition of such an attempt, by immediately fortifying that part of the line which lay between the foot of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, reserving the rest, where they were less exposed to interruption, till this should be finished. The Syracusans, who were still masters of the Great Harbour, as the enemy's fleet lay at Thapsus, now began to carry a ditch and a palisade across the marsh nearer the shore. The Athenians, as before, offered no interruption; but when they had finished that part of their own work which secured the south side of Epipolæ, they descended at daybreak under the command of Lamachus, to the marsh, where

they could only make their way by laying down planks on the mud, and fell upon the new counterwork. The Syracusans were dislodged, but did not give up their last hope without a hard struggle. An engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were again victorious. The right wing of the defeated army fled toward the city; the left attempted to reach the bridge of the Anapus, which would have afforded them a passage to the Olympæum, and being intercepted by the 300 picked troops, drove them back on the Athenian right, which was thrown into partial disorder. Lamachus, who was in the other wing, advanced with a small body of troops to restore order in his right, but having crossed a ditch with a few followers was surrounded and slain. This new skirmish, being observed by the fugitives of the Syracusan right wing, encouraged them to make a stand, and even to conceive the design of surprising the Athenian lines on Epipolæ, where Nicias had been left behind, only because a painful disorder disabled him from accompanying his colleague. His presence prevented a great disaster. For a detachment of the Syracusans took and destroyed an outwork which had been erected in front of the line of circumvallation, and would probably have overpowered the guard which defended the main works, if Nicias had not ordered the followers of the camp to set fire to the machines and the timber which lay in the intervening space. The conflagration stopped the enemy's advance, and they were soon forced to retreat before the victorious Athenians who returned from the field of battle. At the same time the Athenian fleet, according to orders which had been given in the morning, was seen entering the Great Harbour, and by its appearance extinguished every remaining hope of obstructing the completion of the circumvallation.

The besiegers now prosecuted their work with fresh ardour, and — since the arrival of the fleet — with many additional hands. They brought down a double wall within a very short distance of the shore of the harbour;

and all the preparations were made for finishing that which had been begun on the side of the bay of Thapsus. Supplies and auxiliaries flowed in from many quarters to the prosperous party. Provisions came in abundance from all parts of Italy; three galleys brought reinforcements from Tyrænia, and many of the Sicels who had before wavered, now that the fate of Syracuse seemed fixed, joined their forces to the victorious side. The Syracusans themselves began to despair of their own safety. They had lost all confidence in themselves; no succours were known to be at hand; and before long none which they could hope for would be of any avail. They endeavoured to persuade themselves that their reverses had been owing either to the treachery, or to the adverse stars, of their generals, and deposed them from their office; but saw no firmer ground of reliance in the zeal or the fortune of the three whom they elected in their room. The question of capitulation began to be discussed; the more anxiously as suspicions were entertained of treasonable practices, and overtures were made to the Athenian general. It seemed as if fortune had deprived Nicias of his colleagues, in order that he might enjoy the undivided glory of bringing an enterprise which he had so strongly condemned, to the happiest issue. It was a pause, like that of the *Iliad*, while Hector's hand was on the ship of Protesilaus.

CHAP. XXVI.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION FROM THE ARRIVAL OF
GYLIPPUS TO ITS CLOSE.

GYLIPPUS had been joined at Asine, where he had manned two Laconian galleys, by two others from Corinth, under the command of Pythen. With these they sailed to Leucas, where they were led by a concurrence of many false rumours to believe that Syracuse was already completely invested; and Gylippus, considering the affairs of Sicily desperate, only hoped that he might be in time to counteract the influence of the Athenians among the Italian Greeks. While therefore the Corinthians were fitting out a squadron, consisting of ten of their own galleys, two Leucadians, and three from Ambracia, he and Pythen pushed across to Tarentum, and proceeded to Thurii, where, through his father Cleandridas, who in his exile had been admitted a citizen there, he had connections which he hoped might enable him to arm the Thurians against Athens. But his small force, which seemed only fit for a piratical adventure, did not encourage them to comply with his wishes, and he continued his voyage westward. But before he reached Locri he was driven out to sea by a gale from the north, and with some difficulty made Tarentum again, where he was forced to wait for a time to refit. Intelligence of his approach had gone before him to the Athenian camp; and Nicias might easily have provided means for stopping or intercepting his little squadron. The military virtue which Nicias possessed in the highest degree was prudence; the failing toward which he most leaned, timidity. For the first time perhaps in his life he was so elated by success

as to despise his enemy, and neglected to take any precautions against the danger until they were too late.

Gylippus and Pythen, having refitted their shattered galleys, pursued their voyage along the coast to Locri; and there they discovered that the state of Syracuse, though one of extreme peril, was not yet past relief, but that an army might still be introduced into the town from the side of Epipolæ. They deliberated whether they should make directly for Syracuse, or should sail to Himera, and march across the island with what forces they could collect; and they decided on the latter course without being aware of the risk which they would have run if they had attempted the other. Nicias, on hearing of their arrival at Locri, had at length despatched four galleys to arrest their progress, which if they had proceeded straight toward Syracuse, would perhaps have fallen in with them. But they passed without interruption through the Straits, touching at Rhegium and Messana, and reached Himera in safety. Here they left their galleys, and prevailed on the Himeræans both to furnish arms for the crews, and themselves to join their expedition. Selinus was directed to send her whole force to an appointed place of rendezvous; Gela also was induced to promise a small body of auxiliaries; and some of the Sicel tribes, seeing that the interference of Sparta was likely to give a new turn to the struggle, veered round to the same side, the more freely, as Archonides was lately dead. With the reinforcements drawn from all these quarters Gylippus found himself at the head of a little army of about three thousand men, with which he marched upon Syracuse.

His arrival in Sicily was not yet known there. Despondency had been gaining ground among the besieged, and an assembly had been appointed to deliberate on terms of capitulation, when one of the Corinthian galleys, which had sailed from Leucas after the departure of Gylippus, having been detained there a little longer than the rest, and therefore probably

taking the shorter course to its place of destination, entered the harbour. Gongylus, its commander, announced the succours which had already reached Sicily, and those which were on the way; and soon after news came that Gylippus was approaching. The Syracusans now assembled in arms, and went forth with all their forces to meet their expected deliverer. Nicias was again supine, or short-sighted. He suffered Gylippus to ascend the heights of Epipolæ; and as the Athenian works had only been carried across a part of the slope, the two armies having effected their junction without hindrance, crossed the line of circumvallation, and presented themselves in battle array on the ground between the besiegers and the city. Nicias, though taken by surprise, and though a part of his troops were still employed in finishing the wall on the side of the harbour, did not decline an action. But Gylippus, before he advanced, either to gain time or to animate his men, sent a herald to offer the Athenians permission to quit Sicily in five days with all that belonged to them. The proposal was received with derision, and the messenger sent back without an answer. But the Syracusan troops were still so imperfectly disciplined, that Gylippus found it necessary to draw them off into the more open space, for the sake of putting them into better order. And as Nicias did not advance, he finally retreated into Temenites for the night. The next day he again drew up the greater part of his forces in front of the Athenian lines; and while he thus engaged the enemy's attention, he sent a detachment against Labdalum, which took the fort—the more easily as it was not within view of the Athenian intrenchments—and put all the garrison to the sword.

The Syracusans now began a wall, which they purposed to carry up the slope of Epipolæ, across that part of the line of circumvallation which was still open: this work, if accomplished, would secure the communication between the city and the country, and thus

would put an end to the siege on the land side ; and Nicias saw that he should probably be unable to prevent its completion. He began already to turn his thoughts toward precautions for his own safety, and with this view transported the army across the harbour to the headland of Plemyrion, which closes its entrance on the south side, being parted by a channel about a mile broad from the island on which the lower town was built. On this headland Nicias erected three forts, in which he deposited the greater part of his stores ; and here he stationed the larger boats and the ships of war. By this operation he gained the advantage of protecting the introduction of supplies, which, so long as the fleet remained stationed at the bottom of the harbour, could not be done without much labour and risk. But he incurred an inconvenience which almost counterbalanced this benefit. For the crews were now obliged to go to a distance for their daily provision of wood and water, and the parties on this duty were exposed to continual attacks from the Syracusan horse, a third part of which was stationed at the Olympieum for the express purpose of giving them constant annoyance.

In the meanwhile the besieged were carrying on their wall with the materials which had been collected by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, while Gylippus covered the workmen with the line of battle which he every day presented to the enemy. But as the counter-work approached the point at which it would render all that had been done for the blockade of the city fruitless, Nicias resolved to try the chance of a battle, and Gylippus, aware that a struggle was inevitable, advanced to the attack. He did not observe that by this movement he was confining himself to the space between the enemy's wall and his own, where his cavalry and slingers had not room to act. The Athenians again displayed the superiority of their infantry, and remained masters of the field. But Gylippus cheered his men by taking upon himself the whole blame of their defeat, and promised shortly to repair his over-

sight. He took the earliest opportunity of again offering battle on more favourable ground, beyond the interval where the two walls converged toward each other, and posted his cavalry and slingers so as to fall on the left flank of the Athenians during the battle. Their charge spread disorder throughout the enemy's line, and he was driven back to his intrenchments. The Syracusans immediately took advantage of their success, and working all night, before the next day had advanced their wall, though in an imperfect condition, yet so as to be secure from immediate attack, beyond the Athenian line. Soon after the Corinthian galleys which Gongylus had preceded, having escaped the observation of an Athenian squadron which Nicias had sent to look out for them, entered the harbour; and with this reinforcement the Syracusans rapidly completed their counterwork.¹

They now felt themselves in perfect safety on this side, and began to meditate a new course of offensive operations. Gylippus set out to collect auxiliaries from the interior, and naval succours from the maritime towns, and envoys were despatched to Sparta and Corinth for fresh reinforcements to meet those which the besiegers might receive from Athens. At the same time the Syracusans began to man and exercise their fleet, in the hope of being soon able to cope with the Athenians on their own element. Nicias saw the evils and dangers of his situation gathering fast upon him and perceived that nothing but prompt and very powerful succours could save the armament from utter ruin. It was therefore necessary to lay the whole state of the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 7: *μέχρι τοῦ ἰγκυρσίου τείχους*. The explanation which we have here ventured to offer of this disputed passage is in substance not very different from Goeller's (*De Situ Syrac.* p. 94.), except that we see no difficulty in taking the *ἰγκυρσίου τείχος* (a merely relative term) to mean the Athenian wall. But we conceive with Goeller that before the arrival of the Corinthians the counterwork, though carried to its utmost length, was in an unfinished state. Dr. Arnold's remarks do not point out any better way of reconciling the seeming contradiction between the language of Thucydides in c. 6 — *ἑφθασαν παρρηκοδομήσαντες τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἰκοδομίαν* — and in c. 7. *ἐντετελείσαν τὸ λοιπὸν μέχρι τοῦ ἰγκυρσίου τείχους*.

case before the people. He had hitherto sent none but oral despatches—a vestige of ancient simplicity for which in so refined an age we could hardly have been prepared.¹ But now the extreme importance of the subject suggested the apprehension, that his messengers might be wanting either in ability or courage to execute a commission which would require them to deliver many unpleasant truths; and he therefore described his distress, danger, and exigencies, in a letter addressed to the people, which being brought to Athens was read in the assembly.

He related the change which had been made in the aspect of affairs by the arrival of Gylippus; the contravallation, which had put a stop to the Athenian works, and which opposed an obstacle to the blockade of the place that could only be overcome by dint of numbers; the superiority of the enemy, especially in cavalry, which reduced the besiegers nearly to the state of a besieged garrison. He then proceeded to mention the succours which the Syracusans still expected both from Sicily and from Greece, and their purpose of attacking him, not only by land, but by sea. Many, he was aware, would think it almost incredible that their fleet could be threatened; and he therefore enters into a full explanation of the causes by which its condition had been impaired. Neither the ships nor the crews were any longer in the same flourishing state in which they had been sent out. The ships were growing leaky and unsound through the length of time that they had been at sea; and it was necessary to keep them always afloat, as the enemy, who was acquainted with their weakness, had an equal, if not a superior number, always ready, and in constant training, which he could

¹ It is with some hesitation, after considerable reflection, that we venture to give this interpretation to the words of Thucydides, vii. 8., notwithstanding the first sentence of the letter itself. But it seems easier—though difficult—to believe that Nicias might use the word *ἐπιστολαῖς* for oral despatches—referring it, in the sense of *instructions*, to the messengers—than that Thucydides, with the meaning which has hitherto been attributed to him, should have used language which, but for the first sentence of the letter, could never have suggested any other notion than that expressed in our text

send out at his own time, and could refit whenever they needed it at his leisure ; whereas the whole Athenian force was not more than sufficient to secure the importation of provisions for the camp. The crews had been thinned and weakened by a variety of losses. Many lives had been lost in the foraging parties which were continually threatened by the enemy's cavalry ; and since the contest had begun to take an unfavourable turn, desertions had been frequent both among the slaves and the foreign seamen. Those who had been pressed into the service, and those who had been attracted by high pay and the hope of a profitable campaign, were now equally bent on going over to the enemy, or making their escape into the interior of Sicily. Several made excursions into the country for purposes of traffic, and prevailed on the captains of the galleys to fill their places with slaves whom they had bought from the spoil of Hyccara. It was difficult for a commander who had to deal with Athenian tempers to prevent such practices, and the evil which they caused was irreparable. The efficacy of a ship's company depended, they well knew, on a few able seamen ; and in Sicily there were no means of replacing the lost hands. Naxos and Catana wanted the power, the other cities the will, to furnish recruits. But there was a calamity still more to be dreaded, to which the armament was exposed by its altered circumstances. They depended for food on the Italian cities ; and if they should be induced to close their ports, the war would be ended in a few days without a battle.

He might have found matter more agreeable to them, but none which it more imported them to hear ; and he knew the danger of attempting to deceive them by a flattering statement, which would be belied by the event. Their armament had been adequate to the original objects of the expedition. But now all Sicily was on the point of uniting against it ; another hostile force was expected from Peloponnesus ; and it was no longer sufficient for its own safety even against its pre-

sent enemies. Either therefore they must recall it, or they must send another to join it: but it must be one not inferior either in military or naval strength to the last, and with it they must send treasure to no small amount, and a new commander to supply his place; for the disorder with which he had been for some time afflicted rendered him incapable of sustaining the burthen of his office; and he hoped that his past services would be thought worthy of this indulgence. Whatever their resolution might be, it must be executed as soon as the season permitted in the approaching spring. For the succours which the enemy expected from Sicily would arrive soon, and it would demand all their vigilance and alertness to stop or to get the start of those which were coming from Peloponnesus.

It belonged to the character of the Athenians not to suffer themselves to be diverted by any obstacles from an undertaking in which they had once engaged. They had displayed this tenacity of purpose on so many great occasions with such a happy issue, that it had become not merely a habit on which they prided themselves, but a settled maxim of policy which they had learnt to regard as the foundation of their greatness. The gloomy picture which Nicias drew of his situation and prospects, instead of leading them to conclude that their present enterprise exceeded their strength, only urged them to increased exertions. They voted a new armament, to be equipt in all respects as he designed, but they would not forego the benefit of his experience, and only appointed Demosthenes and Eurymedon, as his colleagues, to command the forces which they decreed to send. In the mean while Menander and Euthydemus, two officers who were serving under him, were invested with equal rank, to relieve him from a part of his labours. And in the depth of the winter, while Demosthenes remained to superintend the preparation of the main armament, Eurymedon was sent forward with ten galleys and 120 talents, and the promise of more ample succours. At the same time they despatched Conon, with a squadron

of twenty galleys, to Naupactus, to intercept the reinforcements which were to proceed from Corinth and the rest of Peloponnesus to Sicily. Transports had been prepared to convey the Peloponnesian troops; and now the Corinthians fitted out a squadron of twenty-five galleys to protect their departure.

Early in the spring of 413 the Spartans proceeded to execute the design which Alcibiades had suggested, of occupying a permanent position in Attica. Notwithstanding the many demonstrations of hostile feelings which had been interchanged between them and the Athenians since the peace of Nicias, they had hitherto scrupled to invade Attica. They had been led to consider the ill success of their arms in the early part of the war as the effect of the anger of the gods which they had incurred by their violation of the 'Thirty Years' Truce; for they were conscious that they had broken it both by the sanction which they gave to the Theban attack on Platæa and by declining the offer of the Athenians to refer their differences to arbitration; and they feared again to provoke the divine displeasure by a similar aggression. The Athenians on their part had long abstained, notwithstanding the repeated solicitations of their Argive allies, from making a direct attack on Laconia; and the excursions of their garrison at Pylus had been confined to the west of Taygetus, a province indeed of Sparta, but not viewed as part of the Spartan soil. But in the summer of 414 they had sent a squadron of thirty galleys to the assistance of the Argives, whose territory was ravaged by a Lacedæmonian army; and the Athenian commanders had landed their troops on several points of the eastern coast of Laconia, and wasted the land. And as the Athenians persisted in rejecting the proposals of Sparta for submitting their claim to a peaceful decision, the Spartans now felt that the wrong was altogether on the side of the enemy, and that the invasion of Attica would only be an act of just retaliation. They also hoped that the appearance of their army in Attica might divert the

Athenians from their purpose of sending out the great armament which they were equipping for the Sicilian war. Accordingly, as soon as the season permitted, Agis marched into Attica at the head of the Peloponnesian forces, and after ravaging the plain of Athens, began to fortify Decelca.

The site chosen was strong by nature. It was a steep eminence connected by a narrow ridge with the range of Parnes, about fifteen miles north-east of Athens, and commanding a view of the plain down to the Saronic gulf; and near its foot was the road leading to the eastern coast of Bœotia, by which the Athenians received their ordinary supplies from Eubœa. Thus Decelca was in every respect peculiarly well adapted for enabling an enemy stationed there to inflict the greatest injury on Attica, and to distress the city. These were undoubtedly the advantages which had recommended the position to the eye of Alcibiades. The Spartans perhaps adopted his advice the more readily as the deme of Decelca was friendly ground; for a local tradition of services which the Decelcans had rendered to the Twin Heroes, in their expedition against Theseus, had been so far respected by the Spartans, that in their previous invasions they had spared the lands of Decelca, and even honoured the Decelcans with certain privileges which, though they could be seldom enjoyed, were signs of good will.¹ The fortification was soon completed by the joint efforts of a numerous army: and the presence of the garrison which remained there under the command of Agis was speedily attended with most of the effects which Alcibiades had predicted. The country was completely swept of every thing valuable. The number of the slaves who ran away to Decelca was computed at more than 20,000, and consisted for the most part of artisans, whose loss was deeply felt in the Athenian manufactures. The cavalry was worn out by incessant excursions to meet the enemy's

¹ Herod. ix. 73.

forays ; the citizens scarcely rested night or day from watch and ward ; for by day they took their turns, but at night all were either on the walls, or in stations where they were ready for action at a moment's call. The city depended entirely on the sea for the supply of provisions, and their price was raised, while money became every day scarcer, by the additional expense which, we learn from Thucydides, attended the water carriage. Athens was reduced to the condition of a besieged town.

Yet, as if her treasury had been overflowing, and she had been unable to find employment for her troops at home, at the very time that this blockade was beginning, she sent out the second mighty armament destined for the reduction of Syracuse — a city as large as Athens, and defended by the united strength of Sicily and of Peloponnesus. Demosthenes left Piræus with a fleet of sixty Attic, and five Chian galleys, having on board, as the core of the army, twelve hundred Athenian infantry. He waited awhile at Ægina, to collect lingerers, and then proceeded to the coast of Argolis, to join a squadron of thirty galleys under Charicles, which had been sent forward to call upon Argos for her contingent. After it had been taken on board, they sailed together as far as the Laconian gulf opposite Cythera, and on a point of the Laconian coast erected a fort to be, like Pylus, a refuge for runaway helots, and a sallying place for marauding inroads into the heart of the country. Demosthenes then pursued his voyage toward Corcyra ; and Charicles, leaving a garrison in the fort, returned with his squadron, and the Argives, whom he landed on their own coast.

Among the levies which had been raised in the winter for this expedition was a body of 1300 Thracian targeteers, of the independent tribe called the Dians, who inhabited the highlands of Rhodope. But they did not reach Athens till Demosthenes had sailed. They had been hired at the rate of a drachma a day ; and in the present state of the treasury this was too heavy a charge to be incurred for any services which

they might render against the enemy at Decelea. It was therefore resolved that they should be immediately conducted home — they might otherwise perhaps have contracted other engagements — and Diitrephes was charged with this commission. That the cost of their journey might not have been entirely thrown away, he was ordered to make use of them as any occasion might arise on their passage. In compliance with these instructions he first landed them to plunder the neighbourhood of Tanagra, and then having reached Chalcis in the evening, transported them in boats across the Euripus and encamped for the night unobserved about two miles from the Bœotian town of Mycalessus. It was a small quiet town, far enough both from the coast and the frontier to seem secure from invasion. The walls had been suffered to fall to decay, and even the gates were left open. At daybreak Diitrephes and his barbarians fell upon it like a thunderbolt. No resistance appears to have been attempted ; but the helplessness of the inhabitants only inflamed the cruelty of the Thracians, who, as Thucydides observes — and he looks upon it as a feature in the character of all barbarous tribes — were never more bloodthirsty than when they felt most secure. The plundering of the houses and temples was accompanied by an indiscriminate slaughter not only of all human beings, but of all living creatures, that fell in their way : and it happened that at the time of the irruption the children were already assembled in the principal school of the place, where all were found and massacred by the savages. When at length they retreated with their booty, they left Mycalessus almost a desert. They were however overtaken before they had proceeded far by a body of Thebans, were deprived of their spoil, and, though they made a good defence on their retreat, and killed one of the Bœotarchs who was among their pursuers, they lost about 250 lives before they regained their boats. Whether Diitrephes himself was among the slain, does not appear from Thucydides : Pausanias saw

his statue at Athens which represented him as pierced with arrows.¹

About the same time that Demosthenes set sail from Athens, Gylippus had arrived, with all the reinforcements he could procure, at Syracuse; and he immediately called an assembly for the purpose of urging the Syracusans to man their ships, and try their strength in a sea fight. The established reputation of the Athenians for nautical skill made it difficult to rouse the Syracusans to what seemed so bold an attempt; but the proposal was powerfully seconded by Hermocrates, though even he insisted chiefly on the effect which their unexpected daring would produce on the enemy; and it was finally adopted. Eighty ships were manned; and it was concerted that five and thirty of them should advance from the Great Harbour, while the rest sailed round from the lesser harbour on the other side of the island, to join them. This double movement would, it was expected, distract the Athenians, and further the main design of Gylippus, which was to surprise their forts on Plemyrion. The Athenians hastily manned sixty galleys, and with twenty-five encountered those of the Syracusans in the Great Harbour, while the rest sailed out to meet the other squadron. The battle began nearly at the same time at both points. But while the Athenians in Plemyrion crowded toward the shore to view the action, Gylippus, who had begun his march from the city during the night, arrived unobserved by the dawn of day, and stormed the largest of the three forts. The garrisons of the two smaller ones, seeing it taken, abandoned them without resistance, and made their escape to the shore, where they and the fugitives from the great fort embarked in such vessels as they found at hand. The sea fight also at first inclined against the Athenians. They were giving way in the Great Harbour, and the forty-five Syracusan galleys forced a passage through their op-

¹ Which according to the reading *ἔξω τοξόμαχος*, Thuc. vii. 30., appear to have been employed by the pursuers. The surprise which Pausanias affects (i. 23. 4.) is outrageously silly.

ponents, and sailed in. But this success threw them into disorder, and exposed them, while they were entangled together, to a renewed attack from the Athenians, who put all to flight, and sank eleven galleys. Yet such a victory was in itself little better than a defeat; and one much more decided would not have compensated for the loss they suffered in the forts, which contained many valuable stores, and property both public and private, or for the difficulty which they experienced in the introduction of supplies, now that the enemy's fleet was constantly stationed at Plemyrion to dispute the passage.

While general despondency prevailed in the Athenian camp, the Syracusans with heightened confidence despatched Agatharchus with a squadron of twelve galleys, one of which proceeded with ambassadors to Greece, while the rest intercepted a convoy on its way from Italy to the enemy, and destroyed most of the vessels; burnt a quantity of timber which had been collected in the territory of Caulonia for the use of the Athenians, and at Locri took on board a band of heavy infantry from Thespiæ, which had just arrived in one of the Peloponnesian transports. On their passage home they were met by a squadron which Nicias had stationed on the look out, but escaped with the loss of a single galley. In the meanwhile several sharp contests took place in the Great Harbour, where the Athenians attempted to destroy a stockade which the Syracusans had formed for the shelter of their ships in front of the old docks. A great vessel of burthen well guarded from the enemy's missiles, and mounted with wooden towers to give more effect to their own, was moored along side the stockade, to cover the operations of a number of parties in boats, which either forced up the piles by means of cranes or windlances, or sent down divers to saw them in two.

The action of Plemyrion was represented by the envoys of Syracuse at Ambracia, Corinth, and Sparta, in its true light, as, notwithstanding the partial failure, which in fact arose out of the heat of victory, a just

ground for the most cheering hopes ; and they urged their allies to hasten their succours, which, if they arrived in time, might make an end of the war before the new armament now expected from Athens came to the relief of Nicias. The same tidings overtook Eury-medon, as he was returning to join Demosthenes, after leaving the ships and treasure with which he had been sent out in the winter, at Syracuse. He found his colleague on the coast of Acarnania, where he was collecting auxiliaries as he had done at Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and Naupactus. Here they received a visit from Conon, who had left his station at Naupactus to solicit a reinforcement for his squadron, which had been reduced to eighteen galleys ; a number with which he did not venture to meet the twenty-five Corinthians, if, as seemed likely, they should offer battle.

The main end of the Corinthian squadron had been already attained ; the transports had sailed from Peloponnesus with 600 men from Laconia — picked Helots and Neodamodes under a Spartan commander — 300 Bœotians, and Corinthians, Sicyonians and Arcadians amounting to 700. But the Corinthians had made some improvements in their ships of war, which led them to hope for success even against a superior Athenian force. Conon had procured ten of the fastest sailers from the great fleet, which the admirals believed they might spare as they were to be reinforced by fifteen from Corcyra, and when he arrived at Naupactus, he found five others under Diphilus, who now took the command of the whole thirty-three. The Corinthians also augmented their force, so as to bring it near to an equality with the enemy, and stationed themselves in a bay off the town of Erineus in Achaia, a few miles within the gulf ; their troops lining the shore at either point of the crescent. They then advanced to meet the Athenians, who, strong in numbers, seem not to have tried the manœuvres with which in former times they had conquered greatly superior forces near the same spot. But the Corinthians had strengthened

the bows of their galleys by solid timbers contrived for the occasion, and when the vessels met prow to prow, those of the Athenians, not being thus armed, were stove in by the shock. Seven were so disabled, yet none went down, and they sank three of the Corinthians, and kept possession of the wrecks, which were carried by the wind out into the gulf. Nevertheless when they had sailed away to Naupactus, the Corinthians raised a trophy as conquerors, not so much on a comparison of the numbers sunk and disabled, as because to have come off without defeat was in their eyes a triumph. The Athenians viewed the event in the same light, though, when the Corinthian fleet and army had withdrawn, they crossed over, and erected their trophy also on the Achæan coast.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after having strengthened their armament with all the reinforcements they could collect on the western coast of Greece, crossed over to the south-east point of Italy, and through their interest with a chief named Artas, of the Messapian race, obtained a small body of Iapygian dartmen; and at Metapontum, beside 300 dartmen, they procured two galleys. At Thurii, where they touched next, they found circumstances still more favourable to them. A sedition had broken out not long before, in which the party adverse to the Athenian interest had been expelled. Here therefore they were induced to wait awhile, to collect and review their forces, and they prevailed on the government of Thurii, which was now so deeply interested in their success, actively to espouse their cause. It furnished them with 700 heavy infantry, and 300 bowmen. With their army thus reinforced they marched across the Thurian territory, as far as the river Hylias, which separated it from that of Croton, while the fleet moved toward the same point along the coast. But on the banks of the Hylias they were met by envoys from Croton, who forbade them to pass through their land, and as they did not wish to provoke hostility, they marched along the left bank to

the mouth of the river, where they found their fleet, and embarking moved slowly along the coast, touching at every city which they passed, except Locri, to Petra in the territory of Rhegium, from whence it only remained for them to cross over to Sicily.

The seeming slackness of these operations might lead us to suspect that the new commanders were more anxious to render their armament as formidable as they could, than concerned about the danger to which Nicias was in the meanwhile exposed. His situation would have been still more alarming, if he had not contrived a blow, which for a time disheartened as well as weakened the enemy. After the reduction of Plemyrium, the Syracusans had found the other Sicilians more willing to aid them; and Agrigentum was almost the only Greek city in the island that remained neutral. Their envoys, accompanied by one from Corinth, succeeded in raising upwards of 2000 men, and were marching with them towards Syracuse. As Agrigentum would not give them passage through her territory, their road lay among the Sicels, friendly to Athens, who, on the suggestion of Nicias, placed an ambush in their way. They fell into it, and 800 men, including the Syracusan envoys, were slain. The Corinthians led the remnant, about 1500, to Syracuse. And though about the same time a reinforcement of 500 heavy infantry, 300 dartmen, and as many archers came from Camarina, and Gela sent five galleys, 400 dartmen, and 200 horse, the recent disaster left so deep an impression, as to prevent the Syracusans from renewing their offensive operations against Nicias until news arrived that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were on the coast of Rhegium. Then however they resolved no longer to delay the attack which they had meditated immediately after their success at Plemyrium. They had adopted the contrivance for strengthening the bows of their galleys which the Corinthians had found so serviceable in the action off Erineus; and they calculated that the

Athenians, pent up in narrow room, would be unable to perform the evolutions in which they excelled, and which enabled them in the open sea to strike their enemy obliquely or on the broadside, and would be forced to meet them, as they themselves through the imperfection of their seamanship had always been used to fight, stem to stem. They had also the advantage of commanding the greater part of the harbour for their own backward movements, while the enemy, fighting in a corner, would be unable to back water without falling into irreparable disorder.

When their preparations were made, Gylippus led the main body of the Syracusan army out of the city against the Athenian wall — the part of their line included between Epipolæ and the harbour, to which, since the heights had been occupied by the enemy, they seem to have confined themselves — while the garrison of Olympieum, the cavalry, and light troops, advanced against the opposite side. While the Athenians prepared to resist this double attack, they were thrown into a new alarm by the sudden approach of the whole Syracusan fleet, of eighty sail. They hastily manned seventy-five galleys, and put out to meet the enemy. But the day passed in manœuvres which led to no important advantage on either side, except as they tended to raise the confidence of the Syracusans, who sank one or two Athenian galleys. The next day they did not stir; and Nicias employed this respite in inspecting the state of his ships and directing the necessary repairs; and anchored a line of merchant vessels, at intervals of 200 feet, in front of the stockade which had been formed as an inner port for the reception of the fleet. The space now inclosed was to serve as a retreat for any galley which might be pressed by a pursuer, and the passages between the merchantmen were guarded by projecting beams, which supported heavy weights, ready to be dropped on a hostile vessel.

The next day, at an early hour, the Syracusans threatened the Athenians as before with their land and

sea force: but it seemed as if the day would again be consumed in ineffectual manœuvres. A pause took place at the usual meal time, when, according to their ordinary practice, the Syracusan seamen would have landed, and have gone into the city to supply their wants. But the master of a Corinthian galley, named Aristo, suggested the plan of forcing the market-people to carry their provisions down to the seaside, so as to enable the men to make their purchases, and finish their meals with the least possible delay. The Athenians, seeing the enemy retreat toward the city, concluded that there was no more chance of an engagement that day, and themselves landed to prepare their meals. But while they were thus busied, and for the most part before they had yet refreshed themselves, they were surprised to see the enemy advancing towards them, and again embarked. A general impatience now began to prevail among them for bringing the contest to an issue; and it would seem was rashly seconded by Menander and Euthydemus, who were desirous of distinguishing themselves by some achievement during their temporary command.¹ Without attempting any other manœuvres, the two fleets met in direct conflict. The solidity of the Syracusan bows overpowered, as had been foreseen, the slighter frame of the enemy's galleys: the light troops on their decks galled the Athenians with their missiles; and they were still more annoyed by a continual discharge from a multitude of boats in which the Syracusans came round them, impeded the action of the oars, and picked off the seamen. After a hard struggle the Athenians were put to flight, and sought refuge behind their floating rampart. Seven of their galleys were sunk; many more disabled: the loss of lives and pursuers even exceeded the usual proportion. The pursuers were however arrested by the line of merchantmen; and two galleys which attempted to force their way through were destroyed by the engines. They therefore retired to erect their trophies

¹ Plut. Nic. 20.

— for this and the last battle — but with the confident hope of a still more decisive and complete triumph both by sea and land.

Such was the state of things at Syracuse, when Demosthenes and Eurymedon sailed into the Great Harbour, to the sound of martial music, with an armament no less gallantly equipt than that which left Athens two years before, of seventy-three galleys, with 5000 heavy infantry, and according to Plutarch, 3000 light troops. The arrival of this formidable force astonished and dismayed the Syracusans, who, when they reflected that it had left Attica occupied by an invading army, concluded that the resources of Athens were inexhaustible, and were ready to give up all hopes of deliverance. But the confidence of the Athenian commanders did not equal the terror which they inspired. Demosthenes, after inspecting the state of affairs, perceived that the conquest of Syracuse was still extremely doubtful. But on one point he at once made up his mind; to avoid the error by which Nicias had flung away the advantage of a first impression, and the opportunity of completing the blockade of the place before the Syracusans were so far aware of their danger as even to call in foreign succours. He saw the necessity of immediately striking a blow which would either insure their success, or if it failed would leave no further question as to the expediency of raising the siege. He therefore proposed to make an attempt to recover possession of Epipolæ — which the Athenians appear to have entirely evacuated — and to dislodge the Syracusans from their counterwork, so that the circumvallation might be resumed and completed. It was however thought advisable to make a display of their newly regained superiority, by marching out along the valley of the Anapus, which they ravaged without any interruption, except from the cavalry and the light troops stationed at the Olympieum, while the fleet rode without opposition over every part of the harbour. The army was then led

against the counterwork ; and an attempt was made to storm it in the usual manner with the aid of machines. But the besieged poured combustibles from the walls, which burnt the engines, and the assailants, repeatedly repulsed, were at length forced to retire. Demosthenes now protested against any further delay, and obtained the consent of his colleagues to the plan which he seems to have meditated from the first, and which the open attack served at least to cover. Epipolæ was guarded not merely by the garrison which manned the cross-wall, but by three distinct camps near the city, by a body of 600 men who were posted higher up the slope, and by a fort which had been constructed still nearer to the summit. There seemed to be no chance of effecting the ascent in the presence of these forces, or of eluding their vigilance in the day-time ; and it was therefore resolved to make the attempt by night. The troops were ordered to provide themselves with victuals for five days, and the masons and carpenters to be in readiness with their tools ; and stores were laid in, as well for the work of fortification, as for the defence of a fortified line. After these preparations Demosthenes, Eurymedon, and Menander, leaving their infirm colleague in the camp, issued forth in the dead of night with the whole army, and marched toward Epipolæ, to gain the top of the ridge, above the enemy's posts, near Euryelus.* The first attack, which was the most important and difficult, succeeded. The Athenians mounted unobserved, and surprised the fort ; but most of the men made their escape, and flying toward the city gave the alarm to the corps of 600 and to the three camps behind them. The 600 advanced to meet the enemy, but were overpowered and put to flight ; and while the main body of the assailants pressed forward to secure the victory by making themselves masters of the Syracusan camps, a detachment stormed the cross-wall, and immediately began to pull it down. Gylippus had by this time formed the Syracusan troops, and sallied out of his entrenchments to stop the progress of

the Athenians. But as they had scarcely yet recovered from the consternation of the first surprise, the division which was foremost gave way, and the Athenians advanced, no longer apprehending resistance, to disperse the remainder. The eagerness of success had produced some disorder in their ranks, when they were suddenly charged by a very small body of Bœotians¹, who had kept their ground amidst the general retreat. This unexpected shock entirely broke the Athenian line, and the confusion which it caused in front rapidly spread to the rear, where some had but just gained the top of the ascent, and others were still mounting. Now began a scene which the historian is only able to exhibit with an indistinctness corresponding to its real aspect, over which a bright moon shed a strong, but partial and misleading light. The Athenians who were coming up, ignorant of what had happened, were unable to distinguish their flying comrades from the pursuers. Their watchword, repeatedly passing, at length became known to the enemy, and served to protect those who fell in with a superior Athenian force; but the Syracusans keeping in general closer together, did not betray their own. At a season when friends and foes could only be recognized by sound, the noise of so great a multitude in a narrow space soon became so deafening as almost to drown questions and answers. But the sounds which were most easily caught tended to increase the perplexity and terror of the defeated. For in the Athenian army were many bands of Dorian race — as the Corcyræans and Argives — whose pean exactly resembling that of the enemy, struck the ear of their allies as a hostile note. Hence arose repeated conflicts, in which they turned their arms against one another. But at length they were driven back toward the narrow pass by which they had ascended the heights; and, as all could not find room in the path, many were

¹ These Bœotians appear to have been the Thespians who were brought from Locri (Thuc. vii. 25.) — a part, perhaps the smaller part, of the 300 mentioned vii. 19. The rest were most probably in the ships which arrived later. vii. 50.

forced over the cliffs ; and even among those who reached the plain unhurt, several, who were newly arrived and ignorant of the country, were unable to find their way back, and wandered about till morning, when they were overtaken, and cut down by the enemy's horse. Thucydides does not mention the number of the slain, which is stated by the later authors at between two and three thousand. But the shields left behind greatly exceeded the proportion of the lives lost.

This unexpected stroke of good fortune revived the most sanguine hopes of the Syracusans. Sicanus, one of their generals, was sent with fifteen galleys to Agrigentum, where the strife of parties had broken out into open violence, and seemed to show a prospect of gaining its alliance for Syracuse, and Gylippus set out to procure fresh reinforcements from the interior. In the meanwhile the Athenian commanders held a council of war with their principal officers, to deliberate on the new posture of their affairs. The views of Demosthenes were clear, and his opinion decided. He saw that every reasonable hope of conquest and victory was now lost, and that their position would be growing every day more dangerous. Sickness had begun to spread widely through the camp, which since the loss of Plemyrion had been confined, in the most unhealthy season of the year, to the marshy ground near the mouth of the Anapus. The men were dejected by a series of disasters, and impatient to quit the place. He had urged the attempt upon Epipolæ for the very purpose of deciding the question of going or staying. Prudence required that they should lose no time in moving, while the sea was navigable, and their fleet commanded it. The force of their armament would be better employed against the enemy in Attica : to linger at Syracuse was a mere waste of lives and treasure. These were arguments which might have been expected to weigh with Nicias more than with any of his colleagues, as they were both congenial to his cha-

racter, and accorded with the opinion which he had always expressed of the expedition. Yet he seemed now as reluctant to abandon the enterprise, when it had become manifestly hopeless, as he had been slow to prosecute it when he was encouraged by the fairest prospect of success. He professed to shrink from the responsibility of raising the siege without the sanction of a decree of the people. The judges before whom they would have to defend their conduct, would not be such as knew the state of the case from their own observation, but would probably draw their conclusion from the specious calumnies of some malevolent orator: and even the men who were now loudest in their complaints, and clamorous for departure, at Athens would change their language, and be the foremost to charge their generals with corruption and treachery. He declared that with his knowledge of the Athenian temper he preferred meeting death from the hands of the enemy, to the risk of an ignominious execution at home. But though he did not deny that their situation was gloomy, that of the Syracusans was still more distressing and alarming. The finances of Syracuse could not much longer support the enormous expenses of the war, in which, he was informed, she had already spent 2000 talents, and had beside contracted a great debt: and when once her funds began to fail for the maintenance of the foreign auxiliaries, on whom she chiefly depended, her affairs would go rapidly to ruin.* He thought it best therefore to wait for the effect which time might produce in their favour; and not, through unseasonable parsimony, to lose a contest, in which the superior wealth of Athens gave them a sure advantage.

But these arguments did not exactly represent the motives by which Nicias was principally swayed. The danger which he now affected to dread from the character of the Athenians, was no more than he had been willing to brave, when against the judgment of his original colleagues he proposed prematurely to abandon

the enterprise.¹ He could not seriously intend to try whether the Syracusan or the Athenian treasury might be the sooner exhausted. But the intelligence which he had received as to the state of Syracuse gave him hopes that it might not be able to hold out much longer; and as he believed that his naval superiority would enable him to retreat whenever he chose, he thought the chance worth a short delay. He had however another ground of hope which he did not disclose to his colleagues. There was a party in Syracuse, which—through causes which Thucydides does not explain, but which Plutarch leads us to refer to the overbearing character of Gylippus²—was well disposed to the Athenians, had opened a secret correspondence with Nicias, and encouraged him, perhaps by exaggerated accounts of the public distress, to persevere. Still he did not place a firm reliance on any of these expectations, and secretly wavered between them and his colleague's arguments, the force of which he clearly perceived. He was far from being bent on waiting for a decree from Athens. But in any case he thought it prudent to conceal the purpose of retreat from the enemy, and therefore to oppose it in the public debate.—His colleagues, who could only reason upon the ground which he professed to take, were not convinced. Demosthenes insisted, that if they were to wait for orders from Athens, they should at least remove their camp without delay to Catana, where they would have a friendly city, and a healthy country, from which they might make inroads into the enemy's territory, and an open sea, which was required for the success of their naval operations. Eurymedon concurred in this opinion; but Nicias adhered to his own, with a pertinacity

¹ Plutarch, Nic. 22., contrasts the language of Nicias with that of Leon the Byzantian, who on some like occasion, had said to his fellow-citizens: *I would rather you should kill me, than die with me.* But Thucydides, by the manner in which he distinguishes between the real and the pretended motives of Nicias, seems to intimate, that his fear of the Athenians—or, as a modern author, with his usual candour, expresses it, *his extreme horror of the prospect of living under the Athenian democracy*—was a mere pretext. Compare the beginnings of vii. c. 48. and 49.

² Nic. 28.

which, the more unreasonable it appeared, tended the more to induce his colleagues to suspect, that he had some secret intelligence, which afforded him better grounds than those which he avowed; and in this uncertainty, they suspended their opposition, and tacitly consented to a further delay.

During this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse. Sicanus had failed in the object of his expedition; before he arrived at Agrigentum, the party which he was sent to succour had been expelled. But Gylippus had collected fresh reinforcements from the Sicilian cities, and at Selinus had found the transports, with the troops which had been sent from Peloponnesus in the spring. They had been driven to the coast of Cyrene, had obtained two galleys, and pilots from the Cyrenæans, and after aiding the Greeks of the adjacent region in a war with the neighbouring barbarians, reached a Carthaginian port, from whence they crossed over to Selinus. On the arrival of these succours the Syracusans determined on renewing their attack upon the Athenians, both by sea and land. The colleagues of Nicias now regretted their acquiescence in his wishes. The ravages of sickness were spreading, every day more destructively, through the armament; and to expose it in its present enfeebled state to a conflict with the enemy who had just received so considerable a reinforcement, would have been the height of rashness. Nicias himself at length opened his eyes to the danger, and admitted the necessity of an immediate retreat. He only urged the policy of keeping their design concealed from the enemy to the latest moment; and accordingly orders were issued with the utmost secrecy for all to be in readiness for departure on the first signal. The preparations were completed; the hour of embarkation was near at hand: notice had been sent to Catana, that no further supply of provisions would be needed for the camp; the sea was open; no obstruction was threatened; when—an eclipse of the moon took place.

Pericles, who from the instructions of Anaxagoras had gained some more correct notions of the heavenly bodies than were common in his time, had ventured on a similar occasion to disregard an eclipse of the sun, and to enlighten the popular ignorance by an explanation of its real cause.¹ But the nature of an eclipse of the moon was still less generally understood. It was perhaps one of the misfortunes of Athens, that the astronomer Meton, whose authority might have counteracted the vulgar error, did not accompany the expedition, having, according to one account, feigned madness to obtain exemption from the service.² There was, it would seem, in the Athenian camp, no man who had both the knowledge and the courage to deny, that the eclipse was an omen of evil, or a token of divine displeasure; and the generals were called upon by the multitude to defer their departure. Still as, according to the received rules of Greek superstition, three days were commonly accounted sufficient for the precautions required by presages of the heavenly bodies, the interruption might not have been attended with important consequences, even if no soothsayer could have been found to declare—as appears to have been the opinion of those who were most learned on such questions—that for a retreating army the veiling of one of the celestial luminaries was an auspicious sign. But Nicias was deeply imbued with the religious prejudices of the vulgar, and, instead of instructing the soothsayers, listened with submissive credulity to their directions. One of the most intelligent among them, named Stilbides, who had often exerted his influence to allay the general's superstitious fears, and who might now have rendered an inestimable service to his country, was lately dead. The men whom Nicias consulted, enjoined that the retreat of the armament should be deferred to the next full moon; and he expressed his unalterable resolution of complying with this response.

In the meanwhile the Syracusans had become ac-

¹ Plut. Per. 35.

² Plut. Nic. 13.

quainted with the object of the Athenian preparations, and were encouraged by it, as a tacit confession of inferiority, to more vigorous efforts. They determined to bring the enemy to an engagement, while he remained in a situation where the very magnitude of his armament — too large for the space to which it was confined — would turn to their advantage. After some days' exercise of their fleet, they began by an attack on the Athenian lines, which led to a skirmish, in which they remained masters of the field. Animated by this success, they sailed out the next day with seventy-six galleys, while their land force again advanced toward the enemy's wall. The Athenians manned eighty-six galleys, and gave battle. In the direct shock of the two centres the Syracusans retained the superiority which they had gained by their mechanical contrivances, by the multitude of troops which covered their decks, and by their flotilla of boats. But Eurymedon, who commanded the Athenian right, aimed at turning the enemy's left, and moved away from the centre toward the shore. Before he could execute the manœuvre which he designed, the Syracusans, victorious in the centre, turned against him with an overwhelming force, while he was pent up in a corner of the harbour, and destroyed almost the whole of his division. He himself perished. After this blow the rest of the Athenian line was soon put to flight, and the greater part could not even regain their station, or shelter themselves behind their row of merchant vessels, but were driven to the nearest points of the shore. Gylippus, seeing this, hastened with a body of troops to the water-side, where a high firm road ran between the sea and the Lysimelian marsh, to cut off the enemy as they landed, and to aid the victors in securing the ships which were run aground. But as he advanced in some disorder, he was encountered by the Tyrrhenians, who were stationed on this side of the Athenian camp, dislodged from the causeway, and forced on to the marsh. This skirmish engaged the two armies in a general action, in which the Athenians,

roused to desperate efforts by the danger of their fleet, at length routed the enemy, and rescued their remaining galleys. The Syracusans then, availing themselves of a favouring breeze, attempted to send a fireship into the midst of the Athenian station. In this attempt indeed they were baffled by the skill and alertness of the Athenians ; but they had destroyed eighteen galleys with all their crews.

After this victory they had but one remaining care : to prevent the great armament, which a few hours before had still appeared formidable, from making its escape. They were now again masters of the harbour, and determined to close its entrance, so that the enemy might not elude their vigilance by secret flight. They immediately proceeded to connect the nearest points of Ortygia and Plemyrion by a line of galleys and smaller craft, anchored with their broadsides to the sea, while they made active preparations for another seafight, should the Athenians venture to try their fortune again. Nicias and Demosthenes called a council of their principal officers. The order which had been sent to Catana to stop the supplies had never been revoked : their stock of provisions was low ; and the communication with all foreign ports was now cut off. They were in a situation in which they could not subsist many days longer, and from which they could not extricate themselves without an extraordinary effort. It was determined that they should abandon the greater part of their fortification on the side of Epipolæ, and should inclose and fortify a space adjacent to their naval station, just sufficient for the reception of the baggage and the sick ; that the troops thus spared from the defence of the walls should be employed to man all the galleys they could bring into action, with which they would endeavour to force their way out of the harbour, and, if they succeeded, make for Catana, but, should they fail, they were to burn their ships, and retreat over land to some friendly part of the island.

Accordingly the remains of the two armaments were

collected, and including some galleys which were scarcely seaworthy, amounted to 110 sail; the crews were made up from the serviceable part of the land force, and a great number of archers and slingers were taken on board; the hopes of the Athenians no longer rested on their nautical evolutions, for which there was no room in the crowded harbour, but — according to the ancient method of warfare which they had long abandoned, but were now compelled to resume — on the force which they could bring upon deck; and it was their object to render the conflict as much as possible like a land battle. For this end they contrived grappling irons, or iron hands, to detain the enemy's galleys on the first encounter, till they should be boarded and taken. When these and all other preparations suggested by the urgency of the occasion were completed, and the men were about to embark for the eventful struggle, Nicias called them together to set before them all the motives both of fear and of hope that could rouse them to the utmost stretch of exertion. He reminded all, from whatever country they came, that they were on the verge of a crisis, which was to decide whether they should ever see it again. But for men who, like the Athenians and the allies with whom they had shared so many vicissitudes, knew the fickleness of fortune and the uncertainty of war, their past reverses were not a ground for despondency; and their forces were sufficient to encourage reasonable hopes. Their generals had taken every precaution they could devise to counteract the advantage which the enemy derived from the narrow sea room, from his system of naval tactics, and from the increased strength of his vessels; and they were now prepared for a battle which would be more like one on shore than a sea-fight. It only remained for all on board to do their duty. They must remember that the land would be near from all points, and, except the small space which they might occupy with the troops left to guard the camp, every where hostile. It must therefore be their aim to keep

clear of it, and when they had once grappled with an enemy's vessel, not to quit their hold, until they had dislodged his troops from the deck, and had become masters of it. * It was for this purpose they had taken on board so great a military force; and he exhorted and entreated the seamen, now that they were thus strongly supported, and that their ships so greatly outnumbered the enemy, to be no longer disheartened by the remembrance of their disasters. He bad those of them, who, though aliens in blood, were by residence, language, and manners, Athenians, recollect the privileges which they enjoyed, the pride with which they had shared the glory of Athens, and once more prove the superiority of their skill, as well over the enemies whom, like the Corinthians, they had repeatedly vanquished, as over the Sicilians who had but lately been encouraged by favourable circumstances to face them for the first time. His countrymen he reminded that they had no ships and no men at home, like those which were there assembled. They must conquer, or the enemy whom they had sought at Syracuse, would join those whom they had left in Attica; and the remaining strength of the commonwealth would be unable to sustain their combined attacks. They might judge of the treatment which they had to expect by their consciousness of the evils which they designed to inflict on the Syracusans. It was a crisis worthy of the most strenuous efforts of their skill and valour. Not one fleet, and one army, but the whole power, and the last hopes, and the great name, of Athens, were at stake, and in their hands.

The preparations of the Athenians were soon known to the enemy, and the Syracusans had devised the expedient of stretching a screen of hides over the stems of their galleys, to elude the grasp of the iron hands. They manned a fleet equal to that with which they had gained their last victory; and they listened with exulting confidence to the exhortations of their generals, who held out to them the prospect of a complete

triumph over that ambitious power, which had threatened the liberties of Sicily and of Greece. The Athenians, they were assured, were reduced by their late defeats to a despondency proportioned to the persuasion they had before entertained of their naval superiority. Their present preparations were no more than the last desperate efforts of men who found their situation intolerable, and were fain to try every chance of escape. But their imitation of the Syracusan tactics would only produce irreparable confusion among the crowds, unused to the service, with which they covered their decks; and the number of ships which they had collected within so narrow a space, instead of being formidable to an inferior force, would but suffer the more from its attacks. It was no longer for safety that the Syracusans were about to fight, but for revenge, the sweetest and most rightful, on an enemy who had wantonly invaded them, and who, if he had succeeded, would have plunged them into the worst calamities of war.

The command of the Athenian fleet was assigned to Demosthenes, with whom were associated Menander and Euthydemus. Nicias remained with the land force, which he drew up outside the encampment, so as to line as much of the shore as he could safely occupy, for the encouragement and protection of the fleet. But he could not take his station, before he had called round him the captains of the galleys, just as they were on the point of embarking, and had addressed them, in a strain of still deeper and more passionate earnestness, each by his name, with the addition of his father and his tribe, reminding them of every distinction, hereditary or personal, that might rouse their emulation, and of every tie, political, domestic, religious, of every dear and every hallowed name, of wives and children, and hearts and altars, that could brace their courage: then, still dissatisfied with all that he had said and done, he reluctantly dismissed them to their posts.

The Athenians began the battle with an impetuous attack on the bar at the mouth of the harbour, which

was guarded by a part of the Syracusan fleet; the rest were disposed all round the harbour, and the shore, except so far as it was covered by the enemy, was lined with their troops. The assailants at the first onset overpowered the resistance of the squadron stationed near the bar, and were proceeding to break its fastenings, when they were interrupted by a simultaneous movement of the whole Syracusan fleet, which fell upon them from all quarters, and the engagement soon became general. The earnestness with which it was maintained was such as had not before been displayed on either side; the preceding battles might have seemed sham fights in comparison. Every man, whether it was skill or courage or labour that his post chiefly demanded, vied both with the enemy and his comrades in discharging its duties, as if all depended on his own exertions. But the skill of the officers and the zeal of the men had to contend not only with the resistance of the enemy, but with the obstacles arising from the scene of the combat — the narrowest, Thucydides observes, in which two such armaments had ever met. Innumerable accidents were perpetually occurring to cross the best planned manœuvres; and the most judicious orders, however promptly obeyed, might produce an effect directly opposite to the intention with which they were given. It was seldom that two galleys found room and time for a regular conflict. The stroke aimed at one was frequently intercepted by another, which was itself engaged in flight or pursuit. Attack and defence were completely diverted by unforeseen objects; and friends and foes were entangled and confounded together in inextricable disorder; during which the decks became a field of battle for the heavy armed troops. The din of so many shocks distracted the attention of the combatants and drowned the words of command, and the noise was increased by a dissonant clamour of exhortation, entreaty, and remonstrance: on the side of the Athenians, as they urged one another to force the outlet through which alone they could find a passage home, or not to fall back from the sea, which

they had made their own by so many hard struggles, on a hostile shore: on the side of the Syracusans, as they animated each other to prevent the enemy's escape, or expostulated with those that fled before the Athenians, whose only aim was flight. The tumult of sounds was heightened by the voices of the numberless spectators who lined the shore, all intent upon the combat, all deeply affected by its vicissitudes, but with different feelings and according to various views. As friend or foe appeared to be conquering in the quarter toward which their eyes were turned, the air resounded with the cries of joy and grief, of exultation or terror, with prayers and shouts and lamentations; and, like men in a dream, they accompanied the motions of their distant friends with ineffectual gestures. What were the causes which decided the event of the day, Thucydides only intimates by the language which he puts into the mouth of the Syracusan generals before the battle. Plutarch attributes great importance to the different weapons of the light troops. In the motion of the vessels the arrows and darts of the Athenians did less execution than the stones with which the Syracusans were armed; a suggestion of Aristo, who did not survive the victory which he helped to gain. But at length doubt and anxiety were set at rest: the Athenians were seen chased by the enemy, and making for the nearest land; and the confused clamour of their comrades who witnessed the calamity, was changed for one universal wail of agony and despair.

The Syracusans, masters of the sea, and believing themselves secure on that side, did not follow up their victory by an attack on the remains of the enemy's fleet, but after collecting the wrecks and the dead, sailed to the city, and raised their trophy. While they were celebrating their triumph, the Athenians, in whom every ordinary feeling was stifled by the pressure of danger, instead of sending a herald to recover their slain, turned all their thoughts toward an immediate retreat. Demosthenes however retained his presence of mind, and pro-

posed to Nicias, with their remaining galleys, which were still superior in number to those of the enemy — for though the Athenians had lost fifty out of their hundred and ten, the Syracusan fleet had been reduced to fifty — to attempt at daybreak to force a passage through the bar. Nicias consented to this project; but the spirits of the men were so downcast, that the generals could not induce them to embark, and were obliged to yield to the prevailing wish of setting out on their retreat in the course of the following night. Their design, as that which was most likely to occur to men in their circumstances, was suspected at Syracuse; and Hermocrates was desirous of taking immediate precautions against it. He urged the government to give directions for drawing out their whole force, and securing all the passes by which the enemy might retreat. The magistrates acknowledged the wisdom of the proposal; but all Syracuse was now reposing after the toils of a hard day, and deep in revelry, under the double pretext of celebrating the victory, and a festival of Hercules, which happened to coincide with it. It seemed hopeless to think of inducing men at such a season to interrupt their carousings for a night march; and Hermocrates was forced to resort to another expedient for attaining his object. He knew that Nicias had agents in Syracuse, who conveyed information to him of all that passed there. He therefore sent some of his friends as soon as it grew dark, with a party of horse, to the Athenian lines. When they had approached within hearing, they sent a message to Nicias in the name of his Syracusan partizans, bidding him beware of beginning his retreat that night, because the enemy were guarding the roads: “it would be safer to set out after due preparation in the day-time.” This stratagem succeeded; and when morning came, as it was too late to steal a march, it was thought best to postpone their departure to the morrow, to allow time for collecting all that might be useful to the men on their retreat. In the meanwhile Gylippus led out the Syracusan troops, to block up the passes, and to

guard the fords; and the fleet sailing up to the Athenian station, and meeting with no resistance, burnt some of the ships which they found there, and carried off the rest in triumph to Syracuse.

On the third day after the battle the Athenians began their retreat. If the recollection of the past, the thought of the great armament which they left in the enemy's hands, weighed down their spirits, the aspect of the present was no less saddening. As they quitted the camp, the sight of the unburied dead struck their surviving friends with pious grief and religious fear: but still more painful was the parting from the living, the sick and wounded, whom they were obliged to leave behind. There were few who could refrain from tears when they heard these unhappy men intreating to be taken along with them and saw them collecting their remaining strength to detain their departing comrades, or dragging their feeble limbs in the rear of the army, until they dropt down from fatigue, and could only follow it with cries of anguish and despair. It was still in appearance a formidable host — for the whole multitude of all classes amounted to no less than forty thousand men — but its numbers did not raise its confidence; it seemed to itself not an army ready to face an enemy, but a garrison making its escape from a besieged city. The general dejection was heightened by hardships and privations, suffered or apprehended. The followers of the camp had almost all deserted; those who remained could no longer be trusted; and hence the soldier, both in the infantry and the cavalry, was compelled to carry his own provisions: a burthen which a Roman would not have felt, but to which the Greek was unused. But the scarcity of victuals was more distressing than their weight. Amidst these sights and sounds of woe, the imagination was carried back to the martial pomp, the cheering crowds, the prayer and the pæan of the day when the proud armada, now to the last ship destroyed or taken, had sailed from Athens, for the conquest of the land, on which, a band of mi-

serable fugitives, they were seeking a place of shelter from a victorious enemy. And still the sadness of the present spectacle and the bitterness of the recollections it awakened, were more tolerable than the thought of the dangers which were still impending.

Nicias — whose character like that of many weak but upright men gained strength from adversity — though himself ready to sink under the pressure of bodily and mental sufferings, exerted himself to cheer the troops with all the topics of consolation he could find, and to impart hopes which he could not feel. As he passed along the line, he raised his voice to its highest pitch, that, if possible, none might lose such comfort as he could bestow, while he bad them not to give way to despondency, and endeavoured to extract encouragement out of the very depth of their present misery. He pointed to his own feeble frame, and reminded them of his once envied fortune, for an example of one who suffered a double share of the common distress and danger, and yet was conscious of a life blameless in all its dealings both toward gods and men. And as he himself had reason confidently to expect deliverance from a calamity which he had not incurred by any breach of piety or justice, so, after the disasters they had experienced, which were sufficient to satisfy the envy and to move the pity of the gods, all might hope for a happy turn in their affairs. Their situation however was not in itself desperate ; and they might well take courage, when they considered the formidable strength of their numbers, which wherever they went would overpower resistance, and defy attack. Only they must observe order and vigilance on their march, remembering that all was hostile ground but what they could win and keep with the sword ; and it must be prosecuted without intermission, by day and night ; for famine was at their heels. But let them once reach the country of the friendly Sicels — to whom messengers had been sent for succours and a supply of provisions — and they would be safe. The present emergency was indeed one

which called for all their manhood ; but when they had passed happily through it, they might hope, all to see their homes and families, and the Athenians to recover the great power of their city, which, though fallen, since it rested not on walls or on ships but on men, might still be restored by their hands.

The army was formed in a hollow square, inclosing the baggage and the followers of the camp. Nicias led the van, Demosthenes the rear. At the ford of the Anapus, which they had to cross, in order to ascend the valley on its right bank, they found a body of Syracusans prepared to dispute the passage with them. But having put them to flight they pursued their march on the opposite side of the river, only molested by the enemy's cavalry and light troops, which prevented them from making more than about five miles this day. On the morrow they advanced only half that distance, and encamped in a little plain for the sake of collecting all the provisions they could seize, and of laying in a supply of water for the next part of their march, in which, for a long tract, none was to be found. In the meanwhile the Syracusans had fortified a narrow ridge between two deep ravines, which the Athenians had to cross in order to issue from the valley of the Anapus. But the next day, when the retreating army resumed its march, it was so galled by the hostile cavalry and dartmen, that it could not even reach the ridge, but fell back upon the plain where it had encamped the night before. But now provisions could no longer be procured here ; for no foraging parties could elude the enemy's observation ; and, goaded by necessity, the Athenians set out early the next morning, to make a desperate effort to storm the ridge. They forced their way to it, but found the Syracusans drawn up in deep array behind the wall which they had built, and waiting to receive their assault with all the advantage which the higher ground gave them in the discharge of their missiles. The Athenians braved this shower for a time ; but the strength of the position baffled their attack ; a

thunderstorm which happened during the combat, interpreted by their despondency, served to increase it ; and they retreated to a short distance for repose. While they rested, Gylippus sent a body of troops to block up the road by which they had come with another wall ; but this design was frustrated by a detachment of Athenian troops, and the whole army then descended, and once more encamped in the plain. The next day they moved again—it would seem toward the high ground, but scarcely with even a hope of reaching it—and the whole day was spent in skirmishes with an enemy who dealt his deadly blows with perfect impunity, and whom they could neither overtake nor avoid. At night they found themselves little more than half a mile from their last encampment.

The Athenian generals now saw that their only chance of escape was to steal a night's march on the enemy, and descending to the coast to follow it southward as far as the valley of the Cacyparis, by which they hoped to ascend into the interior, and to meet their Sicel allies. Fires were accordingly lighted in the camp to deceive the enemy, and the army set forward. But it had scarcely begun to move when the troops in the rear were seized with a panic, which disordered and delayed them, so that they were separated by an interval of some miles from the van, which Nicias led in good order into the Helorus road, and along it to the banks of the Cacyparis. Here he found a guard of Syracusans employed in blocking up the passage of the river with a wall and palisade, but having overpowered them, instead of immediately quitting the coast, by the advice of his guides he proceeded toward the valley of the Erineus. Demosthenes followed, though more slowly and less steadily, in the same direction.¹

¹ There is some obscurity in the description given by Thucydides of the movements of the two generals after their separation ; and the account in the text differs materially from that which the readers may find in other histories of Greece. But it seems tolerably clear that both Nicias and Demosthenes pursued the Helorus road, and crossed the Cacyparis at the same point : but that Demosthenes was overtaken before he reached

The Syracusans, when they found that the enemy had slipt through their hands, broke out into violent complaints, and absurd charges of treachery, against Gylippus ; but as they had no difficulty in learning the road which the fugitives had taken, they pursued with all speed, and before noon came up with the division of Demosthenes. Instead of pressing forward as they approached, he put his troops into fighting order, and waited for their attack. But they were soon surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, and driven into a hollow place¹, which proved to be an olive ground inclosed by a wall, and commanded on two sides by an upper road. Here the Syracusans were able to ply the Athenians with their missiles, without any danger of losing a man or receiving a wound, until, seeing their strength nearly spent, Gylippus made a proclamation, inviting the islanders, subjects of Athens, to come over to him, on condition of retaining their liberty. Few however accepted this offer ; and at length Demosthenes concluded a capitulation in behalf of all his troops, by which their lives were guaranteed, with an express provision against every kind of violent death whether inflicted by bloodshed, chains, or hunger. On these terms 6000 men laid down their arms, and delivered up their money, which filled four shields.

Nicias had crossed the Erineus, and encamped on a neighbouring height. But the next day, he was overtaken by the Syracusans, who informed him of the surrender of Demosthenes, and invited him to accept the same conditions. He was at first incredulous, but after he had ascertained the fact by means of a horseman whom he was permitted to send, he proposed to the enemy, that he should be suffered to retreat under an engagement that Athens would indemnify Syracuse for

the Erineus, which Nicias crossed late in the same day on which his colleague surrendered.

¹ The *close* of Polyzelus — Πολυζήλιος ἀνάη — Plutarch, Nic. 27., from some Sicilian author, probably Timæus. But the notion we have here expressed of the situation is no more than a conjecture, which must be left to the judgment of the intelligent reader.

the whole cost of the war, and in the meanwhile would give hostages, a man for every talent of the stipulated sum. The Syracusans rejected the offer, and without further parley encircled his troops, and kept up an incessant discharge of missiles upon them till the evening. In the dead of the night, though nearly exhausted by wounds, toil, and hunger, the Athenians made an attempt to escape; but the sound of the Syracusan pæan soon convinced them that they were observed: and they laid down their arms again, all but 300 men, who went off unmolested. At daybreak the army moved once more, harassed as usual by the enemy, until they approached the banks of a little stream, the Assinarus, which flowed at the bottom of a deep hollow. The Athenians rushed down to the water, both to slake their raging thirst, and to gain a shelter on the other side from the attacks of the enemy. But, with most, appetite was stronger than fear; and the eagerness with which all strove to gratify it, turned the bed of the river into the scene of a fatal struggle, in which numbers were trampled under foot, and suffocated by their comrades. The Syracusans, standing on the precipitous bank, showered their weapons on the crowd, which while it quenched its thirst hardly felt the stroke of death. But at length the Peloponnesians, descending into the hollow, began a more active massacre of the unresisting foe, who still struggled, not for life, but with each other, for a draught of the muddy and blood-stained water. Nicias, seeing that even those who escaped from this slaughter were overtaken and cut down by the cavalry, surrendered to Gylippus, only requesting that he would put a stop to the carnage; and Gylippus now ordered that quarter should be given. More of the prisoners were reserved by their captors and sold, than were carried to Syracuse as property of the state: and the lot of those who fell into private hands was the mildest. A considerable number effected their escape; but the 300 who had fled in the night were pursued and taken in the course of the day.

Demosthenes, it seems, had not, any more than Nicias, made terms for himself¹; and the fate of the two captive generals was one of the first subjects of deliberation in the Syracusan assembly. Gylippus was desirous of carrying both of them back with him, to exhibit, as trophies of his triumph, the conqueror of Sphacteria, who had done so much to injure and humble Sparta, and the author of the peace to which she was so deeply indebted. But the secret correspondence which Nicias had opened at Syracuse, and which induced him to waste the irresistible opportunity of a safe retreat, seems now to have proved the occasion of his destruction. For his Syracusan partisans dreading that he might be led to betray them, exerted all their influence and arts to induce the people to condemn him and his colleague to death. That the Corinthians should have been moved either by resentment or fear to concur toward this object, would have been more difficult to believe, if Thucydides had not given his sanction to the report. In either case his death filled up the measure of a singular destiny, by which the reputation he had acquired by his prudence and fortune, his liberality and patriotism, his strength as well as his weakness, all the good and the bad qualities of his mind and character, his talents and judgment as well as his credulity and superstition, his premature timidity, his tardy courage, his long-protracted wavering and his unseasonable resolution, contributed in nearly equal degrees to his own ruin and to the fall of his country. The historian deploras his undeserved calamity: but the fate of the thousands whom he involved in his disasters was perhaps still more pitiable.

• Hermocrates, it is said—and we wish to believe the best of so wise a patriot²—vainly endeavoured to awaken a

¹ According to Plutarch (Nic. 27) he attempted to kill himself before he surrendered, and was prevented by the enemy. But, unless Plutarch has been grossly careless, his author made no mention of the capitulation: which renders the story doubtful.

² The statement (Plut. Nic. 28.) probably rests on the evidence of Timæus, who, among other apocryphal stories, related that Hermocrates

feeling of generous forbearance in his countrymen. The decree, proposed by a demagogue named Diocles,¹ which ordered the execution of the generals, doomed the other captives, according to their condition and country, either to slavery or to the most rigorous form of imprisonment. But for the first two months all were subjected to the same treatment, and by their numbers aggravated the common misfortune. The slaughter made among the troops of Nicias had been so great, and so many had been secreted by the captors, that the state prisoners, including those surrendered by Demosthenes, are computed by Thucydides at little more than 7000. But all were confined in the same place. A vast quarry, hollowed in the side of Epipolæ to a depth of a hundred feet below the surface, served as a prison for the whole multitude. Here, inclosed by the precipitous rock which precluded all possibility of escape, they were exposed alternately to the direct or reflected beams of a scorching sun, and to the chilly damps of the autumnal nights. The wants of nature were supplied by an allowance of bread and water so scanty as never to still the gnawings of hunger or the burning of thirst. No greater indulgence was shown to the wounded

sent notice to the two generals of their doom, and that they anticipated the executioner by suicide.

¹ Plutarch (Nic. 28.), unless his manuscripts are in fault, writes the name Eurycles, clearly meaning the same person. The conduct of the Syracusans toward their prisoners has, as was to be expected, afforded an occasion for the usual declamation on the *jealous, cruel, and faithless temper of democratical despotism* to a modern author, who seems to have thought, or to have been willing to make his readers believe, that it was only under such a despotism that instances have ever occurred, in which terms made with an enemy by a victorious general have been disavowed by his government. The reader may perhaps remember such cases under other forms of government, like the one mentioned in this volume, p. 32. The conduct of the Syracusans was certainly ungenerous and cruel: but the charge of faithlessness rests on an assumption which in the case of Demosthenes is not warranted by the language of Thucydides, and in that of Nicias is directly contradicted by it. The Syracusans according to innumerable precedents had a clear right to deal as they thought fit with Nicias: and it does not appear that they were bound by any compact with Demosthenes. The same author, who thinks the decree, so far as it concerned the two generals, so *black*, that no one would have owned himself the author of it—as if such a fact could have been kept secret—with a genuine aristocratical feeling, is willing to believe that there might have been some unknown provocation, sufficient to palliate the barbarity exercised toward the vulgar herd of the Athenian prisoners.

and the sick ; and when death put an end to their sufferings, their unburied corpses still adding to the ever growing noisomeness of the crowded dungeon, constantly heightened the torment of the survivors. At the end of seventy days their misery was somewhat alleviated by the diminution of their numbers. The greater part were then sold as slaves : only the Athenians and Siceliots were detained six months longer ; and were then perhaps disposed of in the same manner. In the other parts of Sicily to which the Athenians were carried as slaves, or wandered as fugitives, they experienced milder treatment. Some, it is said, owed their freedom, or hospitable shelter, to their familiarity with the works of their popular poet Euripides, which in Sicily were more celebrated than known. The pathetic strains with which they had stored their memory to amuse the leisure of their happier days, now served as their ransom or the price of their entertainment : a melancholy anticipation of the period when Athens herself was to be indebted to the literary achievements of her sons for the indulgence and protection of her masters.

APPENDIX.

I. NOTE TO PAGE 24. ON A PRETENDED POWER OF THE AREOPAGUS.

SOME readers may perhaps be surprised to find no mention made here of a prerogative, which they may have seen elsewhere attributed to the Areopagus, and which it is said to have retained even to the time of the change effected by Pericles and Ephialtes. Till that time, we have been informed by a modern historian, the Areopagus *directed all issues from the public treasury*. The assertion is one of those—very numerous in the work where it occurs—which have owed their success neither to the force of testimony nor of reasoning, but simply to the placid assurance with which they are advanced. We have seen indeed (Vol. II. p. 296.) an extraordinary case, in which the Areopagus seems to have assumed such a power. But if any one thinks this a sufficient proof of the general assertion, we could only reply by the old Greek jest, of the simpleton who carried a brick about as a sample of a house, or by the Roman story, of the youth who finding a fragment of a boat on the beach, was seized with the desire of building a ship. It is one of those statements which can hardly be refuted until some attempt has been made to prove them. But we may observe that the very fact of Aristotle's mentioning the report on this subject for which Plutarch cites his authority—and after all it was no more than a report, and Clidemus (Plut. Them. 10.) gave a different account of the matter—raises the strongest presumption that, if true, it was an extraordinary case. But even if there was any reason for supposing that such a power was exerted by the Areopagus, as one of its ordinary prerogatives, at the time of the Persian war, it would still be utterly incredible that it should have subsisted down to the time of Pericles. We are only surprised that Schlosser (I. 2. p. 83.) should have adopted the opinion, and without offering any argument in support of it, have stated

it as a notorious fact. Wachsmuth more judiciously contents himself with remarking its improbability and groundlessness in a note (II. I. p. 147.).

II. ON SOME OF THE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST PERICLES.

THE character of Pericles has been viewed as diversely in our day as by his contemporaries. His political conduct has been considered, sufficiently for our purpose, in the text. But some of the charges which have been brought against him, and which deeply affect his personal reputation, deserve a somewhat more minute discussion than could properly be bestowed on them in the body of this work. We have first to notice that which concerns his integrity in the disposal of the public money. This charge has become much more formidable, since Boeckh has expressed his deliberate assent to it. We shall presently consider Boeckh's argument on this subject, in order to place it in a light, in which it is possible the learned author himself may not have viewed it. But we must first say a few words on the passage of Plato which we have touched on at the end of chap. xviii. To show how ill Pericles had succeeded in managing his countrymen, Socrates is there made to observe, that, toward the end of his life, they convicted him of peculation, and were near condemning him to death. It would of course be impossible to collect Plato's own opinion as to the foundation of the charge from such an allusion. But we think we are warranted in rejecting the fact itself which he assumes, and in believing that he has misrepresented the nature of the charge on which Pericles was condemned. We do not rely on the silence of Plutarch (Per. 35.) or on the language of Diodorus (xii. 45. *μικρὰς τινὰς ἀφορμὰς ἐγκλημάτων λαβόντες*), but would merely ask, whether Thucydides, if he had known that Pericles was convicted of peculation, could not only have put words into his mouth which imply that his integrity was above suspicion (II. 60. *χρημάτων κρείσσων*), but have spoken of him as a person notoriously most incorruptible (II. 65. *χρημάτων ἐμφανῶς ἀδωρότατος*). Nobody who is acquainted with the ordinary value of Plato's historical allusions, can think that in the Gorgias deserving even of the name of a testimony, in opposition to such authority. But as

Pericles had on former occasions been charged with peculation, it was natural enough that Plato should treat this as the ground of his last impeachment, the precise nature of which — as may be inferred from the silence of Thucydides, Plutarch, and Diodorus — it was probably not very easy to collect.

But it may be objected by some readers, that Plato, who, as they have been informed, was himself so warm an admirer of Pericles, as to assign to him *the praise of supereminence in what was wise, great, and becoming*, would not, upon a light surmise, have stated a fact so injurious to the reputation of this wise, great, and honourable man. The objection would be natural enough; for there are some blunders so gross, that they seem incredible until they are pointed out. Any one who happens to have read the long declamation, in which the rhetorician Aristides labours to vindicate the character of Pericles from Plato's attacks, must be surprised to find Plato called up to vouch for the character of the man whom in the Gorgias he assailed with an almost bitter severity. And even if we had not such ample evidence of Plato's opinion on the subject, no ordinary degree of simplicity is requisite to enable any one to allege the philosopher's ironical language in the Meno (Περικλέα οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα) as a serious eulogy, and on the moral character of Pericles. That character has been more endangered by the manner in which it has been defended, than by the arguments with which it has been attacked; and Pericles might well have spared the good word of an advocate, who exalts him in order to depress Athens, and permits him even to share the praises of Pisistratus, for the purpose of insinuating that the glory of Athenian art and literature belongs less to the people than to the tyrant and the demagogue, and thus of suggesting an explanation of the *wonderful and singular phenomenon*, that the intellectual greatness of Athens could subsist and even increase in spite of her freedom.

The only ground which Boeckh opposes to the testimony of Thucydides in favour of the integrity of Pericles, is, that the report about his pecuniary embarrassment, from which he was said to have relieved himself by kindling the Peloponnesian war, was too prevalent not to have had some foundation. (St. d. Ath. II. c. 8.) But if this argument is allowed to have any weight, it would lead us to an inference which Boeckh seems not sufficiently to have considered. There was another report equally prevalent, and repeated in a variety of forms, which charged Pericles with indulging a very expensive vice, by the ministry, sometimes of Phidias, sometimes of Pyri-lampes, sometimes of Aspasia (Plut. Per. 13. 32.); and it

seems clear that the two charges must stand or fall together. The habits of Pericles — his ordinary frugality and strict economy — are sufficiently attested to convince us, that unless his private income was drained by this kind of expenditure, he could scarcely have had any temptation to embezzle the public money. We should be curious to know whether Boeckh himself would degrade Pericles to a level with Louis XV. On the other hand our antijacobin historian, instead of attempting to refute this charge, exults in it, as an illustration of the *popular licentiousness*, which Pericles, *whose power rested on the patronage which he professed of democracy, was obliged to allow.* This to be sure is a mode of begging the question, which must injure the cause of the party defended in the judgment of every impartial and intelligent reader. But we think it not unreasonable to contend that, notwithstanding the rumour on which Boeckh lays so much stress, the integrity of Pericles is as firmly established by the most authentic testimony as any fact in history of a like kind can be; and from this fact we would infer, that the other charge was equally unfounded. It seems strange that Boeckh should be at a loss to conceive, how the charge of peculation should become current at Athens, like many other rumours, without any solid ground; and we have endeavoured in the text to point out, how the other scandal might have arisen out of very innocent occasions. We would rather leave the question on this, footing, than resort to any vague declamation about the *supereminence* of Pericles in *what was wise, great, and becoming.* Yet we may add, that every well attested fact in his life strengthens our intimate conviction of the general purity of his character; and we think that if the two charges are once admitted to be so connected as we suppose them to be, few will hesitate in rejecting both.

The assemblies in the house of Aspasia were uncommon enough to attract much attention, and to give rise to calumnious reports; but on the other hand they indicate how much exaggeration has been admitted into the prevailing opinion about the strict seclusion in which the Athenian ladies were kept. Jacobs in an interesting essay on the Greek women (*Vernichte Schriften* III.) has shown how much this opinion requires to be modified. But our antidemocratical historian has assumed it in its utmost extent, for the purpose of making it the ground of a hypothesis, on the influence of the Athenian constitution on the condition and character of the women. To refute that hypothesis it would be sufficient to observe, that, however close may have been the seclusion of the Athenian women, in the most turbulent state of the democracy, it cannot

have been more rigid than that in which the Portuguese ladies, for instance, were kept under the stillness of an absolute monarchy. But from whatever side the fiction is examined, its absurdity is as glaring, as the temerity with which it is advanced as unquestionable matter of history.

The subject of this Appendix has drawn from us some polemical remarks which we would willingly have avoided, though some readers may have expected and desired that they should occur more frequently. It may indeed be useful, and need not be disagreeable, to point out mistakes in a history which can claim the praise of candour and simplicity, so justly bestowed on Thucydides by the rhetorician Aristides in the declamation already alluded to (*ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττ.* II. p. 163. Dindorf. οὐ φιλονεικίας ἕνεκεν οὐδεμιᾶς, οὐδ' εἰς ἀγῶνος χρεῖαν, οὐδ' εἰς ἐν ᾧ προύθετο πάντα ἀναφέρων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἱστορίᾳ καὶ διηγῆσει ταληθὲς ἀπλῶς παραδίδους. But where that praise is illustrated by a complete antithesis; where a history is all polemical; where the facts are constantly distorted for the sake of accommodating them to the one end which the writer has proposed to himself; so that the whole is thoroughly ingrained with falsehood; those who are best able to estimate its character, will be most reluctant to descend to an exposure of its particular errors.

III. ON THE AUTHOR OF THE ORATION AGAINST ALCIBIADES ATTRIBUTED TO ANDOCIDES.

As we have had occasion frequently to refer to this oration, we are tempted to make a few remarks on the disputed question as to its author, on which it is well known, Taylor (*Lectiones Lystiacæ*, c. vi.) and Ruhnken (*Historia Critica Oratorum Græcorum*, p. LIII. fol.) are at variance. Our object is chiefly to show that though Ruhnken has successfully disposed of many of Taylor's arguments, his own are by no means conclusive. Taylor contends that the oration belongs not to Andocides, but to Phæax. His main argument is, that it appears from the oration itself, that on the occasion to which it relates three persons were threatened with ostracism: that Phæax is known to have been one of the three, and Nicias and Alcibiades the two others; while the name of Andocides is nowhere mentioned among them; Phæax therefore must have been the author of

this oration ; and this conclusion is, he conceives, decisively confirmed by Plutarch, who (Alcib. 13.) quotes an oration of Phæax against Alcibiades for a fact (the abuse of the sacred vessels of the state) which is likewise mentioned in ours. To this Ruhnken replies that the oration of Phæax which Plutarch read cannot have been the same as ours, because, if it had, Plutarch could not have felt the doubt which he expresses (Nic. 11.) as to the parties who contended with each other to avoid the ostracism. But there are two possible cases, either of which would meet this objection. Plutarch might not himself have seen the oration of Phæax, but have quoted it at second hand. This however is certainly not very probable. The other case is, that Plutarch may not have meant, either in Alcib. 13. or in Nic. 11., to express a doubt, whether Phæax was one of the persons in danger of ostracism, but only whether it was he who caballed with Alcibiades to cause the ostracism to fall on Hyperbolus. His words, Alcib. 13., are : *ὡς δ' ἐνιοὶ φασιν, οὐ πρὸς Νικίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φαίακα διαλεχθεῖς, καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου προσλαβὼν ἑταιρίαν, ἐξήλασε τὸν Ὑπέρβουλον.* By the *ἐνιοὶ* he means Theophrastus, as appears from the other passage. Nic. 11. *Οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὅτι Θεοφραστος ἐξοστρακισθῆναι φησι τὸν Ὑπέρβουλον, Φαίακος, οὐ Νικίου, πρὸς Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐρίσαντος.* A comparison of these passages leads us to conclude that Theophrastus attributed the machinations by which Hyperbolus was ostracised to Alcibiades and Phæax. But we can hardly believe that Theophrastus denied a fact, which seems to be so well attested, and from the circumstances of the case so clear, as that Nicias was one of the parties in danger. It did not follow that Nicias conspired with Alcibiades against Hyperbolus, though this was generally suspected ; and Plutarch, adopting the common statement, takes little notice of Phæax, but may have been aware that he was one of the persons concerned. But Ruhnken objects that Phæax, if he was the author of this bitter attack on Alcibiades, cannot have conspired with him against Hyperbolus. And we do not know that he did ; but the oration itself, if we suppose it to be his, would not prove the contrary. For it might not have been delivered or published till a later period. The argument which it suggests against the opinion of Theophrastus, might not occur to Plutarch, though he had read it as the work of Phæax, when he was writing his life of Nicias. And certainly he is not so accurate in his quotations, that we should lay any stress on the slight variance between the statement which he quotes from Phæax, as to the abuse of the sacred vessels, and the account given of the same transaction in our oration. On the side of Taylor's opinion there still remains the weighty testimony of Theo-

phrastus to the fact, that Phæax was one of the persons threatened with ostracism on the same occasion with Alcibiades; and it is easier to suppose Plutarch thoughtless or forgetful, almost to any degree, than to reject this testimony. Whether Theophrastus had read our oration is another matter, which however does not concern the present question; for it must be remembered, that, whether he read it as the work of Phæax or of Andocides, it must have appeared equally to contradict his opinion.

Among Taylor's secondary arguments one is derived from the embassy mentioned toward the end of our oration, which he thinks may have been the same with that of Phæax, related by Thucydides, v. 4. But Ruhnken objects that our orator was sent to Thessaly, Macedonia, Molossia, Thesprotia, Italy, and Sicily; whereas Phæax was ambassador only to the last two countries. On the other hand Lysias mentions the *travels* of Andocides in Sicily, Italy, Peloponnesus, Thessaly, the Hellespont, Ionia, and Cyprus. But Taylor thinks that these cannot be the same which are alluded to in our oration, because Lysias treats them not as an embassy but as a private journey (*ἀποδημία*). To this Ruhnken replies that the language of Lysias is that of an enemy. "*Tardus sit qui non videat Lysium, ut accusatorem, quam προσβέλειαν dicere debebat, invidiose ἀποδημίαν dicere.*" But here it is Ruhnken himself who has committed a most extraordinary oversight. For nothing can be clearer from the context of Lysias (Andocid. p. 103.) than that he is speaking of the travels of Andocides during his absence from Athens *after* the affair of the mysteries; whereas the embassy mentioned in our oration must have preceded that affair. Still it does not appear to agree with that of Phæax, unless we should suppose that after having ended his negotiations in Sicily and Italy, he received orders which induced him to cross over to Macedonia, through Epirus, and to return by the way of Thessaly to Athens, where Thucydides observes he arrived *χρόνῳ ὕστερον*, v. 5. But the embassy to Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly, might also have been undertaken on some other occasion.

On the whole we are inclined to think that the weight of external evidence preponderates on Taylor's side; and high as Ruhnken's authority is with regard to the style, which he pronounces to be clearly Andocidean, we cannot rely upon this kind of proof. That the oration was attributed to Andocides so early as it appears to have been from the quotations of the grammarians, is not so much an objection, as a point on which we must confess our ignorance.

Neither Taylor nor Ruhnken has noticed a passage in the

oration, which seems to raise at least a strong presumption, that it was not delivered in its present form on the occasion to which it refers. The contest which was terminated by the ostracism of Hyperbolus of course preceded the appointment of Nicias and Alcibiades to the command of the Sicilian expedition. This appointment took place early in 415 (*ἄμα ἤρι*, Thuc. vi. 8.). Melos had been reduced in the preceding winter: at the utmost, we should suppose, not above three or four months before. Yet Alcibiades is reproached in the oration with having had a son by a Melian woman, whom he bought, from among the captives condemned to slavery by his own decree (*περὶ τῶν Μηλίων γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος ἐξανδραποδίζεισθαι, πριάμενος γυναῖκα τῶν αἰχμαλώτων υἱὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς πεποίηται*). These words could scarcely have been written before Alcibiades was on his voyage to Sicily.

IV. A COMPARISON OF THE ACCOUNTS GIVEN BY THUCYDIDES AND ANDOCIDES OF CERTAIN POINTS CONNECTED WITH THE PROSECUTION OF ALCIBIADES.

THUCYDIDES has given a general outline of the occurrences connected with the prosecution of Alcibiades, but without names or particulars. Andocides, in an oration composed in his own defence and after a considerable interval of time, professes to relate all the most important details of the transaction. The outline of Thucydides may be safely relied on; the account of Andocides must indeed be received with great caution; but still none of the facts which he states ought to be rejected unless they should appear to be clearly inconsistent with Thucydides. There is however, as every one knows who has examined the subject, great difficulty in inserting the details of Andocides, even where they are least liable to suspicion, in the outline of Thucydides. The chief difficulties arise about the beginning and the concluding scenes of the affair. Wachsmuth in an appendix (I. 2. p. 444.) has arranged the successive informations in their chronological order; and he has noticed the apparent contradiction between Thucydides and Andocides, as to Androcles and Pythonicus, but he has not shown quite satisfactorily how it is to be cleared up. It must however be observed, that it is Plutarch who makes the contradiction appear greater

than it is. According to him (Alc. 19.) the information alluded to by Thucydides vi. 28. (μηνύεται ἀπὸ μετοίκων τέτινων καὶ ἀκολουθῶν) were those collected by Androcles (δούλους τινὰς καὶ μετοίκους προήγαγεν Ἀνδροκλῆς); and it was by these witnesses that Alcibiades was first charged with the profanation of the mysteries. This would directly contradict Andocides, according to whom it was Pythonicus who brought forward the first evidence against Alcibiades. It must therefore be supposed either that these μέτοικοι and ἀκόλουθοι were witnesses of Pythonicus, not of Androcles, though Andocides has only mentioned Andromachus as the most important; or else that they include the witnesses both of Pythonicus and of Androcles, but that those of Androcles did not implicate Alcibiades, though he afterwards procured such testimony that he was able to accuse Alcibiades publicly before his departure. For it is probably Androcles that Thucydides principally alludes to, vi. 28., among οἱ μάλιστα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ἀχθόμενοι ἐμποδῶν ὄντι σφίσι μὴ αὐτοῖς του δήμου βεβαίως προσεσθάναι. We have not ventured in the text to decide between these two suppositions. But it seems clear from the contest mentioned by Andocides between Pythonicus and Androcles about the reward of the informers, that Teucer was one of the witnesses of Androcles, whom however he did not produce before the departure of Alcibiades.

There is another apparent contradiction between Thucydides and Andocides, as to the movements of the enemy, which, by the alarm they caused at Athens, contributed to the passing of the decree for the recall of Alcibiades. According to Thucydides, after the agitation excited by the affair of the Hermes-busts had been allayed by the information of Andocides, the apprehensions of the people were more than ever roused with respect to the mysteries; and were so much heightened by the news that a Lacedæmonian force had arrived at the Isthmus, to act in some way or other in concert with the Bœotians, that one night a body of the citizens kept watch under arms in the Theseum. Andocides does not mention this movement of the Lacedæmonians, but relates that, when the public anxiety was carried to its greatest height by the information of Diocles, orders were given for arming all the citizens, and posting them at various points of the city, among others at the Theseum, for the night; adding apparently as the motive for this measure, that the Bœotians, having learnt the state of affairs in Athens, had marched to the frontier. It seems unavoidable to infer that there is an error in one of these accounts; and it is easier to suppose that the measure of precaution which Thucydides believed to have been adopted only on the occasion of the march of the Lacedæmonian army, had been taken once before, when the

Bœotians first came to the frontier, or else that he was mistaken at to the time to which it belonged, than that Andocides transferred all the circumstances which he so minutely describes in reference to the march of the Bœotians, from a later to an earlier period; though undoubtedly he had an interest in exaggerating the consternation that prevailed before his own disclosure. But still that the alarm at that time was really great is confirmed by Thucydides, though he is silent as to the movement of the Bœotians, at least before the information of Andocides. This is the ground on which we have given the statement in the text, in which however we have not ventured to decide whether the night watch in the Theseum took place twice or only once during the panic. Wachsmuth in his narrative omits the march of the Bœotians mentioned by Andocides, and leaves it uncertain whether on the first occasion the citizens passed the night at the Theseum. Yet this seems clear from the context of Andocides.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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